{ "id": 8523852, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA ex rel. BEVERLY WILLIAMS, mother of Latoya Rashunda Williams, minor child v. WILLIAM EARL COPPEDGE", "name_abbreviation": "State ex rel. Williams v. Coppedge", "decision_date": "1992-03-03", "docket_number": "No. 919DC89", "first_page": "470", "last_page": "480", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "105 N.C. App. 470" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "59 ALR3d 659", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "43 ALR4th 579", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "32 S.E. 552", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "weight": 5, "year": 1899, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "553" }, { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "124 N.C. 807", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8661341 ], "year": 1899, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/124/0807-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 84", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "90", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 626", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4714364 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "635", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0626-01" ] }, { "cite": "358 S.E.2d 679", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 8, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "681" }, { "page": "682" }, { "page": "682" }, { "page": "683" }, { "page": "683" }, { "page": "683" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "320 N.C. 452", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4729285 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/320/0452-01" ] }, { "cite": "304 S.E.2d 765", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "63 N.C.App. 384", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525230 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/63/0384-01" ] }, { "cite": "157 S.E. 851", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1931, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "852" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "200 N.C. 539", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8624412 ], "year": 1931, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "540-541" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/200/0539-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 340", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "345" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 539", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4717560 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "546" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0539-01" ] }, { "cite": "32 S.E. 552", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1899, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "124 N.C. 807", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8661341 ], "year": 1899, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/124/0807-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 843, "char_count": 21159, "ocr_confidence": 0.734, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.095881014791859e-07, "percentile": 0.9094758034155659 }, "sha256": "92aa96987d9fee7e0721856afcd1fee0636afa5e792ce5fd7a8d88c400bd41ea", "simhash": "1:de2ff16236490fba", "word_count": 3420 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:24:40.355340+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge WELLS concurs.", "Judge WALKER dissents." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA ex rel. BEVERLY WILLIAMS, mother of Latoya Rashunda Williams, minor child v. WILLIAM EARL COPPEDGE" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "LEWIS, Judge.\nThe first issue in this case is whether a court accepted expert in the field of genetic determination of paternity can be permitted to testify that he has an opinion as to whether the defendant in a paternity action is the natural father, but then be denied the opportunity to give his opinion. Also at issue is whether the putative father may offer evidence of the mother\u2019s reputation.\nOn 14 February 1983, Latoya Williams was born out of wedlock to sixteen year old Beverly Williams. Latoya has received, via her caretaker Holly M. Williams, public assistance totaling $10,114.00 as of 30 June 1988. Plaintiff, the North Carolina Child Support Enforcement Agency (Agency), filed suit against Mr. Coppedge, on 1 July 1988, in order to establish paternity and support for the child and to obtain reimbursement for the state funds expended on Latoya\u2019s behalf. At the time of trial, Latoya was seven and Ms. Williams was twenty-three.\nThe Agency tendered and the court accepted an expert in genetic evaluation of paternity. The expert, an immunologist, testified that he performed blood tests and comparisons on Beverly Williams, Latoya Williams and on William Coppedge. The tests revealed that the probability that Mr. Coppedge was Latoya\u2019s biological father was 99.2%. The court permitted the expert to state this numerical test result and to say that he had an opinion as to whether or not Mr. Coppedge was Latoya\u2019s natural father. Upon objection he was not permitted to testify as to his opinion.