{ "id": 8520086, "name": "DONALD MICHAEL ANDERS, Plaintiff v. HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA CORPORATION, d/b/a HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA, VANN YORK PONTIAC, INC., and GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Anders v. Hyundai Motor America Corp.", "decision_date": "1991-09-03", "docket_number": "No. 9018SC752", "first_page": "61", "last_page": "68", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "104 N.C. App. 61" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "89 ALR3d 449", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "51 ALR4th 872", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "376 S.E.2d 425", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "427" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 63", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2488503 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0063-01" ] }, { "cite": "348 S.E.2d 524", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 411", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4731443 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0411-01" ] }, { "cite": "339 S.E.2d 460", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 N.C. App. 345", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520733 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/79/0345-01" ] }, { "cite": "248 S.E.2d 257", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "295 N.C. 653", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568227, 8568295, 8568329, 8568265, 8568169 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/295/0653-02", "/nc/295/0653-04", "/nc/295/0653-05", "/nc/295/0653-03", "/nc/295/0653-01" ] }, { "cite": "245 S.E.2d 801", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "807" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "87 N.C. App. 97", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "106" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "251 S.E.2d 419", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "422" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 N.C. 467", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567655 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "470" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/296/0467-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 730, "char_count": 16136, "ocr_confidence": 0.751, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.657061316201031e-07, "percentile": 0.8245592696717067 }, "sha256": "eb1c6c7e40ef1850145e24942302bf43a1c79151b90012902440a2d66097ce5a", "simhash": "1:eefc92671d3b3122", "word_count": 2512 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:39:04.224888+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges COZORT and GREENE concur." ], "parties": [ "DONALD MICHAEL ANDERS, Plaintiff v. HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA CORPORATION, d/b/a HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA, VANN YORK PONTIAC, INC., and GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PARKER, Judge.\nPlaintiff Anders instituted this action against the Hyundai Motor America Corporation (\u201cHyundai\u201d), Vann York Pontiac, Inc., (\u201cdealership\u201d) and General Motors Acceptance Corporation (\u201cGMAC\u201d) pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 20-351 et seq., the New Motor Vehicles Warranties Act (\u201cNew Vehicles Act\u201d) and N.C.G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1 for unfair and deceptive trade practices to recover losses incurred on account of his purchase of an allegedly defective Hyundai automobile. The trial court entered summary judgment against plaintiff as to all defendants. Plaintiff\u2019s motion to withdraw his appeal and dismiss the action as to the dealership and GMAC was allowed.\nOn appeal plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in ruling as a matter of law that plaintiff was not entitled to any relief pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 20-351.3 and 20-351.5 or under N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 75-1.1 and 75-16. We agree in part and reverse as to plaintiff\u2019s claim under the New Vehicles Act; we affirm as to plaintiff\u2019s claim for unfair and deceptive trade practice.\nI. Facts\nPlaintiff bought his car on 26 July 1989 and soon experienced problems both with engine operation and with vibration at highway speeds. Between 26 July and 10 November plaintiff took the car back to the dealership for repair of these problems on about twenty different dates. The problems were never resolved to plaintiff\u2019s satisfaction and finally the dealership offered to contact a Hyundai representative, which it did.\nPlaintiff test drove the car with Ben Hall, the manufacturer\u2019s representative, on 14 November. Hall explained that the vibration evident at about sixty miles per hour was probably the result of weight imbalance and that rebalancing \u201cshould correct the condition ... to a normal or acceptable level for the Hyundai Excel.\u201d According to another part of Hall\u2019s written report, plaintiff \u201cagreed . . . during the test drive\u201d that engine power was sufficient in \u201cgradual or normal acceleration [and] under a load condition test\u201d but performance was less good \u201cduring hard acceleration.