{ "id": 8527334, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CLARENCE MEBANE", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Mebane", "decision_date": "1990-12-18", "docket_number": "No. 9015SC172", "first_page": "119", "last_page": "126", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "101 N.C. App. 119" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "213 S.E.2d 291", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "294" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "287 N.C. 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561054 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "80" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/287/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "341 S.E.2d 31", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 591", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4714794, 4713996, 4714673, 4715445, 4716991 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0591-03", "/nc/315/0591-04", "/nc/315/0591-01", "/nc/315/0591-02", "/nc/315/0591-05" ] }, { "cite": "337 S.E.2d 87", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "89" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 N.C. App. 239", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520661 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/78/0239-01" ] }, { "cite": "352 S.E.2d 673", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "319 N.C. 34", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4741158 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/319/0034-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 S.E.2d 533", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "540", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Etheridge, 319 N.C. 34, 352 S.E.2d 673 (1987)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 666", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2513005 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "678", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Etheridge, 319 N.C. 34, 352 S.E.2d 673 (1987)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0666-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 S.E.2d 575", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "577" }, { "page": "577" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 N.C. App. 57", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526691 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "60-61" }, { "page": "60-61" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/55/0057-01" ] }, { "cite": "459 U.S. 359", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6196436 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/459/0359-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 U.S. 299", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5719289 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1932, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "304" }, { "page": "182" }, { "page": "309" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/284/0299-01" ] }, { "cite": "304 S.E.2d 759", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 N.C. 679", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4705185, 4708995, 4708841, 4705295, 4706902 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/308/0679-05", "/nc/308/0679-02", "/nc/308/0679-01", "/nc/308/0679-04", "/nc/308/0679-03" ] }, { "cite": "300 S.E.2d 9", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "14" }, { "page": "14" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "60 N.C. App. 604", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523101 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "610" }, { "page": "610" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/60/0604-01" ] }, { "cite": "390 S.E.2d 729", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "730" }, { "page": "730" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 N.C. App. 405", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524831 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "407" }, { "page": "407" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/98/0405-01" ] }, { "cite": "251 S.E.2d 616", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "619" }, { "page": "620" }, { "page": "619" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 N.C. 564", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568241 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "568" }, { "page": "569" }, { "page": "568" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/296/0564-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 701", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "707", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "709" }, { "page": "708" }, { "page": "712" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 444", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4717320 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "451", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "461" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0444-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 634, "char_count": 16814, "ocr_confidence": 0.779, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.792801403923261e-07, "percentile": 0.7152401549279513 }, "sha256": "cf19ca98481396cd8f777db64b45ccf6c0c9f4d615681af9f4ecaeb950bb9d84", "simhash": "1:fa05cf76046eb4fa", "word_count": 2743 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:54:53.681770+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge HEDRICK and Judge DUNCAN concur. \u2022", "Judge DUNCAN concurred in this opinion prior to 30 November 1990." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CLARENCE MEBANE" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "LEWIS, Judge.\nThe first question on appeal is whether the defendant\u2019s conviction and sentencing under the North Carolina Controlled Substances Act by the trial court violated the prohibition against double jeopardy contained in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and in the North Carolina Constitution, article I \u00a7 19. The second question on appeal is whether the trial court erred in ordering the forfeiture of the defendant\u2019s vehicle pursuant to the Act.