\nBeverly Williams testified that she first met William Coppedge in early spring and had a monogamous sexual relationship with him from April until the end of 1982. After Latoya was born defendant visited her in the hospital, held the baby, and \u201cbrought [the child] stuff.\u201d She alleges that they saw each other on and off for two years; however, after Latoya\u2019s birth, Mr. Coppedge requested that Ms. Williams not reveal their sexual interludes because Ms. Williams\u2019 age at the time of conception would place him in jeopardy of \u201cgoing to jail\u201d [i.e. for statutory rape].\nMr. Coppedge, on the other hand, denies paternity. He admits that he has known Ms. Williams for nine years, admits their cohabitation, but denies having intimate relations with Ms. Williams until July or August of 1982. Further, he admits to only one sexual contact because he learned of her true age of 15 years. Testifying on behalf of the defendant, a Child Support Enforcement Officer stated that Ms. Williams declined to name anyone as Latoya\u2019s father on the first interview, later named another man, but finally named Mr. Coppedge.\nOver the State\u2019s objection, Mr. Coppedge was permitted to testify as to Ms. Williams\u2019 sexually promiscuous reputation at the time of Latoya\u2019s conception.\nQ: Mr. Coppedge, you need to answer this question yes or no. Do you know of your own knowledge what Beverly Williams\u2019 reputation was concerning her using her body for sex in exchange for drugs and alcohol? Answer yes or no.\nObjection.\nOverruled.\nA: Yes.\nCOURT: Wait, now. When are you talking about?\nIn July and August of 1982.\nCOURT: Overruled. Go ahead.\nQ. What is her reputation. . .\nCOURT:' What was, what was.\nQ. What was her reputation during that period of time for using her body for sex in exchange for drugs and alcohol?\nObjection.\nOverruled.\nA: That\u2019s exactly what she was doing.\nCOURT: No. What was her reputation?\nA: That was her reputation. If somebody had some money where they could give her or had some drugs, you know, they was good to go.\nObject and move to strike as being not responsive.\nOverruled. Motion to strike denied.\nThe jury found that Mr. Coppedge was not Latoya\u2019s father. The State appeals from imposition of judgment on the verdict.\nThe State assigns two errors. First, the State claims that the trial court erred in prohibiting the accepted expert\u2019s opinion as to whether Mr. Coppedge is Latoya\u2019s natural father. Second, the State claims that it was error for the trial court to permit reputation testimony to discredit Ms. Williams\u2019 veracity.\nOn the first allegation of error, we find instructive our Supreme Court\u2019s holding in State v. Jackson, 320 N.C. 452, 358 S.E.2d 679 (1987). Though paternity was not a central issue in that rape trial, the Court upheld the following testimony presented at trial by a geneticist regarding the results of a genetic, paternity evaluation:\nbased on the [blood] tests of the [rape] victim (mother), defendant, and the [victim\u2019s] child, (1) defendant could not be excluded as the father of the victim\u2019s child; (2) the frequency of the defendant\u2019s genes in the black population, based upon a probability that a random man in the population would carry his gene markers is 0.0068, or less than 1%; (3) the \u201clikelihood of paternity\u201d is 93.4% at the low range, 99.21% at the median range, and 99.91% at the high range; (4) the \u201cpaternity index,\u201d expressed as an \u201codds ratio\u201d is, at the low range, 14 to 1; at the median range 126.2 to 1; and at the high range, 1,135 to 1; (5) the likelihood of nonpaternity is 6.6% at the weak level, 0.79% at the median level, and 0.09% at the strong level.\nId. at 456, 358 S.E.2d at 681. Also upheld was the geneticist\u2019s testimony regarding the proper application of the numerical ranges, i.e., that the lower ranges apply if the jury finds that the nongenetic evidence is weak.\nThe Court overturned the admission of the geneticist\u2019s opinion as to whether the defendant was the father of the rape victim\u2019s child. Probability of paternity is calculated by combining nongenetic with genetic information. Id. at 458, 358 S.E.2d at 682. The nongenetic factor consists of evidence of all the surrounding circumstances such as: the putative father\u2019s access to the mother, the putative father\u2019s fertility, etc. The nongenetic factor is assigned a numerical value based upon the geneticist\u2019s determination of its weight or significance in the present case. Id. at 458-59, 358 S.E.2d at 682. The geneticist then inserts both genetic and nongenetic factors into the appropriate formula and the probability of paternity results.\nThe Court indicated that the geneticist\u2019s \u201ctestimony on the use of the paternity index was unquestionably of assistance to the trier of fact.\u201d Id. at 460, 358 S.E.2d at 683. However, because the probability of paternity was \u201cbased not only upon \u2018scientific, technical, or other knowledge,\u2019 . . . but also on [the geneticist\u2019s] own assumptions about the [nongenetic surrounding circumstances information],... the jury was in as good a position as [the geneticist] to determine whether the defendant was \u2018probably\u2019 the father of the victim\u2019s child.