{ "id": 8524981, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MICHAEL LEON WASHINGTON, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Washington", "decision_date": "1991-04-16", "docket_number": "No. 9026SC862", "first_page": "535", "last_page": "540", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "102 N.C. App. 535" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "313 S.E.2d 585", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 563", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2395265 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0563-01" ] }, { "cite": "351 S.E.2d 736", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 704", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4735713, 4731958 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0704-02", "/nc/318/0704-01" ] }, { "cite": "350 S.E.2d 83", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 577", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4734194 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0577-01" ] }, { "cite": "17 L.Ed.2d 121", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "385 U.S. 890", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11388630, 11388679 ], "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/385/0890-01", "/us/385/0890-02" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12046400 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 S.E.2d 569", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "578", "parenthetical": "State may overcome presumption of prejudice by showing that other evidence of guilt is \"overwhelming\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 151", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567859 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "164", "parenthetical": "State may overcome presumption of prejudice by showing that other evidence of guilt is \"overwhelming\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0151-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 S.E.2d 874", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing State v. Brown, 306 N.C. 151, 164, 293 S.E.2d 569, 578 (1982) (State may overcome presumption of prejudice by showing that other evidence of guilt is \"overwhelming\")" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 479", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2561346, 2562408, 2565201, 2562581, 2561461 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing State v. Brown, 306 N.C. 151, 164, 293 S.E.2d 569, 578 (1982) (State may overcome presumption of prejudice by showing that other evidence of guilt is \"overwhelming\")" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0479-05", "/nc/323/0479-03", "/nc/323/0479-02", "/nc/323/0479-04", "/nc/323/0479-01" ] }, { "cite": "371 S.E.2d 711", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "716", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Brown, 306 N.C. 151, 164, 293 S.E.2d 569, 578 (1982) (State may overcome presumption of prejudice by showing that other evidence of guilt is \"overwhelming\")" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "91 N.C. App. 198", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525059 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "206", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Brown, 306 N.C. 151, 164, 293 S.E.2d 569, 578 (1982) (State may overcome presumption of prejudice by showing that other evidence of guilt is \"overwhelming\")" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/91/0198-01" ] }, { "cite": "66 L.Ed.2d 76", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "449 U.S. 860", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11753313, 11753892, 11753829, 11754047, 11754126, 11753967, 11753554, 11753395, 11753687, 11753628, 11753757, 11753471 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/449/0860-01", "/us/449/0860-09", "/us/449/0860-08", "/us/449/0860-11", "/us/449/0860-12", "/us/449/0860-10", "/us/449/0860-04", "/us/449/0860-02", "/us/449/0860-06", "/us/449/0860-05", "/us/449/0860-07", "/us/449/0860-03" ] }, { "cite": "616 F.2d 870", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1392153 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "875" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/616/0870-01" ] }, { "cite": "710 F.2d 535", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1866404 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "542-43" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/710/0535-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 L.Ed.2d 281", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "479 U.S. 909", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6438105 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/479/0909-01" ] }, { "cite": "781 F.2d 185", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1536178 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/781/0185-01" ] }, { "cite": "770 F.2d 918", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 332905 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "932" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/770/0918-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 L.Ed.2d 570", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "477 U.S. 907", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6231586, 6235076, 6233959, 6231304, 6230823, 6232556, 6230285, 6233679, 6234675, 6231091, 6234232, 6231929, 6233370, 6233049, 6230559 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/477/0907-06", "/us/477/0907-15", "/us/477/0907-12", "/us/477/0907-05", "/us/477/0907-03", "/us/477/0907-08", "/us/477/0907-01", "/us/477/0907-11", "/us/477/0907-14", "/us/477/0907-04", "/us/477/0907-13", "/us/477/0907-07", "/us/477/0907-10", "/us/477/0907-09", "/us/477/0907-02" ] }, { "cite": "785 F.2d 364", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1565351 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "367" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/785/0364-01" ] }, { "cite": "816 F.2d 918", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1678015 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "923", "parenthetical": "applying harmless error analysis to Miranda