{ "id": 8527395, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CECIL FRANKLIN FOSTER, JR.", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Foster", "decision_date": "1990-12-18", "docket_number": "No. 9027SC205", "first_page": "153", "last_page": "160", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "101 N.C. App. 153" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "336 S.E.2d 410", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "77 N.C. App. 741", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525213 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/77/0741-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 S.E.2d 410", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 520", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2566165 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0520-01" ] }, { "cite": "332 S.E.2d 486", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 119", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4694561, 4688998, 4696056, 4689758, 4693599 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0119-05", "/nc/314/0119-04", "/nc/314/0119-01", "/nc/314/0119-03", "/nc/314/0119-02" ] }, { "cite": "327 S.E.2d 628", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "631" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 N.C. App. 96", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522971 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/74/0096-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 S.E.2d 293", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 N.C. 252", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4684999 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/311/0252-01" ] }, { "cite": "335 S.E.2d 9", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 516", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4688931 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0516-01" ] }, { "cite": "211 S.E.2d 799", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 N.C. 419", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568225, 8568386, 8568195, 8568275, 8568159 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/286/0419-03", "/nc/286/0419-05", "/nc/286/0419-02", "/nc/286/0419-04", "/nc/286/0419-01" ] }, { "cite": "210 S.E.2d 267", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "24 N.C. App. 217", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8549776 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/24/0217-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 S.E.2d 207", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 N.C. App. 600", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525705 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/66/0600-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 S.E.2d 753", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "76 N.C. App. 453", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527450 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/76/0453-01" ] }, { "cite": "338 S.E.2d 881", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 392", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4720096, 4713962, 4716732, 4719293, 4715486 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0392-04", "/nc/315/0392-03", "/nc/315/0392-01", "/nc/315/0392-02", "/nc/315/0392-05" ] }, { "cite": "335 S.E.2d 748", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "77 N.C. App. 516", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523938 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/77/0516-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 S.E.2d 637", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 N.C. App. 498", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522311 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/78/0498-01" ] }, { "cite": "368 S.E.2d 28", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "90 N.C. App. 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523651 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/90/0237-01" ] }, { "cite": "349 S.E.2d 580", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "582" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 487", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4737583 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "491" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0487-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 673", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "693" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 398", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4720550 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "430-31" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0398-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 S.E.2d 231", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 483", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2516419, 2514435, 2514854, 2519337, 2513770 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0483-03", "/nc/322/0483-01", "/nc/322/0483-04", "/nc/322/0483-02", "/nc/322/0483-05" ] }, { "cite": "366 S.E.2d 912", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "916" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 N.C. App. 630", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524320 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "636" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/89/0630-01" ] }, { "cite": "348 S.E.2d 798", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 395", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4737458 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0395-01" ] }, { "cite": "298 S.E.2d 673", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 370", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562412 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0370-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 717, "char_count": 17060, "ocr_confidence": 0.772, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.839129297926821e-08, "percentile": 0.36277308059272956 }, "sha256": "2ec056f4bc7bea19e50d1caf1f879122ca3d0e1b34e909240712d6f0be3679e7", "simhash": "1:8067422a051e9cb6", "word_count": 2809 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:54:53.681770+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges ORR and DUNCAN concur.", "Judge DUNCAN concurred in this opinion prior to 30 November 1990." