{ "id": 5313718, "name": "JAMES W. WATSON, Plaintiff v. AMERICAN NATIONAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Watson v. American National Fire Insurance", "decision_date": "1992-07-07", "docket_number": "No. 906SC1325", "first_page": "681", "last_page": "686", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "106 N.C. App. 681" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "25 ALR4th 986", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "414 S.E.2d 69", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 N.C. App. 563", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524340 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/105/0563-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 S.E.2d 546", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2491072, 2489257, 2490993, 2488279, 2491871 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0437-04", "/nc/325/0437-01", "/nc/325/0437-02", "/nc/325/0437-05", "/nc/325/0437-03" ] }, { "cite": "382 S.E.2d 759", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "763" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 259", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2492574 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0259-01" ] }, { "cite": "345 S.E.2d 387", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 731", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4695400, 4696174, 4696632, 4699005, 4702879 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0731-02", "/nc/316/0731-05", "/nc/316/0731-04", "/nc/316/0731-03", "/nc/316/0731-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 127", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "129" }, { "page": "129" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 N.C. App. 551", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521993 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/79/0551-01" ] }, { "cite": "200 S.E.2d 392", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1939, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "214 N.C. 680", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8632664 ], "year": 1939, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/214/0680-01" ] }, { "cite": "209 S.E.2d 494", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "499" }, { "page": "499" }, { "page": "499" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 N.C. 130", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563771 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "137" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/286/0130-01" ] }, { "cite": "135 S.E.2d 18", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "261 N.C. 445", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573965 ], "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/261/0445-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 595, "char_count": 12279, "ocr_confidence": 0.786, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.4458429402792476e-07, "percentile": 0.9212896195878602 }, "sha256": "ab06e7bca0fb8a163f338993e4ce5a84a131b25dd4d8cbee520417915b5bfdbe", "simhash": "1:a5884870143c2d14", "word_count": 1997 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:35:11.401464+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges COZORT and ORR concur." ], "parties": [ "JAMES W. WATSON, Plaintiff v. AMERICAN NATIONAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "LEWIS, Judge.\nOn 17 February 1989, the plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident with Clyde Lee. The accident occurred while the plaintiff was driving his mother\u2019s 1984 Cadillac automobile on Highway 13 in Hertford County, North Carolina. The plaintiff filed a complaint against Clyde Lee on 25 September 1989 alleging severe and permanent injuries.\nAt the time of the accident, Clyde Lee was insured by Nationwide Insurance Companies with liability coverage in the amount of $100,000.00 per person and $300,000.00 per accident. On 31 October 1989, Nationwide settled the plaintiff\u2019s claim for the limits of Clyde Lee\u2019s policy ($100,000.00).\nThe plaintiff\u2019s damages exceeded his settlement with Nationwide under Clyde Lee\u2019s policy so he made a claim for under insurance coverage (UIM) on his own business insurance policy written by American National Fire Insurance Company, the defendant. The defendant denies that this policy provides under insurance coverage. On 29 October 1990, the trial court granted the plaintiff\u2019s motion for judgment on the pleadings, and awarded all coverage in the amount of $10,000,000.00. The defendant appeals.\nThe appellant argues that the trial court erred in holding that the dispositive issues and material facts of this case are not in dispute by granting the plaintiff\u2019s motion for judgment on the pleadings. Judgment on the pleadings is not favored by the law, and a non-movant\u2019s pleadings will be liberally construed. Edwards v. Edwards, 261 N.C. 445, 135 S.E.2d 18 (1964).\nRagsdale v. Kennedy, 286 N.C. 130, 209 S.E.2d 494 (1974) articulates the position of this State\u2019s courts in determining whether a motion for judgment on the pleadings should be granted. This case reflects the rarity with which the appellate courts embrace the motion.\nIn Ragsdale, the Supreme Court defined the function of Rule 12(c) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure as being to dispose of baseless claims or defenses when the formal pleadings reveal their lack of merit. Id. at 137, 209 S.E.2d at 499. A motion for judgment on the pleadings is the proper procedure when all the material allegations of fact are admitted in the pleadings and only questions of law remain. Id. Furthermore, the movant is held to a strict standard and must show that no material issue of fact exists and that he is clearly entitled to judgment. Id. All allegations in the non-movant\u2019s pleadings, except conclusions of law, legally impossible facts, and matters not admissible in evidence at the trial are deemed admitted by the movant for the purpose of the motion. Id.