{ "id": 8526398, "name": "JOANN W. WADDLE and JACQUELINE E. SIMPSON v. JACK SPARKS and GUILFORD MILLS, INC.", "name_abbreviation": "Waddle v. Sparks", "decision_date": "1990-08-21", "docket_number": "No. 8918SC1031", "first_page": "129", "last_page": "137", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "100 N.C. App. 129" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "346 S.E.2d 140", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 334", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4780326, 4777709, 4778478, 4779983, 4776954 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0334-03", "/nc/317/0334-02", "/nc/317/0334-05", "/nc/317/0334-01", "/nc/317/0334-04" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 116", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 N.C. App. 483", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521761 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/79/0483-01" ] }, { "cite": "19 S.E.2d 627", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1942, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "629" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "221 N.C. 173", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626774 ], "year": 1942, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "177" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/221/0173-01" ] }, { "cite": "276 S.E.2d 325", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "335" }, { "page": "444" }, { "page": "330" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 N.C. 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567370 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "452" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/302/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "339 S.E.2d 23", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "25", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 N.C. App. 163", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8519752 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "165", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/79/0163-01" ] }, { "cite": "341 S.E.2d 39", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 597", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4714275, 4718790, 4717073, 4719672, 4715545 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0597-02", "/nc/315/0597-01", "/nc/315/0597-03", "/nc/315/0597-04", "/nc/315/0597-05" ] }, { "cite": "335 S.E.2d 79", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "77 N.C. App. 253", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521759 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/77/0253-01" ] }, { "cite": "344 S.E.2d 7", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 553", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4697218, 4701773, 4696977, 4696466, 4705013 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0553-04", "/nc/316/0553-03", "/nc/316/0553-05", "/nc/316/0553-01", "/nc/316/0553-02" ] }, { "cite": "336 S.E.2d 653", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 N.C. App. 85", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8519625 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/78/0085-01" ] }, { "cite": "303 S.E.2d 358", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "360", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "62 N.C. App. 533", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523660 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "535", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/62/0533-01" ] }, { "cite": "254 S.E.2d 611", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "621-22" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "297 N.C. 181", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568312 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "196" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/297/0181-01" ] }, { "cite": "346 S.E.2d 140", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 334", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4780326, 4777709, 4778478, 4779983, 4776954 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0334-03", "/nc/317/0334-02", "/nc/317/0334-05", "/nc/317/0334-01", "/nc/317/0334-04" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 116", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "121" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "79 N.C. App. 483", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521761 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "490" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/79/0483-01" ] }, { "cite": "19 S.E.2d 627", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1942, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "221 N.C. 173", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626774 ], "year": 1942, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/221/0173-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 795, "char_count": 18083, "ocr_confidence": 0.766, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.4671313031423333e-07, "percentile": 0.8061080008911716 }, "sha256": "0cda77a8e85d79bf184d260ccff91a98f449150b73507b59ac6a23c18f7b0e78", "simhash": "1:b1abbe3e065e525c", "word_count": 2937 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:37:10.855162+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge Greene concurs.", "Judge Lewis concurs in part and dissents in part." ], "parties": [ "JOANN W. WADDLE and JACQUELINE E. SIMPSON v. JACK SPARKS and GUILFORD MILLS, INC." