{ "id": 8523339, "name": "KATHLEEN WIENECK-ADAMS, Plaintiff v. ROY REX ADAMS, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Wieneck-Adams v. Adams", "decision_date": "1991-12-03", "docket_number": "No. 9113DC290", "first_page": "621", "last_page": "624", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "104 N.C. App. 621" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "29 ALR3d 1184", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "19 ALR4th 239", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "41 ALR4th 481", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "324 S.E.2d 915", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "920" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "72 N.C. App. 409", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526857 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "417" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/72/0409-01" ] }, { "cite": "345 S.E.2d 385", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 730", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4695168, 4704837, 4701513, 4704337, 4704895 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0730-05", "/nc/316/0730-02", "/nc/316/0730-03", "/nc/316/0730-01", "/nc/316/0730-04" ] }, { "cite": "338 S.E.2d 809", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "812" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 N.C. App. 228", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520081 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "231" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/79/0228-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 369, "char_count": 6895, "ocr_confidence": 0.763, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.411867578422581e-08, "percentile": 0.48328049241480875 }, "sha256": "03e226c120548837668a9ab5f8e7b98448e2dd0af8152083c49b4ae7b5295cf9", "simhash": "1:0b6ad02d734dd5f6", "word_count": 1117 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:39:04.224888+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge ARNOLD concurs.", "Judge COZORT dissents." ], "parties": [ "KATHLEEN WIENECK-ADAMS, Plaintiff v. ROY REX ADAMS, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "LEWIS, Judge.\nPlaintiff instituted this action on 28 July 1988, seeking an absolute divorce, equitable distribution of marital property, child custody and child support. Plaintiff subsequently dismissed her claim for child support. Plaintiff obtained an absolute divorce from the defendant on 2 March 1989. At the time of their separation the most significant asset was a marital home with a net equity of $11,394.71, and the most significant debt taxes due for the year 1981 in the amount of $11,964.28 and for the year 1982 in the amount of $11,078.42. After a trial on the issue of equitable distribution, the trial court granted the marital home to the defendant and noted his payment of the joint marital debt to the Internal Revenue Service.\nPlaintiff assigns as error the trial court\u2019s granting the marital home to the defendant in exchange for his payment of the marital debt. Plaintiff argues that she dismissed the claim for child support pursuant to an unwritten agreement that the defendant would, in consideration, pay all back taxes. At trial defendant contended that under the agreement he also received plaintiff\u2019s interest in the marital home. The plaintiff presented evidence that this was not the case and now argues that the trial court\u2019s award of plaintiff\u2019s interest in the home to the defendant results in an inequitable distribution of the marital property.\nOur review of equitable distribution orders is limited to determining whether the court clearly abused its discretion. Andrews v. Andrews, 79 N.C. App. 228, 231, 338 S.E.2d 809, 812 (1986), disc. rev. denied, 316 N.C. 730, 345 S.E.2d 385 (1986). A discretionary order of equitable distribution must be accorded great deference. Id. The trial court heard evidence as to the informal agreement of the parties, including the plaintiff\u2019s contention that payment of back taxes was in return for waiver of child support, and nonetheless awarded defendant the deed to the house. The trial judge\u2019s discretion is to be upheld unless it fails to comply with the requirements of the statute, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50-20(c). In the absence of a separation agreement, nothing in the statute requires the trial court to take a waiver of child support into account in calculating an equitable distribution. To the contrary, the determination of child support is to be made separately from that of equitable distribution. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50-20(f) states that: \u201cThe court shall provide for an equitable distribution without regard to . . . support of the children of both parties.\u201d Having heard the plaintiff\u2019s testimony, the trial judge, in his discretion, declined to take the waiver of child support into account in determining the distribution. In recognition of the fact that the defendant had paid off a joint debt of $23,042.70, the court awarded the defendant the deed in the house, which had $11,394.71 in equity.\nPlaintiff argues on appeal that the trial court failed to make clear findings of fact to justify its unequal distribution. Insofar as the court apparently sought to make as equal a division as possible, the court is not required to make further findings of fact to support its distribution. Weaver v. Weaver, 72 N.C. App. 409, 417, 324 S.E.2d 915, 920 (1985).\nThe order of the trial court is therefore,\nAffirmed.\nJudge ARNOLD concurs.\nJudge COZORT dissents.", "type": "majority", "author": "LEWIS, Judge." }, { "text": "Judge COZORT\ndissenting.\nI believe the trial court\u2019s order cannot stand, and I vote to reverse the order and remand the cause for further proceedings.\nThe trial court found and concluded that \u201can equal distribution is equitable.\u201d The court then awarded plaintiff marital property worth $2,450.00. The trial court then awarded defendant marital property worth $13,844.74, with the difference in the two awards being the net equity in the house, which was awarded to the defendant. Obviously, awarding the defendant $11,394.74 more than the plaintiff is not equal, is inconsistent with the trial court\u2019s determination that the division of the marital property should be equal, and is reason enough to reverse the trial court\u2019s order and remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings.\nHowever, even if we were somehow able to get beyond this obvious internal inconsistency in the trial court\u2019s order and proceeded to review the trial court\u2019s discretion in deciding to give the defendant the house and the plaintiff virtually nothing, we must find that the trial court abused its discretion. The evidence indicates that when the parties separated, they agreed that plaintiff would have custody of the children, that defendant would pay off the $23,042.70 debt to the IRS, and that plaintiff would not demand child support from defendant while defendant was paying off the debt to the IRS. By giving defendant credit for paying plaintiff\u2019s half of the IRS debt, while at the same time giving plaintiff no credit for not pursuing a claim for child support of more than $24,000.00 against the defendant, the trial court has given the defendant double credit by awarding him all the value of the house. That kind of double credit is an abuse of discretion, and we should not let it stand. I must dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Judge COZORT" } ], "attorneys": [ "Shipman and Lea, by James W. Lea, HI, for plaintiff-appellant.", "David P. Ford for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "KATHLEEN WIENECK-ADAMS, Plaintiff v. ROY REX ADAMS, Defendant\nNo. 9113DC290\n(Filed 3 December 1991)\nDivorce and Separation \u00a7 161 (NCI4th)\u2014 equitable distribution\u2014 waiver of child support \u2014 payment of marital debt\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in an action for divorce and equitable distribution by awarding defendant the marital home in exchange for his payment of the marital debt to the IRS. The trial court heard evidence as to the informal agreement of the parties, including plaintiff\u2019s contention that payment of back taxes was in return for waiver of child support, and nonetheless awarded defendant the deed to the house. In the absence of a separation agreement, nothing in the statute requires the trial court to take a waiver of child support into account in calculating an equitable distribution. Insofar as the court apparently sought to make as equal a division as possible, the court is not required to make further findings of fact to support its distribution.\nAm Jur 2d, Divorce and Separation \u00a7\u00a7 903, 923, 930, 1018, 1024.\nDivorce: equitable distribution doctrine. 41 ALR4th 481.\nDivorce and separation: effect of trial court giving consideration to needs of children in making property distribution-modern status. 19 ALR4th 239.\nSpouse\u2019s acceptance of payments under alimony or property settlement or child support provision of divorce judgment as precluding appeal therefrom. 29 ALR3d 1184.\nJudge COZORT dissents.\nAppeal by plaintiff from order entered 26 September 1990 by Judge D. Jack Hooks, Jr. in BRUNSWICK County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals in special session in Wilmington on 16 October 1991.\nShipman and Lea, by James W. Lea, HI, for plaintiff-appellant.\nDavid P. Ford for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0621-01", "first_page_order": 649, "last_page_order": 652 }