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CECIL FRANKLIN FOSTER, JR." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "GREENE, Judge.\nThe defendant entered a plea of guilty to murder in the second degree on 2 December 1988. A sentencing hearing was held and judgment was entered the same day. The trial court sentenced the defendant to fifty years imprisonment. The defendant appeals.\nThe evidence from the sentencing hearing tends to show that on 26 July 1988, the defendant was interviewed by Detective Luckadoo of the Cleveland County Sheriff\u2019s office regarding allegations that the defendant had molested his own daughter. Later the same day, the defendant received information that his wife\u2019s brother-in-law, Howard Champion, was the one who had molested the defendant\u2019s daughter. The defendant\u2019s wife and other family members were aware that the defendant\u2019s daughter had been molested by Champion, but the defendant knew nothing of it until 26 July 1988.\nThe following morning, the defendant tried to call Detective Luckadoo but he was unavailable. A short time later, the defendant went to Champion\u2019s home, taking with him a .22-caliber pistol. When the defendant arrived at Champion\u2019s home, he found Champion\u2019s wife unloading groceries from her car. The defendant told her he wanted to talk to Champion. Mrs. Champion called her husband who was in the bedroom asleep. The defendant waited about five or ten minutes and Champion came out to the living room where the defendant was waiting and sat down on the couch.\nIn his statement to the police, the defendant stated that when Champion entered the living room, he confronted Champion about molesting his daughter and that Champion denied it. While the defendant was talking to Champion he saw a photograph of Champion holding the defendant\u2019s daughter in his lap. Suddenly, Champion jumped up from the couch and told the defendant he was getting tired of him. The defendant pulled his gun from his pocket and shot Champion in the chest. Champion\u2019s wife began screaming, asking the defendant not to shoot Champion because Champion did not mean to hurt the defendant\u2019s daughter. The defendant then fired the remaining five rounds in the pistol, shooting Champion in the head.\nAt the sentencing hearing, Champion\u2019s wife testified that she and Champion entered the living room together that morning and Champion sat down on the couch. Mrs. Champion turned and saw the defendant holding the gun in his hand. The defendant then told Champion to tell his wife what he had done to the defendant\u2019s daughter. Champion denied doing anything. Mrs. Champion started to leave the room, but the defendant pointed his gun at her and told her to sit down. The defendant then said, \u201cI\u2019ve been to Social Services and they . . . and I just can\u2019t take anymore. Bad mother. . . .\u201d At that point, the defendant shot Champion. Mrs. Champion began screaming for the defendant to stop. She stated that every time the defendant pulled the trigger he said, \u201cBad boy. Bad boy.\u201d Just before the defendant fired the last shot, Mrs. Champion screamed for him to stop, telling the defendant that Champion was dead. The defendant said \u201che ain\u2019t either\u201d and fired the last shot. The defendant then told Mrs. Champion she could go outside. Once outside, Mrs. Champion asked the defendant to \u201cjust let me go down there,\u201d referring to the home of one of her relatives. The defendant said, \u201cNo, come on, let\u2019s go back in and if he ain\u2019t dead we\u2019ll shoot him some more.\u201d\nAt the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court found as statutory mitigating factors (1) that the defendant had no criminal record; (2) that the defendant voluntarily acknowledged wrongdoing to a law enforcement officer at an early stage; (3) that the defendant had been honorably discharged from the armed services; and (4) that the defendant was a person of good reputation in his community. The trial court found as a nonstatutory mitigating factor that the defendant suffered from a mental or emotional condition that was insufficient to cause the offense but which may have contributed to the defendant\u2019s actions. The court found as the sole aggravating factor the nonstatutory factor that the defendant had specific intent to kill after premeditation and deliberation. The court then found that the aggravating factor outweighed the mitigating factors, and imposed the sentence from which the defendant appeals.\nThe issues are; (I) whether the trial court\u2019s finding of premeditation and deliberation as an aggravating factor is supported by the evidence; (II) whether the court erred by failing to find as a mitigating factor that the defendant acted under strong provocation; and (III) whether the court erred by finding that the aggravating factor outweighed the mitigating factors.\nWe first note that the defendant has provided in the record only one assignment of error for his three arguments, and that the one assignment of error is defective in that it does not state the \u201clegal basis upon which error is assigned.\u201d N.C.R. App. P. 10(c)(1). However, we choose to suspend the rules as provided by N.C.R. App. P. 2, and address the defendant\u2019s arguments.\nI\nThe defendant first concedes that premeditation and deliberation is a proper nonstatutory aggravating factor where the defendant pleads guilty to murder in the second degree. See State v. Melton, 307 N.C. 370, 298 S.E.2d 673 (1983). However, the defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence to support such a finding in this case. We disagree.