{ "id": 8525598, "name": "FRANCES LINDLER, Plaintiff v. DUPLIN COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Lindler v. Duplin County Board of Education", "decision_date": "1993-02-02", "docket_number": "No. 924SC127", "first_page": "757", "last_page": "761", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "108 N.C. App. 757" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "34 ALR3d 1166", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "348 S.E.2d 524", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "527", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 N.C. App. 21", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8357924 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "25", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/83/0021-01" ] }, { "cite": "68 S.E.2d 783", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1952, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"a subordinate division of the state, or agency exercising statutory governmental functions like a city administrative school unit, may be sued only when and as authorized by statute\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "235 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8620036 ], "year": 1952, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"a subordinate division of the state, or agency exercising statutory governmental functions like a city administrative school unit, may be sued only when and as authorized by statute\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/235/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 S.E.2d 793", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "804", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 N.C. 641", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563176 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "658", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/276/0641-01" ] }, { "cite": "307 S.E.2d 165", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "166" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 322", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4760621, 4766477, 4761397, 4760311, 4766783 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0322-04", "/nc/309/0322-02", "/nc/309/0322-01", "/nc/309/0322-05", "/nc/309/0322-03" ] }, { "cite": "302 S.E.2d 905", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "907" }, { "page": "906" }, { "page": "907" }, { "page": "906" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "62 N.C. App. 470", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523232 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/62/0470-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 640, "char_count": 10767, "ocr_confidence": 0.756, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.613609772085364e-07, "percentile": 0.8206659924960876 }, "sha256": "cb0094d82212f04d13f76888584b5917938e88c37060739c174810fa70a56910", "simhash": "1:e12020562525aa72", "word_count": 1773 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:33:37.144077+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges WYNN and ORR concur." ], "parties": [ "FRANCES LINDLER, Plaintiff v. DUPLIN COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "EAGLES, Judge.\nPlaintiff argues that the trial court erred by granting the defendant\u2019s Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Specifically, plaintiff argues that the defendant, Duplin County Board of Education (Board), waived its sovereign immunity pursuant to G.S. \u00a7 115C-42 by purchasing liability insurance which allegedly covered the plaintiffs injuries. The defendant, on the other hand, argues that G.S. \u00a7 115C-524(b) and Plemmons v. City of Gastonia, 62 N.C. App. 470, 302 S.E.2d 905, disc. review denied, 309 N.C. 322, 307 S.E.2d 165, 166 (1983) prevent liability from attaching to the Board because the school was not being used for a school purpose at the time of the plaintiff\u2019s accident. We agree with the , defendant.\nG.S. \u00a7 115C-42 provides, in pertinent part:\nAny local board of education, by securing liability insurance as hereinafter provided, is hereby authorized and empowered to waive its governmental immunity from liability for damage by reason of death or injury to person or property caused by the negligence or tort of any agent or employee of such board of education when acting within the scope of his authority or within the course of his employment. Such immunity shall be deemed to have been waived by the act of obtaining such insurance, but such immunity is waived only to the extent that said board of education is indemnified by insurance for such negligence or tort.\nG.S. 115C-524(b) provides in pertinent part:\nNotwithstanding the provisions of G.S. 115C-263 and 115C-264, local boards of education shall have the authority to adopt rules and regulations by which school buildings, including cafeterias and lunchrooms, may be used for other than school purposes so long as such use is consistent with the proper preservation and care of the public school property. No liability shall attach to any board of education, individually or collectively, for personal injury suffered by reason of the use of such school property.