{ "id": 8522542, "name": "SUSAN DALE SPRY, Plaintiff v. WINSTON-SALEM/FORSYTH COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Spry v. Winston-Salem/Forsyth County Board of Education", "decision_date": "1992-02-04", "docket_number": "No. 9021SC1247", "first_page": "269", "last_page": "277", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "105 N.C. App. 269" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "379 S.E.2d 30", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "37" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 373", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2483734 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "384" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0373-01" ] }, { "cite": "365 S.E.2d 706", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 N.C. App. 262", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521375 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/89/0262-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 S.E.2d 389", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 N.C. 506", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4724648, 4719920, 4726261, 4722874, 4721598 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/313/0506-04", "/nc/313/0506-03", "/nc/313/0506-05", "/nc/313/0506-01", "/nc/313/0506-02" ] }, { "cite": "321 S.E.2d 502", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "504" }, { "page": "506" }, { "page": "506-07" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "71 N.C. App. 48", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523740 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "49" }, { "page": "52" }, { "page": "53" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/71/0048-01" ] }, { "cite": "528 F.2d 311", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1079779 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/528/0311-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 S.E.2d 579", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 603", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5307658 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0603-01" ] }, { "cite": "380 S.E.2d 770", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 543", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2483650, 2488397, 2482318, 2484176, 2481778 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0543-03", "/nc/324/0543-01", "/nc/324/0543-04", "/nc/324/0543-02", "/nc/324/0543-05" ] }, { "cite": "378 S.E.2d 32", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "93 N.C. App. 168", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527938 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/93/0168-01" ] }, { "cite": "283 S.E.2d 495", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "498" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 N.C. 312", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567539 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "317" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/304/0312-01" ] }, { "cite": "233 S.E.2d 391", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 N.C. 264", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568391, 8568432, 8568464, 8568315, 8568351 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/292/0264-03", "/nc/292/0264-04", "/nc/292/0264-05", "/nc/292/0264-01", "/nc/292/0264-02" ] }, { "cite": "230 S.E.2d 769", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "771", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "31 N.C. App. 641", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551784 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "645", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/31/0641-01" ] }, { "cite": "343 S.E.2d 225", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "226" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "80 N.C. App. 656", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525387 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "658" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/80/0656-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 761, "char_count": 17575, "ocr_confidence": 0.772, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.215967942121602e-07, "percentile": 0.8667899170955526 }, "sha256": "e5ae4d52e9820e488b6ce3a8ab4a0c652a4e87e01f9d1d583bdca74523425c66", "simhash": "1:5337c179078eca4e", "word_count": 2751 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:24:40.355340+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge Parker concurs.", "Judge Johnson dissents." ], "parties": [ "SUSAN DALE SPRY, Plaintiff v. WINSTON-SALEM/FORSYTH COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "EAGLES, Judge.