{ "id": 8528059, "name": "DANA G. ESTRIDGE, Plaintiff v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Estridge v. Ford Motor Co.", "decision_date": "1991-02-19", "docket_number": "No. 9026SC444", "first_page": "716", "last_page": "719", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "101 N.C. App. 716" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "51 ALR4th 872", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "203 S.E.2d 48", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "50", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 N.C. 77", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561764 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "79-80", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/285/0077-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 S.E.2d 468", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "471" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 715", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564683 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "718" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0715-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 S.E.2d 743", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4732963 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "344 S.E.2d 814", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 N.C. App. 639", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524857 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/81/0639-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 401, "char_count": 6652, "ocr_confidence": 0.77, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.5916105598991863e-07, "percentile": 0.8184121931433068 }, "sha256": "adcf0ecccd693ccaba0585c7395c289fce7edb68557558792f5dc2b07e0111d0", "simhash": "1:f2eb9f730c7db13c", "word_count": 1109 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:54:53.681770+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge HEDRICK and Judge WYNN concur." ], "parties": [ "DANA G. ESTRIDGE, Plaintiff v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "LEWIS, Judge.\nThis case presents the Court with one main issue: whether the trial court erred in granting the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the plaintiff\u2019s claim, which was based on the New Motor Vehicles Warranties Act, pursuant to North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 41(b).\nOn 14 September 1987, the plaintiff leased an automobile from an authorized dealer of the defendant\u2019s products. The plaintiff alleged that the car began to malfunction about one week after the lease began. The plaintiff also alleged that she took the car for repair to an authorized dealer, but the attempted repairs failed. She returned the car for repairs at least four times. On 18 July 1989, the plaintiff notified the defendant in writing that the defendant had fifteen days in which to repair the car. The defendant requested that the car be taken to a local dealer for repair and the plaintiff complied. However, the repairs were again unavailing.\nOn 8 September 1989, the plaintiff wrote the defendant that all efforts to fix the car had failed. Further, she wrote pursuant to North Carolina\u2019s Motor Vehicle Warranty Act, the defendant had ten days in which to refund certain monies including the full contract price. The defendant refunded nothing.\nOn 23 October 1989, the plaintiff filed an action alleging that the car she had leased was a \u201clemon\u201d under the North Carolina \u201cLemon Law.\u201d The plaintiff asked the court to: 1) enter \u201cjudgment against the defendant in the sum of $20,796.90,\u201d 2) award the plaintiff treble damages under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-351.2, and 3) award the plaintiff attorney fees under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-351.3. The defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss was based on the plaintiff\u2019s failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted in that N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 20-351 to 351.10 was not intended to apply retroactively. The defendant also argued that if the statute were applied retroactively, it would be unconstitutional. Defendant also moved for the dismissal of the plaintiffs action based on North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure of the plaintiff to comply with Rule 8(a)(2) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial judge granted the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the plaintiff\u2019s action on both grounds.\nA motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted should not be allowed unless the complaint affirmatively shows that plaintiff has no cause of action. Gatlin v. Bray, 81 N.C. App. 639, 344 S.E.2d 814 (1986). Upon such a motion, all allegations of fact in the complaint are taken as true. Jackson v. Bumgardner, 318 N.C. 172, 347 S.E.2d 743 (1986).\nHere the trial judge found that the plaintiff did not state a claim upon which relief can be granted because the legislature did not intend N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 20-351 to 351.10 to apply retroactively. The plaintiff argues that she is not attempting to use the statute in her cause of action for defects or conditions which existed prior to the enactment of the statute. Therefore, the plaintiff argues that she is not asking the court to apply the statute retroactively.\nThe 1987 change in the statutes which created the Act under which the plaintiff seeks to recover was entitled \u201cAn ACT TO PROVIDE REMEDIES FOR CONSUMERS OF NEW MOTOR VEHICLES THAT DO NOT CONFORM TO EXPRESS WARRANTIES.\u201d (1987 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 285.) As the language indicates, the remedies provided under the statute are based on the express warranties which arise at the time the contract is formed. Therefore, the rights and obligations involved in the plaintiff\u2019s claim arise out of the lease contract which was executed in September of 1987, prior to the time when the statute came into effect in North Carolina.\n\u201cThe application of a statute is deemed \u2018retroactive\u2019 or \u2018retrospective\u2019 when its operative effect is to alter the legal consequences of conduct or transactions completed prior to its enactment.\u201d Gardner v. Gardner, 300 N.C. 715, 718, 268 S.E.2d 468, 471 (1980). To apply the law to the plaintiff would require us to apply the law retroactively. Unless contrary intent is expressed by the legislature or clearly implied by the terms of the statute, we must apply the statute prospectively from its effective date. In Re Will of Mitchell, 285 N.C. 77, 79-80, 203 S.E.2d 48, 50 (1974) (citations omitted). The legislature did not express the intent that N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 20-351 to 351.10 be applied retroactively; nor is there any clear implication from the statute that the legislature intended to apply the statute retroactively. Instead, the legislature passed the statute in June of 1987 and made its intention clear that the statute become effective in October of 1987.\nThe trial judge was correct in dismissing the plaintiff\u2019s cause of action under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted in that the legislature did not intend N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 20-351 to 351.10 to apply retroactively. We need not address whether the judge was correct with respect to the dismissal based on N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 41(b), as we found the dismissal correct on other grounds.\nAffirmed.\nChief Judge HEDRICK and Judge WYNN concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "LEWIS, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Weaver, Bennett & Bland, P.A., by Bill G. Whittaker and Michael David Bland, for the plaintiff-appellant.", "Office of General Counsel, Ford Motor Company, by Gary L. Hayden; Maupin, Taylor, Ellis & Adams, P.A., by M. Keith Kapp, Jay A. Gervasi, and Daniel K. Bryson, for the defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DANA G. ESTRIDGE, Plaintiff v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant\nNo. 9026SC444\n(Filed 19 February 1991)\nAutomobiles and Other Vehicles \u00a7 253 (NCI4th)~ automobile sale\u2014 lemon law \u2014 not retroactive\nThe trial judge correctly dismissed plaintiff\u2019s cause of action for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted where plaintiff leased an automobile on 14 September 1987, subsequently made several unsuccessful attempts to have the car repaired, and then filed an action alleging that the car was a lemon under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-351 et seq. The rights and obligations involved in the plaintiff\u2019s claim arise out of a lease contract which was executed in September of 1987, prior to the time when the statute became effective in October of 1987, and the legislature did not express the intent that this statute be applied retroactively.\nAm Jur 2d, Consumer Products Warranty Acts \u00a7 67.\nValidity, construction, and effect of state motor vehicle warranty legislation (Lemon Law). 51 ALR4th 872.\nAPPEAL by plaintiff from an order entered 17 January 1990 by Judge Shirley L. Fulton in the Civil Session of the Superior Court of Mecklenburg County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 3 December 1990.\nWeaver, Bennett & Bland, P.A., by Bill G. Whittaker and Michael David Bland, for the plaintiff-appellant.\nOffice of General Counsel, Ford Motor Company, by Gary L. Hayden; Maupin, Taylor, Ellis & Adams, P.A., by M. Keith Kapp, Jay A. Gervasi, and Daniel K. Bryson, for the defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0716-01", "first_page_order": 744, "last_page_order": 747 }