{ "id": 8522502, "name": "YVONNE B. CHANDLER, Plaintiff/Appellee v. JACK L. CHANDLER, Defendant/Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Chandler v. Chandler", "decision_date": "1992-11-17", "docket_number": "No. 9114DC812", "first_page": "66", "last_page": "74", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "108 N.C. App. 66" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "41 ALR4th 48", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "51 ALR4th 11", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "41 ALR4th 481", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "56 ALR4th 12", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "353 S.E.2d 107", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "319 N.C. 103", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4743692, 4740912, 4746258, 4740023, 4740696 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/319/0103-04", "/nc/319/0103-02", "/nc/319/0103-03", "/nc/319/0103-01", "/nc/319/0103-05" ] }, { "cite": "347 S.E.2d 871", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "872" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "82 N.C. App. 738", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8359921 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "740" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/82/0738-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 S.E.2d 185", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "189" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 708", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564644 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "712" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0708-01" ] }, { "cite": "348 S.E.2d 593", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "595", "parenthetical": "quoting Coble v. Coble, 300 N.C. 708, 712, 268 S.E.2d 185, 189 (1980)" }, { "page": "595" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 404", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4732110 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "406", "parenthetical": "quoting Coble v. Coble, 300 N.C. 708, 712, 268 S.E.2d 185, 189 (1980)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0404-01" ] }, { "cite": "368 S.E.2d 595", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "599" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 396", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2515756 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "403" }, { "page": "405" }, { "page": "406" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0396-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 S.E.2d 829", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 770", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4755941 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0770-01" ] }, { "cite": "401 S.E.2d 784", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "102 N.C. App. 199", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522997 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/102/0199-01" ] }, { "cite": "402 S.E.2d 416", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 92", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2542944, 2542610, 2544147, 2542835, 2537950 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0092-01", "/nc/328/0092-03", "/nc/328/0092-04", "/nc/328/0092-02", "/nc/328/0092-05" ] }, { "cite": "396 S.E.2d 91", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 N.C. App. 326", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526774 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/100/0326-01" ] }, { "cite": "366 S.E.2d 512", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "514" }, { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "515" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 N.C. App. 445", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522677 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "448" }, { "page": "448-49" }, { "page": "449" }, { "page": "450" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/89/0445-01" ] }, { "cite": "368 S.E.2d 412", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "413" }, { "page": "515", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "90 N.C. App. 408", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524780 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "409" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/90/0408-01" ] }, { "cite": "330 S.E.2d 616", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 N.C. 612", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4722697, 4725936, 4721340, 4722525, 4724158 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/313/0612-03", "/nc/313/0612-05", "/nc/313/0612-01", "/nc/313/0612-02", "/nc/313/0612-04" ] }, { "cite": "325 S.E.2d 260", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "72 N.C. App. 372", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526819 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/72/0372-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 S.E.2d 175", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "176" }, { "page": "176" }, { "page": "177" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 N.C. App. 606", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8358729 