{ "id": 8522218, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ALICE RAMONA GORDON, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Gordon", "decision_date": "1991-11-05", "docket_number": "No. 9028SC1360", "first_page": "455", "last_page": "461", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "104 N.C. App. 455" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "322 N.C. 261", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2517806 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0261-01" ] }, { "cite": "377 S.E.2d 762", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 251", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2484836, 2488132, 2484134, 2485115, 2488252 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0251-01", "/nc/324/0251-03", "/nc/324/0251-02", "/nc/324/0251-04", "/nc/324/0251-05" ] }, { "cite": "376 S.E.2d 21", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "22" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 N.C. App. 752", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527656 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "753" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/92/0752-01" ] }, { "cite": "377 S.E.2d 238", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 114", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2483680, 2485665, 2484973, 2487262, 2487903 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0114-02", "/nc/324/0114-05", "/nc/324/0114-01", "/nc/324/0114-03", "/nc/324/0114-04" ] }, { "cite": "373 S.E.2d 131", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "133", "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "91 N.C. App. 559", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526199 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "565", "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/91/0559-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 S.E.2d 457", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "458", "parenthetical": "The State failed to prove prior convictions with exhibits, but this Court held that defendant waived the right to appeal by failing to object." } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 N.C. App. 189", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521677 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "190", "parenthetical": "The State failed to prove prior convictions with exhibits, but this Court held that defendant waived the right to appeal by failing to object." } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/99/0189-01" ] }, { "cite": "307 S.E.2d 156", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "159", "parenthetical": "\"We also agree with the Court of Appeals that the prosecuting attorney's statement concerning a prior conviction of larceny in Jones County constituted insufficient evidence to support a finding of that prior conviction . . . .\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 421", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4766681 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "424-25", "parenthetical": "\"We also agree with the Court of Appeals that the prosecuting attorney's statement concerning a prior conviction of larceny in Jones County constituted insufficient evidence to support a finding of that prior conviction . . . .\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0421-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 65", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "71" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 24", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4695666 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "32" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0024-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 S.E.2d 286", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "87 N.C. App. 349", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8358377 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/87/0349-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 S.E.2d 153", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1955, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "242 N.C. 595", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8619766 ], "year": 1955, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/242/0595-01" ] }, { "cite": "99 L.Ed.2d 912", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "485 U.S. 1036", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 13312, 13445, 13287, 13545, 13740, 13965, 13233, 14131, 13397, 13238, 13399, 13750, 13849, 13725 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/485/1036-05", "/us/485/1036-12", "/us/485/1036-11", "/us/485/1036-04", "/us/485/1036-06", "/us/485/1036-14", "/us/485/1036-08", "/us/485/1036-10", "/us/485/1036-01", "/us/485/1036-02", "/us/485/1036-13", "/us/485/1036-03", "/us/485/1036-09", "/us/485/1036-07" ] }, { "cite": "362 S.E.2d 244", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 201", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2569839 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0201-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 S.E.2d 48", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "54", "parenthetical": "emphasis in the original" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 268", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5306215 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278-79", "parenthetical": "emphasis in the original" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0268-01" ] }, { "cite": "459 U.S. 1018", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6468801, 6468547, 6469476, 6468711, 6469608, 6469353, 6468967, 6468624, 6468240, 6468465, 6469044, 6468343, 6469144, 6469246 