{ "id": 8527515, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CLARK EDWARD CHANDLER", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Chandler", "decision_date": "1990-12-04", "docket_number": "No. 909SC385", "first_page": "706", "last_page": "712", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "100 N.C. App. 706" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "67 ALR3d 824", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "311 S.E.2d 552", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "559" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 284", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2402923 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "295" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0284-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 S.E.2d 286", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "87 N.C. App. 349", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8358377 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/87/0349-01" ] }, { "cite": "308 S.E.2d 258", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 528", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4767283 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0528-01" ] }, { "cite": "241 S.E.2d 65", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 N.C. 210", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572384 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/294/0210-01" ] }, { "cite": "366 S.E.2d 509", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "511" }, { "page": "512" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 N.C. App. 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522806 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "467" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/89/0465-01" ] }, { "cite": "163 S.E.2d 376", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "274 N.C. 295", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560020 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/274/0295-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 S.E.2d 403", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 114", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4731888 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0114-01" ] }, { "cite": "351 S.E.2d 277", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "279" }, { "page": "280" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 663", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4733270 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0663-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 610, "char_count": 11888, "ocr_confidence": 0.738, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.6231860776906956e-07, "percentile": 0.6876146061025179 }, "sha256": "516cba23a565d269aeec5630ed4da377406b5a5feb0322b7091d371274b5ef2d", "simhash": "1:856fc062a0a60c78", "word_count": 1937 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:37:10.855162+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges WELLS and COZORT concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CLARK EDWARD CHANDLER" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JOHNSON, Judge.\nThe State\u2019s evidence tended to show the following: While on patrol on 10 February 1989, Butner Public Safety Officer William J. Pendleton received a dispatch to be on the lookout for a brown pickup truck with a camper shell. Shortly thereafter, a pickup truck matching the dispatched description was observed traveling east on C Street. After following the truck for approximately five blocks, the officer pulled the truck over for speeding. After he approached the truck, the officer explained that he had received information that that vehicle was supplying drugs to Piedmont Village. Defendant subsequently gave Officer Pendleton permission to search the truck.\nWhile searching the truck, Officer Pendleton found a plastic bag containing a white powdery substance located behind and partially underneath the seat of the truck. Defendant was thereafter arrested.\nDuring trial, Irvin Allcox, a forensic chemist, testified that the bag in question contained 44.2 grams of white powder, approximately thirty percent of which was cocaine hydrochloride.\nOn appeal, defendant brings forth five qu\u00e9stions for this Court\u2019s review. First, defendant contends that the trial court improperly excluded the criminal record of Ernest Kemp, the owner of the truck. We disagree.\nG.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(b) provides that \u201c[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.\u201d See also State v. Cotton, 318 N.C. 663, 351 S.E.2d 277 (1987). \u201cEvidence that another committed the crime for which the defendant is charged generally is relevant and admissible as long as it does more than create an inference or conjecture in this regard.\u201d Id. at 667, 351 S.E.2d at 279. \u201cThe admissibility of evidence of th\u00e9 guilt of one other than the defendant is governed ... by the general principle of relevancy.\u201d Id. at 667, 351 S.E.2d at 280. Such evidence, however, must tend to directly implicate another and be inconsistent with the guilt of the accused. Id.