{ "id": 8524545, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TONY HAMMONDS", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Hammonds", "decision_date": "1992-03-03", "docket_number": "No. 9120SC348", "first_page": "594", "last_page": "599", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "105 N.C. App. 594" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "402 S.E.2d 851", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "102 N.C. App. 535", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524981 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/102/0535-01" ] }, { "cite": "297 S.E.2d 766", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 N.C. App. 600", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527029 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/59/0600-01" ] }, { "cite": "289 S.E.2d 335", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "338" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 308", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569745 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "311" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0308-01" ] }, { "cite": "234 S.E.2d 742", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 N.C. 609", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571595 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/292/0609-01" ] }, { "cite": "279 S.E.2d 788", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "797" }, { "page": "797" }, { "page": "797" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 N.C. 321", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573792 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "335" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/303/0321-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 601, "char_count": 11280, "ocr_confidence": 0.749, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.2055361142676658 }, "sha256": "f21c5a71ec816eabf06ad467f9bb6f5627c11daedf18aeb5e10e8f08314e1d86", "simhash": "1:4f7a4f6e626ad0e4", "word_count": 1837 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:24:40.355340+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Wells and Johnson concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TONY HAMMONDS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HEDRICK, Chief Judge.\nDefendant first contends \u201cthe trial court committed error by denying his motion to dismiss his court appointed attorney and obtain other counsel.\u201d We disagree.\nAlthough \u201cin a serious criminal prosecution the accused [has] the right to have the assistance of counsel for his defense,\u201d State v. Hutchins, 303 N.C. 321, 335, 279 S.E.2d 788, 797 (1981), the right to be defended by chosen counsel is not absolute. State v. McFadden, 292 N.C. 609, 234 S.E.2d 742 (1977). The Supreme Court has stated,\nIn the absence of any substantial reason for the appointment of replacement counsel, an indigent defendant must accept counsel appointed by the court, unless he wishes to present his own defense. A disagreement over trial tactics does not, by itself, entitle a defendant to the appointment of new counsel. Nor does a defendant have the right to insist that new counsel be appointed merely because he has become dissatisfied with the attorney\u2019s services. Similarly, the effectiveness of representation cannot be gauged by the amount of time counsel spends with the accused', . . . (citations omitted; emphasis added).\nHutchins, at 335, 279 S.E.2d at 797. \u201cThe trial court\u2019s sole obligation when faced with a request that counsel be withdrawn is to make sufficient inquiry into defendant\u2019s reasons to the extent necessary to determine whether defendant will receive effective assistance of counsel.\u201d State v. Poole, 305 N.C. 308, 311, 289 S.E.2d 335, 338 (1982).\nIn the present case, defendant moved to dismiss his court-appointed counsel after his case had been called for trial, but before the jury had been impaneled. The transcript discloses the following then took place:\nTHE COURT: You want to be heard?\nDEFENDANT: Yes sir. I feel like I need another lawyer because Mr. Hutcherson hasn\u2019t spent enough time with me on this case and really wasn\u2019t concerned about hearing my case. And. I\u2019ve been talking to another lawyer for quite some time. He told me to hold out and see what Mr. Hutcherson offered me.\nTHE Court: Told you what?\nDEFENDANT: Told me to hold out and see what Mr. Hutcherson offered me.\nTHE COURT: Anything else?\nDefendant: No.\nThe COURT: Motion denied. Bring the jury back.