\nThe defendant was convicted and punished for committing the following crimes on 20 January 1989 in one drug related transaction:\n1) felonious possession of cocaine under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(a)(3);\n2) possession with intent to sell or deliver cocaine under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(a)(l);\n3) sale and delivery of cocaine under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(a)(l);\n4) conspiracy to sell or deliver cocaine under North Carolina common law; and\n5) maintaining of vehicle (Chevrolet Corvette) under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90408(a)(7).\nThe defendant was convicted and punished for committing the following crimes on 3 February 1989 in one drug related transaction:\n1) felonious possession of cocaine under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(a)(3);\n2) possession with intent to sell or deliver cocaine under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(a)(l);\n3) sale and delivery of cocaine under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(a)(l); and\n4) conspiracy to sell or deliver cocaine under North Carolina Common Law.\nThe defendant was convicted and punished for committing the following crimes on 17 February 1989 in one drug related transaction:\n1) felonious possession of cocaine under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(a)(3);\n2) possession with intent to sell or deliver cocaine under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(a)(l);\n3) maintaining of vehicle (Nissan Maxima) under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-108(a)(7);\n4) conspiracy to traffic in cocaine under North Carolina Common law;\n5) trafficking in cocaine by possession under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(h)(3); and\n6) sale and delivery of cocaine under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(a)(l).\nThe trial judge consolidated the cases for judgment and sentenced the defendant to fifteen years imprisonment. The trial judge also ordered that the defendant forfeit the Chevrolet Corvette allegedly involved in the cocaine transaction of 20 January 1989.\nDouble Jeopardy\n\u201cThe Double Jeopardy Clause protects against (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense.\u201d State v. Gardner, 315 N.C. 444, 451, 340 S.E.2d 701, 707 (1986) (citations omitted). Here we are concerned with multiple punishments for the same offense.\nThe defendant was convicted of possession with intent to sell or deliver a controlled substance and possessing a controlled substance under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(a)(l) and N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(a)(3) on three separate occasions. The defendant committed one transaction relating to the two convictions on each of the days in question. The defendant argues that principles of double jeopardy bar the defendant\u2019s conviction and punishment for both offenses on each of the days in question. We agree.\nAlthough possession of one gram or more of cocaine is not a lesser included offense of possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, the North Carolina Supreme Court has held and this Court has recently reiterated that double jeopardy principles bar punishment for both offenses for possession of the same cocaine. State v. McGill, 296 N.C. 564, 568, 251 S.E.2d 616, 619 (1979); State v. Williams, 98 N.C. App. 405, 407, 390 S.E.2d 729, 730 (1990). Unless and until the Supreme Court overrules these decisions, we are bound by their holdings.\nThe trial'judge should have instructed the jury to first consider the offense of possession with intent to sell and deliver cocaine; if, and only if, the jury found him not guilty of that offense were they to consider the offense of possession of cocaine. McGill, 296 N.C. at 569, 251 S.E.2d at 620. Therefore, we arrest judgment on the three charges of possession of cocaine. With respect to this issue, we find no error in the three convictions on possession with intent to sell and deliver.\nThe defendant also contends that principles of double jeopardy bar defendant\u2019s punishment for possession with intent to sell and deliver cocaine under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(a)(1), and trafficking in the same cocaine by possession under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(h)(3). The defendant argues that possession with intent to sell and deliver cocaine is a lesser included offense of trafficking in cocaine by possession.\nIn State v. Sanderson, 60 N.C. App. 604, 610, 300 S.E.2d 9, 14, disc. rev. denied, 308 N.C. 679, 304 S.E.2d 759 (1983), the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that possession of marijuana with intent to sell is a lesser included offense of trafficking by possessing one hundred pounds of marijuana. The court did not expressly review the elements of each offense involved and, thus, did not explain its conclusion. However, the court did apply the test set forth in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 182, 76 L.Ed. 306, 309 (1932), to determine whether the offenses are not the \u201csame offense\u201d within the meaning of the double jeopardy clause. The Blockburger test is: \u201cwhether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not.\u201d Id. Applying the Blockburger test, the court held in Sanderson that \u201cpossession under G.S. 90-95(a) does not require proof of any additional facts beyond those required under G.S. 90-95(h)(l), therefore convictions under both statutes violate defendants\u2019 protection against double jeopardy, and the convictions for the lesser included offenses should be vacated.\u201d State v. Sanderson, 60 N.C. App. 604, 610, 300 S.E.2d 9, 14, disc. rev. denied, 308 N.C. 679, 304 S.E.2d 759 (1983).\nAfter State v. Sanderson, the North Carolina Supreme Court held in State v. Gardner, 315 N.C. 444, 340 S.E.2d 701 (1986), that \u201c[i]n single prosecution situations, the presumption raised by the Blockburger test is only a federal rule for determining legislative intent as to violations of federal criminal laws and is neither binding on state courts nor conclusive.