{ "id": 5313704, "name": "JAMES T. MADRY, JR., Plaintiff v. DONNA MELTON MADRY, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Madry v. Madry", "decision_date": "1992-04-07", "docket_number": "No. 9110DC489", "first_page": "34", "last_page": "39", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "106 N.C. App. 34" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "189 S.E.2d 484", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "488" }, { "page": "493" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "281 N.C. 496", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575351 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "501" }, { "page": "505" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/281/0496-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 S.E.2d 111", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "113" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "87 N.C. App. 374", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8358415 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "376" }, { "page": "377" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/87/0374-01" ] }, { "cite": "231 S.E.2d 591", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "596" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 N.C. 646", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558884 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "654" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/291/0646-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 S.E.2d 70", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "320 N.C. 790", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4728992, 4724768, 4725943, 4730841, 4728572 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/320/0790-04", "/nc/320/0790-02", "/nc/320/0790-03", "/nc/320/0790-01", "/nc/320/0790-05" ] }, { "cite": "358 S.E.2d 110", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "111" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "86 N.C. App. 397", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12132142 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "400" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/86/0397-01" ] }, { "cite": "271 S.E.2d 393", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "398-399" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "49 N.C. App. 226", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520529 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "233-34" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/49/0226-01" ] }, { "cite": "310 S.E.2d 326", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "331" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 75", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2402735 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "82" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0075-01" ] }, { "cite": "391 S.E.2d 40", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 586", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5304286 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0586-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 S.E.2d 450", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 705", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2490019, 2491402, 2488216, 2490871, 2488856 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0705-01", "/nc/325/0705-05", "/nc/325/0705-04", "/nc/325/0705-02", "/nc/325/0705-03" ] }, { "cite": "381 S.E.2d 467", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "471" }, { "page": "471" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 N.C. App. 717", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527808 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "722" }, { "page": "722-723" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/94/0717-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-5.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 554, "char_count": 12240, "ocr_confidence": 0.701, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.0967749656041254e-07, "percentile": 0.7611329849732552 }, "sha256": "fc0ff45f676e9ee986d05a6fc02648fcf9e0d9d7d81f08ef083d85b1926356cc", "simhash": "1:2483d320712d2f58", "word_count": 1999 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:35:11.401464+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges ORR and WALKER concur." ], "parties": [ "JAMES T. MADRY, JR., Plaintiff v. DONNA MELTON MADRY, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HEDRICK, Chief Judge.\nPlaintiff and defendant were married on 8 May 1982. Defendant was stricken by a cerebral hemorrhage on 9 August 1986 as a result of which she suffered severe and permanent brain damage and partial paralysis. The parties have lived continuously separate and apart since 19 February 1988. Following the institution of this action by plaintiff and the filing of an answer by defendant, Donna Madry was declared incompetent by the Clerk of Superior Court in Robeson County and her mother, Lula Melton, was appointed as her guardian on 5 July 1990.\nOn 13 July 1990, defendant moved the trial court pursuant to Rule 15(a) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure for leave to amend her previously filed answer in order to assert, among other things, her allegation that her \u201cincurable insanity\u201d was the cause of the parties\u2019 separation and that plaintiff is therefore required to pursue his divorce action in accordance with G.S. 50-5.1. Defendant also asserted in her proposed amended pleading a claim for both temporary and permanent support pursuant to that statute. When the matter came on for hearing, Judge Fullwood ruled that defendant had failed to present evidence that she was \u201cincurably insane\u201d and concluded that \u201cNCGS 50-5.1 does not apply in this action.\u201d Based upon that conclusion, the trial judge denied defendant\u2019s motion to amend.