{ "id": 8525328, "name": "JUDITH COKER COLEMAN NEWELL, Plaintiff v. NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, STATE CAPITAL INSURANCE COMPANY, MICHAEL BLACKMON and ROBERT LEE BLACKMON, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Newell v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance", "decision_date": "1991-05-07", "docket_number": "No. 9019SC98", "first_page": "622", "last_page": "630", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "102 N.C. App. 622" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "93 ALR3d 420", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "278 S.E.2d 507", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "515" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 N.C. 203", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572633 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "216" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/303/0203-01" ] }, { "cite": "700 S.W.2d 801", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 9987532 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "802" }, { "page": "802" }, { "page": "803" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/700/0801-01" ] }, { "cite": "492 N.E.2d 504", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "506" }, { "page": "507" }, { "page": "508" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "142 Ill. App. 3d 906", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3452572 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "908" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/142/0906-01" ] }, { "cite": "344 S.E.2d 7", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 552", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4704936, 4703084, 4704237, 4702483, 4695702 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0552-04", "/nc/316/0552-02", "/nc/316/0552-03", "/nc/316/0552-05", "/nc/316/0552-01" ] }, { "cite": "338 S.E.2d 145", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "147" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 N.C. App. 653", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523471 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "655-56" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/78/0653-01" ] }, { "cite": "295 N.C. 495", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 S.E.2d 744", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "76 N.C. App. 102", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526683 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/76/0102-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 S.E.2d 305", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1954, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "241 N.C. 397", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8611166 ], "year": 1954, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/241/0397-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 S.E.2d 3", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "260 N.C. 402", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574951 ], "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/260/0402-01" ] }, { "cite": "146 S.E.2d 410", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "417" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "266 N.C. 430", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561069 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "439" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/266/0430-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 A.L.R. 3d 420", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "liability insurance" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 A.L.R. 3d 804", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "no-fault and uninsured motorist coverage" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "246 S.E.2d 215", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "295 N.C. 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563683, 8563718, 8563572, 8563607, 8563641 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/295/0465-04", "/nc/295/0465-05", "/nc/295/0465-01", "/nc/295/0465-02", "/nc/295/0465-03" ] }, { "cite": "244 S.E.2d 736", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "738" }, { "page": "738" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "36 N.C. App. 495", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554321 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "497" }, { "page": "498" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/36/0495-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 S.E.2d 137", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "139" }, { "page": "139" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "281 N.C. 582", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575673 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "584-85" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/281/0582-01" ] }, { "cite": "345 S.E.2d 387", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 731", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4695400, 4696174, 4696632, 4699005, 4702879 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0731-02", "/nc/316/0731-05", "/nc/316/0731-04", "/nc/316/0731-03", "/nc/316/0731-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 127", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "129" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 N.C. App. 551", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521993 