\nThe State has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of an aggravating factor. State v. Thompson, 318 N.C. 395, 348 S.E.2d 798 (1986). Premeditation and deliberation must usually be established by circumstantial evidence. State v. Lloyd, 89 N.C. App. 630, 636, 366 S.E.2d 912, 916, disc. rev. denied, 322 N.C. 483, 370 S.E.2d 231 (1988). Our Supreme Court has found that the circumstances which tend to establish premeditation and deliberation include:\n(1) want of provocation on the part of the deceased; (2) the conduct and statements of the defendant before and after the killing; (3) threats and declarations of the defendant before and during the course of the occurrence giving rise to the death of the deceased; (4) ill-will or previous difficulty between the parties; (5) the dealing of lethal blows after the deceased has been felled and rendered helpless; and (6) evidence that the killing was done in a brutal manner.\nId. (quoting State v. Gladden, 315 N.C. 398, 430-31, 340 S.E.2d 673, 693 (1986)).\nThe Court has also held that the nature and number of the victim\u2019s wounds may infer premeditation and deliberation. State v. Carter, 318 N.C. 487, 491, 349 S.E.2d 580, 582 (1986).\nIn the present case, the defendant went to Champion\u2019s home, armed with a loaded .22-caliber pistol, on the morning after being told that Champion had molested the defendant\u2019s daughter. There was evidence that the defendant refused to allow Mrs. Champion to leave the living room. With her still in the room, the defendant shot Champion one time in the chest. He proceeded to fire the pistol five more times, shooting Champion in the head. Before firing the last shot, Mrs. Champion pleaded with the defendant to stop shooting because Champion was already dead. The defendant refused to believe her and fired the last shot into Champion\u2019s head. Once the defendant and Mrs. Champion were outside, the defendant said \u201clet\u2019s go back inside and if he ain\u2019t dead we\u2019ll shoot him some more.\u201d\nWe conclude that the defendant\u2019s conduct and statements, as well as the number and nature of the wounds inflicted, establishes circumstances from which the trial court could find that the defendant committed the offense after premeditation and deliberation.\nII\nThe defendant next argues that the court erred by failing to find as a statutory mitigating factor that the defendant acted under strong provocation. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.4(a)(2)i (1988) (providing as a mitigating factor that the \u201cdefendant acted under strong provocation . . .\u201d). The defendant contends he was provoked by receiving information that Champion had molested the defendant\u2019s daughter.\nThe State argues that in order to support a finding of provocation, there must be a showing that the defendant was threatened or challenged by the victim. See State v. Faison, 90 N.C. App. 237, 368 S.E.2d 28 (1988); State v. Braswell, 78 N.C. App. 498, 337 S.E.2d 637 (1985); State v. Bare, 77 N.C. App. 516, 335 S.E.2d 748 (1985), disc. rev. denied, 315 N.C. 392, 338 S.E.2d 881 (1986); State v. Benfield, 76 N.C. App. 453, 333 S.E.2d 753 (1985); State v. Puckett, 66 N.C. App. 600, 312 S.E.2d 207 (1984). The defendant concedes that he was never threatened or challenged by the victim in this case, but instead argues that \u201cprovocation\u201d should be expanded to include an offense committed in the heat of passion. The defendant further argues that \u201cheat of passion\u201d means that the defendant\u2019s state of mind was so violent as to overcome his reason such that he could not think to the extent necessary to form a deliberate purpose and control his actions. See State v. Pope, 24 N.C. App. 217, 210 S.E.2d 267 (1974), cert. denied, 286 N.C. 419, 211 S.E.2d 799 (1975). The defendant concludes that he possessed such a state of mind at the time he killed Champion because of the information he received to the effect that Champion molested the defendant\u2019s daughter.\nThere are cases which suggest that provocation, for purposes of sentencing, is not limited to situations where the victim threatened or challenged the defendant before the defendant committed the offense. In State v. Cameron, 314 N.C. 516, 335 S.E.2d 9 (1985), the trial court failed to find as a mitigating factor that the defendant acted under strong provocation where the defendant pled guilty to murder in the second degree for killing a man he had mistaken for his wife\u2019s alleged paramour. The defendant made no contention that the victim threatened or challenged him in any way. The Supreme Court upheld the trial court on this issue. However, the Court\u2019s holding was based on the presence of conflicting evidence. The Court did not conclude that there must be an actual threat or challenge to the defendant. Similarly, in State v. Watson, 311 N.C. 252, 316 S.E.2d 293 (1984), the trial court failed to find provocation as a mitigating factor where the defendant murdered his wife after learning that she was leaving him and upon finding evidence that someone had been visiting his wife at home that same day. The Supreme Court upheld the trial court, finding insufficient evidence to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant acted under strong provocation. Again, however, the Court did not dismiss the argument based on a holding that provocation is limited to a threat or challenge by the victim. Thus, strong provocation may be found to mitigate the offense where the defendant acted in the \u201cheat of passion\u201d other than that arising as a result of a direct challenge or threat by the victim.\nHowever, provocation will not be found where the defendant had time for a \u201ccooling of the blood.\u201d In State v. Highsmith, 74 N.C. App. 96, 327 S.E.2d 628, disc. rev. denied, 314 N.C. 119, 332 S.E.2d 486 (1985), this Court held that the defendant failed to show that he acted under strong provocation where he was originally threatened by the victim, but then walked six blocks to his residence, obtained a shotgun and shells, then, approximately twenty minutes later, returned to the vicinity where the original altercation with the victim had occurred and assaulted the victim. In State v. Faison, 90 N.C. App. 237, 368 S.E.2d 28 (1988), this Court held that the evidence did not compel a finding of provocation where the defendant first confronted the victim at work, then the defendant walked out to his car, obtained a rifle, returned and shot the victim numerous times. In State v. Canty, 321 N.C. 520, 364 S.E.2d 410 (1988), the Supreme Court upheld a finding of no provocation by the trial court where the victim stabbed the defendant and then threatened the defendant when he was released from the hospital, and where the defendant killed the victim forty-eight hours after this initial altercation.