\nDefendant thereafter filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and, in support of that motion, defendant again alleged that, due to the fact that she is \u201cincurably insane,\u201d plaintiff\u2019s exclusive remedy for an absolute divorce is G.S. 50-5.1. When this motion came on for hearing, the trial court converted defendant\u2019s motion to one for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure and considered all of the pleadings as well as the affidavit of a medical doctor who had been involved in the treatment, of Ms. Madry. Judge Morelock granted summary judgment in favor of defendant and dismissed plaintiff\u2019s claim for relief pursuant to G.S. 50-6 stating that \u201cN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-5.1 provides the exclusive remedy by which the plaintiff herein may obtain an absolute divorce from the defendant herein.\u201d\nWe will first address defendant\u2019s appeal. Ms. Madry argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion to amend her pleadings in accordance with Rule 15(a) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. As set forth above, defendant sought leave to amend in order to assert an affirmative defense to plaintiff\u2019s claim for an absolute divorce pursuant to G.S. 50-6 which she had failed to assert in her initial answer.\nUnder Rule 15(a), amendment of pleadings may be accomplished only by leave of court when the amendment is sought after responsive pleadings have been filed. That rule specifically provides, however, that \u201cleave shall be freely given when justice so requires.\u201d The grant or denial of an opportunity to amend pleadings is within the discretion of the trial court, Coffey v. Coffey, 94 N.C. App. 717, 722, 381 S.E.2d 467, 471, disc, review allowed, 325 N.C. 705, 388 S.E.2d 450 (1989), disc, review improvidently allowed, 326 N.C. 586, 391 S.E.2d 40 (1990), and that court\u2019s decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of an abuse of discretion. Henry v. Deen, 310 N.C. 75, 82, 310 S.E.2d 326, 331 (1984). Although our Rules of Civil Procedure do not require the trial judge to\ndeclare the reasons for a denial of a motion to amend, Coffey, 94 N.C. App. at 722-723, 381 S.E.2d at 471, it is \u201can abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend if the denial is not based on a valid ground.\u201d Id., citing 3 J. Moore, Moore\u2019s Federal Practice Sec. 15.08[4] at 15-65, 15-66. Similarly, a denial based upon a misapprehension of law is reversible error. Ledford v. Ledford, 49 N.C. App. 226, 233-34, 271 S.E.2d 393, 398-399 (1980).\nThe trial judge stated in his ruling that the motion to amend was denied due to his conclusion that G.S. 50-5.1 does not apply to this case and he further stated that his conclusion was based upon the fact that defendant had not presented at the motion hearing any of the evidence required by that statute to prove \u201cincurable insanity.\u201d The only issue properly before Judge Fullwood at this hearing was whether \u201cjustice required\u201d that defendant be granted leave to amend her responsive pleadings. G.S. 1A-1, Rule 15(a). The trial judge was not required nor was it proper to adjudicate the merits of defendant\u2019s proposed affirmative defense at this stage of the proceedings. The denial of defendant\u2019s motion was not therefore based upon \u201ca valid ground\u201d and was an abuse of discretion by the trial judge.\nAs our review of the record discloses no other apparent reason to deny defendant leave to amend her pleadings, Banner v. Banner, 86 N.C. App. 397, 400, 358 S.E.2d 110, 111, disc, review denied, 320 N.C. 790, 361 S.E.2d 70 (1987), and plaintiff has demonstrated no prejudice which would result from grant of leave, Vernon v. Crist, 291 N.C. 646, 654, 231 S.E.2d 591, 596 (1977), we hold that \u201cjustice required\u201d in this case that defendant\u2019s motion be allowed.\nPlaintiff appeals Judge Morelock\u2019s granting of summary judgment in favor of defendant and argues that the trial court committed reversible error in ruling that G.S. 50-5.1 provides the exclusive remedy for plaintiff. In his first assignment of error, plaintiff contends that Judge Morelock\u2019s order for summary judgment improperly overruled the decision rendered by Judge Fullwood upon defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss. Judge Fullwood ruled that, as a matter of law, G.S. 50-5.1 does not apply to this case while Judge Morelock concluded that, as a matter of law, that statute provides plaintiff\u2019s exclusive means of obtaining an absolute divorce from defendant.\nIt is a well established rule that \u201cno appeal lies from one Superior Court judge to another; that one Superior Court judge may not correct another\u2019s errors of law; and that ordinarily one judge may not modify, overrule, or change the judgment of another Superior Court judge made'' in the same action.\u201d Smithwick v. Crutchfield, 87 N.C. App. 374, 376, 361 S.E.2d 111, 113 (1987), quoting Calloway v. Ford Motor Co., 281 N.C. 496, 501, 189 S.E.2d 484, 488 (1972). If, however, the initial ruling is one which was addressed to the discretion of the trial judge, another trial court judge may rehear an issue and enter a contradictory ruling if there has been a material change in the circumstances of the parties. Calloway v. Ford Motor Company, 281 N.C. at 505, 189 S.E.2d at 493.\nDespite the fact that Judge Morelock\u2019s order is denominated a summary judgment, the legal issue decided by that judgment, whether G.S. 50-5.1 bars this plaintiff\u2019s claim for absolute divorce pursuant to G.S. 50-6, was precisely the same issue decided to the contrary by Judge Fullwood\u2019s earlier order denying defendant\u2019s motion to amend. The materials and arguments considered by Judge Morelock were essentially the same arguments and materials considered by Judge Fullwood. Simply labeling the order a summary judgment did not change its essential character nor authorize Judge Morelock to overrule Judge Fullwood. Smithwick v. Crutchfield, 87 N.C. App. at 377, 361 S.E.2d at 113.