{ "id": 5314228, "name": "STATE AUTOMOBILE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. MICHAEL W. HOYLE, ELIZABETH HOYLE, CYNTHIA THOMAS McABEE, JAMES B. McABEE, and THOMAS WALKER McABEE", "name_abbreviation": "State Automobile Mutual Insurance v. Hoyle", "decision_date": "1992-05-05", "docket_number": "No. 9114SC441", "first_page": "199", "last_page": "204", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "106 N.C. App. 199" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "176 S.E.2d 352", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "353" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "9 N.C. App. 446", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551475 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "447" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/9/0446-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 S.E.2d 518", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "522" }, { "page": "522-23" }, { "page": "522" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 N.C. 348", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561396 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "354" }, { "page": "355" }, { "page": "354" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/276/0348-01" ] }, { "cite": "394 S.E.2d 209", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "211" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 N.C. App. 64", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526289 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "68" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/100/0064-01" ] }, { "cite": "574 A.2d 138", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 7378812 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/574/0138-01" ] }, { "cite": "332 N.Y.S.2d 121", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 531, "char_count": 11327, "ocr_confidence": 0.756, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.5038306200838735e-07, "percentile": 0.9230069011745472 }, "sha256": "5ec74b51b68c4b0c59e71faab8f676ed63e4b7cbf46bf4ef5f0fffab3dfd1204", "simhash": "1:c8fb5dee857c9154", "word_count": 1813 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:35:11.401464+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges JOHNSON and COZORT concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE AUTOMOBILE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. MICHAEL W. HOYLE, ELIZABETH HOYLE, CYNTHIA THOMAS McABEE, JAMES B. McABEE, and THOMAS WALKER McABEE" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "GREENE, Judge.\nPlaintiff appeals from an order filed 5 March 1991, denying plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs declaratory judgment action, and entering summary judgment in favor of defendants.\nThe evidence established that on 13 April 1990, Will Hoyle (Will), son of defendants Michael W. and Elizabeth D. Hoyle (the Hoyles), was driving his go-cart approximately two and one half blocks from his home in Durham, North Carolina. Generally speaking, a go-cart is a recreational device made out of some type of tubing and generally about four to five feet long, with four small tires, a steering wheel, a lawnmower-type engine, and gas and brake pedals, but, usually without lights, directional signals, a rear-view mirror, a horn, or a proper breaking system. See Zapp v. Ross Pontiac, Inc., 332 N.Y.S.2d 121 (N.Y. 1972); Sentry Ins. Co. v. Castillo, 574 A.2d 138 (R.I. 1990). Go-carts are not designed for use on public highways. At the intersection of Falkirt Road and Farintosh Court, Will\u2019s go-cart struck defendant Thomas Walker McAbee (Thomas), causing injury to Thomas\u2019 left leg. At the time of the incident, the Hoyles were insured under a homeowner\u2019s policy with plaintiff. The policy provides coverage for personal liability and medical payments to others due to bodily injury. The policy also contains the following exclusionary clause:\n1. Coverage E \u2014 Personal Liability and Coverage F \u2014Medical . Payments to Others do not apply to bodily injury or property damage:\ne. arising out of:\n(1) the ownership, maintenance, use, loading or unloading of motor vehicles or all other motorized land conveyances, including trailers, owned or operated by or rented or loaned to an insured.\nThe policy does not provide a definition of the terms \u201cmotor vehicle\u201d or \u201cmotorized land conveyance.\u201d However, the policy states that the above exclusion does not apply to \u201ca motorized land conveyance designed for recreational use off public roads, not subject to motor vehicle registration and (a) not owned by an insured; or (b) owned by an insured and on an insured location.\u201d It is undisputed that the go-cart was owned by an insured, and that the go-cart accident did not occur on an insured location.