{ "id": 8521457, "name": "ROSE'S STORES, INC., Plaintiff v. BRADLEY LUMBER COMPANY, INC., Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Rose's Stores, Inc. v. Bradley Lumber Co.", "decision_date": "1992-01-07", "docket_number": "No. 909SC1343", "first_page": "91", "last_page": "94", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "105 N.C. App. 91" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "162 S.E.2d 623", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2 N.C. App. 138", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551494 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/2/0138-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 S.E.2d 772", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "9 N.C. App. 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8549320 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/9/0237-01" ] }, { "cite": "341 S.E.2d 26", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 588", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4718370, 4716643, 4720483, 4716008, 4719926 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0588-01", "/nc/315/0588-04", "/nc/315/0588-05", "/nc/315/0588-03", "/nc/315/0588-02" ] }, { "cite": "336 S.E.2d 103", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "77 N.C. App. 796", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525460 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/77/0796-01" ] }, { "cite": "209 S.E.2d 524", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "23 N.C. App. 742", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554288 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/23/0742-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 S.E.2d 922", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "action involved termination of leasehold interest and, therefore, venue was governed by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1-76(1)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "46 N.C. App. 831", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554196 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "action involved termination of leasehold interest and, therefore, venue was governed by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1-76(1)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/46/0831-01" ] }, { "cite": "48 S.E. 769", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1904, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "770" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 N.C. 392", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8660554 ], "year": 1904, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "393-94" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/136/0392-01" ] }, { "cite": "368 S.E.2d 41", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "90 N.C. App. 210", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523424 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/90/0210-01" ] }, { "cite": "154 S.E.2d 320", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "321" }, { "page": "324" }, { "page": "323", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "270 N.C. 201", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566561 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "203" }, { "page": "205" }, { "page": "206" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/270/0201-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 418, "char_count": 7364, "ocr_confidence": 0.772, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.12982294956584e-08, "percentile": 0.3236250453211751 }, "sha256": "13c06d8892eaedcbfd90bb744107dc723a1146aebf982051a005f3d688fe39af", "simhash": "1:2a658c66b45b0172", "word_count": 1183 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:24:40.355340+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Wells and Wynn concur." ], "parties": [ "ROSE\u2019S STORES, INC., Plaintiff v. BRADLEY LUMBER COMPANY, INC., Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PARKER, Judge.\nThe sole issue on appeal is the trial court\u2019s denial of defendant\u2019s motion to remove this action from Vance County to McDowell County as a matter of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1-76(1). McDowell County is the situs of certain commercial property formerly leased by plaintiff Rose\u2019s Stores, Inc. (\u201cRose\u2019s\u201d). Rose\u2019s assigned that lease to defendant Bradley Lumber Company, Inc. (\u201cBradley\u201d). McDowell is also the county in which defendant, but not plaintiff, has its principal place of business.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 1-76 creates special, mandatory venue rules for certain actions, requiring trial \u201cin the county in which the subject of the action ... is situated,\u201d where the action involves:\nRecovery of real property, or of an estate or interest therein, or for the determination in any form of such right or interest, and for injuries to real property.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 1-76(1) (1983). Defendant contends that this venue provision governs plaintiff\u2019s action. Plaintiff argues that this action does not affect \u201can estate or interest\u201d in the McDowell County property. In plaintiff\u2019s view proper venue lies in Vance County, the county of its principal place of business. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1-79(2). We hold that the trial court correctly denied defendant\u2019s motion to remove as a matter of right.\nIn deciding whether plaintiff\u2019s action would affect title to or an interest in land for purposes of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1-76(1), we determine the nature and purpose of plaintiff\u2019s action solely from the allegations in its complaint. Rose\u2019s Stores v. Tarrytown Center, 270 N.C. 201, 203, 154 S.E.2d 320, 321 (1967); Pierce v. Associated Rest and Nursing Care, Inc., 90 N.C. App. 210, 368 S.E.2d 41 (1988). If the outcome of an action \u2014 whether plaintiff does or does not prevail on the particular claims asserted in its complaint \u2014 would not affect an interest in land, the action is not removable as a local action under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1-76(1). Rose\u2019s Stores, 270 N.C. at 205, 154 S.E.2d at 324; see also Eames v. Armstrong, 136 N.C. 392, 393-94, 48 S.E. 769, 770 (1904).