\nDefendant\u2019s motion to amend was a request addressed to the discretion of the trial judge. There were no changed circumstances however which would justify Judge Morelock\u2019s reconsideration of this issue. In fact, defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) was filed by defendant on 14 December 1990 which was prior to the date that Judge Fullwood even signed the order denying her motion to amend. It is obvious from the record that, in filing her 12(b)(6) motion, defendant was simply attempting to again put before the court those contentions that Judge Fullwood had rejected.\nWe hold that Judge Morelock committed reversible error in ruling that G.S. 50-5.1 is the exclusive remedy for this plaintiff when Judge Fullwood had previously ruled otherwise.\nPlaintiff\u2019s second assignment of error contends that summary judgment was improper as the record before Judge Morelock affirmatively established that plaintiff was entitled to an absolute divorce based upon one year\u2019s continuous separation of the parties in accordance with G.S. 50-6. In light of our decision to allow defendant the opportunity to amend her pleadings, summary judgment in favor of either party would be inappropriate at this time. We therefore decline to address plaintiff\u2019s contention.\nThe summary judgment entered by Judge Morelock dismissing plaintiff\u2019s claim is reversed. Judge Fullwood\u2019s order denying defendant\u2019s motion to amend is reversed and the cause is remanded to the District Court wherein defendant shall be allowed to file and serve amended pleadings and the plaintiff shall be allowed 30 days within which to file any necessary response.\nReversed.\nJudges ORR and WALKER concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "HEDRICK, Chief Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Ragsdale, Kirschbaum, Nanney, Sokol & Heidgerd, P.A., by William L. Ragsdale, C. D. Heidgerd, and Connie E. Carrigan, for plaintiff, appellant, cross appellee.", "Womble Carlyle Sandridge and Rice, by Susan D. Crooks, and Susan S. McFarlane, for defendant, appellee, cross appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JAMES T. MADRY, JR., Plaintiff v. DONNA MELTON MADRY, Defendant\nNo. 9110DC489\n(Filed 7 April 1992)\n1. Rules of Civil Procedure \u00a7 15.1 (NCI3d| \u2014 divorce \u2014amendment of pleadings \u2014denied \u2014abuse of discretion\nThe trial court erred by denying defendant\u2019s motion to amend her pleadings to assert the affirmative defense that she was incurably insane and that plaintiff\u2019s exclusive remedy for an absolute divorce was N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50-5.1. The trial judge was not required nor was it proper to adjudicate the merits of defendant\u2019s proposed affirmative defense at this stage of the proceedings.\nAm Jur 2d, Divorce and Separation \u00a7\u00a7 297, 301.\n2. Courts \u00a7 74 (NCI4th)\u2014 district court \u2014 authority of one judge to overrule another\nThe trial court erred by granting summary judgment for defendant in a divorce action on the issue of whether N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50-5.1 provided the exclusive remedy for plaintiff where another judge, in ruling on defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss, had held that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50-5.1 did not apply. The legal issue was precisely the same, the materials and arguments were essentially the same, and simply labeling the order a summary judgment did not change its essential character nor authorize the second judge to overrule the first;\nAm Jur 2d, Courts \u00a7 130.\nAPPEAL by plaintiff from Morelock (Fred MJ, Judge. Judgment entered 19 March 1991 in District Court, WAKE County. Cross Appeal by defendant from Fullwood (James), Judge. Order entered 19 December 1990 in District Court, Wake County. Heard in the Court of Appeals on 16 March 1992.\nPlaintiff instituted this civil action by filing a complaint on 6 October 1989 wherein he requested an absolute divorce from defendant based upon G.S. 50-6, an equitable distribution of the parties\u2019 marital property, and custody of the minor child born to the marriage. On 11 December 1989, defendant filed an answer admitting that plaintiff was entitled to an absolute divorce pursuant to G.S. 50-6 and joining in his request for an equitable distribution. Defendant also admitted that plaintiff was entitled to custody of the minor child. Defendant counterclaimed for liberal visitation, temporary and permanent alimony, as well as attorney\u2019s fees.\nDefendant filed a motion to amend her answer which was denied by Judge Fullwood on 19 December 1990. She thereafter filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure claiming that plaintiff cpuld not obtain an absolute divorce pursuant to G.S. 50-6 due to the fact she is \u201cincurably insane\u201d within the meaning of G.S. 50-5.1 which statute would therefore provide the exclusive method by which plaintiff could obtain a divorce. Judge Morelock agreed with defendant and entered summary judgment dismissing plaintiff\u2019s claim pursuant to G.S. 50-6 on 19 March 1991.\nPlaintiff appeals from the granting of summary judgment and defendant cross appeals from the order of Judge Fullwood denying her motion to amend her answer.\nRagsdale, Kirschbaum, Nanney, Sokol & Heidgerd, P.A., by William L. Ragsdale, C. D. Heidgerd, and Connie E. Carrigan, for plaintiff, appellant, cross appellee.\nWomble Carlyle Sandridge and Rice, by Susan D. Crooks, and Susan S. McFarlane, for defendant, appellee, cross appellant." }, "file_name": "0034-01", "first_page_order": 64, "last_page_order": 69 }