\nIn this appeal defendant contends that the trial court erred by (1) denying the Board\u2019s motions for summary judgment, directed verdict, and judgment notwithstanding the verdict; (2) instructing the jury regarding the standard for establishing a violation of G.S. 115C-325(m)(2); (3) admitting evidence and instructing the jury concerning actual damages for mental, emotional, and physical harm resulting from the nonrenewal of plaintiff\u2019s contract; (4) admitting evidence and instructing the jury concerning damages to plaintiff\u2019s reputation; (5) admitting evidence concerning the school system\u2019s financial worth and instructing the jury that it could award punitive damages; (6) admitting testimony concerning plaintiff addressing the Board at a public rather than executive session; (7) admitting irrelevant prejudicial evidence; and (8) denying the Board\u2019s motion for a mistrial based on improper closing arguments made by plaintiff\u2019s counsel. We hold that defendant was entitled to a directed verdict and reverse the judgment of the trial court.\nIn 1981 the General Assembly enacted G.S. 115C-305 which provides:\nAppeals to the local board of education or to the superior court shall lie from the decisions of all school personnel, including decisions affecting character or the right to teach, as provided in G.S. 115C-45(c).\nThis Court has said that the General Assembly\u2019s decision to enact this section \u201cindicates an intention to extend the right of appeal in public school personnel decisions far beyond the confines of the former law.\u201d Warren v. Buncombe County Board of Education, 80 N.C. App. 656, 658, 343 S.E.2d 225, 226 (1986).\nHere, plaintiff initially brought a petition for review of the Board\u2019s decision under G.S. 115C-45(c) and 115C-305. Plaintiff then filed an amended complaint seeking a jury trial. \u201cIn North Carolina, our courts have held that when the Legislature has provided an effective administrative remedy by statute, then that remedy is exclusive. In addition, our courts have held that not only is the administrative remedy exclusive but also a party must pursue it and exhaust it before resorting to the courts.\u201d Church v. Madison County Board of Education, 31 N.C. App. 641, 645, 230 S.E.2d 769, 771 (1976) (citations omitted) (emphasis added), disc. review denied and appeal dismissed, 292 N.C. 264, 233 S.E.2d 391 (1977). But for other recent decisions of this Court, plaintiff would have a right to appeal the Board\u2019s decision to the Superior Court under G.S. 115C-305 and that remedy would be the exclusive procedural avenue for determining whether the Board\u2019s decision was for arbitrary, capricious, political, or personal reasons. As the Supreme Court has noted, the whole record test set out in G.S. 150B-51 applies to appeals from decisions of city or county boards of education. Overton v. Goldsboro City Board of Education, 304 N.C. 312, 317, 283 S.E.2d 495, 498 (1981). While review under G.S. 115C-305 would constitute the exclusive remedy for determining whether the Board\u2019s decision violated G.S. 115C-325(m)(2), nothing would preclude plaintiff from bringing other claims, for example under 42 U.S.C. 1983, based on the same conduct. See Crump v. Board of Education, 93 N.C. App. 168, 378 S.E.2d 32, review on additional issues denied, 324 N.C. 543, 380 S.E.2d 770 (1989), decision affirmed as modified, 326 N.C. 603, 392 S.E.2d 579 (1990).\nHowever, in prior cases concerning the nonrenewal of probationary teachers\u2019 contracts, this Court said that \u201c[n]o statutory right of appeal exists. G.S. 115C-325(n). Probationary teachers who contend non-renewal was for a prohibited reason therefore must sue in the appropriate court. Sigmon v. Poe, 528 F.2d 311 (4th Cir. 1975) (per curiam).\u201d Abell v. Nash County Board of Education, 71 N.C. App. 48, 49, 321 S.E.2d 502, 504 (1984), disc. review denied, 313 N.C. 506, 329 S.E.2d 389 (1985). In addition, by entertaining appeals involving questions of summary judgment and directed verdict, this Court has implied that a teacher has a right to a trial on the question of whether the Board\u2019s actions were in violation of G.S. 115C-325(m)(2). Abell v. Nash County Board of Education, 71 N.C. App. 48, 321 S.E.2d 502 (1984), disc. review denied, 313 N.C. 506, 329 S.E.2d 389 (1985) and Abell v. Nash County Board of Education, 89 N.C. App. 262, 365 S.E.2d 706 (1988). The Supreme Court has said: \u201cWhere a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided the same issue, albeit in a different case, a subsequent panel of the same court is bound by that precedent, unless it has been overturned by a higher court.