{
  "id": 8554598,
  "name": "JAMES C. UNDERWOOD v. RALPH L. HOWLAND, Commissioner of Motor Vehicles of the STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA",
  "name_abbreviation": "Underwood v. Howland",
  "decision_date": "1968-07-10",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "560",
  "last_page": "563",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "1 N.C. App. 560"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "142 S.E. 2d 643",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "264 N.C. 602",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8574692
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/264/0602-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "131 S.E. 2d 335",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "259 N.C. 672",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8561989
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/259/0672-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "152 S.E. 2d 219",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "269 N.C. 229",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8562680
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/269/0229-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 350,
    "char_count": 7645,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.551,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 2.773363322049538e-07,
      "percentile": 0.8345258739023008
    },
    "sha256": "ef3691a844fed3f0f713f6ac8f0960ab34d08ba2e4ea76b3611269b019cf131f",
    "simhash": "1:8717925b277f4c5a",
    "word_count": 1243
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:11:01.747951+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Campbell and Morris, JJ., concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "JAMES C. UNDERWOOD v. RALPH L. HOWLAND, Commissioner of Motor Vehicles of the STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Britt, J.\nFirst, we must decide if, in the light of G.S. 20-25, the Superior Court may consider this action. Pertinent provisions of the statute are as follows: \u201cAny person denied a license or whose license has been cancelled, suspended or revoked by the Department, except where such cancellation is mandatory under the provisions of this article, shall have a right to file a petition within thirty (30) days thereafter for a hearing in the matter in the superior court. )>\nFor the purpose of this appeal, the crucial clause in the statute is \u201cexcept where such cancellation is mandatory under the provisions of this article.\u201d\nIn view of defendant\u2019s demurrer, we must accept as true the facts alleged in the complaint. Coble v. Reap, 269 N.C. 229, 152 S.E. 2d 219. Therefore, it becomes necessary to determine if the defendant, under the facts alleged in the complaint, was under statutory mandate to revoke plaintiff\u2019s operator\u2019s license for the period from 4 March 1968 to 4 March 1969. This brings us to a consideration of G.S. 20-28.1, pertinent provisions of which are as follows:\n\u201cConviction of moving violation committed while driving during period of suspension or revocation of license. \u2014 (a) Upon receipt of notice of conviction of any motor vehicle moving violation committed while driving a motor vehicle, such offense having been committed while such person\u2019s operator\u2019s or chauffeur\u2019s license was in a state of suspension or revocation, the Department shall revoke the person\u2019s license effective on the date set for termination of the suspension or revocation which was in effect at the time of such offense. (Emphasis added.)\n\u201c(b) When a license is subject to revocation under this section, the period of revocation shall be as follows:\n\u201c(1) A first such revocation shall be for one year;\u201d\nIn his complaint, plaintiff alleges that the termination date of his original suspension was 13 October 1966; that he was indicted for operating a motor vehicle on the highway without a license on 28 August 1966 but was not convicted until 31 January 1968; that because of said conviction defendant has ordered plaintiff\u2019s license revoked for one year beginning 4 March 1968.\nPlaintiff contends that on the facts alleged in his complaint, any order of defendant under G.S. 20-28.1 revoking his license would have to become \u201ceffective on the date set for termination of the suspension or revocation which was in effect at the time of such offense,\u201d and that said date was 13 October 1966.\nPlaintiff\u2019s contention is well-founded. We hold that the complaint alleges sufficient facts to show that the revocation of plaintiff\u2019s license by defendant was not mandatory under the provisions of Article 2 of Chapter 20 of the General Statutes, and the sustaining of defendant\u2019s demurrer by the Superior Court was error.\nIn his brief, defendant contends that a literal interpretation of G.S. 20-28.1 would lead to absurd results; that the statute should be interpreted to mean that the revocation should date from the termination of the initial suspension \u201cif notice of conviction is received before such termination date,\u201d and that where \u201cnotice of conviction is received after such termination date, the revocation should be prospective in nature.