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "607" }, { "page": "607" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/88/0606-01" ] }, { "cite": "394 S.E.2d 267", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "275" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 N.C. App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526211 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/100/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-20", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)" }, { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 732, "char_count": 18800, "ocr_confidence": 0.769, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.3731571087229199e-07, "percentile": 0.7959917740377914 }, "sha256": "3c51de8f5828ea5a021704716adcdf70f62613df791b543f086ae90cea23abe5", "simhash": "1:83bbd46bb62e9c50", "word_count": 2970 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:33:37.144077+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge HEDRICK and Judge LEWIS concur." ], "parties": [ "YVONNE B. CHANDLER, Plaintiff/Appellee v. JACK L. CHANDLER, Defendant/Appellant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WYNN, Judge.\nPlaintiff and defendant were married on 4 September 1954. Four children were born of the marriage, all of whom were emancipated adults under no disability at the time of trial. Plaintiff sought an absolute divorce which was granted on 27 September 1990. Subsequently, an order for equitable distribution was entered on 29 January 1991 wherein the trial judge held that an equal division of property was equitable and divided the parties\u2019 property accordingly. The court found as fact that defendant received $140,796.63 of income from marital assets during the period between separation and the equitable distribution action. From that amount, the court further found that defendant made tax payments on marital property, capital contributions, and mortgage payments on the marital home totaling $41,639. The court gave the defendant a credit for these payments against the total income received, leaving a total net post-separation income of $99,157.63. The court concluded that this rental income obtained from properties owned by the parties as tenants by the entirety was \u201cmarital property\u201d subject to distribution and ordered the defendant to pay plaintiff $49,578.82, representing one-half of the net rental income. From this order of the trial court, defendant appeals. Additional facts will be discussed as necessary for a proper resolution of the issues raised on appeal.\nI.\nAppellant first assigns as error the trial court\u2019s classification and distribution as \u201cmarital property,\u201d of the $99,157.63 in post-separation net rental income received by defendant from rental properties owned by the parties as tenants by the entirety. He contends that post-separation rental income obtained from marital property is not itself subject to distribution as \u201cmarital property\u201d under North Carolina\u2019s equitable distribution statute. We agree.\nNorth Carolina General Statute \u00a7 50-20(b)(l) defines marital property as \u201call real and personal property acquired by either spouse or both spouses during the course of marriage and before the date of separation of the parties, and presently owned except property determined to be separate property.\u201d (Emphasis added). Property is not part of the marital estate unless it is owned by the parties on the date of separation. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-20(b); Lawrence v. Lawrence, 100 N.C. App. 1, 16, 394 S.E.2d 267, 275 (1990); Becker v. Becker, 88 N.C. App. 606, 607, 364 S.E.2d 175, 176 (1988). Under our equitable distribution statute, only property meeting this definition of \u201cmarital property\u201d is subject to equitable distribution. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-20(a); Wade v. Wade, 72 N.C. App. 372, 325 S.E.2d 260, disc. rev. denied, 313 N.C. 612, 330 S.E.2d 616 (1985); Rogers v. Rogers, 90 N.C. App. 408, 409, 368 S.E.2d 412, 413 (1988). The statute provides no authority to distribute non-marital property or separate property.\nAccordingly, this Court has held that post-separation appreciation of a marital asset, whether passive appreciation or appreciation due to the efforts of an individual spouse, is not marital property and cannot be distributed by the court. Truesdale v. Truesdale, 89 N.C. App. 445, 448, 366 S.E.2d 512, 514 (1988). In Truesdale, Judge Greene, writing for this Court stated that:\n[t]he post separation appreciation of marital property is itself neither marital nor separate property. Such appreciation must instead be treated as a distributional factor under Section 50-20(c)(lla) or (12) since: (1) Section 50-20(b)(l) restricts the definition of marital property to property \u201cacquired . . . before the date of separation\u201d; (2) Section 50-21(b) mandates the valuation of marital property on the date of separation; and (3) Section 50-20(b)(2) limits the scope of separate property to property acquired before marriage or \u201cby bequest, devise, descent or gift during the course of marriage.\u201d\nId. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).