{ "id": 8550963, "name": "W. A. McELDUFF v. E. C. McCORD, JR., the CITY OF GASTONIA, and CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK IN GASTONIA", "name_abbreviation": "McElduff v. McCord", "decision_date": "1970-12-16", "docket_number": "No. 7027DC479", "first_page": "80", "last_page": "83", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "10 N.C. App. 80" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "107 S.E. 2d 154", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "249 N.C. 534", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8618798 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/249/0534-01" ] }, { "cite": "49 S.E. 79", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 N.C. 136", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8655897 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/137/0136-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 S.E. 964", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "174 N.C. 508", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11254565 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/174/0508-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 S.E. 364", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "213 N.C. 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627064 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/213/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "57 S.E. 2d 793", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "231 N.C. 546", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8630993 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/231/0546-01" ] }, { "cite": "113 S.E. 2d 712", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "252 N.C. 346", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8621858 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/252/0346-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 S.E. 510", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "179 N.C. 686", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8657875, 8657839 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/179/0686-02", "/nc/179/0686-01" ] }, { "cite": "147 S.E. 2d 550", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "267 N.C. 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558336 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/267/0062-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 A. 2d 279", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "171 Pa. Super. 312", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa. Super.", "case_ids": [ 475748 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa-super/171/0312-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 553, "char_count": 9632, "ocr_confidence": 0.561, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.947487136851577e-08, "percentile": 0.3118662516617764 }, "sha256": "4a7adad63542fca93ede50f717e3468fc696e4deb93fe42c0494ecccd9047812", "simhash": "1:5a4095338f237d34", "word_count": 1626 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:51:53.441044+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Brock and Morris concur." ], "parties": [ "W. A. McELDUFF v. E. C. McCORD, JR., the CITY OF GASTONIA, and CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK IN GASTONIA" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "GEAHAM, Judge.\nPlaintiff\u2019s principal contention is that the court erred in allowing the appellee\u2019s motion for a directed verdict.\nPlaintiff\u2019s evidence tended to show that on 14 October 1967 he landed his 1953 Cessna aircraft at the Gastonia airport, which was under lease to appellee\u2019s intestate and being operated by him. Under the terms of the lease, appellee\u2019s intestate was responsible for the installation and maintenance of landing areas, parking areas and taxiing areas for aircraft. Plaintiff had landed at the airport approximately fifty times previously. A paved taxiway was provided to the one area used by aircraft for parking. Plaintiff planned to park his aircraft and to pay a fee to defendant\u2019s intestate for this privilege. As plaintiff proceeded along the paved taxiway and toward the parking area he observed an automobile parked between him and the parking area. In plaintiff\u2019s opinion there was insufficient room to operate his aircraft around the parked automobile and still remain on the paved taxiway, so he turned off the taxiway and on to a level grass strip in an effort to proceed to the parking area. After traveling about three feet off the taxiway the left wheel of his aircraft struck a concrete slab, causing the aircraft to turn over and sustain damage. The slab was approximately three feet long, two feet wide, and six to eight inches above the ground. It was one of many concrete slabs that were placed along the runway and taxiway two years after the airport was constructed in 1945. The purpose of the slabs was to indicate where a high voltage cable ran underneath the ground conducting power for the runway lights. Plaintiff testified that the slab was \u201calmost covered over with grass\u201d and that he had not seen it on any occasion before his aircraft collided with it.\nWe turn first to the question of the sufficiency of plaintiff\u2019s evidence as to the negligence of appellee\u2019s intestate.\nPlaintiff\u2019s evidence was sufficient to show that he entered the premises as an invitee, within the meaning of that term. An aircraft landing field operator owes a duty to persons landing thereon by invitation to maintain the premises in reasonably safe condition for contemplated use, and he must use reasonable care to keep premises in reasonably safe condition so that a person landing his aircraft there will not be unreasonably exposed to any danger. 65 C.J.S., Negligence, \u00a7 63 (133), p. 913; Plewes v. Lancaster, 171 Pa. Super. 312, 90 A. 2d 279. The rule is identical to the general rule governing the duty owed by the owner or operator of any place of business to an invitee entering the premises. \u201cThe owner or proprietor of premises is not an insurer of the safety of his invitees. But he is under a duty to exercise ordinary care to keep that portion of his premises designed for their use in a reasonably safe condition so as not to expose them unnecessarily to danger, (but not that portion reserved for himself and his employees), and to give warning of hidden dangers or unsafe conditions of which he has knowledge, express or implied.\u201d 6 Strong, N.C. Index 2d, Negligence, \u00a7 53, pp. 108-109, and cases therein cited.