\u201d\nWe cannot adopt defendant\u2019s contention. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction and the courts must give its plain and definite meaning; Davis v. Granite Corp., 259 N.C. 672, 131 S.E. 2d 335; and the courts are without power to interpolate, or superimpose provisions and limitations not contained therein. Board of Architecture v. Lee, 264 N.C. 602, 142 S.E. 2d 643.\nIt is our duty to adjudicate, not legislate; to interpret the law as written, not as we would have it. We are compelled to interpret the statutes, including G.S. 20-28.1, as written, leaving to the General Assembly the responsibility of writing and amending statutes.\nThe judgment of the Superior Court sustaining defendant\u2019s demurrer is\nReversed.\nCampbell and Morris, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Britt, J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Herbert B. Hulse, Attorney for plaintiff appellant.",
      "T. Wade Bruton, Attorney General, by William W. Melvin, Assistant Attorney General, and T. Buie Costen, Staff Attorney, for the defendant appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "JAMES C. UNDERWOOD v. RALPH L. HOWLAND, Commissioner of Motor Vehicles of the STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA.\n(Filed 10 July 1968.)\n1. Automobiles \u00a7 2\u2014 Complaint properly alleged that revocation under G.S. 20-28.1 was not mandatory.\nIn an action by the bolder of an operator\u2019s license to review the revocation of bis license by the Commissioner, plaintiff alleged that he was convicted on 31 January 1968 of the offense of operating a motor vehicle without a license on 28 August 1966 while his license was in a state of suspension from 13 July 1966 to 13 October 1966, that subsequent to his conviction defendant notified him that, effective 4 March 1968, his license would be revoked under G.S. 20-28.1 for a period of one year as a result of his conviction of a moving violation committed while driving during a period of suspension. Held.: The complaint alleges sufficient facts to show that (1) the revocation of plaintiff\u2019s license by defendant was not mandatory under G.S. 20-28.1, since the statute provides that revocation must become \u201ceffective on the date set for termination of the suspension or revocation which was in effect at the time of such offense,\u201d and that (2) plaintiff is entitled to a review of defendant\u2019s order in the Superior Court pursuant to G.S. 20-25.\n2. Pleadings \u00a7 12\u2014\nUpon demurrer the facts alleged in the complaint must be accepted as true.\n3. Statutes \u00a7 5\u2014\nWhere the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction, and the courts must give it its plain and definite meaning and are without power to interpolate or to superimpose provisions and limitations not contained therein.\n4. Automobiles \u00a7 2\u2014\nContention of defendant Commissioner that a literal interpretation of G.S. 20-28.1 would lead to absurd results, and that the statute should be interpreted to mean that where notice of licensee\u2019s conviction is received after the termination date of the initial suspension the revocation should be prospective in nature, presents a question for the legislature and not the courts, the language of the statute being clear and unambiguous.\nAppeal by plaintiff from Fountain, J., April-May 1968 Session of WayNE Superior Court.\nPertinent allegations in the complaint in this civil action are summarized as follows: On 27 February 1968, plaintiff was the holder of an operator's license; on said date, he received a notice of revocation from defendant advising that pursuant to G.S. 20-28.1 said license would be revoked for one year from and after 4 March 1968; the purported reason of revoking plaintiff\u2019s license was that defendant had been notified that plaintiff was convicted in the Wayne County Court on 31 January 1968 of operating a motor vehicle on the public highway on 28 August 1966, and that plaintiff\u2019s operator\u2019s license was in a state of suspension from 13 July 1966 to 13 October 1966. Pursuant to the notice, plaintiff surrendered his operator\u2019s license to defendant and on 8 March 1968 requested that his license be returned for the reasons hereinafter stated.\nDefendant failed to return plaintiff\u2019s license and this suit was instituted. Defendant demurred to the complaint, contending that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.\nFollowing a hearing on the demurrer, Judge Fountain entered judgment sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the action. Plaintiff appealed.\nHerbert B. Hulse, Attorney for plaintiff appellant.\nT. Wade Bruton, Attorney General, by William W. Melvin, Assistant Attorney General, and T. Buie Costen, Staff Attorney, for the defendant appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0560-01",
  "first_page_order": 582,
  "last_page_order": 585
}