\u201d When Hall offered to repair the car to plaintiff\u2019s satisfaction and to provide a loaner vehicle in the interim, plaintiff refused the offer and told Hall he no longer wanted the car and wished Hyundai to repurchase the vehicle. Plaintiff further informed Hall that he would go to court; Hall responded \u201cthat the . . . offer [to repair] will remain open if [you] . . . decide to have the vehicle repaired.\u201d On 17 November plaintiff\u2019s attorney requested in writing that Hyundai accept return of the car and reimburse plaintiff for enumerated expenses. The letter also stated that failure to respond appropriately would result in legal proceedings. This action for \u201crefund\u201d was filed on 15 December 1989.\nII. The New Vehicles Act\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 20-351 to 20-351.10 establish a private r\u00e9medy for a consumer against an automobile manufacturer for failure to conform a vehicle to express warranties. The New Vehicles Act is applicable to plaintiff and defendant Hyundai under the definitions of \u201cconsumer\u201d and \u201cmanufacturer\u201d in N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 20-351.1(1) and (2). The next section of the Act imposes a duty on the manufacturer post-sale to conform the car to express warranties.\nIf a new motor vehicle does not conform to all applicable express warranties ... and the consumer reports the nonconformity to the manufacturer, its agent, or its authorized dealer . . . , the manufacturer shall make, or arrange to have made, repairs mecessary to' conform the vehicle to the express warranties.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-351.2 (1988 Cum. Supp.).\nThe remedy for consumers arises upon the occurrence of certain conditions.\nIf the manufacturer is unable, after a reasonable number of attempts, to conform the motor vehicle to any express warranty by repairing ... or arranging for the repair ... off] any defect or condition . . . which substantially impair[s] the value ... to the consumer, . . . the manufacturer shall, at the option of the consumer, replace the vehicle ... or accept return . . . and refund to the consumer the following[.]\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-351.3 (1988 Cum. Supp.).\nTo assist a consumer in showing a manufacturer\u2019s failure to conform the vehicle to express warranties, the New Vehicles Act creates a statutory presumption as to what constitutes a reasonable number of attempts to conform. The statute provides:\n(a) It is presumed that a reasonable number of attempts have been undertaken to conform a motor vehicle to the applicable express warranties if:\n(1) The same nonconformity has been presented for repair to the manufacturer, its agent, or its authorized dealer four or more times but the same nonconformity continues to exist; or\n(2) The vehicle was out of service to the consumer during or while awaiting repair of the nonconformity or a series of nonconformities for a cumulative total of 20 or more business days during any 12-month period of the warranty,\nprovided that the consumer has notified the manufacturer directly in writing of the existence of the nonconformity or series of nonconformities and allowed the manufacturer a reasonable period, not to exceed 15 calendar days, in which to correct the nonconformity or series of nonconformities. The manufacturer must clearly and conspicuously disclose to the consumer in the warranty or owners manual that written notification of a nonconformity is required before a consumer may be eligible for a refund or replacement of the vehicle and the manufacturer shall include in the warranty or owners manual the name and address where the written notification may be sent. Provided, further, that notice to the manufacturer shall not be required if the manufacturer fails to make the disclosures provided herein.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-351.5(a) (1988 Cum. Supp.).\nThe undisputed facts in this case permit plaintiff to clear the initial eligibility hurdles in the pr\u00e9sumption provision in that \u201cthe same nonconformity continue[d] to exist\u201d after four or more repairs, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-351.5(a)(l), and plaintiff had not been able to use the car \u201cfor a cumulative total of 20 or more business days\u201d because of the nonconformity, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-351.5(a)(2). The issue is whether plaintiff was required to comply with the notice requirements in the presumption provision. Plaintiff contends that under the statute notice was not required and defendant manufacturer was not entitled to fifteen days to repair because the owner\u2019s manual failed to make the requisite disclosure. Defendant Hyundai contends that the dealer, not plaintiff, gave notice of the existence of the noncon-formities; and even if its owner\u2019s manual failed to satisfy the statutorily mandated disclosure requirement, defendant manufacturer is, in any event, entitled to fifteen days to make repairs to conform the vehicle to the express warranty.