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/459/1018-07", "/us/459/1018-04", "/us/459/1018-13", "/us/459/1018-06", "/us/459/1018-14", "/us/459/1018-12", "/us/459/1018-08", "/us/459/1018-05", "/us/459/1018-01", "/us/459/1018-03", "/us/459/1018-09", "/us/459/1018-02", "/us/459/1018-10", "/us/459/1018-11" ] }, { "cite": "676 F.2d 995", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 562145 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1002" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/676/0995-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 S.E.2d 375", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378", "parenthetical": "quoting United States v. McCaskill, 676 F.2d 995, 1002, (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1018 (1982)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 655", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565416 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "660", "parenthetical": "quoting United States v. McCaskill, 676 F.2d 995, 1002, (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1018 (1982)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0655-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 S.E.2d 66", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 298", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5306390 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0298-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 S.E.2d 889", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "891" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 S.E.2d 260", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "65 N.C. App. 355", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523904 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/65/0355-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 84", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 626", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4714364 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0626-01" ] }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 261", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2517806 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0261-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 697, "char_count": 13932, "ocr_confidence": 0.756, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.2569032113852414e-07, "percentile": 0.7822029392447204 }, "sha256": "0f6f759894c46bd9e2f9ea14deace1c00f458bc8e880071511af4f705b9ac557", "simhash": "1:e62ed1a82c2d3c37", "word_count": 2251 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:39:04.224888+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Wells and Parker concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ALICE RAMONA GORDON, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WYNN, Judge.\nThe State\u2019s evidence tended to show that defendant and the victim, Suzanne Jackson, argued about defendant\u2019s boyfriend on 10 September 1989. The next evening, defendant was sitting in or on a friend\u2019s car in her apartment complex parking lot about thirty feet from Jackson\u2019s front door when Jackson came outside. Defendant yelled remarks to her but did not approach her. Thereafter, Jackson walked towards defendant and said \u201cif you want to fight, we\u2019ll fight.\u201d In response, defendant jumped out of the car, ran across the street, and apparently obtained a gun from the hand of her uncle who was standing outside at the time of the incident. In the meantime, Jackson\u2019s husband urged her to go inside, and, while the couple walked toward their front door, defendant followed them and shot Jackson in the arm.\nDefendant presented evidence at trial which formed the basis for her contention that she acted in self-defense. Contrary to Jackson\u2019s testimony that she did not have anything in her hand, four of defendant\u2019s witnesses testified that the victim had something in her hand that looked like a knife prior to the scooting. Defendant\u2019s witnesses also stated that the victim chased defendant around the car with the knife.\nThe jury found defendant guilty of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury. The trial judge sentenced defendant to a term of eight years, five years greater than the presumptive sentence. To this court, defendant appealed.\nI\nDefendant first assigns error to the trial judge\u2019s instructions to the jury on self-defense. She alleges that the instruction given by the trial judge was inadequate, misleading, and erroneous as a matter of law. We disagree.\nAlthough it is not clear from the record, defendant contends that during the charge conference, she requested an instruction on self-defense. The trial judge apparently indicated he would give the pattern jury instructions. However, in his instructions to the jury, the trial judge instructed on self-defense, but did not give the pattern instructions. Following his instructions to the jury, the trial judge asked counsel if they objected to the \u201cpattern\u201d instructions he had just given the jury. Both attorneys stated they had no objections.\nUnder N.C.R. App. P. 10(b)(2), \u201c[a] party may not assign as error any portion of the jury charge or omission therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict . . . .\u201d See State v. Morgan, 315 N.C. 626, 340 S.E.2d 84 (1986); State v. Norfleet, 65 N.C. App. 355, 309 S.E.2d 260 (1983). There are, however, two exceptions to this requirement. The first exception applies when the trial judge fails to give any instruction on the requested issue. State v. Ross, 322 N.C. 261, 367 S.E.2d 889 (1988). In Ross, the trial judge agreed to give a requested instruction on defendant\u2019s decision not to testify, but the trial judge neglected to give the promised instruction. There, our Supreme Court held that \u201ca request for an instruction at the charge conference is sufficient compliance with [Rule 10(b)(2)] to warrant our full review on appeal where the requested instruction is subsequently promised but not given, notwithstanding any failure to bring the error to the trial judge\u2019s attention at the end of the instructions.