{
  "id": 8554808,
  "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CHARLES BROOKS",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Brooks",
  "decision_date": "1968-07-10",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "590",
  "last_page": "592",
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    {
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      "cite": "1 N.C. App. 590"
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
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    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
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    {
      "cite": "174 S.E. 105",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.",
      "opinion_index": 0
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    {
      "cite": "206 N.C. 374",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
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        8630522
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        "/nc/206/0374-01"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:11:01.747951+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Brock and Parker, JJ., concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CHARLES BROOKS."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mallard, C.J.\nDefendant\u2019s assignments of error numbered 1, 2, and 3 relate to questions about his consumption of beer which were asked the defendant on cross examination by the solicitor.\nOne of the charges against the defendant was driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The State\u2019s evidence as to this tended to show that the defendant was driving an automobile on a public highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The defendant testified on direct examination that he had consumed one can of beer. The questions asked did not assume any facts not in evidence. By becoming a witness, the defendant waived his privilege against self-incrimination, and it was proper to ask him questions concerning the offense charged as well as questions designed to discredit him as a witness. Stansbury, N. C. Evidence 2d, \u00a7 66, p. 115.\nAssignment of error number 4 relates to a question asked defendant\u2019s witness on cross examination concerning the amount of alcoholic beverages he had consumed on the occasion under investigation. This assignment is overruled. The specific question asked was, \u201cYou were kinda stoned on the occasion weren\u2019t you?\u201d The witness replied, \u201cWhat do you mean stoned?\u201d The solicitor then asked, \u201cYou had consumed a sufficient quantity of alcoholic beverages to where your mental and physical faculties were numb hadn\u2019t you?\u201d To this the witness replied, \u201cNo, not that much I don\u2019t think. I had taken a drink of whiskey before I left home.\u201d The word \u201cstoned\u201d was apparently not understood by the witness. However, in Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary (1968) the word \u201cstoned\u201d is the past tense of \u201cstone,\u201d and one of the meanings of the verb \u201cstone\u201d is \u201cto make numb or insensible (as from drinks or narcotics).\u201d\nThe sobriety of this witness Lail was a proper subject of inquiry on cross examination. The State\u2019s evidence tended to show that Mr. Lail was with the defendant at the time the defendant was arrested, and that Mr. Lail was also arrested for public drunkenness. The question was not impertinent, insulting, or prejudicial as defendant contends.\nDefendant also contends that the Court committed error in denying his motion for a mistrial. The record reveals that the following occurred with respect to the defendant\u2019s motion for a mistrial:\n\u201cMb. Gullee: Your Honor, I would like to move for a mistrial on the grounds that one of the jurors misrepresented himself in the answer to one of my questions \u2014 more specifically, when I asked the members of the jury whether or not any of them were associated at this time with law enforcement or had been associated with law enforcement previously, one juror raised his hand and said he had been a police officer (Mr. Floyd C. Martin). It has now come to my attention that Mr. Thomas Rankin has been connected with the Domestic Relations Court as a probation officer.\nThu Court: Motion is denied.\nMe. Guller: Your Honor, may I call Mr. Rankin to the stand?\nThe Court: For the purpose of your motion, motion is denied.\nSol. Whitesides: I was listening to the questions he asked and the State would offer evidence that the question was whether or not anyone was now employed as a law enforcement officer or in any capacity of law enforcement and not whether they were employed at any time previously.\nThe Court: The Court overrules the motion, and for the purpose of the record, the statement was that the juror was employed at one time as a probation officer with one of the lower courts; that was the statement.\nMr. Guller: Yes, sir. Exception for the defendant.\u201d\nIt is not clear whether the question propounded by defendant\u2019s counsel related to the juror\u2019s present or past connections with \u201claw enforcement.\u201d However, having served as a probation officer with a domestic relations court would not of itself make a juror incompetent.\nWe are of the opinion that the defendant\u2019s motion for a mistrial was addressed to the discretion of the trial judge. No abuse of discretion is asserted or shown. State v. Sheffield, 206 N.C. 374, 174 S.E. 105.\nIn the trial we find\nNo error.\nBrock and Parker, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mallard, C.J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney General Thomas Wade Bruton, Assistant Attorney General William W. Melvin and Staff Attorney T. Buie Costen, for the State.",
      "Jeffrey M. Gutter for the defendant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CHARLES BROOKS.\n(Filed 10 July 1968.)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 88; Constitutional Law \u00a7 33\u2014\nIi a prosecution for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor, questions asked defendant on cross-examination about bis consumption of beer are held proper, since defendant had testified on direct examination that he had consumed one beer, and since he had waived his privilege against self-incrimination by becoming a witness.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 89; Automobiles \u00a7 126\u2014\nIn a prosecution for driving under the influence of intoxicants, a question asked on cross-examination of a defense witness who was with defendant on the occasion in question as to whether the witness was \"stoned\u201d at that time is held not impertinent, insulting or prejudicial to defendant, one meaning of the word \u201cstone\u201d being to make numb or insensitive, as from drinks or narcotics, and the sobriety of the witness being a proper subject of cross-examination.\n3. Criminal Law \u00a7 130; Jury \u00a7 5\u2014\nxl motion for a mistrial on the ground that a juror who had been a probation officer of a domestic relations court had misrepresented himself in questioning by defense counsel as having no past or present connection with law enforcement is addressed to the discretion of the trial judge, and no abuse of discretion is shown in the denial of such motion where it is not clear whether the question propounded by defendant\u2019s counsel may have related only to the juror\u2019s present connection with law enforcement, and since service as a probation officer would not of itself make a juror incompetent.\nAppeal by defendant from Thornburg, S.J., 15 January 1968 Session of Superior Court of GastoN County.\nDefendant was tried on three different warrants, one charging him with failing to stop for a blue light and siren. of a police officer\u2019s car on 25 October 1967, one charging him with operating a motor vehicle on the public highways while under the influence of intoxicating liquor on 26 October 1967, and one with operating a motor vehicle on the public highways at a speed of 70 miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour zone on 25 October 1967. The cases were consolidated in Superior Court for trial. Trial was by jury upon a plea of not guilty. The verdict of the jury was guilty in all the three cases.\nFrom a judgment of imprisonment imposed in each case, the defendant appeals to the Court of Appeals.\nAttorney General Thomas Wade Bruton, Assistant Attorney General William W. Melvin and Staff Attorney T. Buie Costen, for the State.\nJeffrey M. Gutter for the defendant."
  },
  "file_name": "0590-01",
  "first_page_order": 612,
  "last_page_order": 614
}