\nPlaintiff contends that appellee\u2019s intestate was negligent in not placing a flag or other warning device in the vicinity of the concrete slab. The fallacy of this argument is that the concrete slab was not located in a place designed for use by plaintiff and other airport customers. There is nothing in the record to suggest that appellee\u2019s intestate should have reasonably foreseen that plaintiff would abandon the concrete taxiway provided for his use in favor of a route not intended or maintained for aircraft traffic. \u201cWhat constitutes a reasonably safe condition of premises depends, of course, upon the uses which the proprietor invites his business guests to make of them and those which he should anticipate they will make. 65 C.J.S., Negligence, \u00a7 45(b).\u201d Hedrick v. Tigniere, 267 N.C. 62, 147 S.E. 2d 550. \u201c \u2018The owner or occupant of premises is liable for injuries sustained by persons who have entered lawfully thereon only when the injury results from the use and occupation of that part of the premises which has been designed, adapted, and prepared for the accommodation of such persons.\u2019 20 R.C.L., 67.\u201d Ellington v. Ricks, 179 N.C. 686, 102 S.E. 510; Cupita v. Country Club, 252 N.C. 346, 113 S.E. 2d 712.\nThe record is silent as to who parked the car which plaintiff stated blocked the taxiway and caused him to deviate from it. There is no showing that appellee\u2019s intestate or any of his employees knew of the car\u2019s presence on the taxiway, or that it had been there for a sufficient length of time to give them notice that it was an obstacle to aircraft using the taxiway. In fact, plaintiff makes no contention that the presence of the car in his path resulted from any negligence on the part of appellee\u2019s intestate. The record indicates that plaintiff, upon seeing the car, immediately turned from the paved taxiway. This immediate movement was for the purpose of plaintiff\u2019s convenience and not because any danger arose from the fact the taxiway was blocked by a parked car. A slight delay on plaintiff\u2019s part could haye resulted in the car being moved. Under these circumstances, we do not regard plaintiff\u2019s departure from the concrete taxiway onto the grass area to be such a slight departure \u201c \u2018 \u201cin the ordinary aberrations or casualties of travel\u201d \u2019 \u201d as to extend to him the same protection he was entitled to while lawfully upon the portion of the premises embraced within the object of his visit. Cupita v. Country Club, supra; Coston v. Hotel, 231 N.C. 546, 57 S.E. 2d 793; Dunn v. Bomberger, 213 N.C. 172, 195 S.E. 364; Money v. Hotel Co., 174 N.C. 508, 93 S.E. 964; Quantz v. R.R., 137 N.C. 136, 49 S.E. 79. Nor do we regard this as a case where the obstacle was so close to the portion of the premises held out for plaintiff\u2019s use as to render travel thereon otherwise unsafe. Hood v. Coach Co., 249 N.C. 534, 107 S.E. 2d 154; 38 Am. Jur., Negligence, \u00a7 130, p. 790.\nFor the reasons herein stated it is our opinion that the court correctly granted defendant\u2019s motion for a directed verdict on the grounds that plaintiff\u2019s evidence was insufficient to show actionable negligence on the part of appellee\u2019s intestate. It is, therefore, unnecessary that we discuss the question of plaintiff\u2019s contributory negligence.\nPlaintiff has assigned various errors in connection with the court\u2019s refusal to admit certain testimony. We have considered the testimony which plaintiff says should have been admitted and are of the opinion that it would not change the result we have reached. The assignments of error are consequently overruled.\nNo error.\nJudges Brock and Morris concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "GEAHAM, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Joseph B. Roberts III, for plaintiff appellant.", "Hollowell, Stott & Hollowell by Grady B. Stott for defendant appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "W. A. McELDUFF v. E. C. McCORD, JR., the CITY OF GASTONIA, and CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK IN GASTONIA\nNo. 7027DC479\n(Filed 16 December 1970)\n1. Aviation. \u00a7 2\u2014 liability in operation of airport \u2014 damage to taxiing plane \u2014 temporary deviation from runway\nA plaintiff who taxied his airplane off the concrete runway of an airport in order to avoid an automobile that was blocking the way to the airplane parking area failed to show that the operator of the airport was negligent when the plane struck a concrete slab, which was located on the grassy area just off the runway, and turned over, where (1) there was no evidence to suggest that the airport operator should have reasonably foreseen that plaintiff would abandon the runway in favor of a route not intended or maintained for airplane traffic and (2) the plaintiff\u2019s turning off the runway was for his own convenience and did not arise from any danger presented by the automobile.\n2. Aviation \u00a7\u00a7 2, 5; Negligence \u00a7 52\u2014 pilot landing at airport \u2014 status of invitee\nA plaintiff who landed his airplane at a municipal airport with the intention of parking his airplane and paying a fee to the airport operator for this privilege was an invitee of the operator.\n3. Aviation \u00a7 2\u2014 liability of airport operator to invitees \u2014 standard of care\nAn aircraft landing field operator owes a duty to persons landing thereon by invitation to maintain the premises in reasonably safe condition for contemplated use, and he must use reasonable care to keep premises in reasonably safe condition so that a person landing his aircraft there will not be unreasonably exposed to any danger.\nAppeal from Mason, District Judge, 6 April 1970 Session of Gaston County District Court.\nPlaintiff instituted this action on 31 December 1968 seeking to recover for damage to his aircraft alleged to have occurred at the Gastonia Municipal Airport on 14 November 1967. (The evidence established the date as 14 October 1967.) At that time the airport was under lease to named defendant, E. C. McCord, Jr. Mr. McCord died while this action was pending and Citizens National Bank of Gastonia, as administrator of his estate, was duly substituted as defendant.\nAt the conclusion of plaintiff\u2019s evidence judgment was entered allowing the motion of the City of Gastonia for a directed verdict. No appeal has been taken from that judgment. Motion for a directed verdict was made by the defendant administrator on the grounds that plaintiff\u2019s evidence had failed to show any negligence on the part of defendant\u2019s intestate, and further, that it established as a matter of law plaintiff\u2019s negligence as a proximate cause of his damage. Judgment was entered allowing this motion on both grounds and plaintiff excepted and appealed.\nJoseph B. Roberts III, for plaintiff appellant.\nHollowell, Stott & Hollowell by Grady B. Stott for defendant appellee." }, "file_name": "0080-01", "first_page_order": 104, "last_page_order": 107 }