{ "id": 8522066, "name": "LEWIS E. LAMB, JR., Appellant v. THEDA ANDREWS LAMB, Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Lamb v. Lamb", "decision_date": "1991-08-06", "docket_number": "No. 9021DC1174", "first_page": "541", "last_page": "551", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "103 N.C. App. 541" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "336 S.E.2d 129", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "77 N.C. App. 717", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525140 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/77/0717-01" ] }, { "cite": "339 S.E.2d 825", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "attorney fees awarded where the wife would be forced to sell her only remaining asset, the marital home" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 N.C. App. 592", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522250 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "attorney fees awarded where the wife would be forced to sell her only remaining asset, the marital home" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/79/0592-01" ] }, { "cite": "271 S.E.2d 58", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "67" }, { "page": "137" }, { "page": "68" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 123", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564391 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "135-36" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0123-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-16.4", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 S.E.2d 397", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "399" }, { "page": "399" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 N.C. App. 228", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8358332 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "229" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/83/0228-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-16.5", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "384 S.E.2d 256", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "258" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "76 N.C. App. 545", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527658 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "548" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/76/0545-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-16.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 3, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(3)" }, { "page": "(4)" }, { "page": "(3)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "360 S.E.2d 92", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "320 N.C. 633", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4723595, 4724494, 4731441, 4724438, 4725910 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/320/0633-01", "/nc/320/0633-02", "/nc/320/0633-05", "/nc/320/0633-03", "/nc/320/0633-04" ] }, { "cite": "355 S.E.2d 848", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "852" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "85 N.C. App. 660", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12170260 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "666" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/85/0660-01" ] }, { "cite": "318 S.E.2d 346", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "348" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "69 N.C. App. 755", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527018 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "757" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/69/0755-01" ] }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 174", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574165 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "187" }, { "page": "184" }, { "page": "180" }, { "page": "182" }, { "page": "187" }, { "page": "190" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0174-01" ] }, { "cite": "270 S.E.2d 546", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "548" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "49 N.C. App. 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8519753 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "135" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/49/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "343 S.E.2d 559", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "561" }, { "page": "562" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 N.C. App. 125", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521686 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "128" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/81/0125-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 5046.5", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 4, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 704, "char_count": 19335, "ocr_confidence": 0.78, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.5772556804843413e-07, "percentile": 0.6797376989932618 }, "sha256": "af5b6d73a39ff868aaa7907a209975610c40b3b004a89bd95425e2a2488ea8d4", "simhash": "1:07cfeb22f7078ede", "word_count": 3167 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:27:13.805826+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge WYNN concurs.", "Judge COZORT concurs in part and dissents in part." ], "parties": [ "LEWIS E. LAMB, JR., Appellant v. THEDA ANDREWS LAMB, Appellee" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ORR, Judge.