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ORR, Judge.\nThe sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for defendants. For the reasons below, we hold that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for defendants against plaintiff Waddle and affirm the summary judgment against plaintiff Simpson.\nUnder N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56(e) (1983), a motion for summary judgment shall be granted \u201cif the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u201d This remedy permits the trial court to decide whether a genuine issue of material fact exists; it does not allow the court to decide an issue of fact. Sauls v. Charlotte Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 62 N.C. App. 533, 535, 303 S.E.2d 358, 360 (1983) (citations omitted).\nIn a summary judgment proceeding, the trial court must determine if there is a triable material issue of fact, viewing all evidence presented in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Land-of-Sky Regional Council v. Co. of Henderson, 78 N.C. App. 85, 336 S.E.2d 653 (1985), disc. review denied, 316 N.C. 553, 344 S.E.2d 7 (1986); Walker v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 77 N.C. App. 253, 335 S.E.2d 79 (1985), disc. review denied, 315 N.C. 597, 341 S.E.2d 39 (1986). Summary judgment is generally inappropriate when a state of mind such as intent or knowledge is at issue. Valdese Gen. Hosp. v. Burns, 79 N.C. App. 163, 165, 339 S.E.2d 23, 25 (1986) (citation omitted). With these general principles in mind, we now turn to whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment against plaintiffs.\nBoth plaintiffs argue that summary judgment was improper regarding their claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The elements of this tort are: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) which is intended to cause and does cause (3) severe emotional distress. Dickens v. Puryear, 302 N.C. 437, 452, 276 S.E.2d 325, 335 (1981). This tort also may lie where a \u201cdefendant\u2019s actions indicate a reckless indifference to the likelihood that they will cause severe emotional distress.\u201d Id. The statute of limitations for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is three years. Id. at 444, 276 S.E.2d at 330.\nI.\nPlaintiff Waddle\u2019s Action\nPlaintiff Waddle\u2019s allegations in the complaint and her testimony at her deposition indicate the following acts occurred within three years of the 20 April 1988 date of the complaint.\n1. Plaintiff began her employment for Defendant Guilford Mills (hereinafter Guilford Mills) in 1970, and voluntarily terminated her employment (rather than be fired) in October 1987. Defendant Sparks began his employment as Waddle\u2019s shift supervisor in early 1983. At all times alleged, Sparks acted within the course and scope of his employment for. Guilford Mills.\n2. Sometime in March 1986, plaintiff and some other workers were threading a machine and one worker mentioned greasing the balls. Waddle heard Sparks state something to another employee to the effect of, \u201cwhat are you worrying about Bill\u2019s balls for?\u201d\n3. In the fall of 1985, Waddle had a cut on her finger which became infected with pus. When she went to the supervisor\u2019s office to have her finger treated, Sparks stated, \u201cyeah, Joann\u2019s got a pussy finger. Walt\u2019s going to, have to work on Joann\u2019s pussy.\u201d As someone else was coming into the office Sparks stated, \u201cYou can\u2019t go in there right now. Walt\u2019s working on Joann\u2019s pussy finger.\u201d Waddle testified that as the defendant spoke he paused between the words \u201cpussy\u201d and \u201cfinger.\u201d\n4. Waddle testified that beginning in 1983, Sparks constantly used sexual innuendoes and injected sexual statements into ordinary conversations, which continued throughout Waddle\u2019s employment.\n5. On two occasions in 1983, Sparks attempted to brush up against Waddle\u2019s breasts. This behavior continued until sometime in 1984. Waddle testified that she was continually watching for Sparks\u2019 attempts to rub against her so that she could get away from him.\n\u25a0 6. Sometime in March or April 1985, plaintiff and Sparks were examining some fabric and Waddle commented that the fabric \u201chas four holes the way it\u2019s supposed to.