\nIn holding that the trial court properly excluded Mr. Kemp\u2019s criminal record, we are not inadvertent to State v. Cotton, supra. Instead, we simply find the present case to be distinguishable. In Cotton, the defendant was convicted of first-degree burglary, first-degree rape and first-degree sexual offense. On appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred by excluding evidence tending to show that the crimes charged and another similar offense were committed by the same person \u2014 not the defendant. The defendant was therefore entitled to a new trial. Unquestionably, the evidence excluded in Cotton tended to point directly to the guilt of another person.\nHere, the excluded evidence and the defendant\u2019s contention that Kemp acted in conformity with his prior conviction by placing the cocaine under the seat is based on pure conjecture and does not point directly to the fact that another, namely Ernest Kemp, committed the crime for which the defendant was convicted. Extending the holding in Cotton to the instant case would result in the admissibility of evidence based upon an inference. Given the facts at hand and the purpose for which the defendant sought to have Kemp\u2019s criminal record admitted, the trial court\u2019s decision to exclude the record was proper. This assignment is overruled.\nSecond, defendant contends that the trial court\u2019s questioning of a witness constituted error and the questioning elicited inadmissible prejudicial testimony. Specifically, defendant contends that as a result of the trial court\u2019s question, hearsay testimony was improperly admitted.\n\u201cThe court may interrogate witnesses, whether called by itself or by a party.\u201d G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 614(b). The court may also question a witness for the purpose of clarifying a witness\u2019 testimony and for promoting a better understanding of it. State v. Whittington, 318 N.C. 114, 347 S.E.2d 403 (1986). Such examination must be conducted with care and in a manner which avoids prejudice to either party. State v. Colson, 274 N.C. 295, 163 S.E.2d 376 (1968). Having reviewed the complained of testimony, we find that the witness\u2019 testimony was neither hearsay nor prejudicial to the defendant. See also G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 801(c). This assignment is also overruled.\nThird, defendant contends that the trial court disregarded G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 609 by admitting into evidence his prior conviction of misdemeanor possession of marijuana which occurred more than ten years prior to the date of trial. We disagree.\nG.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 609(b) provides that:\nEvidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of more than 10 years has elapsed since the date of the conviction . . . unless the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. However, evidence of a conviction more than 10 years old as calculated herein is not admissible unless the proponent gives the adverse party sufficient advance written notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to contest the use of such evidence.\n\u201cRule 609 allows the defendant\u2019s prior conviction to be offered into evidence when the defendant takes the stand and thereby places his credibility at issue.\u201d State v. Blankenship, 89 N.C. App. 465, 467, 366 S.E.2d 509, 511 (1988).\nHere, the State gave defense counsel written notice of his intent to- use the defendant\u2019s 1972 conviction pursuant to G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 609(b) and a hearing was thereafter conducted to provide the defendant with an opportunity to contest the use of such evidence. After hearing arguments of counsel, the trial court ruled that\nthe evidence does not have the probative value sufficient to outweigh any possible prejudicial effect under Rule 609B [sic], and I am not going to allow its admission ... if the door, now \u2014 if the door is opened, then we have got a whole new ball game.\nFrom the trial court\u2019s ruling, defense counsel was given sufficient notice of the court\u2019s intent.\nWhen the defendant took the stand, defense counsel posed questions about his convictions within the last ten years. Defense counsel also asked the defendant whether those convictions (the ones within the last ten years) were the only convictions he had. Defendant replied in the affirmative. Later, the court ruled that such a statement opened the door and allowed the State to go into the 1972 conviction. We find that defendant\u2019s testimony creates favorable inferences as to his entire criminal record. Therefore, on cross-examination, the State \u201cmay inquire into defendant\u2019s record and rebut his statement that [he] had not been convicted of anything other than the crimes mentioned in [his] testimony.\u201d State v. Blankenship, supra at 470, 366 S.E.2d at 512.\nFourth, defendant contends that the trial court\u2019s failure to order a transcript of the sentencing hearing constituted prejudicial error. We have considered the defendant\u2019s argument, but find no error. Suffice it to say that in the absence of an abuse of discretion, a judgment will not be disturbed because of either the sentencing procedure or procedural conduct. State v. Locklear, 294 N.C. 210, 241 S.E.2d 65 (1978).