\nThus, an increase in the value of a marital asset which occurs after separation of the parties but before the date of the equitable distribution trial, should be considered pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50-20(c)(lla) or (c)(12) as a \u201cdistributional factor\u201d by the court in its determination of what constitutes an equitable distribution of the marital estate. Section 50-20(c)(lla) covers the \u201c[a]cts of either party to maintain, preserve, develop, or expand; or to waste, neglect, devalue or convert such marital property, during the period after separation of the parties and before the time of distribution.\u201d Section 50-20(c)(12) is a \u201ccatchall provision\u201d under which the court may consider, \u201c[a]ny other factor which the court finds to be just and proper.\u201d Pursuant to Section 50-20(c)(12), any \u201c[m]arked increases or decreases in the value of property not caused by either party\u2019s acts between the date of separation and the date of the equitable distribution action could ... be considered ... as an \u2018any other distributional factor.\u2019 \u201d Truesdale, 89 N.C. App. at 448-49, 368 S.E.2d at 515 (citations omitted).\nPost-separation appreciation and depreciation of marital property have consistently been viewed as distributional factors under Section 50-20(c)(11a) and (c)(12). See generally Truesdale, 89 N.C. App. 445, 366 S.E.2d 512; Nye v. Nye, 100 N.C. App. 326, 396 S.E.2d 91 (1990), disc. rev. denied, 328 N.C. 92, 402 S.E.2d 416 (1991); Atkins v. Atkins, 102 N.C. App. 199, 401 S.E.2d 784 (1991). This Court has also held in Becker v. Becker, that the rental value of the marital home during the period of separation is not a proper consideration for the court to include in the marital estate because \u201cno new property may be added to the marital estate after the date of separation.\u201d 88 N.C. App. at 607, 364 S.E.2d at 176. A trial court may, however, consider the post-separation use of the marital home as a residence, as a \u201cdistributional factor\u201d in determining whether an equal distribution is equitable. Id. at 607-08, 364 S.E.2d at 177.\nIt follows therefrom, that rental income received from marital property between the date of separation and the date of the equitable distribution action may not be added to the marital estate. Rather than distributing the sums representing the income received from marital property, the trial court must consider the existence of this income, determine to whose benefit the income has accrued, and then consider that benefit when determining whether an equal or unequal distribution of the marital estate would be equitable. Where, as in this case, the post-separation income is not a result of either party\u2019s action, the income could be considered as an \u201cany other distributional factor\u201d under Section 50-20(c)(12).\nThe evidence and findings in the present case show that during the period of separation, defendant received and had exclusive use of $140,796.63 in income from various marital assets. Defendant used some of the income received to make tax payments on marital property, reduce the outstanding mortgage against the marital home, and make capital contributions which increased the capital value of limited partnerships held as marital property. All of these are factors the trial court may consider on remand in making its determination as to whether an equal distribution is equitable; or, if not, what unequal distribution is equitable.\nAs this Court pointed out in Truesdale, where as here, there has been no exchange, contribution or conversion of marital funds or assets since separation, the \u201csource of funds\u201d theory does not apply to convert the post-separation income into a marital asset. 89 N.C. App. at 449, 366 S.E.2d at 515. Following Truesdale, we likewise, reject the notion that\nit is harmless error to distribute such [rental income] so long as it is distributed in the same ratio deemed equitable under Section 50-20(c): the trial court cannot determine in the first place what an equitable distribution ratio would be without first considering evidence of this [income] as a distributional factor under Section 50-20(c)(lla) or (12).\nId.\nThus, while it is apparent that the trial judge attempted to make an equitable distribution between the parties, he failed to follow the mandates of North Carolina\u2019s equitable distribution statute. Our legislature expressed its intent through the use of very restrictive language in the equitable distribution statute. By considering post-separation income as a distributional factor, the court can distribute marital property in an equitable manner while adhering to the requirements and definitional standards set out in our equitable distribution statute.\nII.\nAppellant also contends that the trial court erred by failing to make sufficient findings of fact with respect to the post-separation depreciation in the values of defendant\u2019s partnership interests and stock account, post-separation payments of marital debts, and the post-separation gift of stock to the parties\u2019 children. He further contends that the trial court failed to consider each of the above post-separation activities as a distributional factor in determining whether an equal division of property was equitable.