\u201d Id. As an expert\u2019s opinion is admissible only where it \u201cwill assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue . . . N.C.O.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 702 (1988), the geneticist\u2019s calculation of probability of paternity is of \u201cno assistance to the trier of fact and should [be] excluded on that basis.\u201d Jackson, at 460, 358 S.E.2d at 683.\nIn the case at bar, the expert was permitted to give six pages of transcript testimony explaining the nature, process, reliability, and the significance of paternity blood tests in general. The expert testified as to the numerical probability of paternity (99.2%), the probability of nonpaternity, the power of exclusion, and the significance of each of these numerical values. The expert was also permitted to testify that no blood test gives a perfect result and that not even the mother has perfect knowledge regarding this matter. The State elicited further testimony from this expert which showed that the test gave the defendant the benefit of the doubt by considering nongenetic outside evidence equally with genetic evidence.\nThe portion of the transcript pertinent to the State\u2019s objection reveals the following interchange:\nQ: Doctor, based upon your evaluation, do you have an opinion relative to William Earl Coppedge being the natural father of Latoya Williams?\nObjection.\nside bar\nCourt: Your question was \u201cDo you have an opinion.\u201d Is that right?\nProsecutor: That\u2019s correct.\nCourt: I\u2019m going to let you answer that just yes or no.\nA: Yes. I do have an opinion.\nCourt: Stop right there. Next question.\nQ: Doctor would you express your opinion to the court?\nObjection.\nCourt: Sustained. Don\u2019t answer that.\n(Emphasis added). It is abundantly clear that the trial court complied with Jackson both in the testimony admitted and excluded. The trial court, in the case at bar, correctly prohibited the expert\u2019s opinion as to whether Mr. Coppedge was Latoya\u2019s natural father because it was not of \u201cassistance to the trier of fact\u201d where the jury is in an equally good position to consider all of the nongenetic surrounding circumstances to assign weight to the nongenetic factors, to combine these figures with the paternity index, and to determine the probability that Mr. Coppedge was Latoya\u2019s father. Proffer of the geneticist\u2019s opinion as to the probability of paternity would have gone beyond testimony as to scientific information and would thus have trampled upon the jury\u2019s domain. This is not permitted under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 702 (1988). Jackson, at 460, 358 S.E.2d at 683. Hence, constrained by the holding in Jackson above, we uphold the trial court\u2019s exclusion of the expert\u2019s opinion as to the probability that Mr. Coppedge was Latoya\u2019s father.\nThe State\u2019s second assignment of error alleges that Ms. Williams\u2019 reputation for sexual promiscuity was admitted to cast doubt upon Ms. Williams\u2019 credibility and, as such, should have been excluded. With this proposition we agree. North Carolina Rule of Evidence, Rule 608 prohibits attacking a witness\u2019 credibility by opinion, reputation, or specific prior acts by this witness unless those specific acts bear on the witness\u2019 character for truthfulness. \u201c[Ejvidence routinely disapproved as irrelevant to the question of a witness\u2019 general veracity (credibility) includes specific instances of conduct relating to \u2018sexual relationships or proclivities, the bearing of illigitimate [sic] children, the use of drugs or alcohol. . . .\u2019\u201d State v. Morgan, 315 N.C. 626, 635, 340 S.E.2d 84, 90 (1986) (citation omitted). Ms. Williams\u2019 reputation for sexual promiscuity would not be admissible to attack her credibility.\nThis reputation evidence, however, is admissible to refute Ms. Williams\u2019 testimony that she had a monogamous relationship with the defendant from the time of conception until about the time of the child\u2019s birth. This testimony \u201copened the door\u201d to evidence regarding Ms. Williams\u2019 other sexual relationships during the window of the time that surrounded the child\u2019s conception. We recognize that character evidence is generally not admitted in civil cases unless it is character which is in issue because this evidence is often more prejudicial than probative. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 403 (1988). Here, however, evidence of sexual activity and promiscuity goes to a central element of this case: opportunity to impregnate Ms. Williams. Whether or not other men had the opportunity to father Latoya is of ultimate relevance to this issue of paternity. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 401 (1988). In addition, this nongenetic outside information, as a factor in the probability of paternity calculation, must be received in order for the jury to weigh the expert\u2019s assumptions underlying the calculation of numerical probability of paternity. Hence, we uphold the admission of Ms. Williams\u2019 reputation for sexual promiscuity.