\u201d In the Matter of Appeal from, Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 373, 384, 379 S.E.2d 30, 37 (1989). Accordingly, we are bound by the prior decisions of this Court which hold that no statutory right to appeal exists and that a probationary teacher can sue for alleged violations of G.S. 115C-325(m)(2).\nHaving prefaced our decision with these comments, we hold that on this record the trial court erred in denying defendant\u2019s motions for a directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict.\n\u201cA motion for a directed verdict raises the question as to whether there is sufficient evidence to go to the jury. . . . The plaintiff\u2019s evidence must be taken as true and be considered in the light most favorable to him and a directed verdict may be granted only if, as a matter of law, the evidence is insufficient to justify a verdict for the plaintiff.\u201d W. Shuford, N.C. Civil Practice and Procedure \u00a7 50-5 (1988). Here, the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to support a verdict in plaintiffs favor.\nPlaintiff alleges that the Board failed to renew her contract in violation of G.S. 115C-325(m)(2) which provides as follows:\nThe board, upon recommendation of the superintendent, may refuse to renew the contract of any probationary teacher or to reemploy any teacher who is not under contract .for any cause it deems sufficient: Provided, however, that the 'cause may not be arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory or for personal or political reasons.\nThis Court has said that G.S. 115C-325(m)(2) imposes \u201ca duty on boards of education to determine the substantive bases for recommendations of non-renewal and to assure that non-renewal is not for a prohibited reason.\u201d Abell v. Nash County Board of Education, 71 N.C. App. 48, 52, 321 S.E.2d 502, 506 (1984), disc. review denied, 313 N.C. 506, 329 S.E.2d 389 (1985).\nPlaintiff contends that the Board\u2019s decision not to renew her contract was for arbitrary, capricious or personal reasons. At trial she presented evidence relating to \u201cill-will, spite and malice from the members of her support team.\u201d However, even taking this evidence as true, as a matter of law plaintiff failed to establish that the Board\u2019s decision not to renew her teaching contract was arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory, or for personal or political reasons.\nPlaintiff testified at trial that she did not know any of the Board members before they considered her contract on 16 May 1988 and had no reason to believe that any' of the members were biased against her. In making its decision, the Board considered a packet of information composed of: (1) a memo from the school superintendent recommending that the Board not renew plaintiff\u2019s contract; (2) the superintendent\u2019s exhibits which included materials prepared by plaintiff\u2019s principal and support team; and (3) plaintiff\u2019s exhibits, which included letters of recommendation, her letter to Principal Benjamin Warren outlining her concerns about her support team, and several evaluation forms. At the hearing, the Board also heard plaintiff, her attorney, and a local teachers\u2019 organization representative speak on plaintiff\u2019s behalf before it made its decision. The Board members testified that they based their decision on the information presented at the hearing by the superintendent and the plaintiff.\nPlaintiff correctly asserts that\n[b]y statute and under traditional common-law principles . . the superintendent and principal are agents of the board. The board cannot escape responsibility, for its actions, based on the recommendations of its agents, by simply refusing to inquire into their agents\u2019 reasons. The board, if it acts on recommendations made on improper grounds, must accept responsibility therefor. This does not mean that the board. must make exhaustive inquiries or formal findings of fact, only that the administrative record, be it the personnel file, board minutes or recommendation memoranda, should disclose the basis for the board\u2019s action.\nAbell v. Nash County Board of Education, 71 N.C. App. 48, 53, 321 S.E.2d 502, 506-07 (1984), disc. review denied, 313 N.C. 506, 329 S.E.2d 389 (1985). Even assuming plaintiff\u2019s allegations regarding the support team are true, this is not a case where the Board failed to inquire into the reasons of its agents. The assistant superintendent, who had interviewed all of the school personnel who had evaluated plaintiff\u2019s teaching, addressed the Board members and answered their questions regarding the investigation. The Board also heard from the plaintiff, her attorney, and a member of a teacher\u2019s organization who spoke on plaintiff\u2019s behalf. The Board had the opportunity to resolve any conflicts in the evidence. We think that this level of inquiry was sufficient to meet the requirements of Abell and G.S. 115C-325(m)(2).