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "553-54" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/79/0551-01" ] }, { "cite": "338 S.E.2d 92", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "96" }, { "page": "95" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 341", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4716667 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "346" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0341-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 S.E.2d 377", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "379", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 771", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5308955 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "774", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0771-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 794, "char_count": 19000, "ocr_confidence": 0.758, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.1813549812920936e-07, "percentile": 0.7725112545171553 }, "sha256": "63619d0946deb5500c290ffb735cf6626ff9859d4bae4e791bf614b5471b6b90", "simhash": "1:f9484ce204e7b44e", "word_count": 3109 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:20:04.252791+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge WELLS concurs.", "Judge Lewis dissents." ], "parties": [ "JUDITH COKER COLEMAN NEWELL, Plaintiff v. NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, STATE CAPITAL INSURANCE COMPANY, MICHAEL BLACKMON and ROBERT LEE BLACKMON, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "EAGLES, Judge.\nDefendant first assigns as error the trial court\u2019s entry of summary judgment ih favor of plaintiff on the grounds that all of the evidence showed that its policy did not provide coverage for defendant Robert Blackmon. Defendant contends that plaintiff was not entitled to summary judgment because Robert Blackmon was driving Michael Blackmon\u2019s truck without a reasonable belief that he was entitled to do so and the question of whether Robert Blackmon was a resident of Michael Blackmon\u2019s household presented a genuine issue as to a material fact. Defendant argues that if Robert Blackmon was not a resident of Michael Blackmon\u2019s household, he was not covered under the policy.\nInitially we note that\n\u201c[s]ummary judgment is granted when, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\u201d The burden is upon the party moving for summary judgment to show, in order to be entitled to judgment, that no questions of fact remain to be resolved.\nAetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 326 N.C. 771, 774, 392 S.E.2d 377, 379 (1990) (citations omitted). After careful review of the record, we find that the dispositive issues in this case are whether defendant Robert Blackmon was a resident of his father\u2019s household and if so, whether the reasonable belief exclusion would apply to a family member. Here based upon the admitted facts of all the parties we conclude that plaintiff has met her burden of showing that no issues of fact exist.\n\u201cThe avowed purpose of the Financial Responsibility Act, of which Sec. 279.21 is a part, is to compensate the innocent victims of financially irresponsible motorists.\u201d American Tours v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 315 N.C. 341, 346, 338 S.E.2d 92, 96 (1986). \u201cWhen a statute is applicable to the terms of a policy of insurance, the provisions of that statute become part of the terms of the policy to the same extent as if they were written in it.\u201d Id. at 344, 338 S.E.2d at 95.\nCrowder v. N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 79 N.C. App. 551, 553-54, 340 S.E.2d 127, 129, disc. rev. denied, 316 N.C. 731, 345 S.E.2d 387 (1986).\nG.S. 20-279.21(b)(2) provides:\nSuch owner\u2019s policy of liability insurance: (2) Shall insure the person named therein and any other person, as insured, using any such motor vehicle or motor vehicles with the express or implied permission of such named insured, or any other persons in lawful possession, against loss from the liability imposed by law for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of such motor vehicle or motor vehiclesf.]\n\u201cDefendant is liable to the plaintiff only if its liability accrues under the provisions set out in the contract of insurance between defendant and its insured[.]\u201d Younts v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 281 N.C. 582, 584-85, 189 S.E.2d 137, 139 (1972). \u201cIn the absence of any provision in the Financial Responsibility Act broadening the liability of the insurer, such liability must be measured by the terms of the policy as written.\u201d Id. at 585, 189 S.E.2d at 139.\nPlaintiff concedes in her brief that defendant Robert Lee Blackmon was not operating the vehicle \u201cwith the express or implied consent of the defendant Michael Blackmon.\u201d\nHere, the policy in question obligates Nationwide to pay for damages for bodily injury or property damage for which any \u201ccovered person becomes legally responsible because of an auto accident. We will settle or defend, as we consider appropriate, any claim or suit asking for these damages.\u201d The policy defines covered person as the following: \u201c1. You or any family member for the ownership, maintenance or use of any auto or trailer. 