\u201d Id. at 455, 340 S.E.2d at 709. Likewise, \u201cwhere a legislature clearly expresses its intent to proscribe and punish exactly the same conduct under two separate statutes, a trial court in a single trial may impose cumulative punishments under the statutes.\u201d Id. at 453, 340 S.E.2d at 708 (quoting Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 103 S.Ct. 673, 74 L.Ed. 2d 535 (1983)). Thus, the Blockburger test is not considered determinative of whether the defendant\u2019s rights not to be put in double jeopardy have been violated. Instead, we must address the legislature\u2019s intent.\nTo prove the offense of possession with intent to sell and deliver cocaine, the State must show: 1) possession of cocaine and 2) that the person intended to sell or deliver it. State v. McGill, 296 N.C. 564, 568, 251 S.E.2d 616, 619 (1979). To prove the offense of trafficking in cocaine by possession the State must show: 1) possession of cocaine and 2) that the amount possessed was 28 grams or more. However, the purpose behind N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(h), which deters the statutorily defined \u201ctrafficking,\u201d is to prevent large scale distribution of controlled substances. State v. Tyndall, 55 N.C. App. 57, 60-61, 284 S.E.2d 575, 577 (1981). \u201cOur legislature has determined that certain amounts of controlled substances and certain amounts of mixtures containing controlled substances indicate an intent to distribute on a large scale.\u201d Id. Although the offense of trafficking under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(h) does not specifically require that the State prove that the person intended to sell or deliver the controlled substance, such intent is implied from the large amount of controlled substance possessed. This is most likely the reason why the Court of Appeals in Sanderson found the two convictions and punishments in violation of the double jeopardy clause when Blockburger was considered controlling. Without such rationale, a double jeopardy question may not have arisen. See State v. Swann, 322 N.C. 666, 678, 370 S.E.2d 533, 540 (1988) (citing State v. Etheridge, 319 N.C. 34, 352 S.E.2d 673 (1987)).\nAlthough we are mindful of Gardner, we are bound to follow the North Carolina Supreme Court\u2019s reasoning in McGill, and the recent cases that comply with its holding that the defendant not be punished for such closely related offenses. See State v. McGill, supra; State v. Williams, 98 N.C. App. 405, 407, 390 S.E.2d 729, 730 (1990). The only difference between this case and McGill is the amount of the controlled substance in the defendant\u2019s possession: in McGill, the offense was possession of more than one ounce of marijuana; and here, the offense is possession of 28 grams or more of cocaine (\u201ctrafficking\u201d).\nMoreover, we hold that the legislature did not intend that cumulative punishments be imposed for possession with intent to sell and deliver cocaine and trafficking in the same cocaine by possession at the same time. \u201cThe traditional means of determining the intent of the legislature where the concern is only one of multiple punishments for two convictions in the same trial include the examination of the subject, language, and history of the statutes.\u201d State v. Gardner, 315 N.C. 444, 461, 340 S.E.2d 701, 712 (1986).\nLegislative history reveals that the legislature intended the trafficking statute to prevent large scale distribution of controlled substances. State v. Tyndall, 55 N.C. App. 57, 60-61, 284 S.E.2d 575, 577 (1981). On its face, it is apparent that the statute forbidding possession with intent to sell and deliver cocaine was also passed to prevent distribution of cocaine. The only difference is the amount of cocaine distributed. Thus, regardless of whether the two statutes proscribe the same conduct under the Blockburger test, the legislature did not intend that a defendant be punished for both of the statutory crimes in issue. We arrest judgment on the charge of possession with intent to sell and deliver on 17 February 1989. The conviction and punishment for trafficking by possession of cocaine is without error.\nForfeiture of the. Vehicle\nThe defendant\u2019s last contention is that the trial court erred in ordering the forfeiture of the defendant\u2019s Corvette. The defendant argues that if he is found not guilty of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-108(7), the forfeiture of a vehicle under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-112 is prohibited. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-108 provides in pertinent part:\n(a) It shall be unlawful for any person: . . .\n(7) To knowingly keep or maintain any . . . vehicle . . ., which is resorted to by persons using controlled substances in violation of this Article for the purpose of using such substances, or which is used for the keeping or selling of the same in violation of this Article.\n(b) Any person who violates this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. Provided, that if the criminal pleading alleges that the violation was committed intentionally, and upon trial it is specifically found that the violation was committed intentionally, such violations shall be a Class I felony.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-112 provides in pertinent part:\nThe following shall be subject to forfeiture: . . .\n(1) All controlled substances which have been manufactured, distributed, dispensed, or acquired in violation of the provisions of this Article;\n(2) All money . . . acquired, used, or intended for use, in selling, . . . delivering, ... a controlled substance in violation of this Article . . .\n(4) All conveyances, including vehicles, . . . which are used or intended for use to unlawfully conceal, convey, or transport, or in any manner facilitate the unlawful concealment, conveyance, or transportation of property described in (1) or (2) except that . . .