\nAdditionally, the inquiry by the superintendent\u2019s office was sufficient to remove any taint that may have existed in the support team\u2019s evaluation. In her brief plaintiff contends that the superintendent\u2019s office \u201ccovered up the misconduct\u201d of the support team. However, there is absolutely no evidence to support this contention. Plaintiff alleges that the assistant superintendent who conducted the investigation was \u201cgood friends\u201d with two members of the support team, Schreiber and Cowden, but there is no indication that evidence to support this characterization appears in the record. Plaintiff also alleges that the assistant superintendent was biased because she \u201ctalked to all of the Defendant\u2019s witnesses\u201d and \u201cnone of Plaintiff\u2019s witnesses.\u201d The record indicates that the assistant superintendent met with plaintiff, her attorney, and the classroom teacher\u2019s representative and discussed plaintiff\u2019s allegations regarding the support team. The assistant superintendent then interviewed all of the members of the support team, the principal at North Forsyth, and the program specialist in vocational education who observed plaintiff\u2019s teaching. Plaintiff gave the assistant superintendent a list of her students and employers involved in the occupational training program to interview as part of the investigation. The assistant superintendent declined to interview these people \u201c[bjecause the issue was [plaintiff\u2019s] classroom teaching as observed by professionals\u201d and the opinions of these employers and students were not \u201cgermane.\u201d We agree that the opinions of these witnesses were irrelevant and fail to see how the assistant superintendent\u2019s actions constitute a \u201ccover up\u201d or show bias on the part of the superintendent.\nAccordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed.\nReversed.\nJudge Parker concurs.\nJudge Johnson dissents.", "type": "majority", "author": "EAGLES, Judge." }, { "text": "Judge Johnson\ndissenting.\nI respectfully dissent because I believe that plaintiff\u2019s evidence is sufficient as a matter of law to go to the jury and to support its verdict on the issue of whether the Board violated G.S. \u00a7 15C-325(m)(2) in refusing to renew her contract. The record indicates that following the public meeting of the school board, during which all parties were present and allowed to speak, the board met in executive session. Plaintiff and her attorney were excluded from this executive session, but Dr. Epstein, the assistant superintendent and the individual who conducted the investigation of plaintiff\u2019s complaints and recommended non-renewal, was present. She answered board members\u2019 further questions concerning the investigation, the circumstances surrounding the hiring of plaintiff and other matters relating to the case, all outside the presence of plaintiff and her attorney. I believe this is fundamentally unfair and is evidence of arbitrary and capricious behavior on the part of the school board. I vote to affirm the trial court\u2019s denial of defendant\u2019s motion for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict.\nNotwithstanding the above, and recognizing that the question of damages is not before us given the majority decision, I would vote to reverse and remand on the issue of damages.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Judge Johnson" } ], "attorneys": [ "Kennedy, Kennedy, Kennedy & Kennedy, by Harvey L. Kennedy, Harold L. Kennedy, III, and Annie Brown Kennedy, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Womble, Carlyle, Sandridge & Rice, by Anthony H. Brett, for defendant-appellant.", "Tharrington, Smith & Hargrove, by George T. Rogister, Jr., Allison B. Schafer, Ann L. Majestic and Jonathan A. Blumberg, for North Carolina School Boards Association, amicus curiae." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "SUSAN DALE SPRY, Plaintiff v. WINSTON-SALEM/FORSYTH COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant\nNo. 9021SC1247\n(Filed 4 February 1992)\n1. Schools \u00a7 13.1 (NCI3d)\u2014 probationary teacher \u2014 failure to renew contract \u2014 no right to appeal \u2014 right to sue\nA probationary teacher had no statutory right to appeal a board of education\u2019s decision not to renew her contract but could sue in the appropriate court for alleged violations of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 115C-325(m)(2).\nAm Jur 2d, Schools \u00a7 161.