2. Any person using your covered auto. 3. For your covered auto, any person or organization but only with respect to legal responsibility for acts or omissions of a person for whom coverage is afforded under this Part. 4. For any auto or trailer, other than your covered auto, any person or organization, but only with respect to legal responsibility for acts or omissions of you or any family member for whom coverage is afforded under this Part. This provision applies only if the person or organization does not own or hire the auto or trailer.\" (The underlined statements appear in bold type in the policy.) Family member is defined in the policy as \u201ca person related to you by blood, marriage or adoption who is a resident of your household. This includes a ward or foster child.\u201d\nBy the policy\u2019s express terms there are several groups of covered persons among which are included family members and any person using the covered auto. Here the policy does not define the term \u201cresident.\u201d Where the term \u201cresident\u201d is not defined in the insurance policy, \u201c[s]uch term, if not defined, is capable of more than one definition and is to be construed in favor of coverage.\u201d Fonvielle v. South Carolina Insurance Co., 36 N.C. App. 495, 497, 244 S.E.2d 736, 738, disc. rev. allowed, 295 N.C. 465, 246 S.E.2d 215 (1978), motion to withdraw petition for disc. rev. allowed 15 August 1978.\nThe interpretation of the terms \u201cresident of your household\u201d or \u201cresident of the same household\u201d or similar terms in insurance policies has been the subject of numerous appellate court decisions. See generally 96 A.L.R. 3d 804 (1979) (no-fault and uninsured motorist coverage) and 93 A.L.R. 3d 420 (1979) (liability insurance); see, e.g., Jamestown Mutual Insurance Co. v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 266 N.C. 430, 146 S.E.2d 410 (1966); Newcomb v. Insurance Co., 260 N.C. 402, 133 S.E.2d 3 (1963); Barker v. Insurance Co., 241 N.C. 397, 85 S.E.2d 305 (1954) [sic]; Davis v. Maryland Casualty Co., 76 N.C. App. 102, 331 S.E.2d 744 (1985); Fonvielle v. Insurance Co., 36 N.C. App. 495, 244 S.E.2d 736, disc. rev. allowed, 295 N.C. 495 [sic], 246 S.E.2d 215 (1978), motion to withdraw petition for disc. rev. allowed 15 August 1978. As observed by our courts, the words \u201cresident,\u201d \u201cresidence\u201d and \u201cresiding\u201d have no precise, technical and fixed meaning applicable to all cases. Jamestown Mutual Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., supra. \u201cResidence\u201d as many shades of meaning, from mere temporary presence to the most permanent abode. Id. It is difficult to give an exact or even satisfactory definition of the term \u201cresident,\u201d as the term is flexible, elastic, slippery and somewhat ambiguous. Id. Definitions of \u201cresidence\u201d include \u201ca place of abode for more than a temporary time\u201d and \u201ca permanent and established home\u201d and the definitions range between these two extremes, Barker v. Insurance Co., supra. This being the case, our courts have held that such terms should be given the broadest construction and that all who may be included, by any reasonable construction of such terms, within the coverage of an insurance policy using such terms, should be given its protection. Jamestown v. Nationwide, supra; Davis v. Maryland Casualty Co., supra.\nGreat American Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 78 N.C. App. 653, 655-56, 338 S.E.2d 145, 147, disc. rev. denied, 316 N.C. 552, 344 S.E.2d 7 (1986). \u201cIntent to remain at a place seems determinative, although not intent to remain permanently. It is clear that the intent necessary to show residence is not that necessary to show domicile.\u201d Fonvielle v. Insurance Co., 36 N.C. App. at 498, 244 S.E.2d at 738.\nIn Jamestown, supra, the insured\u2019s twenty-nine year old son, who had been previously married and served in the Army, returned to his father\u2019s home to stay until he found a residence more convenient to his place of employment. The son did not intend to stay in his father\u2019s house permanently but had no time as to when he was going to leave. The son had been living in his father\u2019s home only two weeks before the accident occurred. Our Supreme Court held that defendant son was \u201c \u2018a resident of the same household\u2019 as his father.\u201d 266 N.C. at 439, 146 S.E.2d at 417.\nHere, in an affidavit, defendant Michael Blackmon, stated that \u201c[a]bout the middle of January, 1987, he [Robert Blackmon] was released in my custody, pending his trial in February. The judge told him he had to stay with me to get bond.\u201d Defendant Robert Blackmon had been living in his father\u2019s house approximately three weeks before the accident occurred. He was a member of defendant Michael Blackmon\u2019s family and resided in the household as a condition of his pre-trial release from jail. On these facts, defendant Robert Blackmon was a resident of defendant Michael Blackmon\u2019s home and as a result was a \u201cnamed insured\u201d under the policy issued by defendant Nationwide.\nSince Robert Blackmon is a family member who resided in the household of his father, defendant Michael Blackmon, at the time of the accident it is not necessary to reach the question of whether Robert Blackmon used the vehicle without a reasonable belief that he was entitled to do so. The Nationwide policy by its express terms provides that the company \u201cwill pay damages for bodily injury or property damage for which any covered person becomes legally responsible because of an auto accident.