\nc. No conveyance shall be forfeited unless the violation involved is a felony under this Article. . . .\nIn State v. Bright, 78 N.C. App. 239, 337 S.E.2d 87 (1985), disc. rev. denied, 315 N.C. 591, 341 S.E.2d 31 (1986), this Court interpreted N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 90-108(a)(7) and 90408(b) to mean that if a defendant is found to have \u2018.\u2018knowledge that [the vehicle] is resorted to by persons for the use, keeping or selling of controlled substances\u201d that the defendant is guilty of a misdemeanor; however, if the defendant is found to have \u201cintent that it be so used\u201d the defendant shall be guilty of a class I felony. Id. at 242, 337 S.E.2d at 89. Here, the defendant was found guilty of a misdemeanor under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-108.\nThe primary question is whether the word \u201cfelony\u201d in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-112(a)(4)c. is a reference to 1) only a felony involving the violation of using the vehicle, or 2) a felony involving violations in which the vehicle was used. The defendant in this case was found guilty of felonies in which the vehicle was used. However, the defendant claims that because he was only found guilty of a misdemeanor involving the violation of using the vehicle, that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-112(a)(4)c. does not allow forfeiture of the Corvette.\nThe intent of the legislature controls the interpretation of a statute. State v. Hart, 287 N.C. 76, 80, 213 S.E.2d 291, 294 (1975). The legislativ\u00e9 history of the statute demonstrates that the intent of the legislature was to expand the situations in which a vehicle could be forfeited. Originally, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-112(4)(c) only allowed forfeiture if the defendant violated 90-95(a)(l) or 90-95(a)(2). N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-112(4)(c) (Supp. 1971). The change in the statute was called \u201cAn Act to Permit Forfeiture of Conveyances Under Additional Circumstances.\u201d (1973 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 447.) As the language indicates, the legislature intended to expand the statute to cover all felonies under the Act in which a vehicle was used. Thus, we find no error in the forfeiture of the defendant\u2019s Corvette.\nConclusion\nAs the convictions of possession of cocaine and the conviction of possession of cocaine with the intent to sell and deliver cocaine on 17 February 1989 may have influenced the trial judge\u2019s sentence after consolidation of the cases for judgment under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.4(b), we remand the case for resentencing.\n89 CRS 6298 \u2014 possession of cocaine \u2014 arrested;\n89 CRS 6298 \u2014 possession with intent to sell or deliver cocaine\u2014 no error;\n89 CRS 6300 \u2014 knowingly maintaining a vehicle for purpose of unlawfully keeping or selling controlled substances \u2014 forfeiture\u2014no error;\n89 CRS 6301 \u2014possession of cocaine \u2014 arrested;\n89 CRS 6301 \u2014 possession with intent to sell or deliver cocaine \u2014 no error;\n89 CRS 6304 \u2014 possession of cocaine \u2014 arrested;\n89 CRS 6304 \u2014 possession with intent to sell or deliver cocaine \u2014 arrested;\n89 CRS 6305 \u2014 trafficking in cocaine by possession \u2014 no error.\nRemand for Resentencing.\nChief Judge HEDRICK and Judge DUNCAN concur. \u2022\nJudge DUNCAN concurred in this opinion prior to 30 November 1990.", "type": "majority", "author": "LEWIS, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Lacy H. Thornburg, by Assistant Attorney General Patricia F. Padgett, for the State.", "Appellate Defender Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., by Assistant Appellate Defender M. Patricia DeVine, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CLARENCE MEBANE\nNo. 9015SC172\n(Filed 18 December 1990)\n1. Narcotics \u00a7 1.3 (NCI3d); Constitutional Law \u00a7 34 ,(NCI3d) \u2014 one possession of cocaine \u2014 two offenses charged \u2014 double jeopardy\nAlthough possession of one gram or more of cocaine is not a lesser included offense of possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, double jeopardy principles bar punishment for both offenses for possession of the same cocaine.\nAm Jur 2d, Criminal Law \u00a7\u00a7 267, 277, 279; Drugs, Narcotics, and Poisons \u00a7\u00a7 41, 48; Indictments and Informations \u00a7 223.\n2. Narcotics \u00a7 1.3 (NCI3d); Constitutional Law \u00a7 34 (NCI3d)~ one possession of cocaine \u2014 two offenses charged \u2014 double jeopardy\nPrinciples of double jeopardy barred defendant\u2019s punishment for possession with intent to sell and deliver cocaine under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(a)(l) and trafficking in the same cocaine by possession under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(h)(3).\nAm Jur 2d, Criminal Law \u00a7\u00a7 267, 277, 279; Drugs, Narcotics, and Poisons \u00a7\u00a7 41, 48; Indictments and Informations \u00a7 223.\n3. Narcotics \u00a7 6 (NCI3d)\u2014 vehicle used in commission of felony \u2014 no felony use of vehicle \u2014forfeiture proper\nThe trial court did not err in ordering the forfeiture of defendant\u2019s Corvette pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-112(c)(4) where defendant was convicted of felonies under the Controlled Substances Act in which the vehicle was used, notwithstanding defendant was convicted only for a misdemeanor under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-108(b) involving the violation of using the vehicle.\nAm Jur 2d, Forfeitures and Penalties \u00a7 25.\nAPPEAL by defendant from a judgment entered 11 August 1989 by Judge J. Milton Read, Jr. in ALAMANCE County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 November 1990.\nAttorney General Lacy H. Thornburg, by Assistant Attorney General Patricia F. Padgett, for the State.\nAppellate Defender Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., by Assistant Appellate Defender M. Patricia DeVine, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0119-01", "first_page_order": 147, "last_page_order": 154 }