\nAt the time of the judgment of permanent alimony, the trial court found that the defendant, who was 68 years old and had health problems, owned the following assets:\nDefendant had individual debts of $37,876.\nThe trial court found that defendant had the following monthly income:\nIncluding the temporary alimony of $1684, the trial court found that defendant\u2019s total gross monthly income was $3161. With taxes, the trial court found that defendant\u2019s average net income per month was $2554.08. The trial court found that defendant\u2019s total monthly expenses were $2500.\nRegarding plaintiff, who was 56 years old, in good health, and a dentist, the trial court found that he owned the following assets:\nThe trial court found that plaintiff owed the following debts:\nThe plaintiff filed a Financial Affidavit showing his total monthly living expenses as $10,461.43, but the trial court adjusted it to $2861.11. The trial court found that plaintiff had a gross monthly income of $8696.32 and net monthly income of $5681.18.\nI.\nPlaintiff argues that the trial court erred in failing to consider the effects of equitable distribution, the estates, earnings and accustomed standard of living of the parties in setting the permanent alimony. We disagree.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 5046.5(a) (1987) provides that \u201c[a]limony shall be in such amount as the circumstances render necessary, having due regard to the estates, earnings, earning capacity, condition, accustomed standard of living of the parties, and other facts of the particular case.\u201d Plaintiff argues that the trial court failed to meet at least two of the statutory requirements.\n\u201cThe trial court must at least make findings sufficiently specific to indicate that the trial judge properly considered each of the factors established by G.S. 5046.5(a) for a determination of an alimony award.\u201d Shamarak v. Shamarak, 81 N.C. App. 125, 128, 343 S.E.2d 559, 561 (1986). \u201cThe requirement for detailed findings is thus not a mere formality or an empty ritual; it must be done.\u201d Id. at 128, 343 S.E.2d at 562. \u201cAlthough the trial judge must follow the requirements of this section in determining the amount of permanent alimony to be awarded, the trial judge\u2019s determination of the proper amount is within his sound discretion and his determination will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of that discretion.\u201d Payne v. Payne, 49 N.C. App. 132, 135, 270 S.E.2d 546, 548 (1980).\nPlaintiff contends that a comparison of the estates of the two parties reveals that no amount of alimony is \u201cnecessary\u201d to maintain defendant\u2019s standard of living. We disagree. The trial court found that defendant had assets of over $490,000, debts of $37,876, monthly expenses of $2500, and a gross monthly income of $1477. Plaintiff argues that defendant\u2019s monthly receipts are $3618 with the addition of the monthly payment from plaintiff of $2141.29 (less the $300 interest) on the equitable distribution distributive award note. We disagree with plaintiff\u2019s assessment of defendant\u2019s monthly receipts. The $2141 is the principal on the equitable distribution note, and the trial court properly included this amount in the assets owned by defendant.\nThe trial court found that plaintiff had a gross monthly income of $8696.32, net monthly income of $5681.18, and monthly living expenses of $2861.11. He had assets of $901,338.29 and debts of $338,095.46. Plaintiff argues that his total monthly expenses are $9002.43 which results in a shortfall of $3321.25.\nThe trial court\u2019s findings are supported by competent evidence and are binding on this Court on appeal. Williams v. Williams, 299 N.C. 174, 187, 261 S.E.2d at 849, 858 (1980). We find that the trial court properly considered the factors in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 5046.5(a) in setting permanent alimony and making sufficiently detailed findings. Further, defendant need not deplete her monthly principal payment as plaintiff argues. As our Supreme Court stated in Williams, \u201c[i]f the spouse seeking alimony is denied alimony because he or she has an estate which can be spent away to maintain his or her standard of living, that spouse may soon have no earnings or earning capacity and therefore no way to maintain any standard of living.\u201d 299 N.C. at 184, 261 S.E.2d at 856.\nPlaintiff also argues that the trial court ignored the relationship between equitable distribution and alimony and excluded the effect of equitable distribution from its consideration of plaintiff\u2019s ability to pay alimony. Further, he argues the results are unjust in that the trial court ordered the same amount of permanent alimony as temporary alimony so that defendant is receiving the same amount of alimony as she did prior to equitable distribution.\nWe disagree. Clearly there is a relationship between one\u2019s property and one\u2019s \u201cneed for support and the ability to furnish it.