{ "id": 8527771, "name": "ROY D. MORGAN, Plaintiff v. G. C. MUSSELWHITE, JR., and QUICK STOP FOOD MART, INC., Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Morgan v. Musselwhite", "decision_date": "1991-01-15", "docket_number": "No. 9022SC583", "first_page": "390", "last_page": "393", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "101 N.C. App. 390" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-6.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "32 ALR4th 1221", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "323 S.E.2d 923", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 622", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4755493, 4755336, 4753483, 4753324, 4752111 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0622-01", "/nc/312/0622-05", "/nc/312/0622-03", "/nc/312/0622-04", "/nc/312/0622-02" ] }, { "cite": "319 S.E.2d 290", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "70 N.C. App. 303", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521768 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/70/0303-01" ] }, { "cite": "240 S.E.2d 345", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 N.C. 73", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570898 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/294/0073-01" ] }, { "cite": "232 S.E.2d 846", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "32 N.C. App. 400", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8550917 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/32/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "317 S.E.2d 408", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "69 N.C. App. 551", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526654 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/69/0551-01" ] }, { "cite": "355 S.E.2d 479", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "319 N.C. 413", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4741625 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/319/0413-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-6.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(f)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 402, "char_count": 6696, "ocr_confidence": 0.748, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.9408684735307007e-07, "percentile": 0.8481038855933299 }, "sha256": "0040e4d4907552b41bfcb22a7174f095fff9fda04eef137f474217f2fd6f41fb", "simhash": "1:9bd146d875242d6c", "word_count": 1068 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:54:53.681770+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Eagles and Parker concur." ], "parties": [ "ROY D. MORGAN, Plaintiff v. G. C. MUSSELWHITE, JR., and QUICK STOP FOOD MART, INC., Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ARNOLD, Judge.\nAccording to plaintiff\u2019s deposition and other documents in the record, he sustained thirty percent permanent partial disability of his back as a result of an accident arising out of his employment in February 1986. After the accident, plaintiff filed a workers\u2019 compensation claim and began receiving benefits. Plaintiff resumed working in June 1986, but stopped again on 31 July 1986, claiming he had been injured by a work-related polygraph examination. Plaintiff again received benefits for his work-related injury. Starting in the fall of 1987, plaintiff worked for several months for another convenience store. After leaving in July 1986, plaintiff did not return to work for defendant.\nOn 16 December 1987, defendant informed plaintiff that, in accordance with the company\u2019s sixty-day leave of absence policy, his employment was terminated as of 15 December 1987. At that time, plaintiff had not worked for defendant for more than sixteen months and was working for one of defendant\u2019s competitors. Plaintiff admits that he has no evidence that his discharge was in retaliation for his filing the workers\u2019 compensation claim.\nSummary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ellis v. Williams, 319 N.C. 413, 355 S.E.2d 479 (1987). If any one ground is sufficient to sustain a finding of summary judgment, the trial court\u2019s judgment must be upheld. Payne v. Buffalo Reinsurance Co., 69 N.C. App. 551, 317 S.E.2d 408 (1984).\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-6.1(f) provides for a one-year statute of limitations for actions filed under the retaliatory discharge statute. Plaintiff admits in his affidavit and deposition testimony that by no later than the spring of 1987, and perhaps as early as November of 1986, \u201cI knew that [the company] wasn\u2019t going to put me back to work.\u201d (See affidavit, but then says \u201cSome time later . . see also deposition of plaintiff at 65, 78-79, 82, 89.) Plaintiff filed this complaint on 5 December 1988. Plaintiff\u2019s own evidence, therefore, raises the question of whether his action.was barred by the one-year statute of limitation.