{ "id": 8527950, "name": "JIMMY CLAY HARRINGTON v. BARBARA J. STEVENS, Administrator of the Estate of ROBERT STEVEN STEVENS, a/k/a ROBERT STEVEN BANNER, JOSEPH MARION HENSON, and NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY", "name_abbreviation": "Harrington v. Stevens", "decision_date": "1992-10-20", "docket_number": "No. 9122SC849", "first_page": "730", "last_page": "734", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "107 N.C. App. 730" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "23 ALR4th 108", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "28 ALR4th 362", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "345 S.E.2d 387", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "defining persons insured of the first class as a spouse or relative of the named insured who is a resident of the named insured's household" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 731", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4695400, 4696174, 4696632, 4699005, 4702879 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "defining persons insured of the first class as a spouse or relative of the named insured who is a resident of the named insured's household" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0731-02", "/nc/316/0731-05", "/nc/316/0731-04", "/nc/316/0731-03", "/nc/316/0731-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 127", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "129", "parenthetical": "defining persons insured of the first class as a spouse or relative of the named insured who is a resident of the named insured's household" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 N.C. App. 551", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521993 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "554", "parenthetical": "defining persons insured of the first class as a spouse or relative of the named insured who is a resident of the named insured's household" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/79/0551-01" ] }, { "cite": "420 S.E.2d 124", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "130" }, { "page": "130", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 N.C. 184", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2505670 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "193-94" }, { "page": "194" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/332/0184-01" ] }, { "cite": "421 S.E.2d 142", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "332 N.C. 477", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2506024 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/332/0477-01" ] }, { "cite": "420 S.E.2d 123", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "332 N.C. 340", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2503888 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/332/0340-01" ] }, { "cite": "406 S.E.2d 652", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "103 N.C. App. 629", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522609 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/103/0629-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 S.E.2d 546", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2491072, 2489257, 2490993, 2488279, 2491871 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0437-04", "/nc/325/0437-01", "/nc/325/0437-02", "/nc/325/0437-05", "/nc/325/0437-03" ] }, { "cite": "382 S.E.2d 759", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 259", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2492574 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0259-01" ] }, { "cite": "418 S.E.2d 221", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "332 N.C. 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2506105 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/332/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "345 S.E.2d 387", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 731", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4695400, 4696174, 4696632, 4699005, 4702879 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0731-02", "/nc/316/0731-05", "/nc/316/0731-04", "/nc/316/0731-03", "/nc/316/0731-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 127", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "79 N.C. App. 551", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521993 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/79/0551-01" ] }, { "cite": "420 S.E.2d 124", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "332 N.C. 184", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2505670 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/332/0184-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 451, "char_count": 8708, "ocr_confidence": 0.743, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.770845263994211e-08, "percentile": 0.4120249867849438 }, "sha256": "96b8b9772b4454f9613ad635757318eff45585cc3def9198146341a4ed6c87af", "simhash": "1:6fa58e66b71f154e", "word_count": 1408 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:52:31.872261+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge Orr concurs.", "Judge WELLS dissents." ], "parties": [ "JIMMY CLAY HARRINGTON v. BARBARA J. STEVENS, Administrator of the Estate of ROBERT STEVEN STEVENS, a/k/a ROBERT STEVEN BANNER, JOSEPH MARION HENSON, and NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "GREENE, Judge.