{ "id": 8520713, "name": "BARRY EUGENE BLEVINS, Plaintiff v. FREDERICK MITCHELL TAYLOR, THOMAS SEUBERLING, SOUTHEASTERN HISTORICAL RE-ENACTMENT SOCIETY, INC., BROWN LOFLIN, and HANDY DANDY RAILROAD, INC., Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Blevins v. Taylor", "decision_date": "1991-07-02", "docket_number": "No. 9022SC585", "first_page": "346", "last_page": "352", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "103 N.C. App. 346" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "377 S.E.2d 247", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 117", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2488648, 2482763, 2484198, 2486047 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0117-04", "/nc/324/0117-03", "/nc/324/0117-01", "/nc/324/0117-02" ] }, { "cite": "373 S.E.2d 674", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "678" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 N.C. App. 38", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526326 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "45" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/92/0038-01" ] }, { "cite": "17 S.E.2d 125", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1941, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "128" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "220 N.C. 253", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11301623 ], "year": 1941, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "259" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/220/0253-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 S.E.2d 282", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 8, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "285" }, { "page": "286" }, { "page": "286" }, { "page": "285" }, { "page": "286" }, { "page": "286" }, { "page": "286" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "57 N.C. App. 275", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523822 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "279" }, { "page": "279" }, { "page": "280" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/57/0275-01" ] }, { "cite": "142 S.E.2d 29", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "33" }, { "page": "34" }, { "page": "32" }, { "page": "34" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "264 N.C. 406", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573716 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "411" }, { "page": "412" }, { "page": "410" }, { "page": "413" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/264/0406-01" ] }, { "cite": "14 A.L.R.3d 1008", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1015" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "144 S.E.2d 610", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "615" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "265 N.C. 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575912 ], "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "499-500" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/265/0494-01" ] }, { "cite": "276 S.E.2d 490", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "492" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 N.C. App. 356", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 2646029 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "359" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/51/0356-01" ] }, { "cite": "279 S.E.2d 583", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "587" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 N.C. 493", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574064 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "498" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/303/0493-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 S.E.2d 154", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1959, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "158" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "249 N.C. 534", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8618798 ], "year": 1959, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "540-41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/249/0534-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 742, "char_count": 14240, "ocr_confidence": 0.754, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.551403175557067e-07, "percentile": 0.8143818423390707 }, "sha256": "deb8b8d69ecf533e86b022f40280e2d68b20ec35ca04ac680f46b69bb9d7dd3b", "simhash": "1:033457b9280d785a", "word_count": 2304 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:27:13.805826+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Arnold and Eagles concur." ], "parties": [ "BARRY EUGENE BLEVINS, Plaintiff v. FREDERICK MITCHELL TAYLOR, THOMAS SEUBERLING, SOUTHEASTERN HISTORICAL RE-ENACTMENT SOCIETY, INC., BROWN LOFLIN, and HANDY DANDY RAILROAD, INC., Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PARKER, Judge.