\nThe appellee contends that the appellant\u2019s denial that the plaintiff never rejected under insurance motorist coverage constitutes a legally impossible fact, as contemplated by Ragsdale, 286 N.C. at 137, 209 S.E.2d at 499, since UIM coverage is automatic unless the insured expressly rejects such coverage. The appellee argues that since N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4) (1991) requires that a rejection of UIM coverage be \u201cin writing ... on a form promulgated by the North Carolina Rate Bureau and approved by the Commissioner of Insurance,\u201d the appellant\u2019s answer that it had no knowledge or information that the plaintiff rejected UIM coverage and subsequent denial constitute an admission; had the plaintiff rejected the UIM coverage, the appellant would have a written record of that rejection. The appellee further maintains that, with the disposal of that factual issue as a legally impossible fact, no other material facts were in dispute.\nThe appellee is correct in calling the appellant\u2019s answer to paragraph 21 of the pleadings legally impossible; if the plaintiff had rejected-the automatic UIM coverage, he could only have done so as stipulated in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4). The appellant would have to know of the rejection if it occurred. It would be written and would certainly have been reflected in the policy issued to plaintiff. For the appellant to claim a lack of knowledge concerning something about which he could not have been ignorant is not only disingenuous but legally impossible.\nAs to the appellee\u2019s argument that no other material facts were in dispute, one must view the entire pleadings. In addition to its denial of paragraph 21, the defendant-appellant denied paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 9, 15, 19, 22, 23, 24, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 and 32. Paragraphs 6-9 of the complaint refer to the facts of the accident, to which the appellant responds that it has no knowledge sufficient to form a belief, and therefore denies. Finally, paragraphs 24 and 27-32 make reference to the plaintiff\u2019s damages, to which the appellant responds in the same manner. These denials are to factual matters. In Campbell v. Trust Co., 214 N.C. 680, 200 S.E.2d 392 (1939), the Supreme Court held that a denial on information and belief is sufficient to preclude judgment on the pleadings in favor of the plaintiff. Though this case was decided before the Rules of Civil Procedure, the \u201cmotion operates substantially the same as under the code system before adoption of the new rules.\u201d Ragsdale, at 136, 209 S.E.2d at 499. Consistent with the holding in Campbell, the appellant\u2019s denials on the basis of lack of information or belief of factual matters are sufficient to raise the matters to the level of factual issues, precluding judgment on the pleadings in favor of the plaintiff. The trial court erred in granting the plaintiff\u2019s motion for judgment on the pleadings.\nThe appellant argues next that the trial court erred in affording the plaintiff UIM coverage on his own policy in the amount of $5,000,000.00 per vehicle, for a total of $10,000,000.00. The threshold question, before even considering the amount of coverage to which the plaintiff may be entitled, is whether the plaintiff could stack his own policy and that of Clyde Lee\u2019s; i.e., whether inter-policy stacking was proper in this situation.\nThe appellee relies on Crowder v. N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 79 N.C. App. 551, 340 S.E.2d 127, disc. rev. denied, 316 N.C. 731, 345 S.E.2d 387 (1986), in its argument that \u201ccoverage extends to those insured even though not in the covered vehicle at the time of injury,\u201d id. at 553, 340 S.E.2d at 129, and on N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4) which provides that when a policy affording uninsured motorist coverage is written at limits which exceed the statutorily required minimum coverage, such policy shall \u201cprovide under insured motorist coverage ... in an amount equal to the policy limits for automobile bodily injury liability as specified in the owner\u2019s policy.\u201d In short, when all other liability insurance has been exhausted and the injured party\u2019s damages exceed the limits of that policy, the statute will allow UIM coverage under the injured party\u2019s own policy of insurance. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4). While both Crowder and N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4) are pertinent to the present case, Crowder is careful to limit its holding to \u201cthe particular circumstances of this case.\u201d Id. at 553, 340 S.E.2d at 129. In Crowder, the policy under which the plaintiff sought and was awarded UIM coverage was for a 1978 Dodge van, a private nonfleet passenger motor vehicle. The appellant here contends that the plaintiff\u2019s policy is a commercial or \u201cBusinesspro\u201d policy covering his two buses, and not a private nonfleet passenger motor vehicle policy.\nThe Motor Vehicle Safety and Financial Responsibility Act of 1953, as amended, expressly limits the applicability of the statute to nonfleet private passenger motor vehicles: \u201c. . . this paragraph shall apply only to nonfleet private passenger motor vehicles insurance as defined in G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 58-40-15(a) and (10).