{
  "id": 8556183,
  "name": "CHARLES SOUTHARDS, Employee v. BYRD MOTOR LINES, INC., Employer TRANSIT CASUALTY COMPANY, Carrier",
  "name_abbreviation": "Southards v. Byrd Motor Lines, Inc.",
  "decision_date": "1971-06-23",
  "docket_number": "No. 7118IC243",
  "first_page": "583",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:10:46.806740+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges Morris and Hedrick concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "CHARLES SOUTHARDS, Employee v. BYRD MOTOR LINES, INC., Employer TRANSIT CASUALTY COMPANY, Carrier"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "BROCK, Judge.\nDefendants assign as error that the conclusions of law are not supported by the findings of fact. Specific findings of fact by the Industrial Commission, with respect to the crucial facts upon which the question of plaintiff\u2019s right to compensation depends, are required. Morgan v. Furniture Industries, Inc., 2 N.C. App. 126, 162 S.E. 2d 619.\n\u201cAccident\u201d as used in our statute (G.S. 97-2(18)) involves the interruption of the work routine and the introduction of unusual conditions likely to result in unpredicted consequences. A hernia suffered by an employee does not arise by accident if the employee at the time was merely carrying out his usual and customary duties in the usual way. Gray v. Storage, Inc., 10 N.C. App. 668, 179 S.E. 2d 883.\nThe only facts found by the Commission with respect to circumstances existing at the time of plaintiff\u2019s injury were that plaintiff was lifting cases of canned goods for the first time, that the load weighed 120 pounds, that it was a hot day, and that he was hurrying. No finding was made as to the weight which plaintiff was accustomed to lifting unassisted. The mere fact that plaintiff was handling a different commodity than usual, without more, and that the weather was hot, are not enough to satisfy the requirement of an \u201cinterruption of the work routine and the introduction of unusual conditions likely to result in unpredicted consequences\u201d stated in Gray, supra. Nor is the mere fact that plaintiff was in a hurry. See Rhinehart v. Market, 271 N.C. 586, 157 S.E. 2d 1. The statement that \u201c[i]n the way and manner set out in finding of fact number two plaintiff sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment resulting in a hernia\u201d was included among both the findings of fact (as finding of fact number three) and, with slightly different wording, the conclusions, of law of the Commission. As a purported \u201cfinding of fact,\u201d the statement is surplusage, because the \u201cway and manner set out in finding of fact number two,\u201d to which reference is made in finding of fact number three, does not disclose a compensable accident; as a \u201cconclusion of law,\u201d it is unsupported by the findings of fact.\nThere was evidence in the record from which the Commission could have made the full findings of fact necessary to resolve the controversy, as required by Morgan, supra. This the Commission failed to do.\nThe award is vacated and the cause is remanded to the Industrial Commission for further proceedings as may be appropriate.\nAward vacated and cause remanded.\nJudges Morris and Hedrick concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "BROCK, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Haworth, Riggs, Kuhn & Haworth, by Don G. Miller, for plaintiff-appellee.",
      "Walser, Brinkley, Walser & McGirt, by Charles H. McGirt, for defendants-appellants."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "CHARLES SOUTHARDS, Employee v. BYRD MOTOR LINES, INC., Employer TRANSIT CASUALTY COMPANY, Carrier\nNo. 7118IC243\n(Filed 23 June 1971)\n1. Master and Servant \u00a7 93\u2014 workmen\u2019s compensation \u2014 right to compensation\u2014 findings of fact\nThe Industrial Commission is required to make specific findings of fact with respect to the crucial facts upon which the questions of plaintiff\u2019s right to compensation depend.\n2. Master and Servant \u00a7 55\u2014 workmen\u2019s compensation' \u2014 what constitutes an accident\nAccident within the meaning of the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act involves the interruption of the work routine and the introduction of unusual conditions likely to result in unpredicted consequences. G.S. 97-2(18).\n3. Master and Servant \u00a7\u00a7 55, 65\u2014 what constitutes an accident \u2014 lifting of goods \u2014 hernia \u2014 findings of fact\nAn \u201caccident\u201d did not arise from the mere fact that on the day of the injury (hernia) the employee, who ordinarily lifted furniture, was lifting cases of canned beans for the first time, that the day was hot, and that the employee was in a hurry.\nAppeal by defendants from the Opinion and Award of the North Carolina Industrial Commission, filed 19 November 1970.\nPursuant to the provisions of the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act, G.S. 97-1 et seq., plaintiff asserted this claim for compensation for injury sustained, on 28 July 1969, while in the employ of defendant Byrd Motor Lines, Inc. On 11 May 1970, a hearing was held before Deputy Commissioner C. A. Dandelake. Plaintiff\u2019s evidence tended to show the following. On 28 July 1969, plaintiff was employed by defendant as a dock worker, having been so employed since early June; on the day in question, plaintiff and a helper were unloading cases of canned pork and beans from a truck, each case weighing sixty pounds; plaintiff\u2019s usual job was to load or unload whatever was in the trucks, but the day in question was the first time that he had handled anything other than furniture; plaintiff\u2019s custom was to have help when lifting items weighing as much as one hundred pounds; on the occasion of his injury, plaintiff and the helper were in a hurry and were working faster than usual, each man handling two cases of beans at a time; plaintiff experienced a sharp pain in his left groin while lifting two cases of beans at once; plaintiff rested for a short time and then began to unload furniture, at which time he felt pain again and, upon investigation, found a knot in his groin; the injury was a left inguinal hernia; plaintiff had had a similar injury surgically repaired in September, 1968.\nThe Deputy Commissioner denied plaintiff\u2019s claim upon the ground that plaintiff had not suffered an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. The Full Commission vacated the opinion and award of the Deputy Commissioner, and entered an award in favor of plaintiff. Defendants appealed to this Court.\nHaworth, Riggs, Kuhn & Haworth, by Don G. Miller, for plaintiff-appellee.\nWalser, Brinkley, Walser & McGirt, by Charles H. McGirt, for defendants-appellants."
  },
  "file_name": "0583-01",
  "first_page_order": 607,
  "last_page_order": 610
}