\nPlaintiff argues that the statute of limitation did not begin to run until defendant officially notified him of his termination by a letter dated 16 December 1988. Plaintiff claims that his cause of action did not accrue until he was officially discharged, and, concomitantly, that the statute of limitation did not begin to run until that time. We disagree. Plaintiff\u2019s cause of action arose when he became aware of defendant\u2019s alleged acts that would give rise to the claim. North Carolina State Ports Authority v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 32 N.C. App. 400, 232 S.E.2d 846 (1977), aff\u2019d 294 N.C. 73, 240 S.E.2d 345 (1978). By no later than the spring of 1987, plaintiff states he knew defendant no longer planned to employ him. It was at this time that his cause of action arose, and a one-year period from that date expired well before this claim was filed. Summary judgment is affirmed.\nWe also affirm the judgment because our review reveals that plaintiff\u2019s evidence is insufficient to support his claim that his discharge was in retaliation for his filing the workers\u2019 compensation claim. The burden of proof in a retaliatory discharge action is on the employee. G.S. \u00a7 97-6.1(b). The statute does not prohibit all discharges of employees who are involved in a workers\u2019 compensation claim, it only prohibits those discharges made because the employee exercises his compensation rights. See Henderson v. Traditional Log Homes, Inc., 70 N.C. App. 303, 319 S.E.2d 290, cert. denied, 312 N.C. 622, 323 S.E.2d 923 (1984).\nPlaintiff simply contends that because he filed the claim and then coincidentally was terminated almost two years later, he has provided sufficient evidence to avoid summary judgment. Plaintiff admits he has no other evidence that his termination resulted from his filing the disability claim. Plaintiff also admits defendant allowed him to return to work after he filed his claim and that he, not defendant, terminated the second period of employment. Plaintiff\u2019s contentions to the contrary, these allegations do not raise a triable, material issue of fact. Summary judgment is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nJudges Eagles and Parker concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "ARNOLD, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Joel C. Harbinson for plaintiff appellant.", "Fisher & Phillips, by Griffin B. Bell, Jr.; and Eisele & Ashbum, P.A., by Douglas G. Eisele, for defendant appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ROY D. MORGAN, Plaintiff v. G. C. MUSSELWHITE, JR., and QUICK STOP FOOD MART, INC., Defendants\nNo. 9022SC583\n(Filed 15 January 1991)\n1. Master and Servant \u00a7 10.2 (NCI3d)\u2014 retaliatory discharge for compensation claim \u2014 statute of limitations\nPlaintiff\u2019s action for retaliatory discharge for filing a workers\u2019 compensation claim was barred by the one-year statute of limitations of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-6.1(f) where plaintiff admitted that he knew more than a year before he filed the action that defendant no longer planned to employ him, although defendant was officially notified of his termination by letter less than a year before he filed the action.\nAm Jur 2d, Workmen\u2019s Compensation \u00a7 55.\nRecovery for discharge from employment in retaliation for filing workers\u2019 compensation claim. 32 ALR4th 1221.\n2. Master and Servant \u00a7 10.2 (NCI3d)\u2014 retaliatory discharge for compensation claim \u2014 insufficient forecast of evidence\nPlaintiff\u2019s forecast of evidence was insufficient to support his claim that his discharge was in retaliation for his filing of a workers\u2019 compensation claim where it showed only that he filed the claim and was terminated almost two years later while he was working for one of defendant\u2019s competitors.\nAm Jur 2d, Workmen\u2019s Compensation \u00a7 55.\nRecovery for discharge from employment in retaliation for filing workers\u2019 compensation claim. 32 ALR4th 1221.\nAppeal by plaintiff from order entered 18 December 1989 by Judge Preston Cornelius in ALEXANDER County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 5 December 1990.\nThis appeal arises from an action for retaliatory discharge under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-6.1 (1985). On 5 December 1988, plaintiff Roy Morgan filed a complaint against defendants alleging that he had been terminated and discharged from employment with the corporate defendant in retaliation for his filing a workers\u2019 compensation claim.\nSometime prior to the hearing concerning the order before us, defendant Musselwhite was dismissed from the case because the complaint failed to state a claim as to him. At the motion hearing below, the corporate defendant moved pursuant to Rule 56 for summary judgment. The trial court granted defendant\u2019s motion, and this appeal followed.\nJoel C. Harbinson for plaintiff appellant.\nFisher & Phillips, by Griffin B. Bell, Jr.; and Eisele & Ashbum, P.A., by Douglas G. Eisele, for defendant appellees." }, "file_name": "0390-01", "first_page_order": 418, "last_page_order": 421 }