{
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  "name": "IN THE MATTER OF: TRANSPORTATION OF JUVENILES",
  "name_abbreviation": "In re Transportation of Juveniles",
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          "parenthetical": "holding that \"the filing of a complaint or the issuance of summons pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 3, [was] a condition precedent to the issuance of an injunction or restraining order.\" 11 N.C. App. at 161, 180 S.E.2d at 463"
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          "parenthetical": "holding that \"the filing of a complaint or the issuance of summons pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 3, [was] a condition precedent to the issuance of an injunction or restraining order.\" 11 N.C. App. at 161, 180 S.E.2d at 463"
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          "parenthetical": "holding that \"the filing of a complaint or the issuance of summons pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 3, [was] a condition precedent to the issuance of an injunction or restraining order.\" 11 N.C. App. at 161, 180 S.E.2d at 463"
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          "parenthetical": "holding that \"the filing of a complaint or the issuance of summons pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 3, [was] a condition precedent to the issuance of an injunction or restraining order.\" 11 N.C. App. at 161, 180 S.E.2d at 463"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges Wells and Greene concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "IN THE MATTER OF: TRANSPORTATION OF JUVENILES"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "WYNN, Judge.\nI\nOn 13 July 1990, Guilford County District Court Judge Laurence C. McSwain entered an order, ex mero motu and without an action or proceeding having been filed, directing the Guilford County Sheriff\u2019s Department to \u201ctransport any delinquent or undisciplined juvenile from the Guilford County Detention Center to the designated Juvenile Court in High Point, North Carolina, or Greensboro, North Carolina, by 9:30 a.m. on days required and to transport any designated delinquent or undisciplined juvenile from the Juvenile Courtroom in High Point, North Carolina, or Greensboro, North Carolina, to the Guilford County Juvenile Detention Center.\u201d Prior to the entry of the district court\u2019s order, the practice in Guilford County was that juvenile court counselors transported designated delinquent or undisciplined juveniles who were in secure custody to and from court.\nThe Guilford County Sheriff\u2019s Department now appeals from the entry of Judge McSwain\u2019s order.\nII\nJudge McSwain\u2019s order cites N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 7A-29K6), 7A-574(d) and \u201cthe inherent power of a District Court Judge to enter orders necessary for the efficient exercise of the administration of justice\u201d as authorizing the entry of the order below. We shall address these propositions seriatim.\nNorth Carolina General Statutes section 7A-29K6) provides as follows:\n\u201cAdditional powers of district court judges\u201d\nIn addition to the jurisdiction and powers assigned in this chapter, a district court judge has the following powers:\n(6) To issue all process and orders necessary or proper in the exercise of his powers and authority, and to effectuate his lawful judgments and decrees.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-29K6) (1989).\nWe do not believe this statute was intended to give a district court judge the power to enter an order ex mero motu when no action is before the court.. A court cannot undertake to adjudicate a controversy on its own motion; rather, it can adjudicate a controversy only when a party presents the controversy to it, and then, only if it is presented in the form of a proper pleading. 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts \u00a7 94 (1965). Thus, before a court may act there must be some appropriate application invoking the judicial power of the court with respect to the matter in question. Id. See Carolina Freight Carriers Corp. v. Local 61, International Bhd. of Teamsters, 11 N.C. App. 159, 180 S.E.2d 461, cert. denied, 278 N.C. 701, 181 S.E.2d 601 (1971) (holding that \u201cthe filing of a complaint or the issuance of summons pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 3, [was] a condition precedent to the issuance of an injunction or restraining order.\u201d 11 N.C. App. at 161, 180 S.E.2d at 463). See also N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-193 (1989) (stating in pertinent part, that, \u201cA civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.\u201d).\nIt is clear in this case that no action or proceeding had been commenced. We conclude that without an action pending before it, the district court was without jurisdiction to enter an order pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-29K6).\nFor similar reasons, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-574(d) does not provide a sufficient ground for entering the order below. Section 7A-574(d) falls under the Juvenile Code which requires that the trial court have jurisdiction before exercising the powers granted thereunder. Since the district court was without jurisdiction because there was no action before it, we must conclude that section 7A-574(d) does not provide the necessary basis for the entry of Judge McSwain\u2019s order.\nWe likewise conclude that the court below lacked the inherent power to enter its order. Courts have the inherent power to do only those things which are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of their jurisdiction. 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts \u00a7 78 (1965) (emphasis added). Inherent powers are limited to those powers which are essential to the existence of the court and necessary to the orderly and efficient exercise of its jurisdiction. State v. Gravette, 327 N.C. 114, 124, 393 S.E.2d 865, 871 (1990) (citing Hopkins v. Barnhardt, 223 N.C. 617, 27 S.E.2d 644 (1943)). Since the trial court lacked jurisdiction in the first instance, there could be no concomitant inherent power which was necessary to the orderly and efficient exercise of its jurisdiction.\nWe are acutely aware of the dilemma in which Guilford County Juvenile Court Counselors and Judge McSwain have found themselves. Delinquent or undisciplined juveniles who are ordered into secure custody often prove to be recalcitrant, unpredictably volatile, and even violent. In many cases, law enforcement is clearly better equipped to handle the transportation of such individuals from their secure facilities to designated courtrooms and vice versa. Nonetheless, Judge McSwain lacked the jurisdiction to enter the order made in this case. The order entered below is therefore\nVacated.\nJudges Wells and Greene concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "WYNN, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Deputy County Attorney J. Edwin Pons, for appellant, Guilford County Sheriff\u2019s Department.",
      "No appellee\u2019s brief filed."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF: TRANSPORTATION OF JUVENILES\nNo. 9018DC857\n(Filed 7 May 1991)\nCourts \u00a7\u00a7 6, 12 (NCI4th)\u2014 district court \u2014no action or proceeding filed \u2014absence of jurisdiction to enter order \u2014 no inherent power\nA district court judge had no jurisdiction under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-29H6) or N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-574(d) to enter an order ex mero motu requiring the Guilford County Sheriff\u2019s Department to transport delinquent or undisciplined juveniles who were in secured custody to and from court where no action or proceeding had been filed with the court. Nor did the court have the inherent power to enter this order as being necessary for the efficient exercise of the administration of justice where the court lacked jurisdiction in the first instance.\nAm Jur 2d, Courts \u00a7\u00a7 91, 94.\nAppeal by Guilford County Sheriff\u2019s Department from Order entered 13 July 1990, nunc pro tunc 29 June 1990 in GUILFORD County District Court by Judge Laurence C. McSwain. Heard in the Court of Appeals 19 February 1991.\nDeputy County Attorney J. Edwin Pons, for appellant, Guilford County Sheriff\u2019s Department.\nNo appellee\u2019s brief filed."
  },
  "file_name": "0806-01",
  "first_page_order": 836,
  "last_page_order": 839
}