violation" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/816/0918-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 L.Ed.2d 593", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "applying harmless error analysis to confession" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "492 U.S. 920", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6282722, 6280834, 6280199, 6279116, 6283021, 6283439, 6280528, 6282385, 6279604, 6279924, 6279389 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "applying harmless error analysis to confession" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/492/0920-09", "/us/492/0920-07", "/us/492/0920-05", "/us/492/0920-01", "/us/492/0920-10", "/us/492/0920-11", "/us/492/0920-06", "/us/492/0920-08", "/us/492/0920-03", "/us/492/0920-04", "/us/492/0920-02" ] }, { "cite": "862 F.2d 1348", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1825668 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1351" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/862/1348-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 L.Ed.2d 603", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "applying harmless error analysis to defendant's statement" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "376 S.E.2d 430", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "437-38" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2485742 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "12" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 S.E.2d 398", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "402" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 753", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2518221 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "759" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0753-01" ] }, { "cite": "78 Mich. L. Rev. 1209", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Mich. L. Rev.", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "446 U.S. 291", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6182222 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "301" }, { "page": "308" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/446/0291-01" ] }, { "cite": "110 L.Ed.2d 528", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "case_ids": [ 12124771 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "551" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/496/0582-01" ] }, { "cite": "488 U.S. 9", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1494937 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "10", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "176", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/488/0009-01" ] }, { "cite": "385 S.E.2d 532", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "533-35", "parenthetical": "short detention during traffic stop" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "96 N.C. App. 318", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521885 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "321-23", "parenthetical": "short detention during traffic stop" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/96/0318-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 S.E.2d 241", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "244", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 553", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4753359 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "556", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0553-01" ] }, { "cite": "290 S.E.2d 574", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "583" }, { "page": "581" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 400", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570930 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "414-15" }, { "page": "410" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0400-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 758, "char_count": 13007, "ocr_confidence": 0.757, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.2697500849800604e-07, "percentile": 0.783626767429298 }, "sha256": "1d154fa66c8abf5abc2e8889c570ed482a1a41052c62dd3e43c8bf20cb84561c", "simhash": "1:e893b2baee091c72", "word_count": 2152 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:20:04.252791+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge PARKER concurs.", "Judge GREENE dissents with separate opinion." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MICHAEL LEON WASHINGTON, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PHILLIPS, Judge.\nDefendant was convicted of felonious possession of cocaine with intent to sell in violation of G.S. 90-95 and sentenced to a prison term of three years. On appeal he argues that the trial court erred in admitting statements he made prior to being advised of his Miranda rights and by not granting his motion to dismiss based on the insufficiency of the evidence. Neither argument has merit and we overrule them.\nThe State\u2019s evidence tended to show that: Charlotte Police Officer Casey Carver observed defendant driving a vehicle with a broken headlight and other damage indicating it had recently been involved in an accident, suspected a possible hit and run accident, and stopped the vehicle. Defendant got out of the car and met the officer in front of the patrol car. Defendant did not have a driver\u2019s license and the officer placed him in the back seat of the patrol car while checking defendant\u2019s identity with the Department of Motor Vehicles. Upon returning to defendant\u2019s car Officer Carver looked in the window and saw a \u201cthirty-eight round\u201d (handgun bullet) on the floorboard. The officer then asked defendant, still sitting in the patrol car, where the gun was located; and defendant answered, \u201cMan, there ain\u2019t no gun in the car. It\u2019s not my car. You can search it, you\u2019re not going to find anything.\u201d After Officer R. L. Ferguson arrived at the scene, the two officers searched the vehicle and found a portion of a brown paper bag in the ashtray containing a plastic bag with ten smaller plastic bags of a white powdery substance which was later proved to be cocaine. Officer Carver showed the bag to defendant and said, \u201cLook what I found\u201d; defendant responded that \u201cit was not his [the defendant\u2019s] and that it was only baking soda because he and a friend had been flaking.