{ "id": 5313625, "name": "WILSON L. DAVIS, Individually and as Executor of the Estate of CAROLYN FULBRIGHT DAVIS, Deceased, LISA F. COLLUMS and SUSAN F. ROGERS, Plaintiffs v. NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Davis v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance", "decision_date": "1992-05-05", "docket_number": "No. 9125SC472", "first_page": "221", "last_page": "225", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "106 N.C. App. 221" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "23 ALR4th 12", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "104 N.C. App. 601", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523186 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/104/0601-01" ] }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 259", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2492574 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0259-01" ] }, { "cite": "413 S.E.2d 551", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "606" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 852", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2510088, 2508812, 2511949, 2508183, 2509499 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0852-05", "/nc/330/0852-01", "/nc/330/0852-03", "/nc/330/0852-04", "/nc/330/0852-02" ] }, { "cite": "410 S.E.2d 401", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "404", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "412 S.E.2d 52", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 193", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2511313, 2508242, 2508118, 2508667, 2510653 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0193-01", "/nc/330/0193-05", "/nc/330/0193-02", "/nc/330/0193-04", "/nc/330/0193-03" ] }, { "cite": "406 S.E.2d 652", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 N.C. App. 629", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522609 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/103/0629-01" ] }, { "cite": "408 S.E.2d 521", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Greene, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 N.C. 788", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2553443, 2555141, 2552921, 2556123, 2555932 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Greene, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/329/0788-04", "/nc/329/0788-05", "/nc/329/0788-01", "/nc/329/0788-02", "/nc/329/0788-03" ] }, { "cite": "404 S.E.2d 499", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Greene, J., dissenting" }, { "page": "501", "parenthetical": "emphasis in original" }, { "page": "501" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 N.C. App. 101", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8519696 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Greene, J., dissenting" }, { "page": "103" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/103/0101-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 S.E.2d 546", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2491072, 2489257, 2490993, 2488279, 2491871 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0437-04", "/nc/325/0437-01", "/nc/325/0437-02", "/nc/325/0437-05", "/nc/325/0437-03" ] }, { "cite": "382 S.E.2d 759", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "763" }, { "page": "762" }, { "page": "764" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 N.C. App. 601", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523186 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/104/0601-01" ] }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 259", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2492574 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "263" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0259-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 473, "char_count": 8759, "ocr_confidence": 0.766, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.8915576481914636e-07, "percentile": 0.9013714699196749 }, "sha256": "d3aa7dac3c32d66da5d57519f1c5cc63f2117eca6316bb87efef09337186936f", "simhash": "1:3778c06c8437ac5c", "word_count": 1391 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:35:11.401464+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Arnold and Wynn concur." ], "parties": [ "WILSON L. DAVIS, Individually and as Executor of the Estate of CAROLYN FULBRIGHT DAVIS, Deceased, LISA F. COLLUMS and SUSAN F. ROGERS, Plaintiffs v. NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "LEWIS, Judge.\nOnce again this Court is asked to confront the controversial insurance \u201cstacking\u201d question. We are asked here to determine whether an individual named in \u2014but not the \u201cowner\u201d of \u2014 a motor vehicle insurance policy is permitted to \u201cstack\u201d underinsured (UIM) coverage when the single policy insures two vehicles. The trial court held that such stacking was permissible. Given the recent case law in this Court, we find no error in the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nThis action arose when plaintiffs\u2019 decedent, Carolyn Fulbright Davis, was fatally injured in an automobile accident on 2 June 1989. Decedent was driving a 1985 automobile owned by her husband, Wilson L. Davis, and covered under an insurance policy issued by defendant. The policy was taken in the name of Mr. Davis, but because decedent was his wife and a member of his household at the time of the accident, the policy covered her as well.\nThe other vehicle involved in the accident was owned by Harry C. Nunnery and his wife, Paulette C. Nunnery, with Mrs. Nunnery driving at the time of the accident. Plaintiffs in this action presently have pending a separate wrongful death action against the Nunnerys. In addition, the Nunnerys had a liability insurance policy with Travelers Insurance Company which has paid plaintiffs $50,000.00. None of these facts is disputed by the defendant.\nPlaintiffs brought a declaratory judgment action against defendant to determine their rights under their policy. The Nationwide insurance policy provides underinsured motorist coverage at limits of $100,000.00 per person and $300,000.00 per accident for bodily injury. There were two vehicles covered under this single policy, with separate premiums paid on each vehicle. Relying on N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21 (1989), plaintiffs sought to aggregate, or \u201cstack,\u201d their coverage to increase their liability limit to $200,000.00 \u2014i.e., apply the $100,000.00 limit to each vehicle insured under the policy. The trial court permitted this intrapolicy stacking. From this, defendant appeals.\nAccording to our review of the law, the result in this case seems clear. First, our Supreme Court, in Sutton v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 325 N.C. 259, 382 S.E.2d 759, reh\u2019g denied, 325 N.C. 437, 384 S.E.2d 546 (1989), held that the North Carolina legislature \u201cintended N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4) to require both interpolicy and intrapolicy stacking of UIM coverages.