\n2. Schools \u00a7 13.1 (NCI3d)\u2014 probationary teacher \u2014 failure to renew contract \u2014 action not for arbitrary, capricious or personal reasons\nPlaintiff probationary teacher\u2019s evidence was insufficient to support a jury finding that defendant board of education failed to renew her contract for arbitrary, capricious or personal reasons in violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 115C-325(m)(2) where she presented evidence relating to ill will and malice by members of her support team who had informed her that her perform-anee was unacceptable; board of education members testified that they based their decision on the information presented at the hearing by the school superintendent and the plaintiff; the board properly inquired into the reasons its agents, the principal and superintendent, recommended that plaintiff\u2019s contract not be renewed; and an investigation by an assistant superintendent removed any taint that may have existed in the support team\u2019s evaluation of plaintiff.\nAm Jur 2d, Schools \u00a7 161.\nJudge JOHNSON dissenting.\nAPPEAL by defendant from judgment entered 7 March 1990 by Judge James J. Booker in FORSYTH County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 27 August 1991.\nThe Winston-Salem/Forsyth County Board of Education hired plaintiff as a probationary teacher on 14 August 1987 and assigned her to teach cooperative occupational training and mathematics at North Forsyth High School (North Forsyth). Because plaintiff was a first-year teacher, the Board assigned to plaintiff a support team consisting of Benjamin Warren, the principal of North Forsyth; Elizabeth Lucas, a fellow teacher at North Forsyth; and Patricia Schreiber, the vocational director for the school system. Mr. Warren later assigned Judy Cowden, an assistant principal at North Forsyth, to take his place on the support team. The Board assigned Ms. Lucas to be plaintiff\u2019s mentor.\nDuring the 1987-88 school year the support team worked with plaintiff and evaluated her teaching performance. The team met with plaintiff on several occasions and informed her that her performance was unacceptable. On 4 December 1987 plaintiff complained to the principal at North Forsyth that she had personality conflicts with Judy Cowden and the other members of her support team. Plaintiff said that Ms. Cowden was rude to her throughout the year and refused to speak to her. Plaintiff asked Mr. Warren to observe her teaching.\nIn March 1988 Mr. Warren visited plaintiff\u2019s class after plaintiff contacted the Forsyth County Association of Classroom Teachers. After Mr. Warren\u2019s visit plaintiff learned that Mr. Warren was scheduled to have surgery and might be out of work for the rest of the year. She wrote him a letter dated 20 March 1988 outlining her concerns and asking him to appoint a new support team for her. She said that Ms. Lucas, her mentor, had refused to give her a computer that was bought specifically for her students and had intentionally hidden a printer that plaintiff was supposed to have received at the beginning of the school year. Plaintiff also outlined her disagreements with the conclusions of the teachers who had evaluated her teaching performance. Mr. Warren did not respond to plaintiffs letter; however, he did visit her class again. On 15 April 1988, Mr. Warren, through Ms. Cowden, recommended that the Board not renew plaintiff\u2019s contract. Because plaintiff disagreed with the recommendation, the superintendent\u2019s office conducted an investigation. Based on the result of the investigation, the superintendent recommended that the Board not renew plaintiff\u2019s contract. After a hearing at its 16 May 1988 meeting the Board unanimously voted in public session not to renew plaintiff\u2019s contract.\nPlaintiff filed an action against the, defendant Winston-Salem/Forsyth County Board of Education alleging that the Board should have renewed her contract for employment as a probationary teacher for a second year. The jury found that the Board failed to renew plaintiff\u2019s contract for arbitrary, capricious, or personal reasons and awarded plaintiff $304,910 in actual damages and $150,000 in punitive damages. Defendant appeals.\nKennedy, Kennedy, Kennedy & Kennedy, by Harvey L. Kennedy, Harold L. Kennedy, III, and Annie Brown Kennedy, for plaintiff-appellee.\nWomble, Carlyle, Sandridge & Rice, by Anthony H. Brett, for defendant-appellant.\nTharrington, Smith & Hargrove, by George T. Rogister, Jr., Allison B. Schafer, Ann L. Majestic and Jonathan A. Blumberg, for North Carolina School Boards Association, amicus curiae." }, "file_name": "0269-01", "first_page_order": 297, "last_page_order": 305 }