{ "id": 8524639, "name": "JEROME DICKENS, Plaintiff v. J. O. THORNE and the COUNTY OF EDGECOMBE, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Dickens v. Thorne", "decision_date": "1993-05-04", "docket_number": "No. 917SC920", "first_page": "39", "last_page": "47", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "110 N.C. App. 39" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "79 ALR Fed 826", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "A.L.R. Fed.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "28 U.S.C.S. \u00a7 2680", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(h)" } ], "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "68 ALR2d 1437", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 2d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "222 S.E.2d 412", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "423-24", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "289 N.C. 303", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569569 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/289/0303-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 S.E.2d 187", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "188", "parenthetical": "considering defendant's answer as a factor to determine whether he was sued in his representative capacity" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "254 N.C. 460", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626800 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "462" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/254/0460-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 S.E.2d 439", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5306084 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "413 S.E.2d 276", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 761", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2511641 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0761-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 S.E.2d 596", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 N.C. App. 527", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522096 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/97/0527-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 N.C. App. 379", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525532 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/109/0379-01" ] }, { "cite": "427 S.E.2d 142", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "143-44" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "68 S.E.2d 783", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1951, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "787" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "235 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8620036 ], "year": 1951, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "7" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/235/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "348 S.E.2d 524", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "526", "parenthetical": "\"[Wjaiver of immunity extends only to injuries which are specifically covered by the insurance policy.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 N.C. App. 21", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8357924 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "23", "parenthetical": "\"[Wjaiver of immunity extends only to injuries which are specifically covered by the insurance policy.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/83/0021-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 S.E.2d 518", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 N.C. 585", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569666 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/304/0585-01" ] }, { "cite": "279 S.E.2d 894", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "896" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "52 N.C. App. 688", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12170704 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "691" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/52/0688-01" ] }, { "cite": "343 S.E.2d 266", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "268" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "80 N.C. App. 561", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525185 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "563" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/80/0561-01" ] }, { "cite": "276 S.E.2d 325", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "335", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 N.C. 