\nPlaintiff appeals from a summary judgment for defendant Brown Loflin entered pursuant to Rule 56 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff, a self-described \u201chardcore\u201d member of the Southeastern Historical Re-Enactment Society (Society), brought a negligence suit against a number of defendants for shotgun injuries sustained in connection with a mock Civil War battle during the Southeast Old Thresher\u2019s Reunion, a festival held in Davidson County over the Fourth of July Holiday. The defendants included the Society, the owner of the shotgun, the user of the shotgun and Loflin. Loflin, who sponsored the public event featuring the military re-enactment involved in this case, leased the land op which the staged battle took place. We affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment in that (i) no material facts are in dispute; (ii) defendant breached no legal duty owed to plaintiff; and (iii) defendant was, therefore, entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.\nWe begin with the\u2018salient facts before the trial court on the motion for summary judgment. The following paragraphs in the Society\u2019s own \u201cSafety Regulations,\u201d in effect at the time of plaintiff\u2019s accidental injury, are relevant to the activities in which the Society was engaged on Loflin\u2019s land.\n1) All Safety Regulations will be strictly enforced by the Staff. Any violation of standard firearm safety or common sense in regard to firearm safety shall be cause for an individual to be expelled from the field and the remainder of activities.\n2) The Commander and his Sergeants shall be responsible for the inspection of the unit prior to events and immediately following events to ensure conformance with Safety Regulations.\n5) Only approved weapons may be used and only blank, black-powder cartridges shall be carried. No projectiles, bullets, musket balls, or loading blocks shall be carried at any time.\n26) All firearms must meet All these safety requirements or they may not be used at any event.\nOver the four-year period just prior to the accident, plaintiff had participated in about four dozen Civil and Revolutionary War re-enactments. The Society had no history of accidental injuries. Plaintiff testified that he knew of no injuries at any previous Society re-enactment. Plaintiff was aware of the Society\u2019s regulations concerning weapons and blank ammunition and testified in his deposition that he relied on the Society\u2019s safety measures.\nThe shotgun that allegedly wounded plaintiff in this case had been brought to the battle by a Society member, another defendant in the case. That defendant testified by deposition that he had no reason to believe that the gun was loaded in contravention of the Society\u2019s rules prohibiting the use of live ammunition or projectiles. When questioned about prior accidents, the owner of the shotgun answered that he had participated in about 150 events over the course of twenty years and that there had never been any injuries before plaintiff\u2019s. The alleged weapon was actually fired by yet another Society member, also named as a defendant. His deposition testimony disclosed that he had inspected the shotgun before firing it, discovered that it was loaded and assumed it had been loaded with blank, black-powder cartridges.\nPlaintiff testified in detail at his deposition about the Society\u2019s established procedures for implementing its safety regulations. The Society\u2019s regular method for weapons inspection put the responsibility for safety clearance on officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) of the Society. In their presence, members would drop a ramrod into the barrel of the gun and listen for a \u201cping\u201d indicating that the weapon had an empty barrel and/or they would \u201cpop the cap\u201d (fire the musket or shotgun at the ground to check that it was clear). If the weapon would not clear, it was not to be used. The officers and NCOs also inspected the cartridge box of each rifleman. According to plaintiff\u2019s deposition testimony, he thought the Society\u2019s safety rules and regulations were \u201cgood enough\u201d and \u201cthere was no reason for [him] to believe that live amunition [sic] would be flying through the air.\u201d By his own testimony, plaintiff conceded that there was, therefore, no reason for Loflin to have expected the use of any live ammunition either. Plaintiff also testified that the Society did not follow its safety procedures on the day of his accident, apparently because there was not sufficient time to do so, although some Society members, including plaintiff, had checked their weapons on their own.\nLoflin\u2019s affidavit in support of his motion for summary judgment stated that \u201cit was [his] understanding that the Society had safety rules or precautions it followed before and during each reenactment which included inspection of firearms.\u201d Loflin further indicated that he had agreed to sponsor previous re-enactments with the Society and \u201c[t]here were no problems whatsoever in [those two] previous re-enactments, and I had heard of no problems whatsoever in any previous re-enactments anywhere.