\u201d Id. at 265, 367 S.E.2d at 891. The second exception allows a party to seek relief on appeal without making the proper objection if the instructions complained of constitute plain error. State v. Cummings, 326 N.C. 298, 389 S.E.2d 66 (1990). Plain error means \u201csomething so basic, so prejudicial, so lacking in its elements that justice cannot have been done . . . .\u201d State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 660, 300 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1983) (quoting United States v. McCaskill, 676 F.2d 995, 1002, (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1018 (1982)).\nIn the instant case, defendant\u2019s counsel failed to object to the jury charge, even though the trial judge gave him ample opportunity outside the hearing of the jury. Defendant\u2019s reliance on the Ross exception is misplaced since the trial judge did give a self-defense instruction; Ross concerns the failure of the trial judge to give any instruction at all. Additionally, because the trial judge stated the law on self-defense in a manner very similar to the pattern instruction, it is clear that no plain error exists with respect to his instructions. We, therefore, find that defendant\u2019s assignment of error on this point is without merit.\nII\nIn her next assignments of error, defendant contends that she is entitled to a new trial because the trial court erroneously admitted irrelevant \u201cother crimes\u201d evidence about defendant and her relatives and because the prosecution asked improper questions about those crimes. We disagree.\nFrom the outset, we note that with respect to the evidence about her uncle, defendant has waived her right to preserve this issue on appeal because she neither objected nor moved to strike this evidence. Defendant also cannot appeal inclusion of the evidence relating to her boyfriend because the same information was admitted without objection elsewhere. See N.C.R. App. P. 10(b)(1). Additionally, defendant has failed to argue that there was plain error to excuse her failure to object at trial. N.C.R. App. P. 10(c)(4).\nWe will now examine the \u201cother crimes\u201d evidence which defendant properly preserved for appellate review. At trial, Suzanne Jackson made several remarks on direct examination about defendant \u201cdoing that stuff.\u201d The trial judge, however, did not allow the witness to define the \u201cstuff.\u201d Later in the trial, the prosecutor asked defendant\u2019s sister the following question: \u201cAs a matter of fact, there are not too many days when Alice isn\u2019t on cocaine, is there?\u201d The trial judge overruled defendant\u2019s objection to this question.\nEvidence relating to a defendant\u2019s \u201cother crimes\u201d or prior bad acts is governed by Rule 404(b):\nEvidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake, entrapment or accident.\nN.C.R. Evid. 404(b). Our Supreme Court has interpreted Rule 404(b) as \u201ca clear general rule of inclusion of relevant evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts by a defendant, subject to but one exception requiring its exclusion if its only probative value is to show that the defendant has the propensity or disposition to commit an offense of the nature of the crime charged.\u201d State v. Coffey, 326 N.C. 268, 278-79, 389 S.E.2d 48, 54 (1990) (emphasis in the original).\nIn this case, Ms. Jackson\u2019s testimony and the prosecutor\u2019s questioning of defendant\u2019s sister suggested that defendant had a propensity to break the law. Even though the standard for inclusion under Rule 404(b) is very broad, the state advanced no argument as to any permissible purpose for introducing this evidence. We, therefore, find that the trial court should have excluded this evidence of defendant\u2019s \u201cother crimes.\u201d State v. Bagley, 321 N.C. 201, 362 S.E.2d 244 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1036, 99 L.Ed.2d 912 (1988).\nHaving found the inclusion of this evidence to be error, we now must determine whether defendant is entitled to a new trial. To obtain a new trial, the defendant must show that her rights were prejudiced and that, had the error in question not been committed, a different result would have been reached at trial. State v. Scott, 242 N.C. 595, 89 S.E.2d 153 (1955); State v. Keys, 87 N.C. App. 349, 361 S.E.2d 286 (1987). The, evidence in this case clearly showed that defendant shot Jackson; and there was substantial evidence presented at trial that Jackson was walking towards her home when defendant shot her, negating defendant\u2019s self-defense claim. Considering these facts and other evidence presented at trial, we hold that the \u201cother crimes\u201d evidence did not prejudice the defendant. Accordingly, we overrule defendant\u2019s assignments of error on this point.\nHI\nIn her final assignment of error, defendant contends that she is entitled to a new sentencing hearing because the trial court\u2019s finding of the statutory aggravating sentencing factor of prior convictions is not supported by any record evidence. We agree.\nA trial judge\u2019s finding of an aggravating sentencing factor must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence introduced at the sentencing hearing. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.4(a) (1988). Evidence of prior convictions \u201cmay be proved by stipulation of the parties or by the original or certified copy of the court record of the prior conviction.\u201d Id. \u00a7 15A-1340.4(e). In State v. Swimm, 316 N.C. 24, 32, 340 S.E.2d 65, 71 (1986), our Supreme Court stated that \u201ca trial court may not find an aggravating factor where the only evidence to support it is the prosecutor\u2019s mere assertion that the factor exists.