\nLast, defendant contends that the trial court improperly denied his motion to dismiss at the end of all the evidence. We disagree.\nIn ruling on a motion to dismiss, the trial court must view and consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, and the State is entitled to every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom. State v. Bates, 309 N.C. 528, 308 S.E.2d 258 (1983). The State has the burden of establishing, beyond a reasonable doubt, every essential element of the charge of trafficking in cocaine by possession. Id. A person is guilty of this' offense if (1) he knowingly possesses cocaine or any mixture containing cocaine (either actual or constructive) and (2) the quantity of cocaine or mixture containing cocaine is 28 grams or more. State v. Keys, 87 N.C. App. 349, 361 S.E.2d 286 (1987). See also G.S. \u00a7 90-95(h)(3).\nIn the instant case, the State offered uncontroverted evidence that a plastic bag containing 44.2 grams of powder of which approximately thirty percent was cocaine hydrochloride was found underneath the seat of the truck defendant was driving. As previously held by our Supreme Court, possession of narcotics by an accused may be a result of \u201ccircumstantial evidence from which an inference of knowledge might reasonably be drawn.\u201d State v. Boone, 310 N.C. 284, 295, 311 S.E.2d 552, 559 (1984). Based upon the circumstances of defendant\u2019s arrest, this contention lacks. merit.\nHaving carefully reviewed the record and the briefs, we conclude defendant received a fair trial, in which there was\nNo error.\nJudges WELLS and COZORT concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JOHNSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Lacy H. Thornburg, by Assistant Attorney General E. Burke Haywood, for the State.", "Currin & Currin, by Hugh M. Currin, Jr., for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CLARK EDWARD CHANDLER\nNo. 909SC385\n(Filed 4 December 1990)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 35 (NCI3d)\u2014 trafficking in cocaine \u2014 criminal record of vehicle owner \u2014no proof of guilt of another\nIn a prosecution for trafficking in cocaine found under the seat of a truck defendant was driving, the criminal record of the owner of the truck was not admissible to show that he acted in conformity with his prior conviction by placing the cocaine under the truck seat since such a conclusion would be based on pure conjecture, and the evidence does not point directly to the guilt of another for the crime for which defendant was on trial.\nAm Jur 2d, Drugs, Narcotics, and Poisons \u00a7 46.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 381 (NCI4th)\u2014 court\u2019s examination of witness\u2014 no prejudice to defendant\nThe trial court\u2019s questioning of a witness did not elicit hearsay testimony and did not prejudice defendant. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rules 614(b), 801(c).\nAm Jur 2d, Trial \u00a7 88.\n3. Criminal Law \u00a7 86.2 (NCI3d( \u2014 conviction more than ten years old \u2014 use to impeach defendant\nThe trial court did not violate N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 609(b) by permitting the State to use a prior conviction more than ten years old to impeach defendant\u2019s testimony that his convictions during the last ten years were his only convictions.\nAm Jur 2d, Witnesses \u00a7 577.\nRight to impeach credibility of accused by showing prior conviction as affected by remoteness in time of prior offense. 67 ALR3d 824.\n4. Criminal Law \u00a7 1061 (NCI4th)\u2014 sentencing hearing \u2014 failure to transcribe \u2014absence of prejudice\nThe trial court\u2019s failure to order that the sentencing hearing be transcribed did not constitute prejudicial error.\nAm Jur 2d, Criminal Law \u00a7 527.\n5. Narcotics \u00a7 4 (NCI3d)\u2014 trafficking in cocaine \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThe State\u2019s evidence was sufficient to support defendant\u2019s conviction of trafficking in cocaine by possession where it tended to show that a plastic bag containing 44.2 grams of powder of which approximately thirty percent was cocaine hydrochloride was found underneath the seat of the truck defendant was driving.\nAm Jur 2d, Drugs, Narcotics, and Poisons \u00a7 47.\nAPPEAL by defendant from judgment entered 8 September 1989 by Judge Howard E. Manning, Jr. in GRANVILLE County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 14 November 1990.\nDefendant was charged with trafficking in cocaine by possession in violation of G.S. \u00a7 90-95(h)(3) and trafficking in cocaine by transportation in violation of G.S. \u00a7 90-95(h)(3)a. After a jury trial, defendant was found guilty as charged. The trial court arrested judgment on the charge of trafficking in cocaine by transporting and sentenced the defendant on the charge of trafficking in cocaine by possession to an active term of twelve years imprisonment and imposed a fine of $50,000. Defendant appeals.\nAttorney General Lacy H. Thornburg, by Assistant Attorney General E. Burke Haywood, for the State.\nCurrin & Currin, by Hugh M. Currin, Jr., for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0706-01", "first_page_order": 738, "last_page_order": 744 }