\nDefendant testified and presented Schedule K-l\u2019s, \u201cPartner\u2019s Share of Income, Credits, Deductions, Etc.,\u201d regarding the market value of his interests in five limited partnerships for 1987, the date of separation, and 1989, the date of the equitable distribution. The evidence presented tends to show that the total value of defendant\u2019s interests in three limited partnerships, namely, Executive Park, Eno Trace, and Research Triangle Associates, decreased by $50,839.00 between the date of separation and the equitable distribution. However, the value of defendant\u2019s interest in two other limited partnerships, Sedwick Associates and Southern Pines One, increased by $15,623.00 and $13,607.00, respectively. Thus, the changes in value represented by all of these partnership interests resulted in a net loss of $21,609.00.\nWith respect to the depreciation in value of defendant\u2019s stock account, defendant\u2019s evidence consisted of his own testimony that the market value at the time of the distribution hearing was one-third of its date of separation value. As to the post-separation payment of marital debts, the defendant submitted evidence tending to indicate that he made over $150,000.00 in payments on marital debts during the post-separation period. Finally, the evidence tends to show that subsequent to the date of separation of the parties, the defendant made gifts of approximately 1,600 shares of J-Rod, Inc. stock to the parties\u2019 children.\nWhen evidence is presented from which a reasonable finder of fact could determine that an equal division would be inequitable, the trial court is required to consider the distributional factors set forth in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50-20(c), \u201cbut guided always by the public policy expressed ... [in the Act] favoring an equal division.\u201d White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 324 S.E.2d 829 (1985). Pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50-20(j), the trial court then must \u201cmake written findings of fact that support the determination that marital property has been equitably divided.\u201d Therefore, written findings of fact are required in every case in which a distribution of marital property is ordered under the Equitable Distribution Act, not merely when property is divided unequally. Armstrong v. Armstrong, 322 N.C. 396, 403, 368 S.E.2d 595, 599 (1988).\n\u201cThe purpose for the requirement of specific findings of fact that support the court\u2019s conclusions of law is to permit the appellate court on review \u2018to determine from the record whether the judgment \u2014 and the legal conclusions that underlie it \u2014 represent a correct application of the law.\u2019 \u201d Patton v. Patton, 318 N.C. 404, 406, 348 S.E.2d 593, 595 (1986) (quoting Coble v. Coble, 300 N.C. 708, 712, 268 S.E.2d 185, 189 (1980)). This only requires that the court make findings as to ultimate rather than evidentiary facts. Id. at 407, 348 S.E.2d at 595. The trial court is not required to recite in detail the evidence it considered in determining what division is equitable. Armstrong, 322 N.C. at 405, 368 S.E.2d at 600.\nIn the case at bar, the court made the following findings of fact with respect to the payment of marital debts:\n10. That with the post-separation funds which the Defendant acknowledges receiving, he has made tax payments on marital property in the amount of $3,931.00 for the home on Pinafore Drive and $5,058.00 for the property on 15-501 Boulevard. In addition, the court finds that he has made capital contributions to Southern Pines One and Sedwick Associates which have increased the capital account in those partnerships in the amounts of $13,607.00 and $15,623.00, respectively. In addition, he has reduced the outstanding principal due on the mortgage against the marital home in the amount of $3,600, for which the Court in its discretion, has determined that the Defendant is entitled to a credit for those payments against the post-separation income which he has received, but the court further determines that in light of the fact that most of the other expenses which the Defendant claims are related to interest payments which did not increase the capital value nor did it diminish outstanding indebtedness, that the Defendant has used the interest payments and depreciation of marital property to reduce his personal income tax liability and that the Court further believes that the Defendant has not acknowledged all of the cash to which he had access subsequent to the separation of the parties.\nThe court\u2019s findings as to the post-separation gift of stock to the parties\u2019 children are as follows:\n6.(a) . . . Subsequent to the separation of the parties, the Defendant made an additional gift to his children of approximately 1,600 shares of J-Rod, Inc. stock. The Plaintiff, Mrs. Chandler did not consent to such transfer and did not waive her marital interest in the stock which the Defendant transferred, and as such, the Court finds that the marital property of the parties at date of separation includes 2,779 shares of stock in J-Rod, Inc. at a value of $62.44 per share as of the date of separation.