{ "id": 8525472, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. VERNON JUNIOR WOODS", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Woods", "decision_date": "1993-03-16", "docket_number": "No. 9129SC988", "first_page": "360", "last_page": "366", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "109 N.C. App. 360" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "369 S.E.2d 607", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "90 N.C. App. 489", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525181 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/90/0489-01" ] }, { "cite": "414 S.E.2d 65", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 N.C. App. 550", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524256 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/105/0550-01" ] }, { "cite": "231 S.E.2d 833", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 N.C. 480", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558733 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/291/0480-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 S.E.2d 914", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "46 N.C. App. 641", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8552865 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/46/0641-01" ] }, { "cite": "277 S.E.2d 376", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 N.C. 75", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571418 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/303/0075-01" ] }, { "cite": "368 S.E.2d 377", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 349", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2515495 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0349-01" ] }, { "cite": "221 S.E.2d 375", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "building described as \"little shack,\" \"shed\" or \"garage\" located twenty feet from house found to be \"within the curtilage of the home\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "28 N.C. App. 376", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8549334 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "building described as \"little shack,\" \"shed\" or \"garage\" located twenty feet from house found to be \"within the curtilage of the home\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/28/0376-01" ] }, { "cite": "2 N.C. 102", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 1794, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 N.C. 656", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8683481 ], "year": 1883, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "658" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/88/0656-01" ] }, { "cite": "241 S.E.2d 324", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "primary function of court in construing legislation is to insure that purpose of the enacting legislature is accomplished" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 N.C. 60", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570860 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "primary function of court in construing legislation is to insure that purpose of the enacting legislature is accomplished" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/294/0060-01" ] }, { "cite": "279 S.E.2d 826", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 N.C. 424", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573945 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/303/0424-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 719, "char_count": 14826, "ocr_confidence": 0.77, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.138363859351185e-08, "percentile": 0.47307507117210307 }, "sha256": "e030da7eab3677dbbe9276215692a2f35be3c9d63f9052505a0fd61facfd10e1", "simhash": "1:abed5c54155fa046", "word_count": 2495 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:43:31.464788+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge ARNOLD and Judge COZORT concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. VERNON JUNIOR WOODS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "LEWIS, Judge.\nThe defendant was charged in a proper bill of indictment on 21 October 1989, among other crimes, with wantonly and willfully burning \u201can uninhabited storage building located at 607 Old Highway 10, Marion, North Carolina\u201d in violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-62. A trial was held on the charges beginning on 10 June 1991, in McDowell County before the Honorable Herbert 0. Phillips, III. At trial the evidence presented tended to show that on 18 October 1989, defendant was an inmate in the North Carolina Department of Correction. While working on a road crew in McDowell County between Marion and Old Fort, the defendant escaped.\nOn 21 October 1989, around 5:00 a.m. Dennis Butner (\u201cButner\u201d) was driving his car in Marion on Old Highway 10 when he saw a \u201ctrail of fire\u201d proceeding from the roadway to a \u201cstorage building\u201d located adjacent to a nearby house. Butner testified that when he first saw the fire, the flames had not yet reached the storage building. Upon seeing the fire, Butner called the authorities. When Butner and others returned to the scene of the fire, they found the defendant standing in the middle of the road. To their questions the defendant merely replied that he \u201clived up the road.\u201d He later took Butner\u2019s car and fled, only to be recaptured.\nThe storage building, which was owned by Edith Sowers (\u201cSowers\u201d), was completely destroyed by the fire. Sowers and her children had used the storage building to store lawn mowers, weed eaters, gasoline, furniture, tools and other items. The building was often referred to as a \u201cgarage,\u201d even though it did not house an automobile.\nCharles Presnell, an engineer and a member of the arson investigation team for the Marion Fire Department conducted an investigation as to the cause and origin of the fire. As a result of his investigation, Presnell concluded that the fire was incendiary in origin.\nThe defendant testified at trial that he had escaped from the road squad and that he had stolen Butner\u2019s car. However, the defendant denied having set fire to the storage building.\nUpon hearing all the evidence, the jury convicted the defendant on three counts of assault with a deadly weapon, two counts of traffic violations, one count of felony larceny, one count of felony escape from prison and one count of burning an uninhabited storage building. The only conviction from which defendant appeals is the burning of the uninhabited storage building or \u201couthouse.