\u201d Capps v. Capps, 69 N.C. App. 755, 757, 318 S.E.2d 346, 348 (1984). However, in its determination of the factors required to be considered by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 5046.5(a), the trial court did consider the effects of equitable distribution. Further, at the time of the award of permanent alimony, over six years had passed since the award of temporary alimony. Here the trial court properly considered the required factors and did not abuse its discretion in setting the amount of permanent alimony.\nPlaintiff also contends that the \u201ctrial court committed reversible error by repeatedly sustaining objections to testimony regarding the parties\u2019 accustomed standard of living prior to separation, contrary to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 5046.5(a) and the decisions of this court.\u201d Plaintiff assigns as error the sustaining of an objection by defendant\u2019s attorney regarding plaintiff\u2019s preparation of a summary sheet of what he considered \u201creasonable monthly expenses for the maintenance of one person at the Woodberry Drive address.\u201d The summary sheet has not been included in the record. \u201c[T]he parties\u2019 standard of living during the marriage is a critical factor, which the trial court must consider to insure that the dependent spouse\u2019s alimony award will sustain.her prior lifestyle.\u201d Perkins v. Perkins, 85 N.C. App. 660, 666, 355 S.E.2d 848, 852, disc. review denied, 320 N.C. 633, 360 S.E.2d 92 (1987). Consistent with this requirement, the trial court\u2019s findings indicate he considered defendant\u2019s \u201cstation in life to which she became accustomed to during the parties\u2019 marriage.\u201d\nII.\nPlaintiff also contends that the trial court erred in concluding as a matter of law that defendant is a dependent spouse and that plaintiff is a supporting spouse. We disagree.\nThe trial court stated in its conclusions of law:\n2. The Defendant is a dependent spouse, the Plaintiff is the supporting spouse and is financially capable of supporting the Defendant; and that grounds exist for award of permanent alimony.\n3. The Plaintiff is the person upon whom the Defendant is actually substantially dependent to maintain the station in life to which Defendant has become accustomed during the parties\u2019 marriage and Defendant is in need of support and maintenance from the Plaintiff; that Plaintiff has financial ability to provide, or take necessary means to provide, the Defendant with permanent alimony in the amount of $1,684.00 per month.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-16.1(3) (1987) defines \u201cdependent spouse\u201d as a \u201cspouse, whether husband or wife, who is actually substantially dependent upon the other spouse for his or her maintenance and support or is substantially in need of maintenance and support from the other spouse.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-16.1(4) defines \u201csupporting spouse\u201d as \u201ca spouse . . . upon whom the other spouse is actually substantially dependent or from whom such other spouse is substantially in need of maintenance and support.\u201d\nIn order to be \u201cactually substantially dependent\u201d on the other spouse, \u201cthe spouse seeking alimony must have actual dependence on the other in order to maintain the standard of living in the manner to which that spouse became accustomed during the last several years prior to separation.\u201d Williams, 299 N.C. at 180, 261 S.E.2d at 854. \u201c[T]he trial court must evaluate the parties\u2019 incomes and expenses measured by the standard of living of the family as a unit\u201d in order to determine if a spouse is \u201cactually substantially dependent.\u201d Talent v. Talent, 76 N.C. App. 545, 548, 384 S.E.2d 256, 258 (1985).\nIn addition, even where a spouse is not \u201cactually substantially dependent,\u201d the spouse may be a dependent spouse under the second part of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-16.1(3) if he or she is \u201csubstantially in need of maintenance and support,\u201d the meaning of which is determined by construing this statute in pari materia with the terms of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-16.5. Williams, 299 N.C. at 182, 261 S.E.2d at 855. Thus, a spouse is a dependent spouse if \u201cconsidering the parties\u2019 earnings, earning capacity, estates, and other factors, the spouse seeking alimony demonstrates the need for financial contribution from the other spouse to maintain his or her accustomed standard of living.\u201d Phillips v. Phillips, 83 N.C. App. 228, 229, 349 S.E.2d 397, 399 (1986). If a trial court decides a spouse is dependent and is entitled to an order for alimony, the award will not be disturbed on appeal except for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 230, 349 S.E.2d at 399.