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567370 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "453", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/302/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "400 S.E.2d 767", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "769", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 N.C. App. 636", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8528017 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "639", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/101/0636-01" ] }, { "cite": "248 S.E.2d 455", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "456" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "38 N.C. App. 625", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8555487 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "626" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/38/0625-01" ] }, { "cite": "218 S.E.2d 348", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "350", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 N.C. 368", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568488 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "371", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/288/0368-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-277", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 773, "char_count": 18134, "ocr_confidence": 0.767, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.3783498217228957e-07, "percentile": 0.7965636220490074 }, "sha256": "b11558f77519bb0093b77d7323ae9761775f9b7de1eccde43875d5d4f608fb87", "simhash": "1:3f0a46a238b97540", "word_count": 2881 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:46:54.224272+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges WELLS and GREENE concur." ], "parties": [ "JEROME DICKENS, Plaintiff v. J. O. THORNE and the COUNTY OF EDGECOMBE, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ORR, Judge.\nPrior to this action, Dickens was an employee of the County. In his complaint, Dickens alleges Thorne made untrue statements and divulged confidential information that had been discussed at a Board meeting about Dickens\u2019 resignation from his job with the County to a local reporter from The Daily Southerner. Dickens alleges the reporter published a libelous article about him based on these statements. The defendants make two assignments of error in support of their contention that they are entitled to summary judgment in this action based on their defense of governmental immunity. Before we can address the defendants\u2019 assignments of error, we must first address the threshold question of whether an appeal lies from the order of the trial judge denying their motion for summary judgment.\nI.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-277 \u201cin effect, provides that no appeal lies to an appellate court from an interlocutory order or ruling of the trial judge unless such ruling or order deprives the appellant of a substantial right which he would lose if the ruling or order is not reviewed before final judgment.\u201d Pruitt v. Williams, 288 N.C. 368, 371, 218 S.E.2d 348, 350 (1975) (citations omitted). Generally, orders denying motions for summary judgment do not affect a substantial right and are not appealable. Hill v. Smith, 38 N.C. App. 625, 626, 248 S.E.2d 455, 456 (1978). The denial of a summary judgment motion \u201c \u2018on the grounds of sovereign and qualified immunity,\u2019 \u201d however, \u201c \u2018is immediately appealable.\u2019 \u201d Herndon v. Barrett, 101 N.C. App. 636, 639, 400 S.E.2d 767, 769 (1991) (citation omitted).\nIn the case sub judice, Thorne and the County are appealing the trial court\u2019s denial of their motion for summary judgment, claiming they are entitled to immunity in this case under the doctrine of governmental immunity. The order denying this motion is, therefore, immediately appealable.\nII.\nWe now turn to defendants\u2019 first assignment of error, that the trial court erred by denying their motion for summary judgment on the ground that there is no genuine issue of material fact that the defendants are shielded from liability by governmental immunity.\nSummary judgment is the device whereby judgment is rendered \u201cif the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u201d N.C.R. Civ. P. 56(c). \u201cThus a defending party is entitled to summary judgment if he can show that' claimant cannot prove the existence of an essential element of his claim,... or cannot surmount an affirmative defense which would bar the claim.\u201d Dickens v. Puryear, 302 N.C. 437, 453, 276 S.E.2d 325, 335 (1981) (citation omitted). \u201cIn ruling on a motion for summary judgment the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.\u201d Hinson v. Hinson, 80 N.C. App. 561, 563, 343 S.E.2d 266, 268 (1986).\nDickens does not dispute that Thorne and the County would be entitled to summary judgment under the doctrine of governmental immunity. Instead, Dickens argues the County has waived its governmental immunity by purchasing liability insurance which covers this action and that Thorne has waived his immunity as a public official by acting maliciously.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 153A-435(a) states:\nA county may contract to insure itself and any of its officers, agents, or employees against liability for wrongful death or negligent or intentional damage to person or property or against absolute liability for damage to person or property caused by an act or omission of the county or of any of its officers, agents, or employees when acting within the scope of their authority and the course of their employment. . . .