\u201d Loflin\u2019s affidavit attested to Loflin\u2019s complete lack of knowledge about any load of live ammunition in the shotgun that allegedly injured plaintiff.\nNone of these facts is in dispute on appeal. Rather, plaintiff\u2019s argument is that, on such facts, Loflin had a non-delegable legal duty, based on the alleged intrinsically dangerous activity of the Society\u2019s handling of firearms, (i) to institute his own safety regulations for the protection of the public and Society members, (ii) to insure that the Society complied with its safety rules and regulations and (iii) to inspect the weapons himself. No such duties existed in this case. As we discuss herein, Loflin had only the ordinary duties owed by owners and occupiers of land to business invitees; and he did not breach any of those duties. Therefore, we affirm the summary judgment order in favor of Loflin.\nUnder the facts in this case, plaintiff was Loflin\u2019s invitee rather than a mere licensee. See, e.g., Hood v. Coach Co., 249 N.C. 534, 540-41, 107 S.E.2d 154, 158 (1959). The general rule is that an owner or possessor of land owes an invitee the duty to exercise ordinary care to maintain the premises in a safe condition and to warn of hidden dangers that have been, or could have been, discovered by reasonable inspection. Mazzacco v. Purcell, 303 N.C. 493, 498, 279 S.E.2d 583, 587 (1981); Cantey v. Barnes, 51 N.C. App. 356, 359, 276 S.E.2d 490, 492 (1981). Where the danger on land is not hidden but arises out of the negligent or intentional act of a third person, the owner or occupier will not be held liable for negligence if he did not know of the danger and it had not existed long enough for him to have discovered it, corrected it or warned against it. Aaser v. Charlotte, 265 N.C. 494, 499-500, 144 S.E.2d 610, 615, 14 A.L.R.3d 1008, 1015 (1965); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 344 comment f (1965) (possessor \u201cunder no duty to exercise any care until he knows or has reason to know that the acts of the third person are occurring, or are about to occur. ... If the place or character of his business, or his past experience, is such that he should reasonably anticipate careless or criminal conduct on the part of third persons, ... he may be under a duty to take precautions against it.\u201d).\nPlaintiff argues, however, that this case does not come within these general rules but is more like cases finding a non-delegable duty of the owner of a place of amusement to provide for the reasonable protection of patrons against injuries from \u201cthe defective or dangerous condition of the premises or from defective amusement apparatus or devices,\u201d Dockery v. Shows, 264 N.C. 406, 411, 142 S.E.2d 29, 33 (1965), or cases finding a non-delegable duty of employers to undertake necessary precautions to protect others from injury caused by acts of independent contractors engaged in peculiarly risky activities, where harm is likely to occur absent such precautions, Deitz v. Jackson, 57 N.C. App. 275, 279, 291 S.E.2d 282, 285 (1982). We do not agree that Loflin had such a non-delegable duty in this case.\nDeitz does not recognize the existence of a duty to undertake safety precautions unless and until the activity is \u201csufficiently dangerous.\u201d Id. at 281, 291 S.E.2d at 286. Differently stated, the duty exists only if \u201charm will likely result if precautions are not taken\u201d by the person with general oversight over the activities. Id. at 280, 291 S.E.2d at 286. Despite injury to an invitee, the landowner does not have a duty to inspect or protect against harm where the injury is caused by \u201ca danger collaterally created\u201d by the negligence of another. Evans v. Rockingham Homes, Inc., 220 N.C. 253, 259, 17 S.E.2d 125, 128 (1941); see also Woodson v. Rowland, 92 N.C. App. 38, 45, 373 S.E.2d 674, 678 (1988), disc. rev. allowed on additional issues, 324 N.C. 117, 377 S.E.2d 247 (1989).\nA parallel limitation exists in the amusement park cases. \u201cThere is responsibility only for perils discoverable by ordinary and reasonable inspection and oversight.\u201d Dockery, 264 N.C. at 412, 142 S.E.2d at 34. Thus, it must be \u201creasonably foreseeable that harmful consequences will arise from the activity . . . unless precautionary methods are adopted\u201d before the duty to implement precautions arises. Deitz, 57 N.C. App. at 279, 291 S.E.2d at 285 (quoting Dockery, 264 N.C. at 410, 142 S.E.2d at 32). Not surprisingly, Dockery acknowledges that the owner of an amusement park or its general manager \u201cneed not provide against unlikely or unforeseeable conduct of a patron\u201d or \u201cfor casual or isolated acts of negligence of sub-concessionaire or his employee.