{ "id": 8520410, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. EDDIE LEE SHAW", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Shaw", "decision_date": "1991-06-18", "docket_number": "No. 9016SC202", "first_page": "268", "last_page": "272", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "103 N.C. App. 268" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "36 ALR3d 553", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "477 F. Supp. 463", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 4107840 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/477/0463-01" ] }, { "cite": "670 F. Supp. 1432", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3970539 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/670/1432-01" ] }, { "cite": "699 F. Supp. 1514", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 7402621 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/699/1514-01" ] }, { "cite": "493 F.2d 346", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 198341 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/493/0346-01" ] }, { "cite": "542 F.2d 661", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1029165 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/542/0661-01" ] }, { "cite": "732 F.2d 372", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1947766 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/732/0372-01" ] }, { "cite": "868 F.2d 970", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10532289 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/868/0970-01" ] }, { "cite": "416 U.S. 505", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 84471 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "514" }, { "page": "353" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/416/0505-01" ] }, { "cite": "57 Fordham L. Rev. 1035", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Fordham L. Rev.", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "authored by Cori D. Stephens" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "420 F. Supp. 944", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3889055 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/420/0944-01" ] }, { "cite": "693 F. Supp. 851", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 7397537 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/693/0851-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 L.Ed.2d 141", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "419 U.S. 897", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6388160, 6387303, 6387692, 6386991, 6387152, 6387825, 6387570, 6386392, 6386202, 6387966, 6386687 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/419/0897-11", "/us/419/0897-06", "/us/419/0897-08", "/us/419/0897-04", "/us/419/0897-05", "/us/419/0897-09", "/us/419/0897-07", "/us/419/0897-02", "/us/419/0897-01", "/us/419/0897-10", "/us/419/0897-03" ] }, { "cite": "490 F.2d 803", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 228521 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/490/0803-01" ] }, { "cite": "558 F.2d 677", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 946684 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/558/0677-01" ] }, { "cite": "18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2511", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(1)" }, { "page": "(1)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2515", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2510", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(5)(a)(i)" }, { "page": "(6)" }, { "page": "(5)(a)(i)" }, { "page": "(5)(a)(i)", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "222 S.E.2d 463", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "28 N.C. App. 644", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551565 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/28/0644-01" ] }, { "cite": "266 S.E.2d 347", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "290 N.C. 373", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561510 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "382" }, { "page": "382" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/290/0373-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 555, "char_count": 9125, "ocr_confidence": 0.74, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.1653960117688132e-07, "percentile": 0.7704070777871606 }, "sha256": "cdc1b1c0ab4269b18e53c5aa334626c304e20c8ce89458fe3e056b2b8625d561", "simhash": "1:37ba636bc3ff6941", "word_count": 1457 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:27:13.805826+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Johnson and Eagles concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. EDDIE LEE SHAW" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PARKER, Judge.\nDefendant pled guilty to the charge of felonious possession of a controlled substance in violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(a)(3), reserving his right to appeal, pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-979(b), the trial court\u2019s denial of his motion to suppress. Defendant based his motion to suppress one bag of psilocybin, a Schedule 1 substance, on the allegation that the search warrant leading to discovery of the evidence was based on information obtained in violation of federal wiretapping statutes. The trial judge denied the motion, holding that Rickenbaker v. Rickenbaker, 290 N.C. 373, 266 S.E.2d 347, aff\u2019g as modified 28 N.C. App. 644, 222 S.E.2d 463 (1976), the leading case in this State upholding the suppression of evidence under the federal wiretapping statutes, was distinguishable. We find that Rickenbaker is controlling and that defendant\u2019s motion was improperly denied. We, therefore, reverse.\nThe search warrant in this case was issued to Detective John Moore. Detective Moore\u2019s application for the warrant and his accompanying affidavit relied on the contents of a tape-recorded telephone conversation between defendant and another young man to establish probable cause to believe that defendant was in possession of a controlled substance. The other man\u2019s mother had obtained the tape recording on her own initiative, apparently by attaching a microcassette tape recorder to a telephone extension line in her house. She called the police after listening to the recorded conversation, part of which involved the speakers\u2019 plans to get together about \u201cshrooms,\u201d the street name for mushrooms (psilocybin). The mother played the tape for Detective Moore and identified the speakers as her son and defendant. Evidence at the suppression hearing suggested that the woman\u2019s son and defendant did not know about, and had not consented to, the taping of their phone conversation. Neither the mother nor defendant testified on voir dire.\nThe sole question on appeal is the legality under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. 2510 et seq. (Title III), of the surreptitious tape recording of defendant\u2019s telephone conversation by the parent of his telephone partner and the admissibility of evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant issued on information contained in the audiotape. In Rickenbaker, the estranged husband had an extension, line from the telephone in the marital home installed in a closet in his downtown office. Husband installed a recording device on this extension and, unknown to his wife, recorded her telephone conversations. The Supreme Court reasoned that such interception did not fall within any of the exceptions to the wiretapping prohibitions enumerated in the statute, specifically the exception for telephone lines used \u201cin the ordinary course of ,. . . business.