\u201d The officer asked defendant what flaking meant and defendant replied that \u201che [the defendant] had bagged up baking soda to look like cocaine so that he could sell it as cocaine and make a good profit.\u201d At that point Officer Carver placed defendant under arrest for possession of cocaine. Officer Ferguson had seen defendant driving the car on several different occasions.\nFrom this evidence the trial court found that although defendant\u2019s movement was involuntarily restricted, as he was in the back seat of the police car while the officer was checking a possible traffic violation with the Department of Motor Vehicles, under the decision in Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, reh\u2019g denied, California v. Stewart, 385 U.S. 890, 17 L.Ed.2d 121 (1966), and its progeny, defendant was not \u201cin custody\u201d at the time he made the statements to the police officer and the warning established by those decisions was not required. The court\u2019s interpretation of the above decisions is correct, and since the findings made are supported by competent evidence they are conclusive. Lemmerman v. A. T. Williams Oil Co., 318 N.C. 577, 350 S.E.2d 83, reh\u2019g denied, 318 N.C. 704, 351 S.E.2d 736 (1986).\nAs to the sufficiency of the evidence argument, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence above stated is clearly sufficient to prove all the elements of the crime that defendant was convicted of State v. Brown, 310 N.C. 563, 313 S.E.2d 585 (1984). Inter alia, it tends to show that defendant owned, controlled and possessed the cocaine, and that he and his friend intended to sell it.\nNo error.\nJudge PARKER concurs.\nJudge GREENE dissents with separate opinion.", "type": "majority", "author": "PHILLIPS, Judge." }, { "text": "Judge GREENE\ndissenting.\nI disagree with the majority\u2019s conclusion upholding the trial court\u2019s \u201cfinding of fact\u201d that the \u201cdefendant was not \u2018in custody\u2019 at the time he made the statements to the police officer . . . \u201cThe determination [of] whether an individual is \u2018in custody\u2019 during an interrogation so as to invoke the requirements of Miranda requires an application of fixed rules of law and results in a conclusion of law and not a finding of fact.\u201d State v. Davis, 305 N.C. 400, 414-15, 290 S.E.2d 574, 583 (1982). I would conclude as a matter of law that the defendant\u2019s incriminating statements were the product of custodial interrogation and therefore, under the facts in this case, should not have been admitted into evidence.\n\u201cThe rule of Miranda requiring that suspects be informed of their constitutional rights before being questioned by the police only applies to custodial interrogation.\u201d State v. Braswell, 312 N.C. 553, 556, 324 S.E.2d 241, 244 (1985) (emphasis added). The determination of whether a suspect was \u201cin custody\u201d is based \u201cupon an objective test\u201d which asks \u201cwhether a reasonable person in the suspect\u2019s position would believe that he had been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way or, to the contrary, would believe that he was free to go at will.\u201d Davis, 305 N.C. at 410, 290 S.E.2d at 581. The facts of this case differ significantly from routine traffic stop cases where custody is typically not found to have existed. See State v. Seagle, 96 N.C. App. 318, 321-23, 385 S.E.2d 532, 533-35 (1989) (short detention during traffic stop). In such stops, \u201c[t]he detained motorist\u2019s \u2018freedom of action ... [is not] curtailed to \u201ca degree associated with formal arrest.\u201d \u2019 \u201d Pennsylvania v. Bruder, 488 U.S. 9, 10, 102 L.Ed.2d 172, 176 (1988) (citations omitted) (motorist stopped for erratic driving). Here, the defendant was stopped and placed in the back seat of the officer\u2019s police car and his movement was thereby involuntarily restricted. The door handles on the insides of the back seat doors did not work, and consequently, the defendant was not free to leave at will. He was, in effect, incarcerated on the side of the road. A reasonable person in the defendant\u2019s position would have believed that he had been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in a significant way. Accordingly, I would conclude that the defendant was \u201cin custody\u201d when he made the statements to the police officer.\nNot only was he \u201cin custody,\u201d but he was interrogated. \u201cInterrogation\u201d may take the form of either \u201cexpress questioning\u201d or its \u201cfunctional equivalent.\u201d Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. \u2014, \u2014, 110 L.Ed.2d 528, 551 (1990). The \u201cfunctional equivalent\u201d form of \u201cinterrogation\u201d \u201cfocuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police. This focus reflects the fact that the Miranda safeguards were designed to vest a suspect in custody with an added measure of protection against coercive police practices, without regard to objective proof of the underlying intent of the police.\u201d Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 64 L.Ed.2d 297, 308 (1980).. However, the intent of the police is relevant, \u201cfor it may well have a bearing on whether the police should have known that their words or actions were reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response.\u201d Id. n.7.\n\u2018[T]he best reading of the Innis test is that it turns upon the objective purpose manifested by the police. Thus, an officer \u201cshould know\u201d that his speech or conduct will be \u201creasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response\u201d when he should realize that the speech or conduct will probably be viewed by the suspect as designed to achieve this purpose. To ensure that the inquiry is entirely objective, the proposed test could be framed as follows: if an objective observer (with the same knowledge of the suspect as the police officer) would, on the sole basis of hearing the officer\u2019s remarks, infer that the remarks were designed to elicit an incriminating response, then the remarks should constitute \u201cinterrogation\u201d \u2019.