\u201d 264 N.C. at 413, 142 S.E.2d at 34. Accord Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 415 comment c (1965) (\u201cthe rule . . . does not impose liability upon the possessor . . . for harm which results from a merely casual act of negligence which is not sufficiently persistent to give the possessor the opportunity to prevent it by the exercise of reasonable care\u201d).\nThis Court \u201cmay pass upon the intrinsic dangerousness of an activity as a matter of law.\u201d Deitz, 57 N.C. App. at 280, 291 S.E.2d at 286. Deitz tests whether there is \u201c \u2018a recognizable and substantial danger inherent\u2019 \u201d in an activity, id. at 279, 291 S.E.2d at 286, by an analysis of certain factors: \u201cknown conditions\u201d under which the activity is carried out, together with \u201ctime, place, and circumstances\u201d of the activity, id. at 281, 291 S.E.2d at 286. Intrinsic dangerousness is not \u201cthe ordinary dangerousness which accompanies countless activities when they are negligently performed.\u201d Id.\nNothing in the facts before the trial judge suggests that the Society was engaged, on the day of plaintiffs accident, in an intrinsically dangerous activity from which defendant Loflin\u2019s duty to take precautionary measures could possibly arise. Rather, the testimony supports the view that plaintiff\u2019s injury was the result of an unforeseeable and isolated act by a fellow member of the Society. The Society had safety regulations in place and it had a long, unbroken record of absolute safety. Indeed, plaintiff\u2019s own testimony reveals that, by Society custom and under written safety rules, the Society banned live ammunition and projectiles from its re-enactments. As defendant Loflin argues: \u201cThe fact that replicas of firearms loaded only with blanks were to be used at the reenactment effectively negates plaintiff\u2019s contention that the reenactment involved an inherently dangerous activity.\u201d\nEqually significant, plaintiff conceded in his deposition that neither he nor Loflin could possibly have foreseen the use of live ammunition.\nQ You were comfortable enough to go ahead through with the re-enactment without this safety inspection?\nA I wouldn\u2019t say I was comfortable. I was a little nervous but there was no reason for me to believe that live amunition [sic] would be flying through the air.\nQ There would have been no reason for Brown Loflin to have thought that that would be happening either, was there?\nA Not that I can recollect.\nThe deposition testimony of the defendant who fired the shotgun further reinforces the unforeseen circumstances of plaintiff\u2019s accident:\nQ What did you think as far as whether it [the shotgun] had any bullet or projectile in it?\nA That was the last thing on my mind.\nQ So, you assumed that it did not, is that correct?\nA Yes, sir.\nThe undisputed facts in this record will not permit the inference that Loflin had knowledge of a substantial danger or sufficient information to foresee injury to an invitee from live ammunition. In these circumstances, no duty to take special precautions for plaintiff\u2019s safety arose. Summary judgment in Loflin\u2019s favor was, therefore, appropriate.\nAffirmed.\nJudges Arnold and Eagles concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PARKER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Wilson, Biesecker, Tripp & Sink, by Roger S. Tripp, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Bell, Davis & Pitt, P.A., by Joseph T. Carruthers and Chariot F. Wood, for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "BARRY EUGENE BLEVINS, Plaintiff v. FREDERICK MITCHELL TAYLOR, THOMAS SEUBERLING, SOUTHEASTERN HISTORICAL RE-ENACTMENT SOCIETY, INC., BROWN LOFLIN, and HANDY DANDY RAILROAD, INC., Defendants\nNo. 9022SC585\n(Filed 2 July 1991)\nNegligence \u00a7 53.6 (NCI3d)\u2014 historical re-enactment \u2014 loaded weapon \u2014liability of sponsor\nSummary judgment was correctly entered for the sponsor of a civil war re-enactment in a negligence action brought by a participant who received shotgun injuries during the battle. Defendant Loflin had only the ordinary duties owed by owners and occupiers of land to business invitees. The undisputed facts in the record will not permit the inference that defendant Loflin had knowledge of a substantial danger or sufficient information to foresee injury to an invitee from live ammunition; rather, the testimony supports the view that plaintiff\u2019s injury was the result of an unforeseeable and isolated act by a fellow member of the Society. No duty arose in these circumstances to take special precautions for plaintiff\u2019s safety.\nAm Jur 2d, Negligence \u00a7\u00a7 135, 136, 488.\nAPPEAL by plaintiff from order entered 20 March 1990 by Judge Thomas W. Seay, Jr., in DAVIDSON County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 5 December 1990.\nWilson, Biesecker, Tripp & Sink, by Roger S. Tripp, for plaintiff-appellant.\nBell, Davis & Pitt, P.A., by Joseph T. Carruthers and Chariot F. Wood, for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0346-01", "first_page_order": 376, "last_page_order": 382 }