\nFrom the foregoing, it is clear the trial court fulfilled its obligation to inquire into defendant\u2019s reasons for wanting to discharge his attorney. The only reason cited by defendant in support of his motion was that, in his opinion, Mr. Hutcherson had not spent enough time with him on his case. We find nothing in the record to substantiate defendant\u2019s assertion, nor to demonstrate that defendant\u2019s representation was inadequate. Furthermore, \u201cthe effectiveness of representation cannot be gauged by the amount of time counsel spends with the accused . . . .\u201d Hutchins at 335, 279 S.E.2d at 797. Therefore, we hold the trial court correctly determined that there was no \u201csubstantial reason\u201d requiring the discharge of defendant\u2019s court-appointed counsel and properly denied his motion. This contention is overruled.\nIn his second and third assignments of error argued on appeal, defendant challenges the trial court\u2019s ruling allowing defendant\u2019s oral statements made to law enforcement officers to be admitted into evidence.\nDefendant first argues the trial court erred in admitting the statements because they were made while defendant was in custody and defendant had not been advised of his constitutional rights against self-incrimination. Defendant admits, however, that \u201cvolunteered or spontaneous statements] made by a [defendant to a police officer without any interrogation on the part of the officer are not barred by any theory of our law.\u201d State v. Parker, 59 N.C. App. 600, 297 S.E.2d 766 (1982).\nThe record indicates that, upon objection by defense counsel, the trial judge conducted a voir dire hearing to determine the admissibility of the statements. The court heard evidence from Detective Roger Coan who was present at the Monroe Public Safety Department when defendant was brought in. Detective Coan testified that, at that time, defendant was not under arrest, was not handcuffed and was free to leave. He also stated that neither he nor Officer Haulk, who was also present, attempted to question defendant. Detective Coan said that Officer Haulk asked defendant how he was doing and in response, defendant stated, \u201cI messed up. This was a good girl. She doesn\u2019t deserve what I did to her. Whatever I get I deserve. I been accused of a couple, so I just thought I would do one.\u201d\nFrom the evidence presented on voir dire, Judge Helms found that defendant was in custody at the time he made the oral statements, but that they were \u201cmade voluntarily and not as a result of any question or interrogation by [the] law enforcement officers.\u201d Defendant does not challenge the findings of the trial court, and we are bound by his findings if supported by competent evidence. State v. Washington, 102 N.C. App. 535, 402 S.E.2d 851 (1991).\nWe hold the testimony of Detective Coan supports the findings made by the trial judge with respect to defendant\u2019s statements, and these statements were properly admitted.\nIn his third assignment of error, defendant argues the trial judge erred in admitting his oral statements because they contained references to two other crimes of rape for which defendant had not been tried or convicted. Defendant contends the statements, \u201cI\u2019ve been accused of a couple\u201d and \u201cI just thought I\u2019d do one\u201d were so prejudicial as to inflame the jury against him. However, the record reveals that defendant did not object to the admission of these statements on this ground at trial; and defendant has, therefore, not properly preserved this issue for appellate review. N.C.R. App. 10(b).\nIn the interests of justice, however, we have considered the issue defendant has attempted to raise and find no error in the trial court\u2019s admission of defendant\u2019s statements concerning other rapes which he may have committed. As part of defendant\u2019s confession, these statements were clearly relevant and were not offered to prove defendant\u2019s character, but to explain the motive or reason for his commission of the offense charged. See N.C.R. Evid. 404(b). This assignment of error is without merit.\nFinally, defendant contends \u201cthe numerous questions asked by the trial judge were prejudicial to him.\u201d However, defendant has failed to discuss in his brief how he was prejudiced by the judge\u2019s questions or to even refer us to specific questions he finds erroneous, and does not cite any authority supporting his contention. Ordinarily, when an appellant\u2019s brief does not adequately state a reason or argument upon which the assignment of error is based or cite appropriate authority for that argument, the assignment of error is deemed abandoned. N.C.R. App. 28(b)(5). Nevertheless, we have reviewed the record and find no prejudicial error in the questions posed by the trial judge to the witnesses.\nDefendant received a fair trial, free from prejudicial error.\nNo error.