\nOn 22 May 1990, plaintiff instituted an action seeking a declaratory judgment that the insurance policy at issue provides no coverage for personal liability or medical payments to others for Thomas\u2019 injuries resulting from the go-cart accident. On 17 January 1991, plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. On 5 March 1991, the trial court determined that the insurance policy provides coverage for the accident, and accordingly denied plaintiff\u2019s motion and granted defendants\u2019 oral motion for summary judgment.\nThe issues presented are whether (I) the undefined term \u201cmotor vehicle\u201d as used in the exclusionary clause of a homeowner\u2019s insurance policy encompasses a go-cart; and (II) the undefined term \u201cmotorized land conveyance\u201d as used in the same exclusionary clause encompasses a go-cart.\nThe general rule applicable to insurance contracts is that, in the absence of an ambiguity, the language used must be given its plain, ordinary, and accepted meaning. Integon Gen. Ins. Corp. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 100 N.C. App. 64, 68, 394 S.E.2d 209, 211 (1990). However, where an ambiguity or uncertainty as to the meaning of words exists, the insurance contract must be construed in favor of the insured. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 276 N.C. 348, 354, 172 S.E.2d 518, 522 (1970). A word is ambiguous when it is reasonably capable of more than one meaning. Chadwick v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 N.C. App. 446, 447, 176 S.E.2d 352, 353 (1970). When included in an insurance contract, exclusionary clauses are to be strictly construed in favor of coverage. Wachovia, 276 N.C. at 355, 172 S.E.2d at 522-23. However, if such exclusions are plainly expressed, \u201cinsurers are entitled to have them construed and enforced as expressed.\u201d 43 Am Jur 2d Insurance \u00a7 291 (1982).\nI\n\u201cMotor Vehicle\u201d\nPlaintiff argues that a go-cart is \u201cobviously\u201d a \u201cmotor vehicle.\u201d Defendants, on the other hand, contend that the term is ambiguous since it is not defined in the policy.\nWhen an insurance policy contains no definition of a non-technical term, the ordinary meaning of the term controls. Wachovia, 276 N.C. at 354, 172 S.E.2d at 522. The dictionary defines \u201cmotor vehicle\u201d as \u201ca vehicle on wheels having its own motor and not running on rails or tracks, for use on streets or highways-, especially, an automobile, truck or bus.\u201d Webster\u2019s New. World Dictionary, Second College Edition (1970) (hereinafter Webster\u2019s) (emphasis added). A \u201cvehicle\u201d is \u201cany device or contrivance for carrying or conveying persons or objects, including land conveyances . . . .\u201d Id.; see also 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles \u00a7 1 (1969) (\u201cmotor vehicle\u201d is commonly applied to any form of self-propelled vehicle suitable for use on a street or roadway). North Carolina\u2019s motor vehicle statutes define a \u201cmotor vehicle\u201d as \u201cevery vehicle which is self-propelled and every vehicle designed to run upon the highways which is pulled by a self-propelled vehicle,\u201d excluding mopeds. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-4.01(23) (1989). A \u201cvehicle\u201d is defined as \u201cevery device in, upon, or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway, excepting devices moved by human power or used exclusively upon fixed rails or tracks . . . ,\u201d and including bicycles. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-4.01(49) (1989) (emphasis added).\nThus, the common, ordinary meaning as well as the statutory definition of the term \u201cmotor vehicle\u201d contemplates suitability for highway use. As previously noted, a go-cart is not designed nor suitable for use on public highways, nor is a go-cart subject to our motor vehicle laws, including the requirement of registration. In fact, the term \u201cgo-cart\u201d is not mentioned anywhere in our motor vehicle statutes. Accordingly, a go-cart is not a motor vehicle within the ordinary meaning of that term. Even accepting as true the assertion that some definitions or uses of the term \u201cmotor vehicle\u201d might include any self-propelled vehicle regardless of its suitability for highway use, this simply renders the term capable of more than one meaning. As previously discussed, words contained in an insurance policy which are capable of more than one meaning are ambiguous, in which case the policy must be construed in favor of the insured. Thus, under either analysis, the exclusion from coverage of injuries arising out of \u201cmotor vehicles\u201d contained in the Hoyle\u2019s insurance policy does not operate to exclude coverage for the injuries arising out of the go-cart accident.\nII\n\u201cMotorized Land Conveyance\u201d\nPlaintiff asserts that a go-cart is a \u201cmotorized land conveyance\u201d within the plain meaning of that term. Moreover, according to plaintiff, since the exclusionary clause in the Hoyle\u2019s insurance policy expressly does not apply to injuries arising out of motorized land conveyances designed for recreational use off public roads, not subject to motor vehicle registration, and owned by an insured and used on an insured location, that the exclusion does apply to such motorized land conveyances that are owned by an insured and not used on an insured location. Defendants contend that the term \u201cmotorized land conveyance\u201d is ambiguous, and that therefore the policy should be construed in favor of coverage.