\nAccording to the allegations in plaintiff\u2019s complaint, defendant Bradley filed an action against plaintiff in McDowell County, alleging Rose\u2019s liability for (i) assigning its lease of the McDowell County property to Bradley by fraud or misrepresentation and (ii) violating the terms of the assignment by terminating the lease without Bradley\u2019s consent. Bradley took a voluntary dismissal of that action in 1990. The present action was filed by Rose\u2019s as the result of Bradley\u2019s previous action. The leasehold property in McDowell County is owned by National Community Centers, I (\u201cNCCI\u201d), which is not a party in the present action.\nPlaintiff\u2019s complaint avers four causes of action: (i) in violation of Rule 11 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, defendant instituted the 1988 action against plaintiff to coerce plaintiff into paying an increased rent to defendant under a lease not related to these civil actions; (ii) defendant\u2019s institution of litigation for the improper purpose of harassment makes plaintiff eligible for attorney\u2019s fees pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 6-21.5; (iii) defendant\u2019s conduct constitutes unfair and deceptive trade practices, rendering defendant subject to treble damages under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1; and (iv) plaintiff is entitled to a declaratory judgment that its assignment of lease to defendant was valid and non-fraudulent and the notice of default and termination to NCCI was given with defendant\u2019s consent. The complaint contains five prayers for relief: (i) damages in excess of ten thousand dollars, (ii) costs, (iii) reasonable attorney\u2019s fees, (iv) trebling of any damage award and (v) a declaratory judgment that plaintiff committed no tort in assigning the lease to defendant and that plaintiff breached no contract with defendant by sending written notice to NCCI of NCCI\u2019s default in not repairing the leased premises.\nOn the face of plaintiff\u2019s complaint, then, there is no allegation or prayer for enforcement of the parties\u2019 rights or interest in real property. The gravamen of plaintiff\u2019s action is not the title to or interest in the commercial property. Rather, plaintiff\u2019s complaint essentially challenges defendant\u2019s motives for filing its 1988 action against plaintiff and raises the issue of defendant\u2019s liability under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 11, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 6-21.5 and N.C.G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1. A determination of the validity of the lease assignment and of the propriety of the notice of default and termination to the landlord is necessary to resolution of these alleged statutory violations and entitlements. As stated in Rose\u2019s Stores:\n\u201c[A]n action is not necessarily local because it incidentally involves the title to land or a right or interest therein .... It is the principal object involved in the action which determines the question . . . .\u201d\nRose\u2019s Stores, 270 N.C. at 206, 154 S.E.2d at 323 (citation omitted).\nThe allegations and prayers for relief in the case under review plainly distinguish this action from the cases argued by defendant on appeal. Gurganus v. Hedgepeth, 46 N.C. App. 831, 265 S.E.2d 922 (1980) (action involved termination of leasehold interest and, therefore, venue was governed by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1-76(1)); see also Sample v. Towe Motor Company, Inc., 23 N.C. App. 742, 209 S.E.2d 524 (1974). Under existing case law in personam actions, such as plaintiff\u2019s action for Rule 11 sanctions and damages under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1, are transitory rather than local and, therefore, not subject to the special venue rule urged by defendant in this case. McCrary Stone Service v. Lyalls, 77 N.C. App. 796, 336 S.E.2d 103 (1985), disc. rev. denied, 315 N.C. 588, 341 S.E.2d 26 (1986); Wise v. Isenhour, 9 N.C. App. 237, 175 S.E.2d 772 (1970); Mortgage Corp. v. Development Corp., 2 N.C. App. 138, 162 S.E.2d 623 (1968).\nFor these reasons, we affirm.\nAffirmed.\nJudges Wells and Wynn concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PARKER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Perry, Kittrell, Blackburn & Blackburn, by George T. Blackburn, II, and Charles F. Blackburn, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Dameron and Burgin, by Anthony Lynch, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ROSE\u2019S STORES, INC., Plaintiff v. BRADLEY LUMBER COMPANY, INC., Defendant\nNo. 909SC1343\n(Filed 7 January 1992)\nVenue \u00a7 7 (NCI3d)\u2014 action for sanctions and damages \u2014 transitory action \u2014 no removal as matter of right\nThe trial court properly denied defendant\u2019s motion to remove this action as a matter of right from Vance County, the county of plaintiff\u2019s principal place of business, to McDowell County, the situs of certain commercial property formerly leased by plaintiff and the county of defendant\u2019s principal place of business, since the gravamen of plaintiff\u2019s action was not the title to or interest in the commercial property, though a determination of the validity of the lease assignment and of the propriety of the notice of default and termination to the landlord was necessary to a resolution of plaintiff\u2019s claims, but was instead plaintiff\u2019s right to Rule 11 sanctions, attorney fees under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 6-21.5, and damages for unfair and deceptive trade practices. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1-76(1).\nAm Jur 2d, Costs \u00a7 30; Monopolies, Restraints of Trade, and Unfair Trade Practices \u00a7 735; Venue \u00a7 82.\nAppeal by defendant from order entered on or about 10 September 1990 by Judge Henry W. Hight, Jr., in VANCE County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 24 September 1991.\nPerry, Kittrell, Blackburn & Blackburn, by George T. Blackburn, II, and Charles F. Blackburn, for plaintiff-appellee.\nDameron and Burgin, by Anthony Lynch, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0091-01", "first_page_order": 119, "last_page_order": 122 }