\n(Emphasis ours.)\nIn Plemmons, a minor allegedly sustained serious and permanent brain damage as the result of a fall from gymnasium bleachers to the floor. The defendant Board of Education argued that because of the express language of G.S. \u00a7 115C-524(b) and the fact that the gymnasium was leased to the City of Gastonia at the time of the accident, the Board was immune from liability. The plaintiff, on the other hand, argued \u201cas a policy matter, that G.S. \u00a7 115C-524 should be construed to include an active negligence caveat and that . . . the statute\u2019s operation [should be limited] to circumstances in which liability is sought to be imposed on a Board of Education solely by reason of its status as landlord.\u201d Id. at 473, 302 S.E. 2d at 907. Our court held that \u201cthe clear, specific mandate of the statute categorically bars liability[.]\u201d Id. at 472, 302 S.E.2d at 906. The Court observed that although the construction proffered by the plaintiff \u201cwould be the more humane, we simply cannot read into a statute a requirement that is not there. G.S. \u00a7 115C-524 provides no chink in its armor of immunity, even for the sword of active negligence. To accept plaintiffs\u2019 argument would render the statute superfluous.\u201d Id. at 473, 302 S.E.2d at 907.\nThe plaintiff argues that Plemmons does not control the instant case because (1) the court did not directly address the effect of G.S. \u00a7 115C-42 on G.S. \u00a7 115C-524(b) and (2) that the language regarding active negligence was mere obiter dicta. We disagree and find that we are bound by Plemmons. But even assuming, arguendo, that the Plemmons decision does not control the instant case, we nevertheless believe that the Plemmons Court\u2019s analysis is equally valid here. The clear intent of the legislature was set out in the plain language of G.S. \u00a7 115C-524(b) which explicitly precludes liability from attaching to schools when the school facilities are being used for non-school purposes.\nIn any event, we also note that other well established principles of statutory construction support our holding. First, \u201c[i]t is always presumed that the legislature acted with care and deliberation and with full knowledge of prior and existing law.\u201d State v. Benton, 276 N.C. 641, 658, 174 S.E.2d 793, 804 (1970) (citations omitted). The General Assembly originally adopted the statutes now codified as G.S. \u00a7 115C-42 (1955 N.C. Sess. Laws c. 1256) and G.S. \u00a7 115C-524(b) (1955 N.C. Sess. Laws c. 1372, art. 15, s.9) in 1955. However, it was not until 1963 that our legislature enacted the portion of G.S. \u00a7 115C-524(b) which provides: \u201cNo liability shall attach to any board of education, individually or collectively, for personal injury suffered by reason of the use of such school property.\u201d 1963 N.C. Sess. Laws c. 253. If in 1963 the General Assembly had intended for sovereign immunity to be waived to the extent of liability insurance for personal injury resulting from non-school use of school property, they would not have added to G.S. \u00a7 115C-524(b) the unambiguous language quoted above. To have done so would have been unnecessary in light of the well established rule that schools enjoy the right of sovereign immunity absent a statute to the contrary. Smith v. Hefner, 235 N.C. 1, 68 S.E.2d 783 (1952) (\u201ca subordinate division of the state, or agency exercising statutory governmental functions like a city administrative school unit, may be sued only when and as authorized by statute\u201d). Obviously, the General Assembly intended to prevent liability from attaching to boards of education under these specific circumstances.\nWe also note that the Plemmons Court\u2019s interpretation of G.S. \u00a7 115C-524(b), whether obiter dicta or not, was published in the Plemmons opinion in 1983. However, in the ensuing four biennial sessions since 1983 the General Assembly has not seen fit to change the pertinent language of G.S. \u00a7 115C-524(b). This argument is bolstered by the General Assembly\u2019s most recent amendment of G.S. \u00a7 115C-524(b). While the 1992 amendment did modify that portion of G.S. \u00a7 115C-524(b) dealing with non-school use of school property, it retained unchanged the portion of the statute precluding liability to boards of education because of personal injury arising from non-school use. G.S. \u00a7 115C-524(b) (1992).\nFinally, our court, interpreting G.S. \u00a7 115C-42, has said: \u201c \u2018Waiver of sovereign immunity may not be lightly inferred and State statutes waiving this immunity, being in derogation of the right to sovereign immunity, must be strictly construed.