\nAn examination of the plain language of the statute reveals that the obvious purpose of the notice requirement is to give the manufacturer at least fifteen days to repair the vehicle. However, a condition to the notice requirement is that the manufacturer make a specific disclosure to the consumer. Thus if the purchaser\u2019s direct notification to the manufacturer is waived by the manufacturer\u2019s failure to disclose, the opportunity to make repairs is also waived. Without notification, the opportunity to repair is nullified. In this regard we note that the notification requirement by the purchaser directly to the manufacturer in the presumption section of the statute differs from the reporting requirement in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-351.2, which allows reporting to the \u201cmanufacturer, its agent, or its authorized dealer.\u201d The happenstance that in this particular case the dealer notified the manufacturer does not control or alter the statutory interpretation that the opportunity to repair is at least implicitly tied to notification. On first blush this interpretation may appear unduly harsh, but the manufacturer can protect itself by making the necessary disclosure..\nThe question then is whether in the case under review defendant Hyundai\u2019s warranty or owner\u2019s manual disclosed the necessary information. We hold that it did not.\nHyundai\u2019s manual, which plaintiff received, contains procedures to be followed in case a buyer has \u201ca concern with a Hyundai product.\u201d These procedures appear under the caption \u201cHELPFUL INFORMATION\u201d in a larger section of the owner\u2019s manual called \u201cConsumer Information.\u201d\nThe following sequence will provide the fastest response to your concern:\nTalk to your Hyundai Dealer first.\nYour Hyundai Dealer is in the best position to assist you with your concern. He employs trained technicians and can supply the necessary parts for your Hyundai. Every Hyundai Dealer is ultimately responsible for your continued satisfaction.\nPlease talk to the Service Manager or the Consumer Affairs Manager, explaining your situation. In the event your concern has not been resolved, then speak with the owner of the dealership who is interested in your satisfaction and long term patronage.\nIn the unlikely event you and your Dealer were unable to reach an understanding, then contact the Regional Consumer Affairs Department responsible for your area (see page 9).\nPage 9 provides a map of Hyundai\u2019s regional centers in the United States with the address and phone numbers for each.\nNowhere in this \u201chelpful information\u201d is there any statement which \u201cclearly and conspicuously disclose[s] to the consumer . . . that written notification of a nonconformity is required before a consumer may be eligible for a refund or replacement of the vehicle.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-351.5(a). In fact, written notification is not mentioned and the clear implication is that the dealer, who has trained technicians, is the manufacturer\u2019s representative for making repairs. The New Vehicles Act, also commonly known as a \u201clemon law,\u201d is a consumer protection statute. To allow the manufacturer the benefit of the opportunity to repair without compliance with the statute\u2019s mandates thwarts the underlying purpose of the Act.\nSummary judgment is appropriate only if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56. As we have held that the manufacturer\u2019s deficient disclosure relieved plaintiff from the written notice requirement as well as the requirement that the manufacturer be allowed a reasonable time to make repairs, defendant Hyundai was not entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff\u2019s claim under the New Vehicles Act. Moreover, even if defendant Hyundai\u2019s disclosure were sufficient, on the record in this case, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether plaintiff in fact gave notice to the manufacturer. In his sworn answers to defendant\u2019s interrogatories, plaintiff stated that he sent a letter to defendant Hyundai in September. On summary judgment the court does not weigh the credibility of the evidence. Moore v. Fieldcrest Mills, Inc., 296 N.C. 467, 470, 251 S.E.2d 419, 422 (1979).\nFinally we note that a consumer\u2019s inability to satisfy the conditions creating the presumption of a reasonable number of attempts to repair does not preclude him from proving, without benefit of the presumption, that the manufacturer was unable to conform the vehicle to the express warranty by correcting defects which substantially impair the value of the vehicle. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-351.5(b).\nSummary judgment on plaintiff\u2019s claim under the New Vehicles Act is reversed.\nIII. Unfair Trade Practice\nPlaintiff also contends that defendant Hyundai violated N.C.G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1 when its representative informed him that he would have to pay \u201csubstantial additional sums of money\u201d to obtain a comparable replacement vehicle. Plaintiff argues that this statement was deceptive and shows defendant\u2019s oppressive, unethical and unscrupulous dealing. We disagree.