\nIn Williams the trial court found that the wife\u2019s monthly expenses exceeded $3500 based on the standard of living to which the parties had become accustomed, and that the wife had a monthly gross income of $1833, resulting in a monthly shortfall of $1667, and an estate with a net worth of $761,935. The trial court found the husband had a gross income of $116,600, a net income of $61,702, and an estate with a net worth of $870,165. There the Supreme Court in upholding the trial court\u2019s award of permanent alimony held that the wife was \u201csubstantially in need of maintenance and support\u201d from the supporting spouse and was therefore a dependent spouse. Williams, 299 N.C. at 187, 261 S.E.2d at 858.\nHere the trial court properly considered the required factors in determining whether defendant is a dependent spouse and plaintiff a supporting spouse, and its findings are supported by the evidence. Because defendant is \u201csubstantially in need of maintenance and support\u201d from plaintiff, we hold that the trial court did not err in concluding that defendant is a dependent spouse and plaintiff is the supporting spouse.\nIII.\nPlaintiff contends that the trial court erred in concluding that defendant was without necessary funds to pay her attorneys\u2019 fees, that plaintiff has the ability to pay $12,235.15 of these fees, and ordering plaintiff to pay $12,235.15 of such fees. We agree.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-16.4 (1987) provides:\nAt any time that a dependent spouse would be entitled to alimony pendente lite pursuant to G.S. 50-16.3, the court may, upon application of such spouse, enter an order for reasonable counsel fees for the benefit of such spouse, to be paid and secured by the supporting spouse in the same manner as alimony.\nIn Clark v. Clark, 301 N.C. 123, 135-36, 271 S.E.2d 58, 67 (1980), our Supreme Court stated:\nIn order to receive an award of counsel fees in an alimony case, it must be determined that the spouse is entitled to the relief demanded; that the spouse is a dependent spouse; and that the dependent spouse is without sufficient means whereon to subsist during the prosecution of the suit, and defray the necessary expenses thereof. Whether these requirements have been met is a question of law that is reviewable on appeal, and if counsel fees are properly awarded, the amount of the award rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge and is reviewable on appeal only for an abuse of discretion. The guiding principle behind the allowance of counsel fees is to enable the dependent spouse, as litigant, to meet the supporting spouse, as litigant, on substantially even terms by making it possible for the dependent spouse to employ adequate and suitable legal representation. [Citations omitted.]\nIn Clark, where the husband had a net worth in 1975 of $650,000 with a savings account in 1978 of $75,000, and the wife had an entire separate estate of only $87,000, the Court said that \u201c[i]t would be contrary to what we perceive to be the intent of the legislature to require a dependent spouse to meet the expenses of litigation through the unreasonable depletion of her separate estate where her separate estate is considerably smaller than that of the supporting spouse. . . .\u201d Id. at 137, 271 S.E.2d at 68; see also Cobb v. Cobb, 79 N.C. App. 592, 339 S.E.2d 825 (1986) (attorney fees awarded where the wife would be forced to sell her only remaining asset, the marital home). In Beaman v. Beaman, 77 N.C. App. 717, 336 S.E.2d 129 (1985), this Court, in looking at the dependent spouse\u2019s income alone, affirmed the trial court\u2019s awarding of attorney fees.\nIn Williams, the Court denied attorney fees where the dependent spouse had a substantial separate estate. There the Court stated: \u201cIt is clear from the record before us that an award of counsel fees was not necessary to enable plaintiff, as litigant, to meet defendant, as litigant, on substantially even terms by making it possible for her to employ counsel.\u201d Williams, 299 N.C. at 190, 261 S.E.2d at 860.\nHere the trial court found that \u201cDefendant does not have sufficient income and assets with which to pay said sum and Plaintiff has the ability to take reasonable measures to secure assets to pay Defendant\u2019s attorneys for a portion of the services rendered to the Defendant in the sum of $12,235.15.\u201d This finding that the defendant \u201cdoes not have sufficient income and assets with which to pay\u201d her attorneys\u2019 fees is not supported by the evidence.\nThe evidence shows that defendant had assets of over $490,000, debts of $37,876, a total gross monthly income of $1477 (plus $1684 in alimony) with monthly expenses of $2500. The evidence also shows that plaintiff had assets of $901,338.29, debts of $338,095.46, a gross monthly income of $8696.32, and monthly living expenses of $2861.11.\nDefendant argues that 57% of the value of her estate consists of non-income producing assets used by the parties when they were living together and the remaining assets were invested to generate income to meet her expenses. However, in looking at the evidence, we conclude that an award of attorneys\u2019 fees was not necessary in order for defendant, as litigant, to meet plaintiff, as litigant, on substantially even terms. The amount of attorney fees that defendant is responsible for is substantial but not so substantial as to deplete or jeopardize the defendant\u2019s assets and income. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in awardr ing attorneys\u2019 fees to defendant.