\nPlaintiff Jimmy Clay Harrington was injured on 24 July 1988 when his car was struck by a car driven by Robert Steven Stevens (Stevens). With respect to the injuries plaintiff sustained in the accident, the car driven by Stevens was underinsured. Pursuant to plaintiff\u2019s auto insurance policy, defendant Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company (Nationwide) provided plaintiff with underin-sured motorist coverage (UIM), and paid plaintiff pursuant to his personal policy. At the time of the accident, plaintiff resided in the same household with his father, Crafton, and his brother, Rickey. Nationwide had also issued personal automobile policies to plaintiff\u2019s father and brother. Plaintiff\u2019s brother\u2019s policy covered two separate motor vehicles and provided UIM coverage for bodily injury in the amount of $50,000.00 per person and $100,000.00 per occurrence. Plaintiff\u2019s father\u2019s policy also covered two vehicles and provided UIM coverage for bodily injury in the amount of $50,000.00 per person and $100,000.00 per occurrence. Plaintiff sought \u201cinter-policy\u201d stacking of his brother\u2019s and father\u2019s policies, and within each of the two policies sought \u201cintra-policy\u201d stacking. Thus, plaintiff sought total coverage of $200,000.00 from Nationwide based on these two policies. At trial, Judge Martin heard cross-motions for summary judgment and granted plaintiff\u2019s motion. Defendant Nationwide appeals.\nThe issue is whether all persons insured of the first class are permitted to stack UIM coverages.\nBoth parties to this appeal agree that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4) is governing in this case. As part of the Motor Vehicles Safety and Financial Responsibility Act of 1953, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4) was enacted to prevail over relevant language in underinsured motorist coverages and allow stacking of underinsured motorist coverage. Section 279.21(b)(4), as it existed at the time of the accident, provided in relevant part:\nIn any event, the limit of underinsured motorist coverage applicable to any claim is determined to be the difference between the amount paid to the claimant pursuant to the exhausted liability policy and the total limits of the owner\u2019s underinsured motorist coverages provided in the owner\u2019s policies of insurance; it being the intent of this paragraph to provide to the owner, in instances where more than one policy may apply, the benefit of all limits of liability of underinsured motorist coverage under all such policies: Provided that this paragraph shall apply only to nonfleet private passenger motor vehicle insurance as defined in G.S. 58-40-15(9) and (10).\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4) (1989).\nIn Harris v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 332 N.C. 184, 420 S.E.2d 124 (1992), our Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether N.C.G.S. \u00a7 279.21(b)(4) allows a non-policy owner to stack UIM coverages. The Court, without deciding whether the statute allows only the \u201cowner\u201d to stack UIM coverages, held that if the non-owner is a (1) spouse or relative of the policy owner, (2) resides in the same household as the policy owner, and (3) the policy owner benefits if the non-owner is allowed to stack UIM coverages in the owner\u2019s policy, stacking of the policy owner\u2019s UIM coverages by the non-owner is permitted. Harris, 332 N.C. at 193-94, 420 S.E.2d at 130.\nIn Harris, the Court held that because the policy owners would benefit if their minor daughter Michelle K. Harris, who lived in her parents\u2019 household, was allowed to stack the UIM coverages in her parents\u2019 policies, stacking was permitted. As noted by the Harris Court, Michelle, as a minor\nwas under no duty to honor any contract of insurance she might have purchased on her own. . . . Therefore, Michelle was dependent on her parents for insurance coverage. Also, since Michelle was a minor at the time of the accident, it was her parents\u2019 duty to support her to the best of their abilities. ... By discharging their duty of support and protecting their daughter, the [policy owner parents] plainly \u201cbenefit\u201d by limiting their out of pocket expenses, as well as increasing their peace of mind.\nHarris, 332 N.C. at 194, 420 S.E.2d at 130 (citations omitted). In conclusion, the Court in a very narrow holding held that the minor plaintiff, \u201cas a nonowner family member living in the same household as the named insured, is entitled to stack UIM coverages under her parents\u2019 policy.