\nJudges Wells and Johnson concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "HEDRICK, Chief Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Lacy H. Thornburg, by Assistant Attorney General Laura E. Grumpier, and Barbara A. Shaw, for the State.", "Joseph L. Hutcherson, II, for defendant, appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TONY HAMMONDS\nNo. 9120SC348\n(Filed 3 March 1992)\n1. Constitutional Law \u00a7 287 (NCI4th)\u2014 motion to dismiss court appointed counsel \u2014 denied\u2014no error\nThe trial court did not err in a rape, burglary, and kidnapping prosecution by denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss his court-appointed counsel where the only reason cited by defendant in support of his motion was that the attorney, in his opinion, had not spent enough time on the case. There was nothing in the record to substantiate defendant\u2019s assertion or to demonstrate that his representation was inadequate; furthermore, the effectiveness of representation cannot be gauged by the amount of time counsel spends with the accused.\nAm Jur 2d, Criminal Law \u00a7\u00a7 981, 984-986.\n2. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 1242 (NCI4th)\u2014 statements at police station \u2014 volunteered\nThe trial court did not err in a prosecution for rape, burglary, and kidnapping by admitting statements made by defendant while in police custody and before he had been advised of his constitutional rights against self-incrimination. The testimony on voir dire supports the trial judge\u2019s findings that the statements were made voluntarily and not as a result of any question by law enforcement officers.\nAm Jur 2d, Evidence \u00a7\u00a7 529, 582, 583.\n3. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 356 (NCI4th)\u2014 defendant\u2019s statement \u2014 reference to other offenses \u2014 admissible\nThe trial court did not err in a prosecution for rape, burglary and kidnapping by admitting at trial statements from defendant which contained references to two other crimes of rape for which defendant had not been tried or convicted. The statements were clearly relevant and were not offered to prove defendant\u2019s character, but to explain the motive or reason for his commission of the offense charged.\nAm Jur 2d, Evidence \u00a7 325.\nAPPEAL by defendant from Helms (William HJ, Judge. Judgment entered 16 January 1991 in Superior Court, UNION County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 15 January 1992.\nDefendant was charged in proper bills of indictment with first degree rape in violation of G.S. 14-27.2(a)(2), first degree burglary in violation of G.S. 14-51, first degree kidnapping in violation of G.S. 14-39 and assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury in violation of G.S. 14-32(a).\nThe evidence presented at trial tends to show the following: On the night of 24 May 1990, the prosecuting witness attended a party given by Laverne Hammonds at a nearby apartment. While there, she spoke to defendant who was Laverne\u2019s brother-in-law. At around 2:00 a.m., the prosecuting witness left the party and returned to her apartment. She fell asleep on the living room couch, but was awakened by a noise sometime later. When she awoke, she saw defendant standing at the bottom of the stairs inside her apartment, carrying a stick and a knife. Defendant told her not to scream or he would kill her and her daughter who was sleeping upstairs. Defendant then hit the prosecuting witness in the face with the stick, placed the knife to her throat and raped her.\nFollowing the attack, defendant gagged the witness, tied her hands behind her back and put her in the closet, placing a chair against the closet door to prevent her escape. However, she managed to untie herself and get out of the closet. She then ran next door to a neighbor\u2019s apartment and banged on the door crying for help. Defendant, who was standing nearby, grabbed her and dragged her into the woods. He again threatened to kill her, hitting her about the head and tried to stab her with the knife. At this point, Laverne Hammonds, defendant\u2019s sister-in-law, came from around the corner of the apartment building calling for the witness, and defendant fled.\nThe jury found defendant guilty as charged. From judgments imposing prison sentences of life for first degree rape, fifteen years for first degree burglary, fifteen years for first degree kidnapping, and ten years for assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill, all sentences to be served concurrently, defendant appealed.\nAttorney General Lacy H. Thornburg, by Assistant Attorney General Laura E. Grumpier, and Barbara A. Shaw, for the State.\nJoseph L. Hutcherson, II, for defendant, appellant." }, "file_name": "0594-01", "first_page_order": 622, "last_page_order": 627 }