{ "id": 8522462, "name": "THOMAS J. REHM, Plaintiff v. LYNNE BARRETT REHM, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Rehm v. Rehm", "decision_date": "1991-11-05", "docket_number": "No. 9012DC1297", "first_page": "490", "last_page": "494", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "104 N.C. App. 490" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "47 ALR4th 38", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "226 S.E.2d 688", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "an order dismissing a charge of indirect civil contempt is appealable where there was no other proceeding by which plaintiff could enforce its rights, thereby affecting a substantial right" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "30 N.C. App. 191", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8553021 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "an order dismissing a charge of indirect civil contempt is appealable where there was no other proceeding by which plaintiff could enforce its rights, thereby affecting a substantial right" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/30/0191-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 S.E.2d 807", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "811" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 N.C. App. 107", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8357856 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "112" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/88/0107-01" ] }, { "cite": "33 S.E.2d 489", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1945, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "490-91" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "225 N.C. 83", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8600361 ], "year": 1945, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/225/0083-01" ] }, { "cite": "34 S.E.2d 154", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1945, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "157" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "225 N.C. 340", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8607057 ], "year": 1945, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/225/0340-01" ] }, { "cite": "327 S.E.2d 60", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "62", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "73 N.C. App. 594", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525088 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "597", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/73/0594-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 469, "char_count": 8006, "ocr_confidence": 0.773, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.465087261263184e-07, "percentile": 0.6581194502073286 }, "sha256": "03d7b1f0e6878292ef54f378c5872fdfe63ff9bb94ec490c71aafb29cb1000ef", "simhash": "1:9d2bfe6a688f537a", "word_count": 1256 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:39:04.224888+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Cozort and Lewis concur." ], "parties": [ "THOMAS J. REHM, Plaintiff v. LYNNE BARRETT REHM, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ORR, Judge.\nThe basic issue for our determination is whether the trial court erred in determining that defendant cohabited with someone of the opposite sex. For the reasons below, we affirm the order of the trial court.\nIt is well settled that in contempt proceedings the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal when supported by any competent evidence and are reviewable only for the purpose of passing on their sufficiency to warrant the judgment. The trial court is not required to make separate conclusions of law.\nGlesner v. Dembrosky, 73 N.C. App. 594, 597, 327 S.E.2d 60, 62 (1985) (citations omitted).\nThe trial court stated in its findings of fact:\n6. Beginning in November, 1989, the Defendant herein began having a relationship with a member of the opposite sex namely, Matthew Blashfield. Thereafter, Defendant became intimate with Mr. Blashfield and had sexual relations with him. Defendant has had sexual relations with no other person other than Mr. Blashfield since they met in November, 1989, and Defendant continues to have sexual relations with Blashfield and he has been a guest in her home as many as five times per week.\n7. The relationship between Mr. Blashfield and Defendant existed to the extent whereby Defendant allowed Mr. Blashfield to stay at her house over night as many as five times per week; on at least two occasions during the time period beginning January 1 until June of 1990, Mr. Blashfield was observed spending the night at the Defendant\u2019s home, leaving the Defendant\u2019s home dressed in different clothes than he was observed wearing the previous night; kissing the Defendant goodbye at the front porch prior to getting into his own car, and driving away. Defendant and Mr. Blashfield have taken trips together lasting for more than one day and have often included the minor child.\n8. Defendant and Mr. Blashfield have an exclusive, monogamous relationship for both sexual and regular domestic purposes.\n9. Defendant testified Mr. Blashfield maintained a separate residence.\nThen the trial court concluded that \u201cthe Defendant has cohabited with someone of the opposite sex and therefore Plaintiffs obligation to pay alimony has terminated.\u201d The trial court then ordered that plaintiff was not in contempt of the prior orders and that his obligation to pay alimony was terminated.\nCohabitation is defined as: \u201cTo live together as husband and wife. The mutual assumption of those marital rights, duties and obligations which are usually manifested by married people, including but not necessarily dependent on sexual relations.