\nPurchase of insurance pursuant to this subsection waives the county\u2019s governmental immunity, to the extent of insurance coverage, for any act or omission occurring in the exercise of a governmental function. . . .\nThus, a municipality may waive its governmental immunity for civil liability in tort for negligent or intentional damage by purchasing liability insurance, but only to the extent of the insurance coverage. Edwards v. Akion, 52 N.C. App. 688, 691, 279 S.E.2d 894, 896, aff\u2019d, 304 N.C. 585, 284 S.E.2d 518 (1981).\nIn the case sub judice, the County purchased a liability insurance policy (the \u201cPolicy\u201d), Part I of which states:\nCoverage B: All Public Officials/Employees, Except Law Enforcement Employees\nThe Fund will pay on behalf of the . . . Covered Person(s) all sums which the . . . Covered Person(s) shall become legally obligated to pay as money damages because of any civil claim or claims made against the ... Covered Person(s) arising out of any Wrongful Act of any Covered Person(s) acting in their capacity as an Employee of the Participant named in the Declarations and caused by the Covered Persons) while acting in their regular course of duty.\nUnder the Policy, the term \u201cCovered Persons\u201d includes \u201cMembers of commissions, boards or other units operating by and under the jurisdiction of such PUBLIC Entity. ...\u201d A \u201cWrongful Act\u201d is defined as \u201cany actual or alleged error or misstatement or misleading statement or act or omission or neglect or breach of duty . . . by an employee while acting within the scope of his professional duties or Fund approved activities.\u201d Dickens contends these terms cover the action in this case. Exclusionary clauses contained in the Policy, however, apply to deny coverage of this action.\nThe Policy excludes claims for any injury arising from \u201cdefamation including but not limited to libel\u201d and for claims \u201carising from the willful violation of any statute, ordinance or regulation committed by or with the knowledge or consent of any Covered Person(s).\u201d\nDickens\u2019 complaint against the defendants is based on allegations that statements made by Thorne to a newspaper reporter constitute a \u201clibel\u201d and that \u201c[t]he statements made by . . . Thorne . . . are in violation of law and particularly Article 9, Section 3 ... of the Personnel Ordinance for the County . . . and of N.C.G.S. 153A-98.\u201d Additionally the complaint states, \u201csaid statements made by . . . Thorne, constitute a reckless indifference to the rights of others and are wanton and willful misconduct . . . .\u201d The language of the Policy specifically excludes this action from coverage. Because the Policy excludes this action from coverage, the County has not waived its governmental immunity as to this action by purchasing the Policy. See, Overcash v. Statesville City Bd. of Educ., 83 N.C. App. 21, 23, 348 S.E.2d 524, 526 (1986) (\u201c[Wjaiver of immunity extends only to injuries which are specifically covered by the insurance policy.\u201d)\nNext, Dickens argues that allegations of \u201cmalicious official behavior\u201d against Thorne preclude summary judgment. Dickens relies on the rule stated in Smith v. Hefner, 235 N.C. 1, 7, 68 S.E.2d 783, 787 (1951) that,\na public official, engaged in the performance of governmental duties involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, may not be held personally liable for mere negligence in respect thereto. The rule in such cases is that an official may not be held liable unless it be alleged and proved that his act, or failure to act, was corrupt or malicious (citations omitted), or that he acted outside of and beyond the scope of his duties. (Citations omitted.)\nDickens fails to note, however, that this rule applies to actions against a p\u00fablic official in his \u201cindividual\u201d capacity, not to actions against a public official in his \u201cofficial\u201d capacity.\nIt is a well-settled rule that \u201cwhen an action is brought against individual officers in their official capacities the action is one against the state for the purposes of applying the doctrine of sovereign immunity.\u201d Whitaker v. Clark, 427 S.E.2d 142, 143-44, 109 N.C. App. 379 (citing, Corum v. University of North Carolina, 97 N.C. App. 527, 389 S.E.2d 596 (1990), aff\u2019d in part, rev\u2019d in part, and remanded, 330 N.C. 761, 413 S.E.2d 276 (1992)).\nIn Whitaker, plaintiff filed a wrongful death action against employees of the Davie County Department of Social Services. The defendants asserted the defense of governmental immunity. Nowhere in the complaint did the plaintiff specify that she had sued defendants in both their individual and official capacities. The complaint never employed the words \u201cindividual\u201d or \u201cindividual capacity,\u201d but it did use the phrases, \u201cin the performance of their official duties,\u201d and \u201cin their official capacity\u201d. Additionally, the overall tenor of the complaint indicated that the allegations were centered solely on the defendants\u2019 official duties as employees of the Department of Social Services. Subsequently, this Court held that defendants were being sued solely in their official capacities and that governmental immunity applied to shield these defendants from liability. Additionally, this Court stated, \u201cif defendants are found to have been sued only in an official capacity, the doctrine of sovereign immunity would be applicable.