\u201d See also State v. Thompson, 309 N.C. 421, 424-25, 307 S.E.2d 156, 159 (1983) (\u201cWe also agree with the Court of Appeals that the prosecuting attorney\u2019s statement concerning a prior conviction of larceny in Jones County constituted insufficient evidence to support a finding of that prior conviction . . . .\u201d). But see State v. Canady, 99 N.C. App. 189, 190, 392 S.E.2d 457, 458 (1990) (The State failed to prove prior convictions with exhibits, but this Court held that defendant waived the right to appeal by failing to object.); State v. Bradley, 91 N.C. App. 559, 565, 373 S.E.2d 131, 133, disc. rev. denied, 324 N.C. 114, 377 S.E.2d 238 (1989) (same). Furthermore, this court has held that \u201c[defendant\u2019s failure to object to the prosecutor\u2019s statement at the sentencing hearing . . . was not fatal; error based on the insufficiency of evidence as a matter of law can be reviewed absent an objection.\u201d State v. Williams, 92 N.C. App. 752, 753, 376 S.E.2d 21, 22, disc. rev. denied, 324 N.C. 251, 377 S.E.2d 762 (1989). See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1446(d)(5) (1983) (Errors based on the insufficiency of the evidence as a matter of law may be the subject of appellate review even though no exception has been made in the trial division.).\nIn the instant case, the prosecutor, at the sentencing hearing, orally listed prior offenses committed by defendant. Defendant\u2019s counsel failed to object. The trial court found the presence of the aggravating sentencing factor of prior convictions and sentenced defendant to an eight-year prison term, five years beyond the presumptive. The trial judge based his finding of the aggravating factor of prior convictions solely on the prosecutor\u2019s unsworn statements. These statements, standing alone, are insufficient to prove defendant\u2019s prior convictions under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.4(a)(l)(o) and under our Supreme Court\u2019s holdings in both Swimm and Thompson. Moreover, defendant\u2019s failure to object at trial does not bar her from appealing this issue since we find the evidence insufficient as a matter of law. Accordingly, we remand the case for resentencing.\nNo prejudicial error in trial. Sentence is vacated and remanded for resentencing in accordance with this opinion.\nJudges Wells and Parker concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "WYNN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Lacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General, by P. Bly Hall, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.", "Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., Appellate Defender, by Daniel R. Pollitt, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ALICE RAMONA GORDON, Defendant\nNo. 9028SC1360\n(Filed 5 November 1991)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 853 (NCI4th)\u2014 assault \u2014 self-defense\u2014pattern instruction not given \u2014 no objection\nThere was no error in an assault prosecution where the court rejected defendant\u2019s requested instruction on self-defense, indicated that the pattern instructions would be given, instructed the jury on self-defense but not with the pattern instructions, and defense counsel did not object to the instruction when given the opportunity to do so outside the presence of the jury. Defendant\u2019s reliance on State v. Ross, 322 N.C. 261, is misplaced because Ross concerned the failure of the trial judge to give any instruction, while the court here gave a self-defense instruction. Additionally, it is clear that no plain error exists with respect to the instruction given.\nAm Jur 2d, Assault and Battery \u00a7\u00a7 69, 107.\n2. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 394 (NCI4th)\u2014 assault \u2014 other crimes \u2014 inadmissible\u2014no prejudicial error\nThere was no prejudicial error in an assault prosecution from the admission of evidence of other crimes concerning defendant and her relatives where defendant did not preserve for appeal issues involving evidence about her uncle and her boyfriend, and there was no prejudice from evidence that defendant had a propensity to break the law, even though the State advanced no argument as to any permissible purpose for introducing the evidence, where the evidence in the case clearly showed that defendant shot the victim and there was substantial evidence that the victim was walking towards her home when defendant shot her, negating defendant\u2019s self-defense claim.\nAm Jur 2d, Evidence \u00a7 320.\n3. Criminal Law \u00a7 1184 (NCI4th)\u2014 assault \u2014 aggravating factors \u2014 prior convictions \u2014 prosecutor\u2019s unsworn statements\nA sentence five years beyond the presumptive term for assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury was remanded for resentencing where the trial judge based his finding of the aggravating factor of prior convictions solely on the prosecutor\u2019s unsworn statements. Defendant\u2019s failure to object at trial does not bar her from appealing this issue since the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.4(a)(l)o.\nAm Jur 2d, Evidence \u00a7 333; Habitual Criminals and Subsequent Offenders \u00a7\u00a7 26, 27.\nAPPEAL from judgment and sentence entered 14 May 1990 in BUNCOMBE County Superior Court by Judge Robert Burroughs. Heard in the Court of Appeals 26 September 1991.\nLacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General, by P. Bly Hall, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.\nMalcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., Appellate Defender, by Daniel R. Pollitt, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0455-01", "first_page_order": 483, "last_page_order": 489 }