\nInitially we note that the breach of an express warranty is not in and of itself a violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1. Stone v. Park Homes, Inc., 87 N.C. App. 97, 106, 245 S.E.2d 801, 807, disc. rev. denied, 295 N.C. 653, 248 S.E.2d 257 (1978).\nFurthermore, to recover for a deceptive trade practice, plaintiff must show that he suffered actual injury as the result of the alleged deceptive act. Bailey v. LeBeau, 79 N.C. App. 345, 339 S.E.2d 460, modified and aff'd, 318 N.C. 411, 348 S.E.2d 524 (1986). In the present case, the record reflects that plaintiff told Hyundai\u2019s representative that he wanted defendant Hyundai to repurchase the vehicle. This election of refund rather than replacement was also reflected in plaintiff\u2019s attorney\u2019s letter dated 17 November 1989 just three days after plaintiffs meeting with the Hyundai representative. In both that letter and in the complaint in this action, the monetary demands are consistent with a \u201crefund\u201d pursuant to .N-C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 20-351.3(a)(1), (2), (3) and (4). Where defendant shows that an essential element of plaintiff\u2019s claim is nonexistent, summary judgment is appropriate. Collingwood v. G.E. Real Estate Equities, 324 N.C. 63, 66, 376 S.E.2d 425, 427 (1989). On the record in this case plaintiff cannot show any injury resulting from the alleged deceptive statement. Accordingly, summary judgment on the unfair and deceptive trade practice claim is affirmed.\nAffirmed in part; reversed in part.\nJudges COZORT and GREENE concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PARKER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Stephen E. Lawing for plaintiff-appellant.", "Maupin Taylor Ellis & Adams, P.A., by M. Keith Kapp and Daniel K. Bryson, for defendant-appellee Hyundai Motor America.", "Keziah, Gates & Samet, by Andrew S. Lasine, for defendant-appellee Vann York Pontiac, Inc.", "Robert V. Suggs for defendant-appellee General Motors Acceptance Corporation." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DONALD MICHAEL ANDERS, Plaintiff v. HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA CORPORATION, d/b/a HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA, VANN YORK PONTIAC, INC., and GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION, Defendants\nNo. 9018SC752\n(Filed 3 September 1991)\n1. Automobiles and Other Vehicles \u00a7 254 (NCI4th)\u2014 failure to conform to warranties \u2014remedies \u2014manufacturer\u2019s; disclosure\nThe trial court improperly granted summary judgment for defendants in an action arising from the purchase of an allegedly defective automobile where the undisputed1 facts permit plaintiff to clear the initial eligibility hurdles in the New Vehicles Act, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-351.5, in that the same nonconformity continued to exist after four or more repairs and plaintiff had not been able to use the car for a cumulative total of 20 or more business days because of the nonconformity, and the manufacturer\u2019s deficient disclosure that written notification of a nonconformity is required relieved plaintiff from the written notice requirement as well as the requirement that the manufacturer be allowed a reasonable time to make repairs. Moreover, even if defendant Hyundai\u2019s disclosure was sufficient, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether plaintiff in fact gave notice to the manufacturer.\nAm Jur 2d, Consumer Product Warranty Acts \u00a7\u00a7 66-69.\nValidity, construction, and effect of state motor vehicle warranty legislation (lemon laws). 51 ALR4th 872.\n2. Unfair Competition \u00a7 1 (NCI3d)\u2014 sale of defective automobile \u2014 replacement vehicle \u2014representation of additional sums required-summary judgment proper\nThe trial court properly granted summary judgment for defendant Hyundai on an unfair and deceptive practice claim where plaintiff alleged defects in his automobile and representations by defendant that he would have to pay substantial additional sums of money to obtain a comparable replacement vehicle. Breach of an express warranty is not in and of itself a violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1, and plaintiff must show that he suffered actual injury to recover for a deceptive trade practice. The record here reflects that plaintiff elected a refund rather than replacement. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1.\nAm Jur 2d, Monopolies, Restraints of Trade, and Unfair Trade Practices \u00a7\u00a7 714, 735.\nPractices forbidden by state deceptive trade practice and consumer protection acts. 89 ALR3d 449.\nAPPEAL by plaintiff from 7 May 1990 order by Judge Russell G. Walker, Jr., in GUILFORD County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 25 January 1991.\nStephen E. Lawing for plaintiff-appellant.\nMaupin Taylor Ellis & Adams, P.A., by M. Keith Kapp and Daniel K. Bryson, for defendant-appellee Hyundai Motor America.\nKeziah, Gates & Samet, by Andrew S. Lasine, for defendant-appellee Vann York Pontiac, Inc.\nRobert V. Suggs for defendant-appellee General Motors Acceptance Corporation." }, "file_name": "0061-01", "first_page_order": 89, "last_page_order": 96 }