{ "id": 8525762, "name": "BRENDA GRAVITTE, Plaintiff v. MITSUBISHI SEMICONDUCTOR AMERICA, INC., Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Gravitte v. Mitsubishi Semiconductor America, Inc.", "decision_date": "1993-04-06", "docket_number": "No. 9114SC967", "first_page": "466", "last_page": "472", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "109 N.C. App. 466" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "57 ALR3d 257", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "63 ALR3d 539", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "84 ALR3d 1107", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "93 ALR3d 659", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "12 ALR4th 544", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "333 S.E.2d 490", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4686660, 4695653, 4695471, 4689718, 4689592 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0331-03", "/nc/314/0331-01", "/nc/314/0331-05", "/nc/314/0331-02", "/nc/314/0331-04" ] }, { "cite": "328 S.E.2d 818", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "826" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 N.C.App. 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524570 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "342" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/74/0331-01" ] }, { "cite": "381 S.E.2d 445", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "447" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2488329 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "175" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "415 S.E.2d 200", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 119", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2499683, 2502026, 2498378, 2501299, 2501692 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0119-05", "/nc/331/0119-03", "/nc/331/0119-01", "/nc/331/0119-04", "/nc/331/0119-02" ] }, { "cite": "412 S.E.2d 97", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "99" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 N.C.App. 652", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523555 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "655" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/104/0652-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 S.E.2d 134", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "138-139" }, { "page": "214" }, { "page": "139" }, { "page": "139" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 205", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5307411 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "414 S.E.2d 339", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "342" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 57", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2500046 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0057-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 778, "char_count": 14961, "ocr_confidence": 0.776, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.221041886993695e-07, "percentile": 0.8671129088993219 }, "sha256": "4e2eb8c09673830216b36916b6b2f9c2359178326fde032a5bf87cb302af1c71", "simhash": "1:830f476606292d6f", "word_count": 2412 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:43:31.464788+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges EAGLES and ORR concur." ], "parties": [ "BRENDA GRAVITTE, Plaintiff v. MITSUBISHI SEMICONDUCTOR AMERICA, INC., Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JOHN, Judge.\nPlaintiff appeals from summary judgment dismissing her claims against defendant for violation of G.S. \u00a7 168A-1 et seq. (the \u201cNorth Carolina Handicapped Persons Protection Act\u201d) and for wrongful discharge. We affirm the trial court.\nThe pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, affidavits, and other materials before the trial court indicate the following:\nWhile working for defendant in 1988, plaintiff sustained a back injury and subsequently took several leaves of absence. During her absence, plaintiff received worker\u2019s compensation benefits and defendant paid her medical bills. According to plaintiff, defendant \u201cput me on leave until their doctor, the physical therapist, and my doctor agreed that it was okay for me to come back.\u201d\nBy letter dated 20 March 1990, Dr. Peter Bronec (plaintiff\u2019s physician) advised defendant that plaintiff could return to work if certain restrictions were followed. In pertinent part his letter provides:\nBrenda Gravitte is suffering from chronic musculoligamentous strain of the lumbar spine which is also associated with mild degenerative disease o[f] the lumbar spine. This is usually the result of excessive stress to the lower lumbar region as is encountered with heavy lifting and repetitive bending at the waist. She is able to do well as long as she stays within certain activity restrictions. Specifically, I have recommended that she not lift more than 40 pounds, avoid repetitive bending at the waist, and avoid prolonged sitting or standing in one place .... I expect her to remain under these restrictions permanently. As long as she can remain within these restrictions, I see no reason why she cannot work.