\u201d Id. at 265, 382 S.E.2d at 763. However, defendant distinguishes Sutton, since the person attempting to stack in that case was the owner of the insurance policy. Defendant argues that the language of the statute, which refers specifically to the \u201cpolicy\u2019s owner,\" demands a different result when, as here, the person injured was named under the policy but did not actually own the policy.\nDefendant\u2019s argument is not without judicial support. Several key dissents, authored by Judge K. Edward Greene of this Court, have argued that the correct interpretation of the statute is that only the owner of the policy is allowed the benefits of stacking. See, e.g., Harris v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 103 N.C. App. 101, 404 S.E.2d 499, disc. rev. allowed, 329 N.C. 788, 408 S.E.2d 521 (1991) (Greene, J., dissenting). His is the minority view, however, and we are bound by the prevailing majority position.\nIn Harris, this Court upheld the trial court\u2019s granting of a summary judgment in favor of Harris to permit intrapolicy stacking of UIM coverage. In that case, the daughter of the insured was permitted to stack a single insurance policy which covered three separate vehicles. Michelle Harris, the daughter, owned neither the vehicles insured under the policy nor the policy itself, yet this Court relied on Sutton to hold that the benefits of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4) \u201cflow to the insured injured party.\u201d Id. at 103, 404 S.E.2d at 501 (emphasis in original).\nSimilarly, in Amos v. North Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 103 N.C. App. 629, 406 S.E.2d 652, disc. rev. allowed, 330 N.C. 193, 412 S.E.2d 52 (1991), this Court again allowed intrapolicy stacking for a nonowner of the policy. Finally, in Manning v. Tripp, 104 N.C. App. 601, 410 S.E.2d 401 (1991), disc. rev. allowed, 330 N.C. 852, 413 S.E.2d 551 (1992), this Court clearly permitted intrapolicy stacking by nonowners. This Court stated, \u201cAs our decision in Harris indicates, defendant\u2019s position that Mrs. Manning cannot aggregate the UIM coverage because she is not an owner of the vehicles is without merit.\u201d Id. at 606, 410 S.E.2d at 404 (emphasis added).\nDefendant nonetheless argues that the language of the policy constitutes a contractual issue that controls this case. Defendant points out that Mr. Davis\u2019 policy explicitly precludes intrapolicy stacking. The language to which it refers is found in Part D of the policy, under \u201cLimit of Liability\u201d of \u201cUninsured Motorists Coverage.\u201d This language says:\nThe limit of bodily injury liability shown in the Declarations for \u2018each person\u2019 for Uninsured Motorists Coverage is our maximum limit of liability for all damages for bodily injury sustained by any one person in any one auto accident. . . . This is the most we will pay for bodily injury and property damage regardless of the number of: . . .\n3. Vehicles or premiums shown in the Declarations.\nWe note that this exact language appeared in the Sutton policy. In examining this language, the Supreme Court said, \u201cThe question[] before us [is] . . . whether the statute prevails over the policy language.\u201d Sutton, 325 N.C. at 263, 382 S.E.2d at 762. The Court made this rough place plain. It held, \u201cWe are confident the statute prevails over the language of the policy.\u201d Id. For this reason, defendant\u2019s contractual argument must fail.\nFinally, defendant argues that public policy reasons justify prohibiting nonowners from stacking coverage. While we recognize that Sutton concerned stacking by a policy \u201cowner,\u201d we have held invalid the practice of distinguishing between a policy owner and a nonowner family member insured for UIM coverage purposes. See, e.g., Harris, 103 N.C. App. at 103, 404 S.E.2d at 501. Therefore, the public policy set forth in Sutton likewise applies and is valid in this instance. There, the Supreme Court said, \u201cOur construction of the statute [permitting stacking] avoids anomalous results, is fairer to the insured and . . . gives the insured due consideration for the separate premiums paid for each UIM coverage within a policy.\u201d Sutton, 325 N.C. at 267, 382 S.E.2d at 764. We therefore find no merit to defendant\u2019s argument on this basis.\nAffirmed.\nJudges Arnold and Wynn concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "LEWIS, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Finger, Parker & Avram, by M. Neil Finger and Raymond A. Parker, II, for the plaintiffs-appellees.", "Nichols, Caffrey, Hill, Evans & Murrelle, by Paul D. Coates and Matthew L. Mason, for the defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "WILSON L. DAVIS, Individually and as Executor of the Estate of CAROLYN FULBRIGHT DAVIS, Deceased, LISA F. COLLUMS and SUSAN F. ROGERS, Plaintiffs v. NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant\nNo. 9125SC472\n(Filed 5 May 1992)\nInsurance \u00a7 69 (NCI3d)\u2014 automobile insurance \u2014underinsured motorist coverage \u2014single policy insuring two vehicles \u2014named individual not owner of the policy \u2014stacking permitted\nThe trial court properly allowed intrapolicy stacking of underinsured motorist coverage by a named individual not the owner of the policy where plaintiff\u2019s decedent was fatally injured in an automobile accident while driving an automobile owned by her husband and covered under a policy issued by defendant which was in the husband\u2019s name but covered decedent as his wife and a member of his household, and which covered two automobiles with separate premiums on each. Although defendant contended that Sutton v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 325 N.C. 259, can be distinguished because the person attempting to stack in that case was the owner of the policy, and that the language of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21 refers to the policy owner, the Court of Appeals clearly permitted intrapolicy stacking by nonowners in Manning v. Tripp, 104 N.C. App. 601. Furthermore, defendant\u2019s argument that policy language explicitly precluding intrapolicy stacking controls must fail because that language appeared in Sutton, and, although defendant argues that public policy justifies prohibiting nonowners from stacking coverage, the public policy set forth in Sutton likewise applies and is valid in this case.\nAm Jur 2d, Automobile Insurance \u00a7 329.\nCombining or \u201cstacking\u201d uninsured motorist coverages provided in single policy applicable to different vehicles of individual insured. 23 ALR4th 12.\nAPPEAL by defendant from judgment entered 7 February 1991 by Judge Forrest A. Ferrell in CATAWBA County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 March 1992.\nFinger, Parker & Avram, by M. Neil Finger and Raymond A. Parker, II, for the plaintiffs-appellees.\nNichols, Caffrey, Hill, Evans & Murrelle, by Paul D. Coates and Matthew L. Mason, for the defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0221-01", "first_page_order": 251, "last_page_order": 255 }