{
  "id": 8522703,
  "name": "WILLIAM J. TOWNSEND, Plaintiff v. ARLENE R. T. HARRIS, Defendant",
  "name_abbreviation": "Townsend v. Harris",
  "decision_date": "1991-03-05",
  "docket_number": "No. 9012SC763",
  "first_page": "131",
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    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:20:04.252791+00:00",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges COZORT and LEWIS concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "WILLIAM J. TOWNSEND, Plaintiff v. ARLENE R. T. HARRIS, Defendant"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "HEDRICK, Chief Judge.\nThe plaintiff, an attorney, has appealed from a judgment declaring his contract with his client, the defendant, void.\nIn her counterclaim, the defendant sought a declaratory judgment, pursuant to G.S. 1-254, declaring that her contract with the plaintiff was void as being against public policy.\nThe record before us discloses that on 2 November 1979, the parties entered into a contract whereby the plaintiff agreed to represent the defendant in an action to recover alimony and child support. The plaintiff\u2019s fee for this representation was to be twenty per cent (20%) of the total amount recovered.\nThe trial court allowed defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment and entered a judgment declaring that the contract entered into between the plaintiff and the defendant was void.\nThe only question presented on this appeal is whether the trial court erred in declaring the contract in this case void.\nIn Thompson v. Thompson, 70 N.C. App. 147, 319 S.E.2d 315 (1984), we held that a contract for the payment of a contingent fee upon an attorney procuring a divorce for his client, or contingent in amount upon the amount of alimony and/or property awarded is void as against public policy. Thompson was appealed to the Supreme Court because one of the judges on the Court of Appeals dissented, but not because of the holding that the contingent fee contract was void as being against public policy. On appeal, our Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Vaughn, noted that review of the decision as to whether the contingent fee contract was void had not been sought and was not before them, and that \u201c[t]he opinion of the Court of Appeals on that point is the law of this case as it now stands before us.\u201d Thompson v. Thompson, 313 N.C. 313, 314, 328 S.E.2d 288, 290 (1985).\nThus, we are bound by our decision in Thompson and we affirm the judgment dated 2 April 1990 declaring the contingent fee contract between the plaintiff and his client to be void.\nAffirmed.\nJudges COZORT and LEWIS concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "HEDRICK, Chief Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "William J. Townsend, plaintiff, appellant, pro se.",
      "Reid, Lewis, Deese & Nance, by James R. Nance, Jr., for defendant, appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "WILLIAM J. TOWNSEND, Plaintiff v. ARLENE R. T. HARRIS, Defendant\nNo. 9012SC763\n(Filed 5 March 1991)\nAttorneys at Law \u00a7 54 (NCI4th) \u2014 alimony and child support\u2014 contingent fee contract \u2014 void\nThe trial court did not err by declaring void a contingent fee contract between plaintiff attorney and his client in an action for alimony and child support. Thompson v. Thompson, 70 N.C. App. 147, was appealed to the N.C. Supreme Court because of a dissent and the Supreme Court noted that review of the decision as to whether the contingent fee contract was void had not been sought and was not before it.\nAm Jur 2d, Attorneys at Law \u00a7 257; Divorce and Separation \u00a7 603.\nAPPEAL by plaintiff from Johnson (E. Lynn), Judge. Judgment entered 2 April 1990 in Superior Court, CUMBERLAND County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 February 1991.\nWilliam J. Townsend, plaintiff, appellant, pro se.\nReid, Lewis, Deese & Nance, by James R. Nance, Jr., for defendant, appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0131-01",
  "first_page_order": 161,
  "last_page_order": 162
}