\nIt is my understanding that there is an aspect of her current job which requires more lifting than the restrictions. This seems to have been giving her the most trouble. I understand . . . that this weight could be broken up into smaller weights. However this has apparently caused some discord among the other employees, therefore Brenda has felt compelled to lift the entire weight. If this problem cannot be rectified then she would not be able to continue performing that job. If there is no other job currently available under these guidelines, than [sic] it might be appropriate to place her on medical leave until such time that a satisfactory job becomes available. I do not feel that any length of medical leave will allow her to return to a job which exceeds these restrictions as she has proven in the past.\nOn 6 April 1990 plaintiff returned to her position as an Operator in defendant\u2019s Plating Department. Before doing so, plaintiff, as well as Sheila Barnes, her supervisor, and E. L. Fricke, defendant\u2019s human relations supervisor, signed a \u201cMemorandum of Understanding\u201d which provided inter alia that plaintiff\u2019s return was \u201ccontingent upon [her] compliance with the stipulations as set down by Dr. Peter Bronec\u201d and listed several \u201crestrictions and conditions\u201d which comport with those set forth in the physician\u2019s letter.\nPlaintiff thereafter sought transfer to other positions, but was told there were no openings. On 18 May 1990 she resigned. In her letter of resignation plaintiff stated:\nIt is with regret that I am turning in my two weeks\u2019 notice. As you and human resources are aware and have been, the medical problems that I have had in plating [sic]. After coming back from medical leave this last time I was informed that modifications were made in plating to accom[mo]date my situation with working in the plating department. The only modifications were two temporary people were added, only one remains. One was discharged 4-26-90. With the amount of work that we have it\u2019s hard for the other operator to stop what she\u2019s doing and do the heavy part of my job. Also if I lift one magazine at the time to load the oven or carry it ... to plating the increased amount of twisting at the waist gives me a lot of pain in my back. I\u2019ve discussed this with Dr. Bronec and he has advised me that if the problems with this particular job cannot be rectified then if the company does not see fit to put me in another job that is not so strenuous on me that I should seek employment else where [sic]. As I have stated I\u2019ve been through channels and ask[ed] for something else but have been told there is nothing else in the plant for me to do. I had planned to stay with MSAI until retirement, being as I have been employed here 5 years [on] May 13, 1990. But my health will not permit me to remain in this job, and the company says there\u2019s nothing else that I can do.\nPlaintiff contends the trial court erred by granting defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment. Under Rule 56(c), N.C. Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment should be granted only \u201cif the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u201d The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of establishing the lack of any triable issue, Roumillat v. Simplistic Enterprises, Inc., 331 N.C. 57, 414 S.E.2d 339 (1992), and may meet this burden by (1) proving that an essential element of the opposing party\u2019s claim is nonexistent; (2) showing through discovery that the opposing party cannot produce evidence to support an essential element; or (3) showing that the opposing party cannot surmount an affirmative defense. Roumillat at 63, 414 S.E.2d at 342.\nI.\nIn her first claim, brought under the North Carolina Handicapped Persons Protection Act, G.S. \u00a7 168A-1, et seq. [hereinafter the Act], plaintiff alleges that she is a \u201cqualified handicapped person\u201d within the meaning of the Act and that defendant failed to make reasonable accommodation to her handicap in violation of G.S. \u00a7 168A-4.\nThe question of whether one is a \u201cqualified handicapped person\u201d under the Act must be preceded by a determination that one is a \u201chandicapped person.\u201d G.S. \u00a7 168A-30). The Act defines a \u201chandicapped person\u201d as \u201cany person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more major life activities-, (ii) has a record of such an impairment; or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment. G.S. \u00a7 168A-3(4) (emphasis added). \u201cMajor life activities\u201d are defined as \u201cfunctions such as caring for one\u2019s self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, and learning.