\u201d Whitaker, at 145.\nIn the present case, because we have already held that the County is entitled to governmental immunity, Thorne is entitled to the same governmental immunity if we find that Dickens sued him only in his official capacity. See, Whitaker, supra.; See also, Harwood v. Johnson, 326 N.C. 231, 388 S.E.2d 439 (1990).\nAt the outset, an examination of the complaint reveals a failure of Dickens to designate in what capacity he is suing Thorne. Dickens at no time makes specific allegations against Thorne \u201cindividually.\u201d He does not indicate in the caption of the complaint whether he is suing Thorne in his \u201cofficial\u201d or \u201cindividual\u201d capacity, as is the general practice. See, Whitaker, supra.\nBecause Dickens has made no distinction as to what capacity he is suing Thorne, we must examine the complaint to determine whether Dickens is suing Thorne in his official or individual capacity. Lynn v. Clark, 254 N.C. 460, 119 S.E.2d 187 (1961). Nowhere in Dickens\u2019 complaint does he refer to Thorne \u201cindividually\u201d. He does, however, allege that \u201c[a]t all times relevant to this action, . . . Thorne, was an officer and employee, of the . . . County . . ., and the . . . County ... is responsible for the actions of its said officer and employee . . . .\u201d\nFurther, the answer filed by defendants to Dickens\u2019 complaint recognizes the fact that Dickens is suing Thorne in his official capacity. See, Lynn, 254 N.C. at 462, 119 S.E.2d at 188 (considering defendant\u2019s answer as a factor to determine whether he was sued in his representative capacity). The answer states as defendants\u2019 fourth defense, \u201cGovernmental immunity is . . . applicable to the defendant County and the defendant Commissioner in his official capacity, and is pleaded in bar of any recovery.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Additionally, the answer states as defendants\u2019 fifth defense, \u201cPunitive damages are not recoverable in this State against a County or its public officials in the absence of a statute authorizing same, . . . .\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nWe also note that Dickens\u2019 brief is void of any arguments against Thorne in his \u201cindividual\u201d capacity. In fact, when he refers to Thorne\u2019s liability in his brief, Dickens refers to \u201cthe liability of J.O. Thorne as a public official. . . .\u201d Further, Dickens\u2019 argument in his brief for punitive damages in no way indicates that he is suing Thorne in an individual capacity. In this section, Dickens argues, \u201cWhile no statute expressly provides for punitive damages against a county, the wanton, reckless and flagrant disregard of state law and its own internal personnel ordinances warrants the implication that counties should be held accountable by the imposition of actual and punitive damages where appropriate.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Dickens does not seek punitive damages from Thorne individually in this section of his brief.\nBased on our review of the record and briefs, we find that Dickens is suing Thorne in his official capacity alone. Thus, this action against Thorne in his official capacity cannot be maintained due to governmental immunity. See, Whitaker, supra.\nFinally, Dickens argues that a genuine issue exists as to whether the County waived immunity by entering into a contract with Dickens and that, based on this argument, the denial of the defendants\u2019 summary judgment motion on the issue of immunity was proper. Dickens bases this argument, however, on an overly broad interpretation of the holding in Smith v. State, 289 N.C. 303, 222 S.E.2d 412 (1976). This argument is, therefore, without merit.\nDickens contends that our Supreme Court held in Smith that sovereign immunity would not be a defense when the state enters into a valid contract with another. The actual holding in Smith, however, is that \u201cwhenever the State of North Carolina, through its authorized officers and agencies, enters into a valid contract, the State implicitly consents to be sued for damages on the contract in the event it breaches the contract.\" Id. at 320, 222 S.E.2d at 423-24 (emphasis added).\nThe present case is not a suit for damages based on a breach of contract. Dickens even admits in his brief that \u201cthe record is void of any evidence on the contractual nature of the Ap-pellee\u2019s employment. . . Dickens\u2019 argument is, therefore, without merit.\nWe hold, therefore, that the defendants did not waive their governmental immunity, and no genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether they are shielded from liability. Based on this holding, we need not address defendants\u2019 second assignment of error. We hold summary judgment was proper for defendants and accordingly reverse the order of the trial court denying defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment.