{ "id": 8555635, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MILES G. SAWYER III", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Sawyer", "decision_date": "1971-03-31", "docket_number": "No. 7115SC177", "first_page": "723", "last_page": "726", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "10 N.C. App. 723" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "177 S.E. 2d 924", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "10 N.C. App. 93", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551084 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/10/0093-01" ] }, { "cite": "282 U.S. 531", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6932733 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "541" }, { "page": "526" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/282/0531-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 S.E. 2d 349", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "253 N.C. 195", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8623494 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/253/0195-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 S.E. 2d 115", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "252 N.C. 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8623506 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/252/0482-01" ] }, { "cite": "154 S.E. 2d 53", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "270 N.C. 241", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566904 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/270/0241-01" ] }, { "cite": "154 S.E. 2d 476", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "270 N.C. 348", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568006 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "353" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/270/0348-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 371, "char_count": 6437, "ocr_confidence": 0.536, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.3608438240779086e-07, "percentile": 0.6359260713655507 }, "sha256": "d3dd02d5f6b1bef661a621c6a38994c30b23b305d60f25443502b69ba129cedc", "simhash": "1:8bfb37671b4d4858", "word_count": 1080 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:51:53.441044+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Brock and Vaughn concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MILES G. SAWYER III" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MORRIS, Judge.\nDefendant assigns as error the court\u2019s allowing the probation officer to testify that when he went to defendant\u2019s residence he \u201cwas informed\u201d that defendant no longer lived there, and that he \u201creceived information\u201d that defendant was living with a juvenile. He also contends that the court expressed an opinion as to the credibility of probationer before the conclusion of the hearing. At the conclusion of defendant\u2019s testimony, the court stated \u201cIt is difficult for me to believe that a Probation Officer would state or make such remarks to a probationer.\u201d\nDuring the course of the trial, defendant moved to suppress all evidence on the ground that the arrest was illegal. In support of his assignment of error to the court\u2019s continuing with the hearing he argues that the warrant did not specify what condition had been violated, that defendant was arrested and a copy of the order of arrest given to defendant on 20 September, report filed and a copy given to defendant on 14 October, and hearing had on 16 October. Defendant did not request any further bill of particulars nor ask for a continuance. Certainly he was familiar with the conditions of his probation.\nIn State v. Hewett, 270 N.C. 348, 353, 154 S.E. 2d 476 (1967), Chief Justice Parker clearly set out the requirements to be met in the conduct of a proceeding to revoke probation:\n\u201cA proceeding to revoke probation is not a criminal prosecution, and we have no statute in this State requiring a formal trial in such a proceeding. Proceedings to revoke probation are often regarded as informal or summary. The courts of this State recognize the principle that a defendant on probation or a defendant under a suspended sentence, before any sentence of imprisonment is put into effect and activated, shall be given notice in writing of the hearing in apt time and an opportunity to be heard. S. v. Duncan, 270 N.C. 241, 154 S.E. 2d 53, and cases cited. Upon a hearing of this character, the court is not bound by strict rules of evidence, and the alleged violation of a valid condition of probation need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. S. v. Robinson, supra; S. v. Morton, 252 N.C. 482, 114 S.E. 2d 115; S. v. Brown, 253 N.C. 195, 116 S.E. 2d 349; Supplement to 1 Strong\u2019s N.C. Index, Criminal Law, \u00a7 136.\nAll that is required in a hearing of this character is that the evidence be such as to reasonably satisfy the judge in the exercise of his sound discretion that the defendant has willfully violated a valid condition of probation or that the defendant has violated without lawful excuse a valid condition upon which the sentence was suspended. Judicial discretion implies conscientious judgment, not arbitrary or willful action. It takes account of the law and the particular circumstances of the case, and \u2018is directed by the reason and conscience of the judge to a just result.\u2019 S. v. Duncan, supra; Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531, 541, 75 L. Ed. 520, 526; S. v. Robinson, supra; S. v. Morton, supra; S. v. Brown, supra.\u201d\nA careful study of the record assures us that these requirements were met in this case. We note also that defendant testified on direct examination \u201cI changed my place of residence without the permission of the probationer (sic) officer. ... I am not currently up in my Court payments. I am behind because my wife and I are separated, and I have to pay her $45 for child support. I have three children, and I just don\u2019t have enough money for Court.\u201d These statements constitute admissions of violation of two of the conditions of probation.\nDefendant also assigns as error the court\u2019s denial of motion to arrest execution of sentence on the grounds that there was insufficient competent evidence to support a finding that defendant had violated conditions of probation and argues that even if there were, the court failed to find that the violations were without lawful excuse. Obviously defendant\u2019s own evidence is sufficient upon which to base a finding that defendant had violated the conditions of his probation. In the order revoking probation, the court found \u201cthat the defendant has wilfully violated the terms and conditions of Probation Judgment as hereinafter set out.\u201d This is sufficient to support the activation of the sentence. \u201cAll that is required in a hearing of this character is that the evidence be such as to reasonably satisfy the judge in the exercise of his sound discretion that the defendant has willfully violated a valid condition of probation or that the defendant has violated without lawful excuse a valid condition upon which the sentence was suspended.\u201d (Emphasis ours.) State v. Hewett, supra, at 353; State v. Butcher, 10 N.C. App. 93, 177 S.E. 2d 924 (1971).\nWe have carefully reviewed all of defendant\u2019s assignments of error and conclude that no prejudicial error has been made to appear.\nNo error.\nJudges Brock and Vaughn concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "MORRIS, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Morgan by Staff Attorney Eatman for the State.", "Robert L. Harris for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MILES G. SAWYER III\nNo. 7115SC177\n(Filed 31 March 1971)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7\u00a7 143, 145.1\u2014 revocation of probation \u2014 fair hearing\nContention of defendant that the revocation of his probation should be set aside on grounds that (1) the probation officer was allowed to testify that when he went to defendant\u2019s residence he \u201cwas informed\u201d that defendant no longer lived there and that he \u201creceived information\u201d defendant was living with a juvenile, (2) the court expressed an opinion on defendant\u2019s credibility as a witness by stating, \u201cIt is difficult for me to believe that a Probation Officer would state or make such remarks to a probationer,\u201d and (3) his motion to suppress all the evidence on the ground that his arrest was illegal should have been allowed by the trial court, held without merit.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7\u00a7 143, 145.1\u2014 probation revocation\nWhere the trial court found that defendant wilfully violated conditions of his probation, it was not necessary that the court also find that such violations were \u201cwithout lawful excuse\u201d in order to revoke defendant\u2019s probation.\nAppeal by defendant from Canaday, Superior Court Judge, 12 October 1970 Criminal Session, Superior Court of Alamance County.\nDefendant was arrested on 20 September 1970 on a warrant charging him with violation of probation.\nFrom an order entered revoking probation and ordering his two-year sentence into immediate effect, defendant appeals.\nAttorney General Morgan by Staff Attorney Eatman for the State.\nRobert L. Harris for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0723-01", "first_page_order": 747, "last_page_order": 750 }