\nFurther, we find both instructive and controlling the case of State v. Warren, 124 N.C. 807, 32 S.E. 552 (1899). Warren was a bastardy case in which our Supreme Court held that specific instance evidence that the mother had had intimate relations with another man during the time of conception was admissible by the alleged father. The Court indicated that this evidence is competent and admissible only for instances which occur during the time period of conception. \u201cIt [is] incompetent for the purpose of contradicting the prosecutrix (citation omitted). ... It [is also] incompetent as corroborative evidence of the defendant. . . .\u201d Id. at 809, 32 S.E. at 553. The rationale is that the only issue before the jury is whether or not the defendant is the child\u2019s father and \u201cwhatever tends to prove or disprove the affirmative of this issue is competent.\u201d Id. (emphasis added). Because evidence that another man had intercourse with the mother during the time period of conception \u201cbears directly upon the issue,\u201d it is competent and as such it is admissible. Id.\nThe case at bar differs from Warren in that Mr. Coppedge proffered reputation rather than specific instance evidence. However, the Warren Court focused upon the issue at hand: paternity, and indicated that \u201cwhatever tends to prove or disprove\u201d this issue is competent. Id. Reputation evidence falls within \u201cwhatever\u201d evidence. Even though reputation evidence is less concrete than specific instance evidence and even though its offer into evidence may be suspect when presented by the putative father whose desire it is to exculpate himself, both of these concerns go to the weight rather than the admissibility of this type of evidence. It is for the jury to determine its weight and to balance the scales. We hold that the reputation evidence was properly admitted.\nWe find no prejudicial error.\nAffirmed.\nJudge WELLS concurs.\nJudge WALKER dissents.", "type": "majority", "author": "LEWIS, Judge." }, { "text": "Judge WALKER\ndissenting.\nI respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which holds Mr. Coppedge\u2019s testimony concerning Ms. Williams\u2019 reputation for sexual promiscuity was properly admitted. Before addressing the issue of whether such testimony is competent substantive evidence, I first take exception to the trial court\u2019s failure to sustain counsel\u2019s objections because the proper method of qualifying a character witness proffered to give reputation testimony was not followed. Established case law provides that:\n[W]hen an impeaching or sustaining character witness is called, he should first be asked whether he knows the general reputation and character of the witness or party about which he proposes to testify. This is a preliminary qualifying question which should be answered yes or no. If the witness answer [sic] it in the negative, he should be stood aside without further examination. If he reply [sic] in the affirmative, thus qualifying himself to speak on the subject of general reputation and character, counsel may then ask him to state what it is. This he may do categorically, i.e., simply saying that it is good or bad, without more, or he may, of his own volition, but without suggestion from counsel offering the witness, amplify or qualify his testimony, by adding that it is good for certain virtues or bad for certain vices.\nState v. Sidden, 315 N.C. 539, 546, 340 S.E.2d 340, 345 (1986), quoting State v. Hicks, 200 N.C. 539, 540-541, 157 S.E. 851, 852 (1931). (Emphasis in original).\nIn this case the reputation evidence was solicited without laying the proper foundation for such testimony. Although it was established that Mr. Coppedge knew Ms. Williams, the record is devoid of any evidence that he knew of Ms. Williams\u2019 reputation for \u201cusing her body for sex in exchange for drugs and alcohol\u201d from his contacts with members of the community in which Ms. Williams worked or lived. There was no inquiry as to how and on what basis Mr. Coppedge gleaned his knowledge so as to qualify him as competent to testify concerning Ms. Williams\u2019 reputation. Further, counsel omitted any preliminary qualifying question on the subject of general reputation but directly sought to elicit testimony enumerating specific character traits, i.e. Ms. Williams\u2019 inclination to use her body for sex in exchange for drugs or alcohol. Mr. Coppedge was permitted to testify categorically concerning the general reputation of Ms. Williams and, by his own volition, could have amplified his testimony by stating it was bad for certain vices. Here, his testimony was elicited absent the proper foundation and preliminary questioning and after being prompted through counsel\u2019s leading question.