\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4). The applicable statute at the time defines private passenger motor vehicles as:\n(a) A motor vehicle of the private passenger or station wagon type that is owned or hired under a long-term contract by the policy named insured and that is neither used as a public or livery conveyance for passengers nor rented to others without a driver; or\n(b) A motor vehicle with a pick-up body, a delivery sedan or a panel truck that is owned by an individual or by husband and wife or individuals who are residents of the same household and that is not customarily used in the occupation, profession, or business of the insured other than farming or ranching. Such vehicles owned by a family farm copartnership or corporation shall be considered owned by an individual for purposes of this Article.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 58-40-10 (1990). The plaintiffs buses do not qualify as nonfleet private passenger motor vehicles as defined by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 58-40-10 (1990).\nThe appellant argues further that the plaintiffs policy covering his two buses is a fleet policy as defined in Sutton v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 325 N.C. 259, 382 S.E.2d 759, reh\u2019g denied, 325 N.C. 437, 384 S.E.2d 546 (1989). In Sutton, the Supreme Court defined a fleet policy as \u201c. . . a single policy designed to provide coverage for a multiple and changing number of motor vehicles used in an insured\u2019s business.\u201d Id. at 266, 382 S.E.2d at 763. Although the appellee\u2019s policy lists only two specific vehicles, it does provide for additional buses to be added to the policy. Therefore, the appellee\u2019s policy is a fleet policy under Sutton and excluded from inter-policy stacking, since the stacking provisions of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4) cover only nonfleet private passenger motor vehicle insurance. Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co. v. Fields, 105 N.C. App. 563, 414 S.E.2d 69 (1992). We recognize that inter-policy stacking is permitted so as to provide the innocent victim of an inadequately insured driver with an additional source of recovery; however, to allow stacking of a victim\u2019s fleet policy onto the nonfleet policy of the insured-tortfeasor is a result contemplated neither by the insurer when it wrote the fleet policy nor the legislature when it wrote the statute. We therefore hold that under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4) fleet policies may not be stacked onto nonfleet policies.\nSince we find that the court erred in allowing inter-policy stacking, we decline to comment on the intra-policy stacking and the amount of coverage allowable under the policy.\nReversed and remanded.\nJudges COZORT and ORR concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "LEWIS, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Pritchett, Cooke and Burch, by William W. Pritchett, Jr., Lars P. Simonsen and David J. Irvine, Jr., for plaintiff-appellee.", "Haywood, Denny, Miller, Johnson, Sessoms and Patrick, by George W. Miller and Robert E. Levin, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JAMES W. WATSON, Plaintiff v. AMERICAN NATIONAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant\nNo. 906SC1325\n(Filed 7 July 1992)\n1. Rules of Civil Procedure \u00a7 12 (NCI3d); Insurance \u00a7 69.3 (NCI3d)\u2014 motion for judgment on the pleadings \u2014denial of knowledge of UIM rejection \u2014 denial on information and belief of issues of fact\nThe trial court erred in an action arising from an underinsured motorist (UIM) claim by granting plaintiff\u2019s motion for judgment on the pleadings where defendant\u2019s answer that it had no knowledge or information that plaintiff had rejected UIM coverage was a legal impossibility, but defendant\u2019s denials on the basis of lack of information or belief of factual matters were sufficient to raise the matters to the level of factual issues and preclude judgment on the pleadings.\nAm Jur 2d, Pleading \u00a7 232.\n2. Insurance \u00a7 69 (NCI3d)\u2014 UIM coverage \u2014interpolicy stacking\u2014 fleet onto nonfleet policies\nThe trial court erred by allowing interpolicy stacking of commercial fleet UIM coverage onto a private nonfleet UIM policy. Although interpolicy stacking is permitted to provide the innocent victim of an inadequately insured driver with an additional source of recovery, allowing stacking of a victim\u2019s fleet policy onto the nonfleet policy of the insured-tortfeasor is a result contemplated neither by the insurer when it wrote the fleet policy nor the legislature when it wrote the statute. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 58-40-10; N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4).\nAm Jur 2d, Automobile Insurance \u00a7 329.\nCombined or \u201cstacking\u201d uninsured motorist coverages provided in fleet policy. 25 ALR4th 986.\nAPPEAL by defendant from judgment on the pleadings and declaratory judgment granted by Judge Cy A. Grant in Bertie County Superior Court on 29 October 1990. Heard in the Court of Appeals 18 September 1991.\nPritchett, Cooke and Burch, by William W. Pritchett, Jr., Lars P. Simonsen and David J. Irvine, Jr., for plaintiff-appellee.\nHaywood, Denny, Miller, Johnson, Sessoms and Patrick, by George W. Miller and Robert E. Levin, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0681-01", "first_page_order": 711, "last_page_order": 716 }