\u201d G.S. \u00a7 168A-3(4)b.\nIn Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, Inc., 326 N.C. 205, 388 S.E.2d 134 (1990), the North Carolina Supreme Court recently considered what constitutes a \u201cmajor life activity\u201d under the Act. In Burgess, the plaintiff was discharged from his position as a short order cook after testing positive for the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), the agent currently recognized as responsible for Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). Although the plaintiff was asymptomatic for the AIDS disease itself, he nevertheless contended that, because he was discharged due to his affliction, he was regarded as having an impairment that limited a major life activity, \u201cworking.\u201d In upholding the trial court\u2019s grant of defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), N.C. Rules of Civil Procedure, the Burgess Court noted that the Act is narrower in scope than the federal act which specifically encompasses \u201cworking.\u201d Burgess at 213-214, 388 S.E.2d at 138-139. \u201cAs an asymptomatic carrier of HIV, plaintiff has failed to show that he has any condition that would substantially limit his ability to perform any of the physical or mental tasks listed in the . . . Act as major life activities.\u201d Id. at 214, 388 S.E.2d at 139. The Court also rejected the argument that (1) the ability to bear a healthy child or (2) the ability to engage in sexual relationships constitute \u201cmajor life activities.\u201d Id. \u201cMajor life activities\u201d encompass only those \u201cessential tasks one must perform on a regular basis in order to carry on a normal existence.\u201d Id.\nUnder Burgess then, plaintiff\u2019s condition must limit more than her mere ability to work a particular job in order for it to affect a \u201cmajor life activity.\u201d The functions which are limited must be those listed in G.S. \u00a7 168A-3(4)b or \u201cof the same nature as those listed.\u201d Burgess at 214, 388 S.E.2d at 139.\nEvidence in the record here indicates that plaintiff experienced some pain in her lower back and that she was under a physician\u2019s order not to \u201clift more than 40 pounds, [to] avoid repetitive bending at the waist, and [to] avoid prolonged sitting or standing in one place without the opportunity to move around and change position.\u201d In her deposition, plaintiff asserted that repetitive lifting of objects weighing 40 pounds did not bother her, but rather it was the repetitive \u201ctwisting, turning, reaching, stooping, bending.\u201d Of further note is a physician\u2019s evaluation from 29 May 1990, 11 days after plaintiff\u2019s employment ceased, that \u201c[s]ince she has been out of work . . . the discomfort is slowly improving.\u201d This physician assessed plaintiff\u2019s condition as \u201c[mjild recurrent low back pain. Probable musculoligamentous strain.\u201d Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that plaintiff at trial will be unable to produce evidence in support of an essential element of her claim, that is, that her physical impairment limits a \u201cmajor life activity\u201d so as to bring her under the purview of G.S. \u00a7 168A-3(4)(i). The activities which cause plaintiff pain and discomfort simply are not those \u201cessential tasks one must perform on a regular basis in order to carry on a normal existence.\u201d Plaintiff is not \u201chandicapped\u201d merely because she cannot perform one particular type of job. We further note there is no evidence indicating plaintiff is a \u201chandicapped person\u201d as defined in either G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 168A-3(4)(ii) or (iii). Since plaintiff is not a \u201chandicapped person\u201d as contemplated in the Act, the trial court properly granted defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff\u2019s first claim.\nII.\nPlaintiff\u2019s second contention is that the trial court erred in dismissing her claim for wrongful discharge. We disagree.\nIn North Carolina, the general rule is that, absent an employment contract for a definite period of time, both employer and employee are generally free to terminate their association at any time and without reason. Salt v. Applied Analytical, Inc., 104 N.C.App. 652, 655, 412 S.E.2d 97, 99 (1991), disc. review denied, 331 N.C. 119, 415 S.E.2d 200 (1992). This typical working relationship is known as \u201cemployment-at-will.\u201d It is uncontroverted that plaintiff was an \u201cat-will\u201d employee.\nAn exception to the employment-at-will doctrine exists where an employee is discharged for \u201can unlawful reason or purpose that contravenes public policy.