{
  "id": 8527636,
  "name": "S.E.T.A. UNC-CH, INC., Petitioner-Appellant v. WILLIAM D. HUFFINES, M.D., Chairman of the Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee, of The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Respondent-Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "S.E.T.A. UNC-CH, Inc. v. Huffines",
  "decision_date": "1991-01-15",
  "docket_number": "No. 9010SC353",
  "first_page": "292",
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    "judges": [
      "Judges WELLS and COZORT concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "S.E.T.A. UNC-CH, INC., Petitioner-Appellant v. WILLIAM D. HUFFINES, M.D., Chairman of the Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee, of The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Respondent-Appellee"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "LEWIS, Judge.\nOn 14 January 1989, petitioner, Students for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, University of North Carolina \u2014 Chapel Hill (hereinafter \u201cSETA\u201d), an incorporated, voluntary student organization, sought access to various documents of the Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee (hereinafter \u201cIACUC\u201d) relating to the care and use of animals in scientific experiments. The respondent refused to provide the \u201capplication for approval\u201d forms for four particular experiments submitted for review to the IACUC. The respondent also refused to provide copies of the minutes' of the IACUC meetings.\nOn 9 October 1989, SETA petitioned the Superior Court for an order compelling disclosure. In its application, petitioner requested that: (1) the court enter an order directing the respondent to release the records sought by petitioner or show cause why respondent should not be required to produce the records; (2) the court declare the requested records to be \u201cpublic records\u201d under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 132-9; (3) respondent be enjoined permanently from denying access to these records; and (4) the court award to petitioners the costs and expenses of suit, including a reasonable attorney\u2019s fee.\nOn 20 December 1989, the court denied petitioner\u2019s application finding that each requested document contained confidential information of proprietary value, which could not be redacted, and that public policy considerations protected information relating to experiments on live animals and outweighed any need for disclosure. Based upon these findings of fact, the court concluded as a matter of law that: (1) the requested documents contained \u201ctrade secrets\u201d as defined by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 66-152; (2) the court identified Art. 24, Chap. 66 of the North Carolina General Statutes as an independent ground for denial of disclosure; (3) the court concluded that \u201cpublic policy considerations alone served as a basis for denial\u201d; and (4) the court held that a \u201cQualified privilege of academic freedom guaranteed by the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States,\u201d exempted the requested documents from disclosure. From denial of its petition, SETA appeals.\nWe first note that SETA has voluntarily dismissed its appeal regarding the disclosure of the minutes of the IACUC meetings. Accordingly, this opinion does not discuss the merits of that aspect of the case. This appeal addresses the issue of whether the respondents are required under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 132-1 et seq. (Public Records Law) to disclose any or all of the information contained in the applications submitted by research scientists to the IACUC.\nThe IACUC is a committee created under the Federal Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2131-2157 (1985), to inspect animal study areas and animal facilities, and to review all potential research experiments to ensure that all experiments minimize pain and distress in animals used in experiments. In conjunction with its duty to review potential research, the IACUC requires the \u201cprincipal investigation\u201d seeking funding for a research project using vertebrate animals, to submit to the committee a protocol application. The application seeks to elicit information regarding the care and use of the animals throughout the experimentation as well as the method of euthanasia, if necessary. SETA presently seeks to obtain access to four of these applications: 1. \u201cEffects of Opiate Manipulations on Latent Inhibitions in Rabbits: Sensitivity of the Medial Septal Region to Intracranial Treatments\u201d; 2. \u201cRecovery and Regeneration of Spinal Neuron Injury\u201d; 3. \u201cLong-Term Neurobiological Effects of Early Social Isolation,\u201d and 4. \u201cNeurophysiological Studies of Respiratory Control.\u201d We grant their petition in part.\nWe hold that the trial court erred in finding that no portion of the requested applications could be disclosed to petitioners and that the information could not be redacted. The information requested in the applications include (1) the title of the project; (2) the name and phone number of the researchers; (3) the researcher\u2019s department; (4) the species and number of animals to be used; (5) justification for use of the animals and significance of the project; (6) procedures to be performed on the animals; (7) whether survival surgery would be performed and if so, pre and post operative care; (8) names and phone numbers of personnel who would work with the animals; (9) their training and experience; (10) what steps would be taken to minimize pain and discomfort; and (11) the method of euthanasia.