\u201d \u201cCovered person\u201d was defined as the named insured or a family member and \u201cfamily member\u201d was defined as \u201ca person related to you [named insured] by blood, marriage or adoption who is a resident of your household.\u201d The Exclusions section of the policy lists the classes of persons for whom the policy does not provide liability coverage. The policy does not attempt to exclude coverage for a family member.\nWe note that in its brief, defendant has cited several cases for the proposition that the reasonable belief exclusion applies to a family member. We find those cases unpersuasive here in light of other cases holding that the reasonable belief exclusion does not apply to a family member. See e.g. Economy Fire & Casualty Co. v. Kubik, 142 Ill. App. 3d 906, 492 N.E.2d 504 (1986).\nIn Economy, supra, the policy in question provided coverage for a family member but did not provide coverage \u201c \u2018[f]or any person using a vehicle without a reasonable belief that the person is entitled to do so.\u2019 \u201d 142 Ill. App. 3d at 908, 492 N.E.2d at 506. There the Illinois appellate court stated that selective use of \u201cfamily member\u201d and \u201cany person\u201d throughout the policy\u2019s exclusions created the impression that the terms referred to mutually exclusive classes. The court stated that the use of the terms became \u201cambiguous through the manner in which those terms are used throughout the policy.\u201d Id. at 910, 492 N.E.2d at 507. The court stated that since the policy considered \u201cfamily member\u201d and \u201cany person\u201d as exclusive classes and since the exclusion in question did not specifically include the term \u201cfamily member,\u201d \u201can ambiguity is created with regard to whether a \u2018family member\u2019 is barred from coverage by exclusion No. 11.\u201d Id. The appellate court held that in construing the policy in a light most favorable to the insured Economy was required to \u201cdefend and/or indemnify\u201d Kubik. Id. at 911, 492 N.E. 2d at 508.\nIn State Auto. Mutual Ins. Co. v. Ellis, 700 S.W.2d 801 (Ky. App. 1985), a fourteen year old girl drove her father\u2019s truck without his permission or consent and was subsequently involved in an accident. State Auto denied coverage \u201cbecause of an exclusion stating that the policy did not provide coverage for any person \u2018[u]sing a vehicle without a reasonable belief that that person is entitled to do so.\u2019 \u201d 700 S.W.2d at 802. The Kentucky Court of Appeals stated that the daughter, who was included in the class of \u201cfamily members,\u201d would have been afforded coverage but for the questioned exclusion which denied coverage for any person using the vehicle without a reasonable belief that the person was entitled to do so. The Kentucky court further stated that \u201c[w]hen an attempt is made to apply the general exclusion to a family member such as Andrea, an ambiguity arises.\u201d 700 S.W.2d at 802. The court stated that \u201c[i]f an insurance contract allows two reasonable constructions, the one most favorable to the insured prevails. Ambiguities in the contract language are resolved in the insured\u2019s favor.\u201d 700 S.W.2d at 803.\nHere, the Nationwide policy uses \u201ccovered person,\u201d \u201cfamily member,\u201d and \u201cany person\u201d selectively throughout the policy and more specifically in the Exclusions section of the policy. The Nationwide policy even highlights the terms \u201ccovered person\u201d and \u201cfamily member\u201d whenever they are used in the policy. Under the express terms of the policy, \u201cany person\u201d is not an \u201call inclusive\u201d term; it does not include family members. The policy establishes mutually exclusive classes. The selective use of these terms creates an ambiguity. \u201c[W]hen there is an ambiguity and the policy provisions are susceptible to two interpretations, one of which imposes liability on the company and the other does not, the provisions will be construed in favor of coverage and against the insurer.\u201d First National Bank v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 303 N.C. 203, 216, 278 S.E.2d 507, 515 (1981). Accordingly, the trial court correctly concluded that there was coverage and properly entered summary judgment for plaintiff.\nDefendant next assigns as error the trial court\u2019s denial of its motion for summary judgment because all of the evidence showed that there was no coverage for Robert Lee Blackmon. For the reasons stated above, this assignment of error is overruled.\nThe decision of the trial court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nJudge WELLS concurs.\nJudge Lewis dissents.", "type": "majority", "author": "EAGLES, Judge." }, { "text": "Judge LEWIS\ndissenting.\nI respectfully dissent.\nThe Nationwide policy under which Michael Blackmon was insured contained the following exclusion: \u201cWe do not provide liability coverage for any person . . . using a vehicle without a reasonable belief that that person is entitled to do so.\u201d Nationwide\u2019s policy included another term indicating coverage for any family member who is \u201ca person related to you by blood, marriage or adoption who is a resident of your household. This includes a ward or foster child.\u201d I believe a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Robert Lee Blackmon was a resident of Michael Blackmon\u2019s household at that time.