\u201d 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2510(5)(a)(i).\nIn Rickenbaker the Court based its holding on the express provisions of Title III, and stated unambiguously that Title III is to be interpreted from its plain language. \u201cWhere the statutory language is clear, there is no need to refer to legislative history.\u201d 290 N.C. at 382, 226 S.E.2d at 352.\nRickenbaker quoted 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2515 in support of its decision that the husband\u2019s unconsented recordings had to be suppressed, unless his wiretapping fell within a stated statutory exception.\nNo part of the contents of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be received in evidence at any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court ... if disclosure of that information would be in violation of this chapter.\n290 N.C. at 382, 226 S.E.2d at 352 (emphasis in original).\nRickenbaker also quoted the following language from Title III as relevant to its determination.\n[A]ny person who \u2014 (a) willfully intercepts . . . any wire or oral communication; . . . (b) willfully uses any . . . mechanical or other device to intercept any oral communication when \u2014 (i) such device is affixed to, or otherwise transmits a signal through, a wire, cable, or other like connection used in wire communication . . . shall be fined not more than $10,000 ....\n18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2511(1) (1968). By implication, the Supreme Court held that \u201cany person\u201d means exactly what it says. And in fact the statutory definition of \u201cperson\u201d includes \u201cany individual.\u201d 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2510(6).\nSignificantly, Rickenbaker did not follow the line of cases that the State now urges this Court to adopt as the better position in two opposing lines of federal authority. The cases preferred by the State involve tape recording in the home of telephone conversations of other family members. Analogizing recording from a home extension line to eavesdropping on an extension line, which is not prohibited by Title III, these courts have found such taping not to violate Title III. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1977); Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897, 42 L.Ed.2d 141 (1974); Perfit v. Perfit, 693 F. Supp. 851 (C.D. Cal. 1988); London v. London, 420 F. Supp. 944 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); see also Note, All\u2019s Fair: No Remedy under Title III for Interspousal Surveillance, 57 Fordham L. Rev. 1035 (1989) (authored by Cori D. Stephens). However, these cases give no satisfactory explanation for not including \u201cany family member\u201d within Congress\u2019 inclusive language of \u201cany individual.\u201d\nConsistent with this line of cases, the State argues that 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2510(5)(a)(i) creates an exception for taping conversations within the privacy of one\u2019s own home. The exception in section 2510(5)(a)(i) is worded, however, as follows:\n(5) \u201celectronic, mechanical, or other device\u201d means any device or apparatus which can be used to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication other than\u2014\n(a) any telephone . . . (i) furnished to the subscriber or user by a provider of wire or electronic communication in the ordinary course of its business and being used .. .in the ordinary course of [subscriber\u2019s or user\u2019s] business-, or furnished by such subscriber or user for connection to [such] facilities. . . .\n18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2510(5)(a)(i) (1988) (emphasis added). There was no evidence before the trial court that the mother used a microcassette recorder \u201cin the ordinary course of business.\u201d Even if section 2510(5)(a)(i) were applicable to tape recorders when the exception refers only to \u201cany telephone,\u201d there was also no evidence in this case that the electronic device was supplied to the mother \u201cby a provider of [telephone] communication\u201d in the ordinary course of its business.\nThe State concedes in its brief that Title III makes no express exception for electronic surveillance between family members. Because Rickenbaker directs us to interpret Title III by its express language, rather than by examination of legislative history or interpretation of congressional intent, the case law authority presented by the State is inapplicable in North Carolina to the facts in this case. The United States Supreme Court has similarly observed that \u201c[t]he purpose of the [wiretapping] legislation ... was effectively to prohibit ... all interceptions of oral and wire comminications, except those specifically provided for in the Act . . . .\u201d United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 514, 40 L.Ed.2d 341, 353 (1974).\nWe conclude, therefore, that the activity by the mother is prohibited by Title III, which states that any exceptions to its prohibitions are \u201cspecifically provided in this chapter.\u201d 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2511(1). See also Kempf v. Kempf, 868 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1989); Pritchard v. Pritchard, 732 F.2d 372 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1976); United States v. Harpel, 493 F.2d 346 (10th Cir. 1974); Heggy v. Heggy, 699 F. Supp. 1514 (W.D. Okla. 1988); Nations v. Nations, 670 F. Supp. 1432 (W.D. Ark. 1987); Kratz v. Kratz, 477 F. Supp. 463 (E.D. Pa. 1979).\nReversed.\nJudges Johnson and Eagles concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PARKER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Lacy H. Thornburg, by Assistant Attorney General Mary Jill Ledford, for the State.", "Musselwhite, Musselwhite & McIntyre, by David F. Branch, Jr., for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. EDDIE LEE SHAW\nNo. 9016SC202\n(Filed 18 June 1991)\nCriminal Law \u00a7 69 (NCI3d) \u2014 narcotics \u2014 recording of telephone conversation by family member \u2014 not admissible\nThe trial court erred in a prosecution for felonious possession of a controlled substance by denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant based on a telephone conversation between defendant and another man which was tape recorded by the other man\u2019s mother. The mother\u2019s activity is prohibited by 18 U.S.C. 2510 et seq., which states that any exceptions to its prohibitions are specifically provided. The statute makes no express exception for electronic surveillance between family members.\nAm Jur 2d, Searches and Seizures \u00a7\u00a7 13, 24.\nAdmissibility, in criminal case, of evidence obtained by search by private individual. 36 ALR3d 553.\nAPPEAL from order entered 13 November 1989 by Judge I. Beverly Lake, Jr., in ROBESON County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 27 September 1990.\nAttorney General Lacy H. Thornburg, by Assistant Attorney General Mary Jill Ledford, for the State.\nMusselwhite, Musselwhite & McIntyre, by David F. Branch, Jr., for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0268-01", "first_page_order": 298, "last_page_order": 302 }