\nReversed and remanded for entry of summary judgment for the defendants.\nJudges WELLS and GREENE concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "ORR, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Baker, Jenkins & Jones, P.A., by R. B. Daly, Jr. and Roger A. Askew, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, by James R. Morgan, Jr.; and Taylor & Brinson, by Herbert H. Taylor, Jr., for defendant-appellants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JEROME DICKENS, Plaintiff v. J. O. THORNE and the COUNTY OF EDGECOMBE, Defendants\nNo. 917SC920\n(Filed 4 May 1993)\n1. Appeal and Error \u00a7 118 (NCI4th)\u2014 . sovereign immunity \u2014 denial of summary judgment \u2014immediate appeal\nThe denial of a motion for summary judgment on the ground of sovereign immunity is immediately appealable.\nAm Jur 2d, Appeal and Error \u00a7 104.\n2. State \u00a7 4 (NCI3d)\u2014 action against county \u2014 libel and willful statutory violation \u2014 liability insurance \u2014 exclusion from coverage \u2014no waiver of sovereign immunity\nDefendant county did not waive its sovereign immunity by the purchase of liability insurance where plaintiff alleged that defendant county commissioner made untrue statements about plaintiff\u2019s resignation from his county job to a newspaper reporter who wrote a libelous article based on these statements, and that the commissioner\u2019s actions constituted a willful violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 153A-98 and the county personnel ordinance, since the county\u2019s liability policy specifically excluded coverage for claims arising from defamation and claims arising from the willful violation of a statute, or ordinance by covered persons.\nAm Jur 2d, Municipal, County, School, and State Tort Liability \u00a7\u00a7 5-41, 177, 178.\nLiability or indemnity insurance carried by governmental unit as affecting immunity from tort liability. 68 ALR2d 1437.\n3. State \u00a7 4.1 (NCI3d)\u2014 county commissioner \u2014 malicious actions \u2014 official capacity \u2014 sovereign immunity\nPlaintiff\u2019s allegations of malicious actions by defendant county commissioner did not preclude entry of summary judgment in favor of defendant commissioner on the ground of sovereign immunity since a public official is liable for malicious acts only when sued in his \u201cindividual\u201d capacity; the caption of the complaint failed to designate in what capacity defendant commissioner was being sued; and the allegations of the complaint and plaintiff\u2019s brief show that defendant commissioner was being sued only in his official capacity.\nAm Jur 2d, Municipal, County, School, and State Tort Liability \u00a7\u00a7 5-41, 177, 178.\n4. State \u00a7 4.1 (NCI3d)\u2014 action for defamation \u2014 employment contract \u2014 no waiver of sovereign immunity\nDefendant county did not waive its sovereign immunity by entering into an employment contract with plaintiff where plaintiff is suing the county for defamation and not for breach of the contract.\nAm Jur 2d, Municipal, County, School, and State Tort Liability \u00a7\u00a7 5-41, 177, 178.\nApplication of libel and slander exception , to waiver of sovereign immunity under Federal Tort Claims Act (28 U.S.C.S. \u00a7 2680(h) ). 79 ALR Fed 826.\nAppeal by defendants from order entered 13 May 1991 in open court and signed on 30 June 1991 by Judge James R. Strickland in Edgecombe County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 23 September 1992:\nOn 17 December 1990, plaintiff Jerome Dickens (\u201cDickens\u201d) filed a libel action against J.O. Thorne (\u201cThorne\u201d) and the County of Edgecombe (the \u201cCounty\u201d) seeking compensatory and punitive damages. The complaint alleges that Thorne communicated libelous statements concerning Dickens in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 153A-98 and Art. 9, \u00a7 3 of the Personnel Ordinance for the County. Thorne is a member of the Board of Commissioners of the County (the \u201cBoard\u201d), and Dickens alleges the County is liable for defendant\u2019s statements based on a respondeat superior theory.\nOn 17 January 1991, Thorne and the County- filed an answer to the complaint denying these allegations and asserting the defense of governmental immunity. On 1 February 1991, Thorne and the County filed a motion for summary judgment' pursuant to Rule 56 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. On 13 May 1991, Judge James R. Strickland denied this motion in open court, and on 30 June 1991, he signed the order to that effect. From the order denying their motion for summary judgment, Thorne and the County appeal. For the reasons stated below, we reverse the order of the trial court .and grant summary judgment for defendants.\nBaker, Jenkins & Jones, P.A., by R. B. Daly, Jr. and Roger A. Askew, for plaintiff-appellee.\nWomble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, by James R. Morgan, Jr.; and Taylor & Brinson, by Herbert H. Taylor, Jr., for defendant-appellants." }, "file_name": "0039-01", "first_page_order": 69, "last_page_order": 77 }