{ "id": 8555944, "name": "JAMES J. GRANT, Administrator of the Estate of WARREN JEWEL GRANT v. ERNEST MARVIN GREENE", "name_abbreviation": "Grant v. Greene", "decision_date": "1971-06-23", "docket_number": "No. 7118SC25", "first_page": "537", "last_page": "541", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "11 N.C. App. 537" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "147 S.E. 2d 387", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "266 N.C. 778", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563653 ], "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/266/0778-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 S.E. 2d 195", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "263 N.C. 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569307 ], "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/263/0237-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 S.E. 2d 845", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "272 N.C. 567", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574049 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/272/0567-01" ] }, { "cite": "136 S.E. 2d 214", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "262 N.C. 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565425 ], "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/262/0062-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 535, "char_count": 8576, "ocr_confidence": 0.538, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.880290748541576e-07, "percentile": 0.7274843050695233 }, "sha256": "33408ff2de5b5f3c6f3e3fd005a7f82ec4d3a9300d5ceee684d65539413314f6", "simhash": "1:8a03c4e6ec987149", "word_count": 1421 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:10:46.806740+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Brock and Hedrick concur." ], "parties": [ "JAMES J. GRANT, Administrator of the Estate of WARREN JEWEL GRANT v. ERNEST MARVIN GREENE" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MORRIS, Judge.\nThe evidence, taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff, tends to show: At the scene of the accident, the highway was a four-lane smooth surface' asphalt highway with two lanes northbound 23 feet and 9 inches wide and two lanes southbound 23 feet and 9 inches wide, divided by a 30-foot median, with an 8-foot paved shoulder for both lanes. The accident occurred at about 9:55 p.m. The night was clear and dark, the road was dry, and the street was not lighted.\nDefendant had five passengers in his car, all members of his family. They had followed an ambulance transporting defendant\u2019s brother from Spartanburg, S. 0., to Durham for admission to the Veterans\u2019 Hospital. They had had the brother admitted and were returning to their homes in South Carolina. Defendant was rounding a slight curve in the highway. A car had just passed him traveling in the same direction. Defendant had been traveling at about 55 to 60 miles per hour, not in excess of 60 miles per hour. Defendant noticed plaintiff\u2019s intestate and a woman he later understood was plaintiff\u2019s intestate\u2019s wife standing off the west side of the highway. They appeared to be scuffling. Someone in the car advised defendant to watch those people. When defendant saw plaintiff\u2019s intestate entering the highway, he switched his lights from low to bright. He immediately took his foot off the accelerator and applied brakes. Plaintiff\u2019s intestate started running toward the inside southbound lane. Defendant immediately turned over onto the left-hand side. Plaintiff\u2019s intestate was struck by defendant\u2019s right front fender. Defendant\u2019s car was still'in motion when it struck plaintiff\u2019s intestate. Plaintiff\u2019s intestate\u2019s body crossed the hood, the windshield, and the top of defendant\u2019s car and came off the left-hand side. Plaintiff\u2019s intestate was attempting to cross the highway in a diagonal direction. The debris \u2014 headlight glass, etc., \u2014 from defendant\u2019s car was located approximately 32 feet from where plaintiff\u2019s intestate was standing. His body was found in the median area a distance of 31 feet from the location of the debris.\nOfficer L. R. Wood of the North Carolina Highway Patrol had been following behind defendant\u2019s vehicle for a short distance, less than a mile. The posted speed limit was 60 miles per hour. Officer Wood was approximately 300 yards behind the defendant and speeded up when he saw defendant swerve. Officer Wood observed the woman standing on the right shoulder a couple of feet from the edge of the road when he began approaching the location but did not see plaintiff\u2019s intestate at any time prior to the collision. He did not hear a horn blow. When he arrived at the location where the woman was standing he pulled his car onto the shoulder and stopped. The woman was hysterical and said her husband had been struck by a car. Officer Wood crossed the road into the median and found the plaintiff\u2019s intestate\u2019s body. Defendant stopped and then pulled down the highway onto the right side and parked. The occupants returned to the scene and defendant stated he felt he was in the grass median. No evidence was found indicating he was in the median at any time. There were no skid marks or tire impressions at any point on the road. Officer Wood testified that trees all along .the area would obstruct vision to the right but would not obstruct vision of the road. In daylight there is approximately 1/10 of a mile good and clear visibility and approximately 200 feet at night,. the difference in visibility being explained by the fact that while in the curve to the right the headlights shine straight ahead and it would be approximately 200 feet to where headlights would light up something on the side of the road where plaintiff\u2019s intestate was standing, but the actual unobstructed vision is at least 1/10 of a mile at all times.