\nAlthough our Supreme Court has said on occasion it was error for failure to follow the correct procedures in eliciting reputation evidence, such is not usually prejudicial error. However, I am not convinced that no prejudice resulted from this noncompliance in light of the fact Mr. Coppedge\u2019s testimony was the only evidence regarding Ms. Williams\u2019 alleged use of her body for sex in exchange for drugs or alcohol. For this reason, I am of the opinion that the trial court should have sustained the objections and excluded the testimony concerning Ms. Williams\u2019 reputation.\nNotwithstanding the fact it is reputation evidence, the majority holds this evidence is admissible because it relates to a central element of the case: the opportunity to impregnate Ms. Williams. I do not believe State v. Warren, 124 N.C. 807, 32 S.E. 552 (1899) can be so broadly construed as to support this conclusion. Warren held that evidence of specific conduct between the mother and another man at the time of conception was competent and admissible by the putative father as relevant to the issue of paternity. Notably, this evidence was of a specific and identifiable act at a certain time which, if accepted as true, would have a bearing on the issue of paternity. In the case before us the reputation evidence covering July and August 1982 would not increase the likelihood of proving or disproving the central issue of paternity but is no more than a broadside attack on the character of Ms. Williams.\nLikewise in State v. Farmer, 63 N.C.App. 384, 304 S.E.2d 765 (1983), where the twins were born on 18 September 1978, defendant was permitted to ask the prosecuting witness about sexual intercourse with Earl Jones in November and December 1977. The court sustained objections, however, to defendant\u2019s questions concerning how long the prosecuting witness had dated Jones, how many times she had sexual intercourse with him, and where he lived. This Court upheld the trial court\u2019s finding that the excluded evidence had no logical tendency to prove the fact in issue: whether defendant was the father of the twins.\nFurther, I cannot uphold the admission of this testimony into evidence as it does not pass muster under the requisite balancing test of G.S. 8C-1, Rule 403, which provides in pertinent part:\nAlthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.\nAs the majority noted, character evidence is generally not admitted in civil cases unless character is an issue because this evidence is often more prejudicial than probative. This case offers a prime example. The evidence of Ms. Williams\u2019 character has questionable probative value, as it does not tend to prove or disprove the issue of paternity, and is highly prejudicial in that it attempts to discredit Ms. Williams through denigration of her reputation. Therefore, having concluded it was prejudicial error to admit this reputation evidence, I dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Judge WALKER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Lacy H. Thornburg, by Assistant Attorney General T. Byron Smith, for the State.", "No brief for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA ex rel. BEVERLY WILLIAMS, mother of Latoya Rashunda Williams, minor child v. WILLIAM EARL COPPEDGE\nNo. 919DC89\n(Filed 3 March 1992)\n1. Bastards \u00a7 5.1 (NCI3d)\u2014 expert on genetic determination of paternity \u2014 opinion as to defendant\u2019s paternity properly excluded\nThe trial court in a paternity action did not err in allowing an expert in the field of genetic determination of paternity who performed blood grouping tests to testify that he had an opinion as to whether defendant was the natural father but then denying the witness the opportunity to give his opinion, since the witness\u2019s opinion was not of assistance to the trier of fact where the jury was in an equally good position to consider all the nongenetic surrounding circumstances, to assign weight to the nongenetic factors, to combine these figures with the paternity index, and to determine the probability that defendant was the father.\nAm Jur 2d, Bastards \u00a7 118.\nAdmissibility and weight of blood-grouping tests in disputed paternity cases. 43 ALR4th 579.\n2. Bastards \u00a7 5 (NCI3d|\u2014 mother\u2019s reputation for sexual promiscuity \u2014 attack on credibility inadmissible \u2014 admissibility to refute evidence of access to mother\nEvidence in a paternity case as to the mother\u2019s reputation for sexual promiscuity was inadmissible to attack her credibility; however, such reputation evidence was admissible to refute the mother\u2019s testimony that she had a monogamous relationship with defendant from the time of conception until about the time of the child\u2019s birth. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 608.\nAm Jur 2d, Bastards \u00a7\u00a7 115, 116.\nAdmissibility, in disputed paternity proceedings, of evidence to rebut mother\u2019s claim of prior chastity. 59 ALR3d 659.\nJudge WALKER dissenting.\nAPPEAL by the State from a judgment filed 17 September 1990 by Judge C. W. Allen, Jr. in FRANKLIN County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 6 November 1991.\nAttorney General Lacy H. Thornburg, by Assistant Attorney General T. Byron Smith, for the State.\nNo brief for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0470-01", "first_page_order": 498, "last_page_order": 508 }