{ "id": 8526317, "name": "PINEHURST AREA REALTY, INC., Plaintiff v. THE VILLAGE OF PINEHURST, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Pinehurst Area Realty, Inc. v. Village of Pinehurst", "decision_date": "1990-08-07", "docket_number": "No. 8920SC1101", "first_page": "77", "last_page": "81", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "100 N.C. App. 77" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "349 S.E.2d 600", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 417", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4732777, 4738513, 4738804, 4734109, 4737790 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0417-02", "/nc/318/0417-01", "/nc/318/0417-03", "/nc/318/0417-04", "/nc/318/0417-05" ] }, { "cite": "344 S.E.2d 357", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 N.C. App. 369", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523145 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/81/0369-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 U.S.C.S. \u00a7 1983", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "471 U.S. 261", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6201048 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/471/0261-01" ] }, { "cite": "345 S.E.2d 699", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "705" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "82 N.C. App. 32", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8358224 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "41-42" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/82/0032-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 S.E.2d 692", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 N.C. 178", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8557751, 8557736, 8557705, 8557719, 8557689 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/291/0178-05", "/nc/291/0178-04", "/nc/291/0178-02", "/nc/291/0178-03", "/nc/291/0178-01" ] }, { "cite": "228 S.E.2d 750", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "30 N.C. App. 611", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8555266 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/30/0611-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 533, "char_count": 10176, "ocr_confidence": 0.743, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.0247430721107324e-07, "percentile": 0.8541434268947726 }, "sha256": "c99bf1f1d1467d96a50b6ef1f72eb943f720d073da41e523f22f8d2667529e38", "simhash": "1:3af2d3c09e26ae6a", "word_count": 1595 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:37:10.855162+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Arnold and Duncan concur." ], "parties": [ "PINEHURST AREA REALTY, INC., Plaintiff v. THE VILLAGE OF PINEHURST, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "LEWIS, Judge.\nPlaintiff challenges two zoning actions by defendant, the 1985 zoning of plaintiff\u2019s property, and a 1987 rezoning.\nI: The 1985 Zoning.\nPlaintiff states that a threshold question is the determination of whether a zoning ordinance was indeed enacted. The allegation is based on the purported failure by defendant to file and index properly the map which demonstrated the zoning boundaries in accordance with the G.S. \u00a7 160A-77. Since this question was not raised during the trial and no information regarding this issue is included in the record, it is not properly before this Court.\nPlaintiff also asserts that its claim is sufficient to raise a constitutional cause of action so as to invoke a three-year statute of limitations instead of the nine-month statute of limitations as provided by G.S. \u00a7 160A-364.1 for challenging zoning ordinances. G.S. \u00a7 160A-364.1 provides:\nA cause of action as to the validity of any zoning ordinance . . . adopted under this Article or other applicable law shall accrue upon adoption of the ordinance . . . and shall be brought within nine months as provided in G.S. \u00a7 1-54.1.\nPlaintiff challenges the validity of the zoning on state constitutional grounds, arguing that the defendant failed to properly notify it of the impending zoning action affecting its property in violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 160A-364. In fact, defendant\u2019s published notice of the zoning action stated that the Village would consider extending its extraterritorial zoning jurisdiction, and the metes and bounds description included the land owned by appellant. That description put plaintiff on notice that changes would be made affecting its property. See Stutts v. Swaim, 30 N.C. App. 611, 228 S.E.2d 750, disc. rev. denied, 291 N.C. 178, 229 S.E.2d 692 (1976). Moreover, North Carolina case law indicates that the statute quoted above has been strictly construed. Petitioner in In re Appeal of CAMA Permit also alleged that the respondent town had failed to follow proper procedural rules. This Court concluded, however, that \u201ceven if the record disclosed that the Town of Bath had violated procedural rules . . ., petitioner is barred from attacking the validity of the amendment based on procedural grounds by the statute of limitations provided in G.S. \u00a7 160A-364.1. . . .\u201d 82 N.C. App. 32, 41-42, 345 S.E.2d 699, 705 (1986).\nPlaintiff characterizes this action as \u201ca cause of action for deprivation of constitutional rights\u201d and states that the United States Supreme Court in Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 85 L.Ed. 2d 254 (1985), has directed that such actions \u201cbe subject to the relevant state\u2019s personal injury statute of limitations\u201d which in North Carolina is three years. The Wilson court was addressing federal civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C.S. \u00a7 1983 when it chose to apply the personal injury statute of limitations. We do not find Wilson controlling.\nZoning claims raise important public policy considerations. There is a strong need for finality with respect to zoning matters so that landowners may use their property without fear of a challenge years after zoning has apparently been determined. North Carolina courts have not held that violations of federal constitutional claims in zoning actions extend the usual nine-month statute of limitations. In Sherrill v. Town of Wrightsville Beach, 81 N.C. App. 369, 344 S.E.2d 357, disc. rev. denied, 318 N.C. 417, 349 S.E.2d 600 (1986), this Court held that plaintiff\u2019s claims for federal due process violations were barred by the nine-month statute of limitations. It is noteworthy that Sherrill was decided after Wilson, supra.\nWe hold plaintiffs challenge to the 1985 zoning law based on alleged state and federal constitutional violations is barred by the nine-month statute of limitations. The trial court properly dismissed plaintiff\u2019s complaint for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted.\nII: The 1987 Rezoning.