\nIn the present case, the defendant confronted the victim the day after the defendant received the information that the victim had molested the defendant\u2019s daughter. The defendant\u2019s actions on the day he killed the victim were \u201cmore consistent with a prior determination to seek out a confrontation rather than a state of passion without time to cool placing defendant beyond control of his reason.\u201d Highsmith at 100-101, 327 S.E.2d at 631. Assuming, arguendo, that the defendant was \u201cprovoked\u201d as that term is used in the statute, we find that the lapse of time between the provocation and the defendant\u2019s actions tends to contradict the defendant\u2019s contention that he acted under strong provocation. The trial court\u2019s failure to find a mitigating factor will not be overturned on appeal unless the evidence in support of the factor is uncontradicted, substantial, and there is no reason to doubt its credibility. State v. Lane, 77 N.C. App. 741, 336 S.E.2d 410 (1985). Accordingly, we find no error in the court\u2019s failure to find the mitigating factor of strong provocation.\nIll\nThe defendant\u2019s final argument is that the trial court erred by finding that the aggravating factor outweighed the mitigating factors. However, the defendant rests this argument primarily on the alleged errors addressed above. The defendant contends that, by erroneously finding the aggravating factor of premeditation and deliberation and by erroneously failing to find the mitigating factor of strong provocation, the court\u2019s weighing of the factors was tainted. Since we find no error in the trial court\u2019s findings with respect to aggravating and mitigating factors, we find no error in the court\u2019s finding that the aggravating factor outweighs the mitigating factor.\nAffirmed.\nJudges ORR and DUNCAN concur.\nJudge DUNCAN concurred in this opinion prior to 30 November 1990.", "type": "majority", "author": "GREENE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Lacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General, by James Peeler Smith, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.", "Lamb Law Offices, P.A., by William E. Lamb, Jr., for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CECIL FRANKLIN FOSTER, JR.\nNo. 9027SC205\n(Filed 18 December 1990)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 1123 (NCI4th)\u2014 second degree murder\u2014 aggravating factor of premeditation and deliberation\u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nEvidence was sufficient to support the trial court\u2019s finding as an aggravating factor for second degree murder to which defendant pled guilty that defendant committed the offense after premeditation and deliberation where it tended to show that defendant went to the victim\u2019s home armed with a .22-caliber pistol on the morning after being told that the victim had molested defendant\u2019s daughter; defendant refused to allow the victim\u2019s wife to leave the living room; with her still in the room, defendant shot the victim once in the chest; he fired the pistol five more times, shooting the victim in the head; before defendant fired the last shot, the victim\u2019s wife pleaded with him to stop shooting because the victim was already dead; defendant refused to believe her and fired the last shot into the victim\u2019s head; once defendant and the victim\u2019s wife were outside, defendant said, \u201clet\u2019s go back inside and if he ain\u2019t dead we\u2019ll shoot him some more.\u201d\nAm Jur 2d, Homicide \u00a7\u00a7 439, 554.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 1238 (NCI4th|\u2014 mitigating factor of strong provocation \u2014evidence of cooling off period\nStrong provocation may be found to mitigate the offense where defendant acted in the \u201cheat of passion\u201d other than that arising as a result of a direct challenge or threat by the victim; however, defendant in this case failed to show strong provocation where the evidence tended to show that he did not go to the home of the victim until the morning after he was told that the victim had molested his daughter; he thus had a cooling off period; and his actions were more consistent with a prior determination to seek out a confrontation rather than a state of passion placing him beyond control of his reason. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.4(a)(2)i.\nAm Jur 2d, Homicide \u00a7\u00a7 62, 69.\n3. Criminal Law \u00a7 1081 (NCI4th)\u2014 mitigating factors outweighed by one aggravating factor \u2014no error\nIn a prosecution of defendant for the second degree murder of a man who allegedly molested defendant\u2019s daughter, the trial court did not err in finding that the aggravating factor of premeditation and deliberation outweighed the mitigating factors of no criminal record, voluntary acknowledgment of wrongdoing at an early stage, honorable discharge from the armed services, good reputation in the community, and mental or emotional condition which was insufficient to cause the offenses but which may have contributed to defendant\u2019s actions.\nAm Jur 2d, Criminal Law \u00a7\u00a7 598, 599; Homicide \u00a7\u00a7 290, 554.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 2 December 1988 by Judge John M. Gardner in CLEVELAND County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 28 September 1990.\nLacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General, by James Peeler Smith, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.\nLamb Law Offices, P.A., by William E. Lamb, Jr., for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0153-01", "first_page_order": 181, "last_page_order": 188 }