\u201d Id. Accordingly, we do not read Harris, as plaintiff suggests, as permitting all persons insured of the first class to stack UIM coverages. See Crowder v. North Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 79 N.C. App. 551, 554, 340 S.E.2d 127, 129, disc. rev. denied, 316 N.C. 731, 345 S.E.2d 387 (1986) (defining persons insured of the first class as a spouse or relative of the named insured who is a resident of the named insured\u2019s household). The Court emphasized throughout the opinion the necessity of finding a \u201cbenefit\u201d running to the owner of the policies as a prerequisite to stacking by a non-owner. Therefore, if there is no \u201cbenefit\u201d running to the owner, there is no stacking of UIM coverages.\nIn this case, although the plaintiff is a family member residing in the household of his father and brother, there is no evidence that the father or brother would benefit if the plaintiff were allowed to stack the underinsurance coverages in the father\u2019s and brother\u2019s policies. The plaintiff, as an adult with children of his own, was not dependent, as was Michelle in the Harris case, on his father for support. The plaintiff was fully responsible for purchasing his own insurance and in fact did so. Accordingly, the order of the trial court must be reversed, and remanded for entry of summary judgment in favor of defendant Nationwide.\nReversed and remanded.\nJudge Orr concurs.\nJudge WELLS dissents.", "type": "majority", "author": "GREENE, Judge." }, { "text": "Judge Wells\ndissenting.\nIn my opinion, the clear teachings of Crowder v. N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 79 N.C. App. 551, 340 S.E.2d 127, disc. rev. denied, 316 N.C. 731, 345 S.E.2d 387 (1986); Bass v. N.C. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co., 332 N.C. 109, 418 S.E.2d 221 (1992); Sutton v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 325 N.C. 259, 382 S.E.2d 759, rehearing denied, 325 N.C. 437, 384 S.E.2d 546 (1989); Amos v. North Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 103 N.C. App. 629, 406 S.E.2d 652 (1991), affirmed, 332 N.C. 340, 420 S.E.2d 123 (1992); and now Grain Dealers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Long, 332 N.C. 477, 421 S.E.2d 142 (1992), is that as an insured of the first class residing in the same household with his father and brother, plaintiff is entitled to stack both his father\u2019s and brother\u2019s UIM coverages. In my opinion, the \u201cbenefits\u201d discussion in Harris v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 332 N.C. 184, 420 S.E.2d 124 (1992), does not alter this fundamental rule, and I therefore vote to affirm the trial court.\nI believe it appropriate to express my concern that if the \u201cbenefit\u201d predicate driving the majority opinion is correct, this and other such cases would not be appropriate for summary disposition, as the issue of who might be an intended \u201cbeneficiary\u201d in such cases could only be determined by a trier of fact.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Judge Wells" } ], "attorneys": [ "Joel C. Harbinson for plaintiff-appellee.", "Nichols, Caffrey, Hill, Evans & Murrelle, by Paul D. Coates and ToNola D. Brown, for defendant-appellant Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JIMMY CLAY HARRINGTON v. BARBARA J. STEVENS, Administrator of the Estate of ROBERT STEVEN STEVENS, a/k/a ROBERT STEVEN BANNER, JOSEPH MARION HENSON, and NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY\nNo. 9122SC849\n(Filed 20 October 1992)\nInsurance \u00a7 528 (NCI4th)\u2014 injured party living with father and brother \u2014UIM coverages \u2014no stacking under father\u2019s and brother\u2019s policies\nAn insured of the first class residing in the same household with his father and brother was not entitled to stack UIM coverages under personal automobile policies issued to plaintiff\u2019s father and brother where plaintiff was an adult who was not dependent on his father for support; plaintiff purchased his own automobile insurance; and there was no evidence that the father or brother would benefit if the plaintiff should be allowed to stack the UIM coverages in their policies.\nAm Jur 2d, Automobile Insurance \u00a7 329.\nCombining or \u201cstacking\u201d uninsured motorist coverages provided in policies issued by different insurers to different insureds. 28 ALR4th 362.\nCombining or \u201cstacking\u201d uninsured motorist coverages provided in separate policies by same insurer to different insureds. 23 ALR4th 108.\nJudge WELLS dissenting.\nAPPEAL by defendant from judgment filed 7 June 1991 in ALEXANDER County Superior Court by Judge Lester P. Martin, Jr., granting plaintiff\u2019s motion for summary judgment. Heard in the Court of Appeals 16 September 1992.\nJoel C. Harbinson for plaintiff-appellee.\nNichols, Caffrey, Hill, Evans & Murrelle, by Paul D. Coates and ToNola D. Brown, for defendant-appellant Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company." }, "file_name": "0730-01", "first_page_order": 758, "last_page_order": 762 }