\nAffirmed in part and reversed in part.\nJudge WYNN concurs.\nJudge COZORT concurs in part and dissents in part.", "type": "majority", "author": "ORR, Judge." }, { "text": "Judge COZORT\nconcurring in part and dissenting in part.\nI agree with that portion of the majority which affirmed the trial court\u2019s order awarding permanent alimony to defendant. I disagree with the majority\u2019s conclusion that the trial court erred in awarding attorneys\u2019 fees to defendant.\nDefendant is 68 years old, in bad health, and did not work outside the home during the marriage. At separation, she had no income and no significant separate estate. After equitable distribution, she has a sizable \u201cpaper\u201d estate; however, the bulk of that estate is the marital home and investment accounts received in the equitable distribution which provide some income for the defendant. If defendant must pay her own attorneys\u2019 fees, she must use all the alimony received from plaintiff for a substantial period of time, sell the marital home, or liquidate the investment assets received in the equitable distribution. Neither option is, in my view, appropriate. The law should not require the dependent spouse to deplete that which she receives in equitable distribution or as alimony payments in order to pay her attorneys for services rendered to her. I vote to affirm the trial court\u2019s decision to award attorneys\u2019 fees to defendant.", "type": "concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part", "author": "Judge COZORT" } ], "attorneys": [ "Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, by Jimmy H. Barnhill and James H. Joyce, III, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Davis & Harwell, P.A., by Joslin Davis and Robin J. Stinson, for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "LEWIS E. LAMB, JR., Appellant v. THEDA ANDREWS LAMB, Appellee\nNo. 9021DC1174\n(Filed 6 August 1991)\n1. Divorce and Separation \u00a7 218 (NCI4th)\u2014 alimony \u2014 substantial assets \u2014 maintaining standard of living\nThe trial court did not err in determining that an award of alimony was necessary to maintain defendant wife\u2019s standard of living where the court found that defendant had assets of over $490,000, debts of $37,876, monthly expenses of $2,500, and a gross monthly income of $1,477. Defendant was not required to deplete plaintiffs monthly payments to her on the principal of a note given in equitable distribution before being entitled to alimony.\nAm Jur 2d, Divorce and Separation \u00a7\u00a7 665, 666.\n2. Divorce and Separation \u00a7 219 (NCI4th)\u2014 alimony \u2014 consideration of equitable distribution\nThe trial court did not fail to consider the effect of equitable distribution on plaintiff husband\u2019s ability to pay alimony. Furthermore, the trial court did not err in awarding defendant wife the same amount of permanent alimony as she had been receiving as temporary alimony prior to equitable distribution.\nAm Jur 2d, Divorce and Separation \u00a7\u00a7 560, 657.\n3. Divorce and Separation \u00a7 201 (NCI4th)\u2014 wife as dependent spouse \u2014 supporting evidence\nThe trial court did not err in concluding that defendant wife is a dependent spouse and plaintiff husband is the supporting spouse where the court found that defendant has assets of over $490,000, debts of $37,876, monthly expenses to maintain her accustomed standard of living of $2,500, and a gross monthly income of only $1,477, and that plaintiff husband has assets of over $901,000, debts of $338,095, gross monthly income of $8,696, net monthly income of $5,681, and monthly living expenses of $2,861.\nAm Jur 2d, Divorce and Separation \u00a7\u00a7 642, 659, 660.\n4. Divorce and Separation \u00a7 539 (NCI4th)\u2014 alimony action\u2014 attorney fees erroneously awarded\nThe trial court erred in awarding attorney fees of $12,235 to defendant wife in an alimony action where both parties had substantial estates and an award of attorney fees was not necessary in order for defendant, as litigant, to meet plaintiff, as litigant, on substantially even terms.\nAm Jur 2d, Divorce and Separation \u00a7 604.\nJudge COZORT concurring in part and dissenting in part.\nAPPEAL by plaintiff from judgment entered 11 June 1990 by Judge Abner Alexander in FORSYTH County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 16 May 1991.\nPlaintiff and defendant separated on 5 July 1983, and on 12 January 1984 plaintiff was ordered to pay as temporary alimony $1600 per month and $84 per month for medical insurance. A judgment of absolute divorce was entered 2 October 1985, and an equitable distribution judgment was entered 6 October 1989. On 11 June 1990, a judgment was entered ordering plaintiff to pay defendant $1684 per month as permanent alimony and $12,235.15 to defendant\u2019s attorneys for services and costs rendered in the action for permanent alimony.\nFrom this judgment, plaintiff appeals.\nWomble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, by Jimmy H. Barnhill and James H. Joyce, III, for plaintiff-appellant.\nDavis & Harwell, P.A., by Joslin Davis and Robin J. Stinson, for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0541-01", "first_page_order": 571, "last_page_order": 581 }