\u201d\nAs his first assignment of error, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss on the grounds that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-62 \u201cdoes not prohibit the burning of the structure that is alleged to have been burned in this case.\u201d We disagree. Defendant was charged pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-62 (1986) which provides:\nIf any person shall wantonly and willfully set fire to or burn or cause to be burned, or aid, counsel or procure the burning of, any uninhabited house, any church, chapel, or meetinghouse, or any stable, coach house, outhouse, warehouse, office, shop, mill, barn or granary, or any building, structure, or erection used or intended to be used in carrying on any trade or manufacture, or any branch thereof, whether the same or any of them respectively shall then be in the possession of the offender, or in the possession of any other person, he shall be punished as a Class E felon.\nThe verdict sheet shows that the jury found the defendant guilty of burning an \u201couthouse.\u201d It is the defendant\u2019s contention that the building which was burned does not come within the purview of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-62, and that he should have been charged with violating N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-67.1 (1986) which provides:\nIf any person shall wantonly and willfully set fire to or burn . . . any building or other structure of any type not otherwise covered by the provisions of this Article, he shall be punished as a Class H felon.\nThe defendant and the State agree that the building which was burned was a storage building. However, the defendant and the State disagree as to whether such a storage building is an \u201couthouse\u201d within the meaning of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-62. Defendant argues that an \u201couthouse\u201d is an outdoor toilet or privy and not a storage building. The State contends that the definition of \u201couthouse\u201d is not limited to outdoor toilets and that it also encompasses any \u201coutbuilding.\u201d We hold that all privies are outhouses but not all outhouses are privies.\nIn interpreting statutes, where the words of a statute have not gained a technical meaning, they must be given their common and ordinary meaning unless a different meaning is apparent or required by the context. Pelham Realty Corp. v. Board of Transp., 303 N.C. 424, 279 S.E.2d 826 (1981). In Black\u2019s Law Dictionary an \u201couthouse\u201d is defined as follows:\nA building subservient to, yet distinct from, the principal dwelling, located either within or without the curtilage. A smaller or subordinate building connected with a dwelling, usually detached from it and standing at a little distance from it, not intended for persons to live in, but to serve some\u2019purpose of convenience or necessity; as a barn, outside privy, a dairy, a toolhouse, and the like.\nBlack\u2019s Law Dictionary 993 (5th ed. 1979). Similarly, Webster\u2019s defines an \u201couthouse\u201d as any \u201coutbuilding.\u201d Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 1602 (1968). There is little doubt that the storage building at issue falls within the modern definition of an outhouse.\nHowever, the predecessor to the current version of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-62 was first ratified 22 March 1875 and the term \u201cout-house\u201d has since been a part of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-62. 1874-75 N.C. Sess. Laws Chap. 228. Therefore, we feel that the intent of the legislature in 1875 is illuminating in interpreting the meaning that should be attached to the word \u201couthouse.\u201d See State ex rel. Comm\u2019r of Ins. v. North Carolina Auto. Rate Admin. Office, 294 N.C. 60, 241 S.E.2d 324 (1978) (primary function of court in construing legislation is to insure that purpose of the enacting legislature is accomplished). In a case decided less than ten years after the enactment of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-62, our Supreme Court held that the term \u201cout-house\u201d has a technical meaning: \u201cAn out-house is one that belongs to a dwelling-house, and is in some respect parcel of such dwelling-house and situated within the curtilage.\u201d State v. Roper, 88 N.C. 656, 658 (1883). This definition shows that the term \u201couthouse\u201d in 1883 was not limited to an outdoor toilet. In fact, the defendant in Roper was charged with burning an \u201cout-house used as a store-house.\u201d When the Roper definition of \u201cout-house\u201d is applied to the present case, it is clear that the storage house which the defendant burned falls within the statutory definition of \u201couthouse.\u201d\nWe are also guided by other uses of the term \u201couthouse\u201d during this same period of time. Webster\u2019s Unabridged Dictionary, 1853, defines \u201couthouse\u201d as: \u201cSmall house or building at a little distance from the main house.\u201d \u201cPrivy\u201d is defined as: \u201csecret,\u201d \u201ca necessary house;\u201d \u201cnecessary\u201d is defined as \u201ca privy.\u201d\nOn 15 October 1880 a fire of unknown origin destroyed buildings in the northwest corner of Capitol Square. A belfry, wood and coal house and the \u201cold closets\u201d were destroyed. Governor Thomas Jarvis of Pitt County and a founder of East Carolina University stated in his message of 3 January 1883 to the Legislature that \u201c[t]he old closets in the northwest corner of the Capitol Square, which were destroyed by fire some two years ago, have not been rebuilt.. . . This rendered it necessary to make other arrangements for closets and sewerage for the Capitol. This necessity will soon be met by the completion of suitable closets in the rear of the Agricultural building, with proper sewerage, which are now in process of construction.\u201d\nThe jury heard evidence from several witnesses as to the contents of the storage building and knew that it contained lawn mowers and other yard implements. Therefore, there could not have been any confusion on the part of the jury as to what manner of structure the defendant allegedly burned. Never did the jury hear any evidence that the building burned was an outdoor toilet.\nThe only question remaining under defendant\u2019s first assignment of error is whether the storage building was within the cur-tilage of the Sowers\u2019 house. Similar to the term \u201cout-house,\u201d the term \u201ccurtilage\u201d has been defined by case law. In State v. Twitty, 2 N.C. 102 (1794), curtilage was defined as meaning \u201ca piece of ground, either enclosed or not, that is commonly used with the dwelling-house.