\u201d Sparks replied, \u201cdo you have four holes? I bet you know how to use all of them, don\u2019t you?\u201d\n7. As early as the fall of 1985, Waddle complained about Sparks to Assistant Plant Manager Ed Gray about several things including Sparks\u2019 \u201cvulgar and filthy\u201d mouth. Sparks acknowledged in his-deposition that he had received a verbal reprimand from Plant Manager John Moffitt concerning his vulgar language.\n8. In November or December 1985, Waddle complained to Personnel Director Brenda Shelton about Sparks\u2019 unfair treatment concerning job assignments and his \u201cfilthy mouth.\u201d\nViewing the above evidence in the light most favorable to Waddle, we hold that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of defendants. First, there are sufficient facts alleged to raise a question of whether Sparks\u2019 conduct was extreme and outrageous. The allegations are sufficient to establish that Sparks\u2019 behavior constituted more than insults or unflattering opinions.\nSecond, there are sufficient facts to raise a question of what Sparks intended by his behavior. There is not enough evidence before the trial court to make a conclusive determination that Sparks did not intend to cause severe emotional distress to Waddle. Sparks testified that there was no truth to any of Waddle\u2019s allegations. Therefore, there was no emotional distress to Waddle and no intent on his (Sparks) part to create emotional distress. However, when there is a question of intent, summary judgment is usually inappropriate. See Valdese Gen. Hosp. v. Burns, 79 N.C. App. 163, 339 S.E.2d 23 (1986).\nMoreover, Waddle alleged that she was humiliated and upset over the situation at work with Sparks\u2019 alleged sexual harassment and was intimidated. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to Waddle, it is not conclusive proof of emotional distress, but it at least raises an issue of fact for a jury.\nThird, with regard to plaintiff\u2019s complaint that defendant Guilford Mills negligently retained Sparks as an employee, the evidence raises enough questions concerning whether Sparks was acting in the course and scope of his employment and whether his behavior was impliedly ratified by Guilford Mills after Waddle reported Sparks to Brenda Shelton. Before an employer may be held liable for negligent retention of an employee, plaintiff must establish that the incompetent employee committed a tortious act resulting in injury to plaintiff, and that prior to the act, the employer knew or had reason to know of the employee\u2019s incompetency. Pleasants v. Barnes, 221 N.C. 173, 177, 19 S.E.2d 627, 629 (1942). Waddle\u2019s evidence raises such inferences here.\nThere is evidence in the case sub judice that some of Sparks\u2019 behavior was reported to Ms. Shelton. There is no evidence before us concerning what Ms. Shelton did with the information she obtained from Waddle. There is certainly no evidence that Sparks was ever confronted after December 1985 with the information available to Ms. Shelton. Therefore, we hold that summary judgment was granted improperly in favor of Guilford Mills with regard to plaintiff Waddle.\nFinally, defendants argue that plaintiffs\u2019 claim for relief is grounded in assault and battery (not intentional infliction of emotional distress); and therefore, the statute of limitations is one year instead of three years. Under this affirmative defense, plaintiffs\u2019 claim would be completely barred because none of the alleged incidents occurred within one year of April 1988 when plaintiffs filed their complaint. We find this argument to be completely without merit. See Dickens v. Puryear, 302 N.C. 437, 276 S.E.2d 325 (1981), and the cases cited therein. (In order for an action to lie in assault and battery, there must be an apprehension of immediate harmful or offensive contact, as distinguished from one in the future. Threats, without an offer or attempt to show violence, are not assaults.)\nII.\nPlaintiff Simpson\u2019s Claims\nPlaintiff Simpson began working at Guilford Mills in 1983 and terminated her employment in 1986. The forecast of Simpson\u2019s evidence indicates that her supervisor, Sparks, engaged in a course of behavior including the use of foul language, sexual innuendoes, and obscene gestures toward her and other employees. Many of her allegations and testimony in her deposition are similar to Waddle\u2019s as reviewed above.\nSimpson, however, can place no time period in which Sparks allegedly intentionally inflicted emotional distress. She was unable to place a day, month or year on any of the specific events she alleged. Therefore, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Simpson, she is unable to prove that any of the specific acts she alleged occurred after March 1985, which would have placed them within the three year statute of limitations period.