\n1 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure \u00a7 6.7(a) (1984) (quoting White, Interrogation Without Questions: Rhode Island v. Innis and United States v. Henry, 78 Mich. L. Rev. 1209, 1231 n.146 (1980)).\nAt trial when asked whether he expected to receive a response from his act of showing the defendant the bag and from his words \u201cLook what I\u2019ve got,\u201d Officer Carver testified that he expected a response, \u201cif nothing else [a] denial.\u201d After getting the sought after response, Officer Carver then asked the defendant a question concerning the response which resulted in an incriminating statement. Therefore, I conclude that an interrogation took place because the officer knew or should have known that his words and actions were reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response and because an objective observer would have believed that such action by the officer was designed to elicit an incriminating response.\nBecause the police officer did not advise the defendant of his Miranda warnings prior to the custodial interrogation, it was error to admit the defendant\u2019s incriminating statements. State v. Banks, 322 N.C. 753, 759, 370 S.E.2d 398, 402 (1988). However, not all errors involving incriminating statements obtained in violation of Miranda require new trials. Pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1443(b) (1988), \u201c[a] violation of the defendant\u2019s rights under the Constitution of the United States is prejudicial unless the appellate court finds that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The burden is upon the State to demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error was harmless.\u201d See State v. Greene, 324 N.C. 1, 12, 376 S.E.2d 430, 437-38 (1989), death sentence vacated on other grounds, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 108 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990) (applying harmless error analysis to defendant\u2019s statement); see also Howard v. Pung, 862 F.2d 1348, 1351 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 920, 106 L.Ed.2d 593 (1989) (applying harmless error analysis to confession); United States v. Johnson, 816 F.2d 918, 923 (3d Cir. 1987) (applying harmless error analysis to Miranda violation); Bryant v. Vose, 785 F.2d 364, 367 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 907, 91 L.Ed.2d 570 (1986); Martin v. Wainwright, 770 F.2d 918, 932 (11th Cir. 1985), modified, 781 F.2d 185, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 909, 93 L.Ed.2d 281 (1986); United States v. Ramirez, 710 F.2d 535, 542-43 (9th Cir. 1983); Harryman v. Estelle, 616 F.2d 870, 875 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 860, 66 L.Ed.2d 76 (1980). Here, the State has not met its burden.\nWithout the unlawfully obtained statements, the only evidence of the defendant\u2019s guilt is circumstantial. As to the possession element, the only evidence is that the cocaine was found in a car driven by the defendant. However, the car belonged to someone else. The only evidence on the intent to sell element shows that the 2.1 grams of cocaine had been packaged in ten, small, zip-lock bags. Here, I believe that the trial court\u2019s error in admitting the defendant\u2019s incriminating statements, in light of the less than overwhelming circumstantial evidence, was not harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Robey, 91 N.C. App. 198, 206, 371 S.E.2d 711, 716, disc. rev. denied, 323 N.C. 479, 373 S.E.2d 874 (1988) (citing State v. Brown, 306 N.C. 151, 164, 293 S.E.2d 569, 578 (1982) (State may overcome presumption of prejudice by showing that other evidence of guilt is \u201coverwhelming\u201d)). Accordingly, I would vacate the defendant\u2019s conviction of felonious possession with intent to sell and remand for a new trial.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Judge GREENE" } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Lacy H. Thornburg, by Assistant Attorney General Teresa L. White, for the State.", "Public Defender Isabel Scott Day, by Assistant Public Defender Allen W. Boyer, for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MICHAEL LEON WASHINGTON, Defendant\nNo. 9026SC862\n(Filed 16 April 1991)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 75.7 (NCI3d)\u2014 defendant in police car\u2014 movement restricted \u2014 defendant not in custody \u2014 Miranda warnings not required\nDefendant was not entitled to Miranda warnings since he was not \u201cin custody\u201d at the time he made statements to police officers, even though he was in the back seat of a police car while the officer was checking a possible traffic violation with the Department of Motor Vehicles and defendant\u2019s movement was thus involuntarily restricted.\nAm Jur 2d, Criminal Law \u00a7 794.\n2. Narcotics \u00a7 4 (NCI3d)\u2014 felonious possession of cocaine with intent to sell \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nIn a prosecution of defendant for felonious possession of cocaine with intent to sell in violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95, the evidence was sufficient to be submitted to the jury where it tended to show that an officer stopped defendant\u2019s car for a suspected traffic violation; when the officer obtained defendant\u2019s consent and searched the car, he found a portion of a brown paper bag in the ashtray containing a plastic bag with ten smaller plastic bags of a white powdery substance which later proved to be cocaine; and defendant claimed that the powder was not his and was only baking soda which he and a friend bagged to make it look like cocaine and to sell it.\nAm Jur 2d, Drugs, Narcotics, and Poisons \u00a7\u00a7 21, 27, 44, 46, 47.\nJudge Greene dissenting.\nAPPEAL by defendant from judgment entered 2 May 1990 by Judge Robert E. Gaines in MECKLENBURG County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 21 March 1991.\nAttorney General Lacy H. Thornburg, by Assistant Attorney General Teresa L. White, for the State.\nPublic Defender Isabel Scott Day, by Assistant Public Defender Allen W. Boyer, for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0535-01", "first_page_order": 565, "last_page_order": 570 }