\nRespondents argue that the information contained in the applications is confidential and proprietary information which must be protected to insure the safety and security of the researcher. The affidavits submitted by respondent indicate that the researchers fear disclosure of their projects would result in violence against them and their staff as well as jeopardize any publication and commercial interest they may have in the research. In essence respondent argues that releasing the applications would cause a \u201cchilling effect\u201d on university research.\nWe reject respondent\u2019s argument that the entire IACUC application- must be protected because of the researcher\u2019s fear of violence and- harassment. The applications are so general in nature as to reveal little or nothing to others. The \u201cchilling effect\u201d contemplated should not occur. See University of Pennsylvania v. Equal Employment Opp. Com., 110 S.Ct. 577, 107 L.Ed.2d 571 (1990). It is significant that after the research proposal has received approval from the IACUC Committee, it is submitted to the applicable federal funding agency. The federal applications for funding are much more detailed documents than the original applications to the IACUC Committee. Also, the federal applications disclose much more fully the nature of the proposed research. These documents are subject to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act. See 5 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 552 et seq.\nPortions of the federal applications may not be made public if the procedures therein could be patented. That is a valid basis for excluding information and we recognize it as such. No one has contended that any part of the four \u201capplications\u201d before us contains patentable ideas or procedures. If subsequent applications on the state level in North Carolina contain material which could be patented, that will surely be made clear to the court having cognizance.\nSETA has obtained the federal grant applications for all four of the IACUC projects which are the subject of this appeal. However, we are sensitive to the needs of researchers to protect their privacy and the privacy of their staffs. We conclude that public policy does require that any information contained in the applications relating to the names of the researcher and staff members, their telephone numbers, addresses, their experience and the department name be redacted from the IACUC applications. We also conclude that applications not approved need not be made public.\nThe respondent also contends that the applications are protected because all of the information contained in the applications constitutes confidential trade secrets. We disagree. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 66-152 defines a \u201ctrade secret\u201d:\n\u201cTrade secret\u201d means business or technical information, including but not limited to a formula, pattern, program, device, compilation of information, method, technique or process that:\na. Derives independent actual or potential commercial value from not being generally known or readily ascertainable through independent development or reverse engineering by persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use. . . .\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 66-152(3)a.\nWe conclude that the information elicited by the questions in these applications are not \u201ctrade secrets\u201d subject to protection. What type and how many animals are going to be used in a particular research project is not a trade secret, nor is whether surgery is going to be performed or the type of anesthesia to be used. Pre and postoperative procedures are not trade secrets, nor is how the animals\u2019 pain and discomfort is to be minimized nor the method of euthanasia, if any. The IACUC must disclose this information. Furthermore, while the application seeks a brief discussion of the justification of the proposed research and the projects\u2019 objectives, it is clear that the committee is only seeking a very general description from the applicant. Such general description can hardly be considered as a \u201ctrade secret\u201d as defined above. The description required is far less detailed than the information required to be submitted which is obtainable through the Freedom of Information Act in federal grant applications. We have examined the four requested applications in camera and find that as to these applications the questions relating to research objectives and justifications are not trade secrets. See ASPCA v. State University of New York at Stony Brook, 556 N.Y.S.2d 447 (1990) (questions asked on an IACUC application regarding justification and objective of research held not to be trade secrets under applicable state law).\nFinally, respondents argued below that the information was protected by the First Amendment. They argue that the First Amendment creates an academic exception for disclosure of documents. This argument has been rejected by the United States Supreme Court. University of Pennsylvania v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 110 S.Ct. 577, 107 L.Ed.2d 571 (1990). This case was handed down after Judge Allen\u2019s decision so he could not have known of it. We are bound by this decision and conclude that the trial court erred in concluding that disclosure was not permitted because of academic privilege.\nAs to these eleven matters on these four applications, we find as follows:\n(1) The \u201cTitle of the Project\u201d is not excludable and must be made public.