\u2019 \u201d Overcash v. Statesville City Bd. of Educ., 83 N.C. App. 21, 25, 348 S.E.2d 524, 527 (1986) (citations omitted). These principles of statutory construction when applied to the case sub judice impel our holding that the Board is immune from liability here.\nAs in Plemmons, we are \u201cnot unmindful that this interpretation is likely to produce harsh results in many cases[.]\u201d Id. at 472, 302 S.E.2d at 906. Even so, the General Assembly\u2019s clear intent as evidenced by the plain language of G.S. \u00a7 115C-524(b) mandates this result.\nAffirmed.\nJudges WYNN and ORR concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "EAGLES, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Ferguson, Stein, Watt, Wallas, Adkins & Gresham, P.A., hy John Gresham and S. Luke Largess, for the plaintiff-appellant.", "Richard Schwartz & Associates, by Richard A. Schwartz and Laura E. Crumpler, for the defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "FRANCES LINDLER, Plaintiff v. DUPLIN COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant\nNo. 924SC127\n(Filed 2 February 1993)\nSchools \u00a7 11 (NCI3d)\u2014 injury sustained in school building \u2014 non-school related function \u2014 no liability of school\nIn plaintiff\u2019s action to recover for injuries sustained when she fell as a result of wet or excessive wax on the floor of a school during the course of a non-school related fundraiser, the trial court properly determined that the plain language of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 115C-524(b) explicitly precludes liability from attaching to schools when the school facilities are being used for non-school purposes.\nAm Jur 2d, Schools \u00a7 323.\nTort liability of public schools and institutions of higher learning for accidents due to condition of buildings or equipment. 34 ALR3d 1166.\nAppeal by plaintiff from order filed 14 November 1991 by Judge Herbert Phillips in Duplin County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 7 January 1993.\nThis is an appeal from an order dismissing plaintiffs claim pursuant to N.C.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The plaintiff\u2019s complaint alleges the following: The plaintiff, a teacher in the Duplin County school system for approximately twenty-seven years, requested and received the permission of the principal of Wallace-Rose Hill School to use the school building, including rest room facilities, in the evening for a fundraising auction to be conducted by Alpha Delta Kappa, an honorary teacher\u2019s sorority. On 17 November 1987, the day of the fundraiser, one of the defendant\u2019s employees waxed the corridor floor leading to the school\u2019s rest rooms, left an excessive amount of wax on the corridor floor and failed to post a sign warning that the floor was wet or recently waxed. During the fundraiser two women asked the plaintiff about using the rest room. The door on the corridor leading to the rest rooms was locked. The plaintiff went to Casey Sharpless\u2019 office and asked Mr. Sharpless if he would unlock the door. Mr. Sharpless, director of the James Sprunt Community College\u2019s evening class program at Wallace-Rose Hill School, unlocked the door for the plaintiff. As the plaintiff walked toward the light switch located just inside the door she slipped and fell because of the excessive amount of wet wax on the corridor floor. Mr. Sharpless tried to help the plaintiff but slipped on the floor as well. However, Mr. Sharpless was able to avoid falling by grabbing the door.\nThe plaintiff was taken to Pender Memorial Hospital where it was discovered that as a result of the fall she had fractured one of her lumbar vertebrae and her left wrist. Because of her injuries, the plaintiff was unable to work for nearly two months and required the assistance of a home health nurse for four hours a day through January of 1988.\nThe plaintiff also alleged that she was required to use all nineteen days of her accrued sick leave as wage compensation for time lost because of the accident; that the defendant failed to inform her that she was eligible for three months of disability leave and that one of defendant\u2019s employees \u201cinformed [her] that she would have to pay a substitute out of her own salary for every day of work that she missed after her sick leave had expired.\u201d Because the plaintiff believed she had no financial alternative, she returned to work on 5 January 1988 before she had fully recovered from her injuries. Her early return caused additional pain and emotional and mental suffering.\nPlaintiff appeals from the order dismissing her claims.\nFerguson, Stein, Watt, Wallas, Adkins & Gresham, P.A., hy John Gresham and S. Luke Largess, for the plaintiff-appellant.\nRichard Schwartz & Associates, by Richard A. Schwartz and Laura E. Crumpler, for the defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0757-01", "first_page_order": 785, "last_page_order": 789 }