\nSimpson did not allege or testify to a single act by Sparks or a group of acts by Sparks that occurred within the limitations period. The following exchange is one example of Simpson\u2019s response concerning when the incidents alleged occurred.\nQ. When did that occur?\nA. I can\u2019t say for sure.\nQ. How long before you left?\nA. I have no idea.\nQ. Could it have been as much as a year?\nA. It might have.\nQ. Maybe more?\nA. I don\u2019t know. I don\u2019t remember.\nQ. You have no idea when that occurred?\nA. No.\nQ. You can\u2019t even tell us which year it occurred in?\nA. No. Like I said, there was lots of them.\nThere is simply no evidence to indicate that any of the alleged incidents regarding Simpson took place within the three year statute of limitations period. For this reason, we hold that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to defendant Sparks against plaintiff Simpson.\nMoreover, we hold that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to Guilford Mills against plaintiff Simpson. Because the evidence is insufficient to establish Simpson\u2019s claim against Sparks, Simpson may not maintain an action against Guilford Mills based upon its negligence in employing or retaining Sparks. See Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club Co., 79 N.C. App. 483, 340 S.E.2d 116, disc. review denied, 317 N.C. 334, 346 S.E.2d 140 (1986).\nIn summary, we hold that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment against plaintiff Waddle and did not err in granting summary judgment against plaintiff Simpson and remand to the trial court for action consistent with this opinion.\nAffirmed in part; reversed in part; and remanded.\nJudge Greene concurs.\nJudge Lewis concurs in part and dissents in part.", "type": "majority", "author": "ORR, Judge." }, { "text": "Judge Lewis\nconcurring in part and dissenting in part.\nI respectfully dissent from the majority regarding plaintiff Waddle\u2019s claims. I do not believe she has made out a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress or negligent hiring.\nOne of the key elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is proving that the defendant intentionally or recklessly caused severe emotional distress. Stanback v. Stanback, 297 N.C. 181, 196, 254 S.E.2d 611, 621-22 (1979). Furthermore, for purposes of summary judgment, we must decide whether, as a matter of law, the conduct complained of \u201cmay reasonably be found to be sufficiently outrageous as to permit recovery.\u201d Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club Co., 79 N.C. App. 483, 490, 340 S.E.2d 116, 121, disc. rev. denied, 317 N.C. 334, 346 S.E.2d 140 (1986).\nThe majority opinion cites an occasion when defendant Sparks made a comment about \u201cBill\u2019s balls.\u201d I think it is important to note that this statement was in response to a female worker\u2019s comment to him, whereby the worker shouted to Sparks, \u201cJack, listen over here. Frances is worried about whether Bill\u2019s greased his balls or not.\u201d Sparks responded, \u201cwhat are you worrying about Bill\u2019s balls for.\u201d These comments were not directed at the plaintiff and were obviously made in response to some off-color joking made by another female employee.\nThe comments made by defendant Sparks about Waddle\u2019s \u201cpussy finger\u201d relative to an infected finger with pus and her having \u201cfour holes\u201d and knowing how to use them, were directed at Waddle. Even if we assume that the plaintiff has shown that these comments could reasonably be found to be sufficiently outrageous as to permit recovery, she still must show that these statements were intended to cause and did cause her severe emotional distress. Waddle alleged that she was continually upset and frequently cried. However, she has made no showing on this point. Her deposition reveals only one incident where she testified that she was crying:\nI went in the office where he [Sparks] was-was when I first started threading ... I went in and told him that Virginia McKee had left the machine that she was working on with me and had gone off to a machine with Frances Russell to work. And that instead of Virginia going on to the next machine like she was supposed to with a cutout, she left the cutout for me. And I told him, I was getting the dirty work. And he said, \u2018No, No. Virginia would never do anything like this. Virginia would never do that.\u2019. . . And I was crying, very upset. I sat there until I got through crying. He talked to me a little bit, and he said, \u2018Virginia-Virginia\u2019s not like that, she\u2019d never do that.\u2019\nThis is the only testimony offered by the plaintiff that she was emotionally distressed by the defendant\u2019s conduct. She also stated that she complained to her supervisors about the conduct and eventually left her job. There is no other testimony to show that Sparks intended to cause or did cause Waddle severe emotional distress. This is hardly a showing of distress at all, much less severe distress. The above testimony has nothing to do with any conduct by defendant Sparks. Plaintiff admits that she never directly complained to Sparks about any of his alleged remarks. Plaintiff has completely failed to show that Sparks intended to cause and did in fact cause her severe emotional distress. Plaintiff apparently was upset by \u201cVirginia\u2019s\u201d actions much more than Sparks.