\nPlaintiff\u2019s intestate was completely blind in his left eye and vision in the right eye was 21/100 with corrective glasses. In all 50 states, 21/100 is considered legal blindness, industrial blindness.\nAccording to the record, defendant moved for a directed verdict \u201cciting the case of Blake v. Mallard, decided by Justice Sharp in 1964.\u201d This, is certainly not an approved method of complying with the requirement that \u201cA motion for a directed verdict shall state the specific grounds therefor.\u201d G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 50(a). A reading of Blake v. Mallard, 262 N.C. 62, 136 S.E. 2d 214 (1964), leads us to the obvious conclusion that defendant\u2019s motion was based on the contributory negligence of plaintiff\u2019s intestate. Since in our opinion the contributory negligence of plaintiff\u2019s intestate is patent, a ruling favorable to defendant on the motion thus grounded would not be error. The court allowed the motion on the grounds that there was no negligence on the part of defendant and even if there were negligence on the part of defendant, plaintiff\u2019s intestate was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. Plaintiff, both by oral argument and by brief, concedes negligence on the part of plaintiff\u2019s intestate but earnestly contends that defendant had the last clear chance to avoid injury to plaintiff\u2019s intestate.\nPlaintiff relies on Exum v. Boyles, 272 N.C. 567, 158 S.E. 2d 845 (1968). The case sub judice is factually distinguishable. There the facts tended to show plaintiff\u2019s intestate, wearing a white shirt, was squatting beside the rear wheel of his disabled station wagon changing a tire. His body projected over the edge of the pavement. The headlights, taillights, and interior dome lights were burning. Defendant, approaching, saw the station wagon 200 yards before he reached it but did not see plaintiff\u2019s intestate until virtually the moment of impact. We agree these facts, if true, were sufficient to bring the doctrine of last clear chance into operation, it being a question for the jury whether these were or were not the facts of the case. Under the principles relating to the application of the doctrine of last clear chance so clearly set out in Exum, defendant\u2019s duty to act arose only after he knew, or in the exercise of due care should have known that the plaintiff\u2019s intestate was insensitive to danger. Wise v. Tarte, 263 N.C. 237, 139 S.E. 2d 195 (1964). The doctrine contemplates that if liability is to be imposed the defendant must have a last \u201cclear\u201d chance, not a last \u201cpossible\u201d chance to avoid injury. Battle v. Chavis, 266 N.C. 778, 147 S.E. 2d 387 (1966). We are of the opinion that the evidence in this case fails to show such an opportunity.\nThe judgment is\nAffirmed.\nJudges Brock and Hedrick concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "MORRIS, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Stephen E. Lawing for plaintiff appellant.", "Smith, Moore, Smith, Schell & Hunter, by David M. Moore II, for defendant appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JAMES J. GRANT, Administrator of the Estate of WARREN JEWEL GRANT v. ERNEST MARVIN GREENE\nNo. 7118SC25\n(Filed 23 June 1971)\n1. Rules of Civil Procedure \u00a7 50\u2014 motion for directed verdict \u2014 specificity of grounds\nA motion for directed verdict which was based on \u201cthe case of Blake v. Mallard, decided by Justice Sharp in 1964\u201d does not comply with the statutory requirement that the motion shall state the specific grounds therefor. G.S. 1A-1, Rule 50(a).\n2. Negligence \u00a7 12\u2014 last clear chance\nThe doctrine of last clear chance contemplates that if liability is to be imposed the defendant must have a last \u201cclear\u201d chance, not a last \u201cpossible\u201d chance to avoid injury.\n3. Automobiles \u00a7 89\u2014 striking a pedestrian \u2014 last clear chance \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nEvidence in an accident case failed to show that the defendant motorist, who was traveling at a lawful rate of speed, had the last clear chance to avoid striking a legally blind pedestrian who had suddenly begun running across the highway.\nOn certiorari to review judgment of Collier, Judge, entered 22 June 1970 Civil Session, Superior Court of Guilford County.\nPlaintiff seeks to recover damages for the alleged wrongful death of his intestate resulting from defendant\u2019s having struck plaintiff\u2019s intestate, a pedestrian, while defendant was driving his automobile on U. S. Highway 29 in Guilford County.\nDefendant by answer denied any negligence on his part and, as a further defense, interposed plaintiff\u2019s intestate\u2019s contributory negligene\u00e9 as a bar to recovery. Plaintiff replied, denying contributory negligence and, as a further defense to defendant\u2019s further answer and defense, set up the plea of defendant\u2019s last clear chance to avoid striking plaintiff\u2019s intestate.\nAt the close of plaintiff\u2019s evidence, defendant\u2019s motion for directed verdict was granted, and plaintiff appealed.\nStephen E. Lawing for plaintiff appellant.\nSmith, Moore, Smith, Schell & Hunter, by David M. Moore II, for defendant appellee." }, "file_name": "0537-01", "first_page_order": 561, "last_page_order": 565 }