\n(2) The names and phone numbers and addresses of the applicant and researchers are confidential and need not be released.\n(3) The researcher\u2019s department need not be released.\n(4) The species and number of animals used is not excludable and should be released.\n(5) Justification for use of the animals and significance of the project in these applications is not excludable and should be released.\n(6) Procedures to be performed on the animals are, in these applications, not excludable and should be released.\n(7) Whether or not survival surgery would be performed and if so, pre and postoperative care, is not excludable in these applications and should be released.\n(8) The names, addresses, departments and phone numbers of personnel who would work with the animals should not be disclosed.\n(9) The training and experience of the applicant and researchers should not be disclosed.\n(10) Steps taken to minimize pain and discomfort as described here are not excludable and should be disclosed.\n(11) Method of euthanasia, if any, in these applications is not excludable and should be disclosed.\nIt is conceivable that some of the answers to questions in future applications could contain \u201ctrade secrets\u201d or be patentable and hence excludable. These questions will have to be decided on a case by case basis. In the present case, we hold that the Public Records Law weighs on the side of disclosure of public documents.\nWe cannot permit a procedure to be withheld from the public merely because someone chooses to label it a \u201ctrade secret,\u201d when it is performed daily by many people and taught in schools all over the world.\nRemanded to Wake County Superior Court for entry of an order consistent with this opinion.\nJudges WELLS and COZORT concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "LEWIS, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Gary L. Francione and Alexander Chams for petitioner-appellant.",
      "Attorney General Lacy H. Thornburg, by Assistant Attorney General James Wallace, Jr. and Special Deputy Attorney General Charles M. Hensey, for respondent-appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "S.E.T.A. UNC-CH, INC., Petitioner-Appellant v. WILLIAM D. HUFFINES, M.D., Chairman of the Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee, of The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Respondent-Appellee\nNo. 9010SC353\n(Filed 15 January 1991)\n1. Animals, Livestock, or Poultry \u00a7 1 |NCI4th) \u2014 experiments using animals \u2014 fears of violence from disclosure \u2014 applications to IACUC not protected\nInformation in applications to the Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee (IACUC) for approval of research experiments using animals is not required to be protected because of researchers\u2019 fears of violence and harassment.\nAm Jur 2d, Animals \u00a7 30.5.\n2. Animals, Livestock, or Poultry \u00a7 1 (NCI4th)\u2014 experiments using animals \u2014 applications to IACUC \u2014 no trade secrets\nInformation in applications to the IACUC for approval of research experiments using animals did not constitute confidential trade secrets protected from disclosure by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 66-152.\nAm Jur 2d, Animals \u00a7 30.5; Depositions and Discovery \u00a7 47.\nApplicability of state animal cruelty statute to medical or scientific experimentation employing animals. 42 ALR4th 860.\n3. Animals, Livestock, or Poultry \u00a7 1 (NCI4th)\u2014 experiments using animals \u2014applications to IACUC \u2014academic freedom\nInformation in applications to the IACUC for approval of research experiments using animals was not protected from public disclosure by principles of academic freedom under the First Amendment.\nAm Jur 2d, Animals \u00a7 30.5; Depositions and Discovery \u00a7 29.\n4. Animals, Livestock, or Poultry \u00a7 1 (NCI4th)\u2014 experiments using animals \u2014 applications to IACUC \u2014 portions required to be disclosed\nThe IACUC is required by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 132-9 to disclose to petitioners portions of applications for approval of animal research experiments relating to the titles of the project; the species and number of animals to be used; justification for use of the animals and significance of the projects; procedures to be performed on the animals; whether surgery will be performed and, if so, pre- and postoperative care; steps taken to minimize pain and discomfort; and the method of euthanasia, if any. However, petitioners are not entitled to the disclosure of information in the applications relating to the department name and the names, telephone numbers, addresses and experience of the applicants and any other researchers or staff members participating in the experiments.\nAm Jur 2d, Animals \u00a7 30.5; Depositions and Discovery \u00a7\u00a7 21, 34-36.\nApplicability of state animal cruelty statute to medical or scientific experimentation employing animals. 42 ALR4th 860.\nAPPEAL by petitioner from a judgment entered 20 December 1989 by Judge J. B. Allen, Jr., in Superior Court, WAKE County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 24 October 1990.\nGary L. Francione and Alexander Chams for petitioner-appellant.\nAttorney General Lacy H. Thornburg, by Assistant Attorney General James Wallace, Jr. and Special Deputy Attorney General Charles M. Hensey, for respondent-appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0292-01",
  "first_page_order": 320,
  "last_page_order": 326
}