\u201d See also, State v. Browning, 28 N.C. App. 376, 221 S.E.2d 375 (1976) (building described as \u201clittle shack,\u201d \u201cshed\u201d or \u201cgarage\u201d located twenty feet from house found to be \u201cwithin the curtilage of the home\u201d).\nThough the exact distance which the storage house was situated from the house is not reflected in the Record, the distance was described as about half the length of the courtroom. Even considering the commodious main courtrooms of Richmond, Buncombe, Lenoir and Yadkin Counties, we know of no courtroom in North Carolina half the length of which would be beyond the curtilage of any house in the state. The late Professor Albert Coates, creator of the Institute of Government, said: It was an early unwritten maxim of municipal law that \u201cno man\u2019s privy should be closer to his neighbor\u2019s house than to his own.\u201d\nIn his second assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss because there was insufficient evidence that he set the storage building on fire. We disagree.\nA motion to dismiss should be denied where there is substantial evidence, whether direct, circumstantial, or both, to support a finding that the offense charged was committed and that the defendant committed it. State v. Locklear, 322 N.C. 349, 368 S.E.2d 377 (1988). The evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to the State, and the State is entitled to every reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence. Id. Substantial evidence has been defined as an amount of relevant evidence a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. State v. Cox, 303 N.C. 75, 277 S.E.2d 376 (1981).\nThe essential elements of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-62 are: (1) the fire; (2) that the fire was of an incendiary origin; and (3) that the defendant was connected with the crime. State v. Sheetz, 46 N.C. App. 641, 265 S.E.2d 914 (1980). As discussed above, the storage building which the defendant burned falls within the list of buildings specified in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-62. The occurrence of a fire is not in dispute and the testimony of Presnell, when taken in the light most favorable to the State, is sufficient to conclude that the fire was of an incendiary origin.\nThe defendant contends the evidence is not sufficient to show that the defendant was connected to the fire. However, when the evidence is viewed as a whole, we feel there is substantial circumstantial evidence for the jury to have found him guilty. The defendant was the only person seen in close proximity to the fire after it started. The defendant also failed to warn the nearby residents, lied about his identity, and attempted to flee the scene in a stolen car. \u201cThe wicked flee when no man pursueth.\u201d Proverbs 28:1; State v. Irick, 291 N.C. 480, 231 S.E.2d 833 (1977); State v. Swift, 105 N.C. App. 550, 414 S.E.2d 65 (1992).\nThe facts of this case are substantially similar to State v. Clark, 90 N.C. App. 489, 369 S.E.2d 607 (1988), where this Court held that even though the evidence was entirely circumstantial, that it was still sufficient to connect the defendant with the fire. Therefore, based on the circumstantial evidence and the fact that the fire was not accidental, it was proper for the trial court to have denied defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss.\nWe hold defendant had a fair trial free from prejudicial error.\nNo error.\nChief Judge ARNOLD and Judge COZORT concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "LEWIS, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Lacy H. Thornburg, by Assistant Attorney General Julia F. Renfrow, for the State.", "Dameron and Burgin, by Anthony Lynch, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. VERNON JUNIOR WOODS\nNo. 9129SC988\n(Filed 16 March 1993)\n1. Arson and Other Burnings \u00a7 8 (NCI4th) \u2014 burning of outhouse \u2014 storage building\nThe trial court did not err by denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss an indictment for burning an uninhabited storage building in violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-62 where the verdict sheet shows that the jury found defendant guilty of burning an \u201couthouse.\u201d Although defendant argues that an \u201couthouse\u201d is an outdoor toilet or privy and not a storage building, there is little doubt that the storage building at issue falls within the modern definition of an outhouse. The intent of the legislature in 1875, which ratified the predecessor to the current version of the statute, is also illuminating. The jury heard evidence from several witnesses as to the contents of the storage building, there was no evidence that the building burned was an outdoor toilet, and there could not have been any confusion by the jury as to the manner of structure the defendant burned. Although the exact distance from the house to the storage building is not in the record, it was described as half the length of the courtroom and was within the cur-tilage of the house.\nAm Jur 2d, Arson and Related Offenses \u00a7\u00a7 16 et seq.\n2. Arson and Other Burnings \u00a7 29 (NCI4th) \u2014 burning of storage building \u2014sufficiency of evidence\nThe trial court properly denied defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss a charge of burning an uninhabited storage building for insufficient evidence where the evidence tended to show that defendant escaped from the North Carolina Department of Correction while working on a road crew; a passer-by saw a trail of fire proceeding from the roadway to a storage building located adjacent to a nearby house; the passer-by called the authorities; he and others returned to the scene and found defendant standing in the middle of the road; defendant replied to their questions merely by saying that he lived \u201cup the road\u201d; he later took a car and fled; the storage building was completely destroyed by fire; and a member of the arson investigation team for the fire department concluded that the fire was incendiary in origin. Viewed as a whole, there was substantial circumstantial evidence in that defendant was the only person seen in close proximity to the fire after it started, the fire was not accidental, defendant failed to warn near-by residents, lied about his identity, and attempted to flee the scene in a stolen car.\nAm Jur 2d, Arson and Related Offenses \u00a7 55.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 13 June 1991 by Judge Herbert 0. Phillips, III, in McDowell County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 January 1993.\nAttorney General Lacy H. Thornburg, by Assistant Attorney General Julia F. Renfrow, for the State.\nDameron and Burgin, by Anthony Lynch, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0360-01", "first_page_order": 388, "last_page_order": 394 }