\nPlaintiff contends that its rights were violated by defendant when plaintiff was given a more restrictive zoning than what it requested for its office tract. The rezoning was, however, less restrictive than the original zoning. The rezoning not only allowed the current use to continue but it also permitted even broader uses of plaintiff\u2019s property. Plaintiff made a vague allegation that it \u201chas been damaged in an [sic] yet unascertained amount due to lost opportunities for sale, use and development of the properties.\u201d This is speculative and cannot stand. Plaintiff has done nothing to acquire a vested right to a less restrictive zoning and cannot recover speculative damages in an \u201cunascertained amount\u201d due to lost potential opportunities for development of the property. Defendant rezoned the property to allow for the then-current uses and plaintiff has suffered no measurable damages. Plaintiff\u2019s allegations are insufficient as a matter of law to state any claim as to the 1987 rezoning and thus were properly dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).\nAffirmed.\nJudges Arnold and Duncan concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "LEWIS, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Allen & Pinnix, by Noel L. Allen and Paul C. Ridgeway, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Petree Stockton & Robinson, by Penni P. Bradshaw and Robin E. Shea, for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "PINEHURST AREA REALTY, INC., Plaintiff v. THE VILLAGE OF PINEHURST, Defendant\nNo. 8920SC1101\n(Filed 7 August 1990)\n1. Municipal Corporations \u00a7 31.2 (NCI3d)\u2014 whether zoning ordinance enacted \u2014 question not raised at trial \u2014 issue not considered on appeal\nPlaintiff\u2019s question as to whether a zoning ordinance was indeed enacted, based on the purported failure by defendant to file and index properly the map which demonstrated the zoning boundaries in accordance with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 160A-77, was not raised during the trial; no information regarding this issue was included in the record; and the issue therefore was not properly before the Court of Appeals.\nAm Jur 2d, Zoning and Planning \u00a7\u00a7 56, 337, 338.\n2. Municipal Corporations \u00a7 31 (NCI3d)\u2014 zoning ordinance attacked on constitutional grounds \u2014 challenge barred by statute of limitations\nPlaintiff\u2019s challenge to a 1985 zoning law based on alleged state and federal constitutional violations was barred by the nine-month statute of limitations in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 160A-364.1.\nAm Jur 2d, Zoning and Planning \u00a7 341.\n3. Municipal Corporations \u00a7 31.1 (NCI3d)\u2014 no measurable damages suffered by plaintiff \u2014 no standing to sue\nPlaintiff\u2019s allegations were insufficient as a matter of law to state any claim as to a 1987 rezoning which was less restrictive than the original zoning, where the rezoning not only allowed the current use to continue but also permitted even broader uses of plaintiff\u2019s property; defendant rezoned the property to allow for the then-current uses; and plaintiff\u2019s vague allegation that it had been damaged in an unascertained amount due to lost opportunities for sale, use, and development of the property was speculative and showed that plaintiff had suffered no measurable damages.\nAm Jur 2d, Zoning and Planning \u00a7\u00a7 342, 343.\nAppeal by plaintiff from order entered 21 July 1989 by Judge William H. Freeman in MOORE County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 April 1990.\nPlaintiff is the real estate developer of a \u201cresidential community\u201d which includes a golf course (hereinafter, \u201cthe country club property\u201d). In addition, plaintiff owns a smaller tract adjoining the country club property upon which plaintiff maintains its place of business (hereinafter, \u201cthe office property\u201d). Prior to July 1985, both properties were within the planning and zoning jurisdiction of Moore County. The country club property was zoned for \u201cResidential Development\u201d (RD) which permitted uses such as single and multi-family residences. The office property was zoned for \u201cBusiness-1\u201d (B-l) which permitted a wide variety of commercial uses.\nOn 3 June 1985, the North Carolina General Assembly ratified 1985 Session Law 308 which amended General Statute \u00a7 160A-360(a) and allowed defendant Village of Pinehurst the right to exercise its zoning and planning powers up to two miles beyond its corporate limits. Defendant published notices in the local newspaper of a public hearing \u201cfor the purpose of considering a proposed area for addition to the extraterritorial zoning jurisdiction of the Village of Pinehurst.\u201d Plaintiff was already aware of the area to be included in the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the Village, and knew that its property was to be included and so did not attend the public hearing. On 15 July 1985, the Village Council of defendant adopted an ordinance stating, in part:\nThat the area of extraterritorial limits of the Village of Pinehurst shall be amended and extended as shown and delineated on the map prepared by C.H. Blue and Associates, which map is attached hereto, and correspondingly described in exhibit \u201cA\u201d attached hereto and dated July 15, 1985.\nPlaintiff alleges that no \u201cExhibit A\u201d dated July 15, 1985 has ever been found, produced or proven. On 22 July 1985, the Board of Commissioners of Moore County relinquished extraterritorial zoning jurisdiction to defendant. When defendant extended its extraterritorial jurisdiction, it designated plaintiff\u2019s country club property \u201cPublic Conservation and Recreation\u201d (PCR) and the office property \u201cOffice Professional\u201d (OP). Plaintiff states that it did not learn of the rezoning until June 1986 when two of its representatives \u201chappened to glance at a zoning map fastened to a wall in the office of the manager of the Village.\u201d\nIn January 1987, plaintiff requested that its office tract be rezoned from OP to \u201cNeighborhood Commercial\u201d (NC). Defendant amended its zoning ordinance to subdivide the former NC classification into two new classifications, NC-1 and NC-2 and then rezoned the office property NC-2. The NC-2 designation was less restrictive than OP.\nPlaintiff filed a complaint challenging both the 1985 and the 1987 rezonings on state and federal due process grounds. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted. Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. The court granted defendant\u2019s motion and denied plaintiff\u2019s motion. Plaintiff appeals.\nAllen & Pinnix, by Noel L. Allen and Paul C. Ridgeway, for plaintiff-appellant.\nPetree Stockton & Robinson, by Penni P. Bradshaw and Robin E. Shea, for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0077-01", "first_page_order": 109, "last_page_order": 113 }