\nAccording to the dictionary, the term \u201cmotorized\u201d means \u201cto equip (vehicles, machines, etc.) with a motor or motors.\u201d Webster\u2019s. A \u201cmotor\u201d is defined as \u201canything that produces or imparts motion.\u201d Id. The term \u201cconveyance\u201d is defined as \u201ca means of [taking from one place to another]; a carrying device, especially a vehicle.\u201d Id. Thus, a \u201cmotorized land conveyance\u201d can be fairly said to describe anything equipped with something that produces motion which is used on land as a means of taking something or someone from one place to another. This term, therefore, is much broader than the term \u201cmotor vehicle,\u201d and unquestionably includes a go-cart. Moreover, the exclusionary clause in the Hoyle\u2019s policy expressly provides coverage for injuries arising out of the use of any motorized land conveyance that is designed for recreational use off public roads, is not subject to motor vehicle registration, and (a) is not owned by an insured; or (b) is owned by an insured and on an insured location. Thus, a reading of the clause in its entirety reveals that motorized land conveyances which do not meet the requirements of the foregoing exception to the exclusion remain within the general exclusion for motorized land conveyances. Whether coverage is provided for the accident in the instant case depends solely on whether the go-cart falls within this exception.\nWe have already determined that a go-cart is a motorized land conveyance, and it is undisputed that a go-cart is designed for recreational use off public roads and is not subject to motor vehicle registration. The language of the Hoyle\u2019s policy provides that in order for injuries arising out of the use of such recreational motorized land conveyances which are owned by an insured to be covered, such use must be on an insured location. Because the accident involving the Hoyle\u2019s go-cart did not occur when the go-cart was being used on an insured location, the trial court erred in determining that the policy provided coverage.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the trial court\u2019s order granting summary judgment in favor of defendants is\nReversed.\nJudges JOHNSON and COZORT concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "GREENE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Teague, Campbell, Dennis & Gorham, by John A. Tomei, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Haywood, Denny, Miller, Johnson, Sessoms & Patrick, by Robert E. Levin, for defendant-appellees Michael W. Hoyle and Elizabeth\u25a0 Hoyle.", "Poe, Hoof and Reinhardt, by Martha A. New, for defendantappellees Cynthia Thomas McAbee and Thomas Walker McAbee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE AUTOMOBILE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. MICHAEL W. HOYLE, ELIZABETH HOYLE, CYNTHIA THOMAS McABEE, JAMES B. McABEE, and THOMAS WALKER McABEE\nNo. 9114SC441\n(Filed 5 May 1992)\n1. Insurance \u00a7 149 (NCI3d)\u2014 homeowners insurance \u2014exclusionary clause \u2014go-cart not motor vehicle\nA go-cart is not a \u201cmotor vehicle\u201d within the meaning of an exclusionary clause of a homeowners insurance policy where the term \u201cmotor vehicle\u201d is not defined in the policy, since the ordinary meaning as well as the statutory definition of \u201cmotor vehicle\u201d contemplates suitability for highway use, and a go-cart is not designed or suitable for use on public highways and is not subject to the motor vehicle laws.\nAm Jur 2d, Insurance \u00a7 727.\n2. Insurance \u00a7 149 (NCI3d)\u2014 homeowners insurance \u2014 exclusionary clause \u2014go-cart as motorized land conveyance\nA go-cart is a \u201cmotorized land conveyance\u201d within the meaning of an exclusionary clause of a homeowners insurance policy. Furthermore, an exception to this exclusionary clause providing coverage for injuries arising out of the use of recreational motorized land conveyances owned by an insured and on an insured location did not apply where the accident in question occurred on a public street and not on an insured location.\nAm Jur 2d, Insurance \u00a7 727.\nAPPEAL by plaintiff from judgment filed 5 March 1991 in DURHAM County Superior Court by Judge Anthony M. Brannon. Heard in the Court of Appeals 10 March 1992.\nTeague, Campbell, Dennis & Gorham, by John A. Tomei, for plaintiff-appellant.\nHaywood, Denny, Miller, Johnson, Sessoms & Patrick, by Robert E. Levin, for defendant-appellees Michael W. Hoyle and Elizabeth\u25a0 Hoyle.\nPoe, Hoof and Reinhardt, by Martha A. New, for defendantappellees Cynthia Thomas McAbee and Thomas Walker McAbee." }, "file_name": "0199-01", "first_page_order": 229, "last_page_order": 234 }