\u201d Coman v. Thomas Manufacturing Co., Inc., 325 N.C. 172, 175, 381 S.E.2d 445, 447 (1989), quoting Sides v. Duke Hospital, 74 N.C.App. 331, 342, 328 S.E.2d 818, 826, disc. review denied, 314 N.C. 331, 333 S.E.2d 490 (1985). Plaintiff argues this exception is applicable to her. We disagree.\nTo proceed under this exception, plaintiff must allege facts which indicate that she was in fact \u201cdischarged.\u201d If plaintiff voluntarily resigned defendant\u2019s employ, she cannot bring a claim for wrongful discharge.\nHere, plaintiff tendered her resignation after asking to be transferred to another position and being told that none was currently available. There is no evidence that she was ever subjected to a reduction in wages, and there is no indication that defendant suggested, much less threatened, that she would be terminated for any reason. Instead, the record shows: (1) that defendant paid plaintiff workers\u2019 compensation benefits including medical bills and disability compensation; and (2) that defendant attempted to accommodate plaintiff\u2019s medical condition. On these facts, it is clear plaintiff was not \u201cdischarged\u201d by any act of defendant. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff\u2019s claim for wrongful discharge.\nThe trial court\u2019s order granting defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment is affirmed.\nJudges EAGLES and ORR concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JOHN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "McCreary & Read, by Daniel F. Read, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Poyner & Spruill, by Cecil W. Harrison, Jr. and Laura \u25a0Broughton Russell, for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "BRENDA GRAVITTE, Plaintiff v. MITSUBISHI SEMICONDUCTOR AMERICA, INC., Defendant\nNo. 9114SC967\n(Filed 6 April 1993)\n1. Handicapped Persons \u00a7 1 (NCI4th) \u2014 back problems \u2014inability to do particular job \u2014no major life activity limited \u2014plaintiff not handicapped \u2014employer not required to reasonably accommodate \u201chandicap\u201d\nPlaintiff was not a \u201chandicapped person\u201d within the meaning of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 168A-1 et seq. (the \u201cNorth Carolina Handicapped Persons Protection Act\u201d), and the trial court therefore properly granted defendant\u2019s summary judgment motion on plaintiffs claim that defendant employer failed to make reasonable accommodation to her handicap in violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 168A-4, since plaintiff would be unable to show at trial that her physical impairment limited a \u201cmajor life activity\u201d where evidence in the record indicated that plaintiff experienced some pain in her lower back and that she was under a physician\u2019s order not to lift more than 40 pounds, to avoid repetitive bending at the waist, and to avoid prolonged sitting or standing without changing position; the activities which caused plaintiff pain and discomfort were not those essential tasks one must perform on a regular basis in order to carry on a normal existence; and plaintiff was not \u201chandicapped\u201d merely because she could not perform one particular type of job. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 168A-3(4)(i).\n2. Labor and Employment \u00a7 63 (NCI4th)\u2014 at-will employee \u2014 resignation \u2014no claim for wrongful discharge\nThe trial court properly granted defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff\u2019s claim for wrongful discharge where plaintiff, an at-will employee, tendered her resignation after asking to be transferred to another position and being told that none was currently available, since a plaintiff who voluntarily resigns defendant\u2019s employ cannot bring a claim for wrongful discharge.\nAm Jur 2d, Master and Servant \u00a7\u00a7 27-33.\nModern status of rule that employer may discharge at-will employee for any reason. 12 ALR4th 544.\nModern status as to duration of employment where contract specifies no term but fixes daily or longer compensation. 93 ALR3d 659.\nRight of corporation to discharge employee who asserts rights as stockholder. 84 ALR3d 1107.\nReduction in rank or authority or change of duties as breach of employment contract. 63 ALR3d 539.\nEmployer\u2019s termination of professional athlete\u2019s services as constituting breach of employment contract. 57 ALR3d 257.\nAppeal by plaintiff from order entered 15 May 1991 by Judge J.B. Allen, Jr., in Durham County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 October 1992.\nMcCreary & Read, by Daniel F. Read, for plaintiff-appellant.\nPoyner & Spruill, by Cecil W. Harrison, Jr. and Laura \u25a0Broughton Russell, for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0466-01", "first_page_order": 494, "last_page_order": 500 }