\nAfter reviewing the findings of fact, we find that the trial court made sufficient findings as to the value at separation of all marital properties. In addition, the findings as to post-separation payment of marital debt, appreciation in the value of two limited partnerships and the gift of stock to the parties\u2019 children are sufficient. As this court has previously stated, the general rule is that \u201c[u]pon appellate review of a case heard without a jury the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal if there is evidence to support them, even though the evidence might sustain a finding to the contrary.\u201d Draughon v. Draughon, 82 N.C. App. 738, 740, 347 S.E.2d 871, 872 (1986), cert. denied, 319 N.C. 103, 353 S.E.2d 107 (1987) (citations omitted).\nThe trial court did not, however, make findings as to the post-separation depreciation in the value of defendant\u2019s interest in three partnerships and the post-separation depreciation of the Peeler stock account. As discussed previously, findings as to these and other factors must be made and considered pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50-20(c)(lla) or (12) when evidence concerning them is introduced, in determining whether marital property has been equitably divided. Truesdale, 89 N.C. App. at 450, 336 S.E.2d at 516.\nThe trial court stated that it \u201cconsidered all of the factors set out in statute [sic] and . . . determined that an equal division by using net value of all marital property as of the date of separation would be equitable in this case.\u201d This conclusion, even taken in conjunction with the court\u2019s findings of fact, does not provide this Court with the information necessary for appellate review. Armstrong, 322 N.C. at 406, 368 S.E.2d at 600.\nHere, the court made insufficient findings to show that it considered the evidence that was presented under the distributional factors of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50-20(c). Specifically, we hold that the court made insufficient findings as to the post-separation depreciation in the value of defendant\u2019s partnership interest and the value of the Peeler stock account.\nIII.\nWe have examined defendant\u2019s remaining assignment of error and find it to be without merit.\nThe order of equitable distribution is vacated and the matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.\nChief Judge HEDRICK and Judge LEWIS concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "WYNN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Northen, Blue, Little, Rooks, Thibaut & Anderson, by J. William Blue, Jr., for plaintiff-appellee.", "Gulley, Eakes, Volland & Calhoun, by Michael D. Calhoun and John L. Saxon, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "YVONNE B. CHANDLER, Plaintiff/Appellee v. JACK L. CHANDLER, Defendant/Appellant\nNo. 9114DC812\n(Filed 17 November 1992)\n1. Divorce and Separation \u00a7 119 (NCI4th)\u2014 equitable distribution \u2014 post-separation net rental income from marital property \u2014distributional factor\nThe trial court erred in an equitable distribution action by classifying and distributing as marital property post-separation rental income from marital property. Rental income received from marital property between the date of separation and the date of the equitable distribution action may not be added to the marital estate. The trial court must consider the existence of the income, determine to whose benefit it has accrued, and then consider that benefit when determining whether an equal or unequal distribution of the marital estate would be equitable.\nAm Jur 2d, Divorce and Separation \u00a7\u00a7 878-881.\nDivorce: excessiveness or adequacy of trial court\u2019s property award \u2014 modern cases. 56 ALR4th 12.\nDivorce: equitable distribution doctrine. 41 ALR4th 481.\n2. Divorce and Separation \u00a7 135 (NCI4th)\u2014 equitable distribution \u2014 findings\u2014post-separation depreciation, payments of debt, gifts \u2014consideration as distributional factors\nThe trial court in an equitable distribution action made sufficient findings as to the value at separation of all marital properties, the post-separation payment of marital debt, appreciation in the value of two limited partnerships, and the gift of stock to the parties\u2019 children, but did not make required findings as to the post-separation depreciation of three partnerships and a stock account and made insufficient findings to show that it considered the evidence that was presented under the distributional factors of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50-20(c).\nAm Jur 2d, Divorce and Separation \u00a7\u00a7 937-949.\nNecessity that divorce court value property before distributing it. 51 ALR4th 11.\nDivorce: equitable distribution doctrine. 41 ALR4th 48.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 29 January 1991 by Judge David Q. Labarre in DURHAM County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 14 September 1992.\nNorthen, Blue, Little, Rooks, Thibaut & Anderson, by J. William Blue, Jr., for plaintiff-appellee.\nGulley, Eakes, Volland & Calhoun, by Michael D. Calhoun and John L. Saxon, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0066-01", "first_page_order": 94, "last_page_order": 102 }