\nAll of the uncontradicted evidence tends to show that the owner of the vehicle both knew Mr. Blackmon had no license and expressly denied Mr. Blackmon the right to operate any of his vehicles. I do not believe that even if Robert Lee Blackmon were found to be a resident that he would thereby automatically always have consent, express or implied, of the owner, his father, to operate a vehicle. This would indeed be an extremely dangerous precedent to set. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Judge LEWIS" } ], "attorneys": [ "Nichols, Caffrey, Hill, Evans & Murrelle, by Joseph R. Beatty, for defendant-appellant.", "O\u2019Briant, O\u2019Briant & Bunch, by Lillian B. O\u2019Briant, for plaintiff-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JUDITH COKER COLEMAN NEWELL, Plaintiff v. NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, STATE CAPITAL INSURANCE COMPANY, MICHAEL BLACKMON and ROBERT LEE BLACKMON, Defendants\nNo. 9019SC98\n(Filed 7 May 1991)\n1. Insurance \u00a7 87.1 (NCI3d) \u2014 automobile liability insurance\u2014 resident of same household \u2014 condition of bail \u2014 insured driver\nThe twenty-year-old driver of a vehicle owned by his father was a resident of his father\u2019s household and was thus a \u201cfamily member\u201d covered under an automobile policy issued to the father where he had been living in his father\u2019s house for three weeks prior to the accident in question as a condition of his pretrial release from jail on a murder charge.\nAm Jur 2d, Automobile Insurance \u00a7\u00a7 189, 247.\nWho is \u201cresident\u201d or \u201cmember\u201d of same \u201chousehold\u201d or \u201cfamily\u201d as named insured, within liability insurance provision defining additional insureds. 93 ALR3d 420.\n2. Insurance \u00a7 87.2 (NCI3d)\u2014 automobile liability insurance \u2014 reasonable belief exclusion \u2014 inapplicable to family member\nAn exclusion of coverage under an automobile liability policy for \u201cany person\u201d using the vehicle without a reasonable belief that he was entitled to do so did not apply to a \u201cfamily member.\u201d\nAm Jur 2d, Automobile Insurance \u00a7\u00a7 251-253.\nJudge LEWIS dissenting.\nAPPEAL by defendant Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company from judgment entered 13 November 1989 by Judge Russell G. Walker, Jr. in RANDOLPH County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 29 August 1990.\nThis is a declaratory judgment action whereby plaintiff seeks a judgment \u201cdeclaring the rights, duties and obligations of the defendant, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company [hereinafter Nationwide], under the liability insurance policy issued to the defendant, Michael Blackmon, and of the defendant, State Capital Insurance Company [hereinafter State Capital], under the automobile liability insurance policy issued to the plaintiff, for attorney fees, for costs, and all other appropriate relief.\u201d\nOn 9 February 1987, plaintiff was injured when she was struck by a 1977 Ford truck being driven by defendant Robert Blackmon and owned by defendant Michael Blackmon. At the time of the accident, defendant Robert Blackmon was twenty years old and did not have a valid North Carolina driver\u2019s license. As a result of the accident, defendant Robert Blackmon was convicted of driving while impaired and driving while license was revoked.\nAfter the accident, defendant Robert Blackmon stated to an investigating officer that his address was Route 1, Box 172, Franklin-ville, North Carolina, which was the same as his father\u2019s, defendant Michael Blackmon. Before the accident, defendant Robert Blackmon had been charged with second degree murder. He was released \u201cabout the middle of January 1987\u201d to the custody of defendant Michael Blackmon pending his trial on the condition that he remained in the custody of his father at his father\u2019s residence.\nAt the time of the accident, defendant Nationwide had issued to defendant Michael Blackmon and his wife, Nan Blackmon, a personal auto policy, which was in full force and effect. The policy provided uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage in the amount of $50,000.00/100,000.00/10,000.00. Plaintiff had a personal auto policy with defendant State Capital. The policy was in effect at the time of the accident and provided bodily injury liability and uninsured motorists coverages. After defendants Nationwide and State Capital denied coverage for the accident, plaintiff filed this declaratory judgment action and also filed a separate tort action against the individual defendants. The parties to the tort action then entered into a consent order staying proceedings in that action pending the outcome of the declaratory judgment action. Defendant State Capital also consented to the stay.\nThe trial court entered summary judgment for defendant State Capital against plaintiff on 30 October 1989. This order was not appealed by any of the parties. The trial court entered summary judgment for plaintiff against defendant Nationwide on 7 November 1989 and denied Nationwide\u2019s motion for summary judgment. Nationwide appeals.\nNichols, Caffrey, Hill, Evans & Murrelle, by Joseph R. Beatty, for defendant-appellant.\nO\u2019Briant, O\u2019Briant & Bunch, by Lillian B. O\u2019Briant, for plaintiff-appellee." }, "file_name": "0622-01", "first_page_order": 652, "last_page_order": 660 }