{ "id": 8525201, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ROGER DALE WOODY", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Woody", "decision_date": "1991-04-16", "docket_number": "No. 9024SC419", "first_page": "576", "last_page": "578", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "102 N.C. App. 576" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "226 S.E.2d 197", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "30 N.C. App. 224", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8553295 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/30/0224-01" ] }, { "cite": "68 L.Ed.2d 856", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "451 U.S. 997", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6355063 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/451/0997-01" ] }, { "cite": "273 S.E.2d 450", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 405", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567680, 8567556, 8567594, 8567641, 8567519 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0405-05", "/nc/301/0405-02", "/nc/301/0405-03", "/nc/301/0405-04", "/nc/301/0405-01" ] }, { "cite": "269 S.E.2d 680", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "48 N.C. App. 481", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551318 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/48/0481-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 291, "char_count": 4919, "ocr_confidence": 0.761, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.28075541403281e-07, "percentile": 0.6174908266852623 }, "sha256": "04a0e723f654ef2d9e943c061c77d6ad313e939e379bc969bc0dc57219626524", "simhash": "1:d571e3ee552f10f7", "word_count": 808 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:20:04.252791+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges EAGLES and WYNN concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ROGER DALE WOODY" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PHILLIPS, Judge.\nDefendant assigns as error the trial court\u2019s denial of his motion to suppress the evidence seized from stopping his vehicle, which he contends was unlawful; the admission into evidence of the order revoking his driver\u2019s license; and the denial of his motion to dismiss at the close of the State\u2019s evidence. None of the defendant\u2019s assignments has merit and we find no error in the trial.\nDefendant\u2019s motion to suppress evidence was properly overruled for two reasons: First, no evidence pertinent to his conviction was obtained from the stop; second, the stop was not unlawful because the officer had reasonable grounds to suspect that defendant was driving while impaired and while his license was revoked. State v. Trapper, 48 N.C. App. 481, 269 S.E.2d 680, appeal dismissed, 301 N.C. 405, 273 S.E.2d 450 (1980), cert. denied by Trapper v. North Carolina, 451 U.S. 997, 68 L.Ed.2d 856 (1981).\nInstead of being error, receiving the civil part of the revocation order into evidence to show that defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license was revoked and he knew it was authorized by the public records exception to the hearsay rule, Rule 803(8)(A), N.C. Rules of Evidence.\nDefendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the prosecution at the end of the State\u2019s evidence was properly overruled. To sustain the charge against him the State had to prove that (1) he operated a motor vehicle, (2) on a public highway, (3) while his operator\u2019s license was suspended or revoked, and (4) had knowledge of the suspension or revocation. State v. Chester, 30 N.C. App. 224, 226 S.E.2d 197 (1976). The first two elements of the offense were supported by Officer Redmond\u2019s testimony; the last two by the revocation order.\nNo error.\nJudges EAGLES and WYNN concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PHILLIPS, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Lacy H. Thornburg, by Assistant Attorney General Richard L. Griffin, for the State.", "Robert T. Speed for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ROGER DALE WOODY\nNo. 9024SC419\n(Filed 16 April 1991)\n1. Searches and Seizures \u00a7 11 (NCI3d) \u2014 driving while license revoked \u2014 evidence seized from stopping defendant\u2019s vehicle\u2014 denial of motion to suppress\nThe trial court properly denied defendant\u2019s motion to suppress in an action for driving with a revoked license where no evidence pertinent to defendant\u2019s conviction was obtained from the stop and the officer had reasonable grounds to suspect that defendant was driving while impaired and while his license was revoked.\nAm Jur 2d, Searches and Seizures \u00a7\u00a7 16, 99.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 73.2 (NCI3d) \u2014 order revoking driver\u2019s license\u2014 admissible \u2014 public records exception to hearsay rule\nThe trial court did not err in a prosecution for driving with a revoked license by admitting into evidence the civil part of the revocation order. The order was admissible under the public records exception to the hearsay rule. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 803(8)(A).\nAm Jur 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic \u00a7 148.\n3. Automobiles and Other Vehicles \u00a7 144 (NCI4th|\u2014 driving with revoked license \u2014 evidence sufficient\nDefendant\u2019s motion to dismiss a prosecution for driving with a revoked license was properly overruled. The State was required to prove that defendant operated a motor vehicle on a public highway while his operator\u2019s license was suspended or revoked and that he had knowledge of the suspension or revocation; the first two elements were supported by an officer\u2019s testimony and the last two by the prior revocation order.\nAm Jur 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic \u00a7 148.\nAPPEAL by defendant from judgment entered 4 January 1990 by Judge Chase B. Saunders in WATAUGA County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 15 January 1991.\nDefendant appeals his conviction of driving while his license was revoked in violation of G.S. 20-28. In substance, the State\u2019s evidence was as follows: Officer Redmond of the Boone Police Department testified that on 4 December 1988 at about 3:30 a.m. while on patrol at the intersection of U.S. Highway 321 and N.C. Highway 105 Extension in the Town of Boone that he recognized defendant\u2019s van, saw that defendant was driving it, and when it pulled into the Wendy\u2019s parking lot he stopped it, because he had been present in the Magistrate\u2019s office about two hours earlier when defendant was cited for driving while impaired and that he suspected that defendant was still impaired and that the Magistrate had revoked his license for a few days as the statute requires when the chemical tests indicate impairment. The civil portion of a revocation order issued that morning by a Watauga County Magistrate was received for the limited purpose of establishing that defendant\u2019s license to drive was revoked at the time and that he had knowledge of it; it revoked defendant\u2019s driving privileges for at least ten days under the provisions of G.S. 20-16.2 and G.S. 20-16.5 and stated that defendant personally appeared before the Magistrate and surrendered his license to the court.\nAttorney General Lacy H. Thornburg, by Assistant Attorney General Richard L. Griffin, for the State.\nRobert T. Speed for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0576-01", "first_page_order": 606, "last_page_order": 608 }