\nAs one offended by the language in \u201cR\u201d rated movies, having seen only one in the last five years, I certainly do not sanction vulgar or even off-color innuendo. Our business here is not to impose our personal preferences but to follow the law as we see it. I do not see proof of \u201cextreme or outrageous\u201d behavior here nor intentional infliction of \u201csevere\u201d emotional distress nor any forecast of proving any of it.\nI would also affirm the dismissal of Waddle\u2019s claim as to the negligent retention of an employee. Before an employer can be held liable, plaintiff must show that the incompetent employee committed a tortious act resulting in injury to plaintiff and that prior to the act, the employer knew or had reason to know of the employee\u2019s incompetency. Pleasants v. Barnes, 221 N.C. 173, 19 S.E.2d 627 (1942). Intentional infliction of emotional distress by Sparks is the underlying tortious conduct relied upon by Waddle to establish her claim. Because I believe Waddle has failed to make out the underlying tort, she may not maintain an action based upon Guilford Mills\u2019 retention of Sparks. See Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club Co., supra. I would therefore affirm the order of the trial court.", "type": "concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part", "author": "Judge Lewis" } ], "attorneys": [ "Ling & Farran, by Jeffrey P. Farran, for plaintiff-appellants.", "Smith Helms Mulliss & Moore, by Martin N. Erwin and Michael A. Gil\u00edes, for defendant-appellee Guilford Mills, Inc.; and Haines, Short, Campbell & Ferguson, by W. Marcus Short, for defendant-appellee Jack Sparks." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JOANN W. WADDLE and JACQUELINE E. SIMPSON v. JACK SPARKS and GUILFORD MILLS, INC.\nNo. 8918SC1031\n(Filed 21 August 1990)\n1. Trespass \u00a7 2 (NCI3d)\u2014 intentional infliction of emotional distress \u2014sexual harassment by supervisor \u2014sufficient forecast of evidence\nPlaintiff\u2019s forecast of evidence presented genuine issues of material fact for the jury in an action against her former supervisor for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on various sexually connotative statements and offensive actions.\nAm Jur 2d, Fright, Shock, and Mental Disturbance \u00a7 17; Trespass \u00a7\u00a7 8, 18.\n2. Master and Servant \u00a7 29 (NCI3d)\u2014 negligent retention of supervisor \u2014sufficient forecast of evidence\nPlaintiff\u2019s forecast of evidence was sufficient to maintain her claim against defendant employer for negligent retention of her supervisor where it would permit a jury to find that the supervisor\u2019s behavior constituted the intentional infliction of emotional distress, the supervisor was acting within the course and scope of his employment, and defendant employer impliedly ratified the supervisor\u2019s behavior after plaintiff reported the supervisor\u2019s actions to the employer\u2019s personnel director.\nAm Jur 2d, Master and Servant \u00a7 213.\n3. Trespass \u00a7 2 (NCI3d)\u2014 intentional infliction of emotional distress \u2014statute of limitations \u2014insufficient forecast of evidence\nA second plaintiff\u2019s forecast of evidence was insufficient to establish a claim against her former supervisor for intentional infliction of emotional distress where there was no evidence that any of the incidents upon which plaintiff relied took place within the three year statute of limitations period.\nAm Jur 2d, Master and Servant \u00a7 357.\nJudge Lewis concurring in part and dissenting in part.\nAPPEAL by plaintiffs from judgment entered 8 June 1989 by Judge Russell G. Walker, Jr. in GUILFORD County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 4 April 1990.\nOn 20 April 1988, plaintiffs filed a complaint against defendants alleging intentional and negligent infliction of mental distress against defendant Sparks and negligent hiring and retention of defendant Sparks by defendant Guilford Mills. Defendants filed motions for summary judgment on 24 April and 26 April 1989. The trial court granted these motions on 15 June 1989.\nFrom the orders granting summary judgment to defendants, plaintiffs appeal.\nLing & Farran, by Jeffrey P. Farran, for plaintiff-appellants.\nSmith Helms Mulliss & Moore, by Martin N. Erwin and Michael A. Gil\u00edes, for defendant-appellee Guilford Mills, Inc.; and Haines, Short, Campbell & Ferguson, by W. Marcus Short, for defendant-appellee Jack Sparks." }, "file_name": "0129-01", "first_page_order": 161, "last_page_order": 169 }