{
  "id": 8524613,
  "name": "GRACE WEST EUBANKS v. DAVID M. EUBANKS",
  "name_abbreviation": "Eubanks v. Eubanks",
  "decision_date": "1993-02-16",
  "docket_number": "No. 924DC186",
  "first_page": "127",
  "last_page": "130",
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    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
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    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
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    {
      "cite": "103 N.C. App. 13",
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      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
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        8519332
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      "year": 1991,
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        "/nc-app/103/0013-01"
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  "analysis": {
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:43:31.464788+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges COZORT and LEWIS concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "GRACE WEST EUBANKS v. DAVID M. EUBANKS"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "WELLS, Judge.\nIn his first assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error by awarding plaintiff a disparate share of liquid assets. In essence, defendant is alleging that plaintiffs \u201chalf\u201d of the marital estate consists of a greater percentage of liquid assets than defendant\u2019s \u201chalf\u201d of the marital estate. From the marital property, defendant received $49,114.05 and plaintiff received $48,763.37. Of the $49,114.05 worth of marital property defendant received, $23,998.76 was in the form of liquid assets. Of plaintiff\u2019s $48,763.37 share, $40,518.37 consisted of liquid assets and $8,245.00 was in the form of personal property. While the defendant does not allege that the total dollar value of the two halves are unfairly disparate, he contends that it was unjust for the trial court to grant plaintiff more liquid assets than defendant was granted.\n\u201cThe division of marital property is a matter within the discretion of the trial court. \u2018It is well established that where matters are left to the discretion of the trial court, appellate review is limited to a determination of whether there was a clear abuse of discretion.\u2019 \u201d Fox v. Fox, 103 N.C. App. 13, 404 S.E.2d 354 (1991), quoting White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 324 S.E.2d 829 (1985). Defendant cited no authority in support of the assertion that a trial judge must divide the marital estate into equal percentages of liquid assets. Contrary to defendant\u2019s assertion, the trial court\u2019s distribution of marital assets did not create a manifest injustice. We find no abuse of discretion. Therefore, we find no merit in defendant\u2019s first argument.\nIn his next argument, defendant contends that the court committed reversible error by consulting N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50-20(c) before dividing the marital property equally. In pertinent part, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50-20(c) states that there \u201cshall be an equal division . . . unless the court determines that an equal division is not equitable [at which point the court shall] divide the marital property equitably.\u201d The statute then goes on to list twelve factors for the trial court to consider when dividing a marital estate unequally, but equitably. Obviously, if the court divided the property equally after referring to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50-20(c), any improper reliance upon the statute could only result in harmless error, as the property was in fact divided equally. Thus, it seems that defendant\u2019s assertion must be based on the proposition that the property was not divided equally. We disagree with that premise. Equal distribution does not require that each party receive equal percentages of liquid, assets. Thus, we find no merit in this assignment of error.\nLastly, defendant refutes the validity of a stipulation concerning the classification and valuation of certain property belonging to the parties. Prior to the start of the equitable distribution trial, the parties\u2019 attorneys negotiated a stipulation of certain facts, conferring with the parties between negotiation meetings. This written stipulation was signed by each party\u2019s attorney but was never signed by either plaintiff or defendant. Plaintiff\u2019s counsel advised the court that the parties had agreed to the stipulation and the stipulation was read into the record, absent any objection from either party. Defendant now asserts that, because the stipulation was not signed and acknowledged by the parties themselves, the court committed reversible error by not treating the stipulation as an oral stipulation and making the requisite inquiries before admitting the stipulation into the record. We disagree.\nIn McIntosh v. McIntosh, 74 N.C. App. 554, 328 S.E.2d 600 (1985), this Court noted that in cases where stipulations concerning marital property in an equitable distribution setting were not reduced to writing, duly executed, and acknowledged, the record must affirmatively demonstrate that the trial court read the stipulation terms to the parties and that they understood the effects of the agreement. While the written stipulation in the case at bar was not signed and acknowledged by the parties themselves, the parties played an active role in the negotiations before their attorneys signed the stipulation. The stipulation was offered into evidence by the parties\u2019 counsel, accepted by the trial court, and read into the record in the presence of the parties without objection. We therefore hold that the stipulation was properly admitted.\nThe trial court\u2019s judgment is affirmed.\nJudges COZORT and LEWIS concur.\n. Defendant received $13,778.90 in securities, a $10,219.86 certificate of deposit, a 3.02 acre parcel of land valued at $3,317.29, personal property (mainly consisting of household furnishings) valued at $9,345.00, and a life estate in the marital home valued by the court at $12,453.00.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "WELLS, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "J. Allen Murphy for plaintiff-appellee.",
      "Judson H. Blount, III for defendant-appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "GRACE WEST EUBANKS v. DAVID M. EUBANKS\nNo. 924DC186\n(Filed 16 February 1993)\n1. Divorce and Separation \u00a7 143 (NCI4th)\u2014 equitable distribution \u2014equal division of property \u2014unequal division of liquid property\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in an equitable distribution action by awarding plaintiff a disparate share of liquid assets where defendant does not allege that the total dollar value of the two halves are unfairly disparate. The division of marital property is within the discretion of the trial court and this distribution of marital assets did not create a manifest injustice.\nAm Jur 2d, Divorce and Separation \u00a7 930.\n2. Divorce and Separation \u00a7 143 (NCI4th)\u2014 equitable distribution \u2014 equal division \u2014use of distribution factors\nThere was no error in an equitable distribution action where the court consulted N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50-20(c) before dividing the marital property equally. Any improper reliance on the statute was harmless error because the property was divided equally. Equal distribution does not require that each party receive equal percentages of liquid assets.\nAm Jur 2d, Divorce and Separation \u00a7 930.\n3. Divorce and Separation \u00a7 164 (NCI4th)\u2014 equitable distribution \u2014 written stipulation between attorneys \u2014 not signed by parties\nA stipulation was properly admitted in an equitable distribution proceeding where the parties\u2019 attorneys negotiated a stipulation of certain facts, conferring with the parties between meetings. This written stipulation was signed by the attorneys but not by plaintiff or defendant, and was read into the record without objection. Although defendant now contends that the court erred by not treating the stipulation as an oral stipulation and making the requisite inquiries before admitting the stipulation into the record, the parties played an active role in the negotiations before their attorneys signed the stipulation and the stipulation was offered into evidence by the parties\u2019 counsel, accepted by the trial court, and read into the record in the presence of the parties without objection.\nAm Jur 2d, Stipulations \u00a7\u00a7 2, 3.\nEffectiveness of stipulation of parties or attorneys, notwithstanding its violating form requirements. 7 ALR3d 1394.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 23 July 1991 in Jones County District Court by Judge Leonard W. Thagard. Heard in the Court of Appeals 3 February 1993.\nOn 5 May 1989, plaintiff, Grace West Eubanks, filed a complaint, requesting a divorce from bed and board, temporary and permanent alimony, equitable distribution of marital property, a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, and a protective order. The parties were married on 13 September 1947, separated on 30 April 1989, and divorced on 10 August 1990. On 13 May 1991, Judge Leonard W. Thagard entered an equitable distribution order, which was signed on 23 July 1991. Defendant gave notice of appeal on 6 August 1991.\nJ. Allen Murphy for plaintiff-appellee.\nJudson H. Blount, III for defendant-appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0127-01",
  "first_page_order": 155,
  "last_page_order": 158
}