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 236 (5th ed. 1979). In Young v. Young, 225 N.C. 340, 34 S.E.2d 154 (1945), where defendant alleged intrinsic fraud in procuring a judgment of divorce on the grounds of false and fraudulent allegations of separation by mutual agreement, the Court stated: \u201cSeparation means cessation of cohabitation, and cohabitation means living together as man and wife, though not necessarily implying sexual relations.\u201d Id. at 344, 34 S.E.2d at 157. In Dudley v. Dudley, 225 N.C. 83, 33 S.E.2d 489 (1945), where the question presented was whether the parties had lived separate and apart for two years, the Court stated:\nCohabit, according to Winston\u2019s Dictionary, Encyclopedia Edition (1943), means: \u201cTo live together as man and wife; usually, though not necessarily, implying sexual intercourse.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary, Third Edition, defines the meaning of cohabitation, as: \u201cLiving together, living together as man and wife; sexual intercourse.\u201d Cohabitation includes other marital duties besides marital intercourse.\nId. at 85-86, 33 S.E.2d at 490-91.\n\u201cThe trial court, when sitting as a trier of fact, is empowered to assign weight to the evidence presented at trial as it deems appropriate.\u201d G.R. Little Agency, Inc. v. Jennings, 88 N.C. App. 107, 112, 362 S.E.2d 807, 811 (1987). Here we conclude that the trial court did not err in determining defendant cohabited with someone of the opposite sex, thereby terminating plaintiffs obligation to pay alimony. There was sufficient evidence of record to support the findings of fact and adequate findings of fact to support the trial court\u2019s conclusions of law.\nPlaintiff also argues that the trial court\u2019s order holding plaintiff not in contempt and terminating plaintiff\u2019s obligation to pay alimony is not appealable. Terminating plaintiff\u2019s obligation to pay alimony affects a substantial right of defendant, and therefore the order is appealable. See Piedmont Equipment Co. v. Weant, 30 N.C. App. 191, 226 S.E.2d 688 (1976) (an order dismissing a charge of indirect civil contempt is appealable where there was no other proceeding by which plaintiff could enforce its rights, thereby affecting a substantial right).\nAffirmed.\nJudges Cozort and Lewis concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "ORR, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Beaver, Holt, Richardson, Sternlicht, Burge & Glazier, P.A., by F. Thomas Holt, III, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Blackwell, Strickland & Luedeke, P.A., by John V. Blackwell, Jr., and Kenneth D. Burns, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THOMAS J. REHM, Plaintiff v. LYNNE BARRETT REHM, Defendant\nNo. 9012DC1297\n(Filed 5 November 1991)\n1. Divorce and Separation \u00a7 30 (NCI4th)\u2014 separation agreement \u2014 alimony \u2014 terminated upon cohabitation\nThere was sufficient evidence to support the trial judge\u2019s conclusion that defendant had cohabited with someone of the opposite sex and that plaintiff\u2019s obligation to pay alimony under a separation agreement incorporated into a divorce decree had terminated where the court found that defendant had begun a relationship with a member of the opposite sex, Mr. Blashfield, and had become intimate with him; Blashfield stayed in defendant\u2019s house as many as five nights a week, although he maintained a separate residence; he was observed on two occasions spending the night at defendant\u2019s home, leaving in different clothes from the night before, and kissing defendant good-bye at the front porch prior to getting into his own car and driving away; Blashfield and defendant took trips together lasting more than one day, often including the minor child; and defendant and Blashfield have an exclusive, monogamous relationship for both sexual and regular domestic purposes.\nAm Jur 2d, Divorce and Separation \u00a7 850.5.\nDivorced or separated spouse\u2019s living with member of opposite sex as affecting other spouse\u2019s obligation of alimony or support under separation agreement. 47 ALR4th 38.\n2. Appeal and Error \u00a7 106 (NCI4th)\u2014 alimony \u2014 contempt\u2014 obligation terminated \u2014immediately appealable\nAn order holding that plaintiff was not in contempt and terminating his obligation to pay alimony affected a substantial right of defendant and was appealable.\nAm Jur 2d, Appeal and Error \u00a7\u00a7 168-170; Contempt \u00a7 45.\nAPPEAL by defendant from order entered 31 October 1990 by Judge James Floyd Ammons, Jr., in CUMBERLAND County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 29 August 1991.\nPlaintiff and defendant entered into a Separation Agreement 7 February 1989 and were granted a divorce 25 January 1990, with the separation agreement being incorporated by reference into the final decree. The \u201cContract of Separation and Property Settlement Agreement\u201d provided that defendant shall receive alimony payments beginning January 1989, and the payments \u201cshall continue until the first to occur of the following events: (i) the death of wife, (ii) the remarriage of wife, (iii) the death of husband, (iv) the passing of thirty six (36) months, or if the wife cohabits with someone of the opposite sex.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nIn June 1990 plaintiff ceased paying alimony, and on 23 July 1990 defendant filed a motion in the cause for recovery of the sum due, praying that defendant be adjudged in willful contempt of court. That same day, an order to show cause was issued against plaintiff. On 13 October 1990, an order was entered denying defendant\u2019s motion in the cause for contempt and ordering that plaintiff\u2019s obligation to pay alimony be terminated.\nFrom this judgment, defendant appeals.\nBeaver, Holt, Richardson, Sternlicht, Burge & Glazier, P.A., by F. Thomas Holt, III, for plaintiff-appellee.\nBlackwell, Strickland & Luedeke, P.A., by John V. Blackwell, Jr., and Kenneth D. Burns, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0490-01", "first_page_order": 518, "last_page_order": 522 }