{ "id": 8524904, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MANLEY JARVIS GUTHRIE, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Guthrie", "decision_date": "1993-05-04", "docket_number": "No. 9210SC214", "first_page": "91", "last_page": "94", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "110 N.C. App. 91" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "95 ALR3d 1181", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 104", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563936, 8563911, 8563818, 8563852, 8563889 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0104-05", "/nc/301/0104-04", "/nc/301/0104-01", "/nc/301/0104-02", "/nc/301/0104-03" ] }, { "cite": "263 S.E.2d 371", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "372", "parenthetical": "\"While the topic of conversation may have been sexual in nature, there is no evidence presented in this case to indicate that the speech rose to the level of sexual behavior or activity . . . .\" Id." } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "45 N.C. App. 501", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8549594 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "503" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/45/0501-01" ] }, { "cite": "292 S.E.2d 741", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "743-44", "parenthetical": "prior false accusations of improper sexual advances not prohibited by Rule 412" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "58 N.C. App. 150", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523706 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "153-54", "parenthetical": "prior false accusations of improper sexual advances not prohibited by Rule 412" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/58/0150-01" ] }, { "cite": "295 S.E.2d 453", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "456" }, { "page": "456" }, { "page": "456-57" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 692", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573479 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "697" }, { "page": "698" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0692-01" ] }, { "cite": "327 S.E.2d 920", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "923" }, { "page": "926" }, { "page": "926", "parenthetical": "child's accusation of her father to the extent it was evidence of conversation was not excluded by Rape Shield Statute" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 N.C. App. 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523546 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "163" }, { "page": "167" }, { "page": "167" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/74/0159-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 385, "char_count": 6741, "ocr_confidence": 0.78, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.11263845248349e-07, "percentile": 0.9385645649611232 }, "sha256": "1e59a140bb931a66fee61074f827dd6858e78fa15e0628085d821111ac9faf2f", "simhash": "1:8f16746639ada4a5", "word_count": 1103 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:46:54.224272+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges COZORT and LEWIS concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MANLEY JARVIS GUTHRIE, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ARNOLD, Chief Judge.\nDefendant\u2019s first argument is that the court erred by not allowing him to cross-examine the victim about the letter. Effective cross-examination is a fundamental right and \u201cis denied when a defendant is prevented from cross-examining a witness at all on a subject matter relevant to the witness\u2019s credibility.\u201d State v. Durham, 74 N.C. App. 159, 163, 327 S.E.2d 920, 923 (1985). The denial of that right \u201cis constitutional error of the first magnitude and no amount of showing of want of prejudice would cure it.\u201d Id. But, the defendant\u2019s right to cross-examination is not absolute. The testimony which defendant sought to elicit must be relevant to some defense or relevant to impeach the witness. Durham, 74 N.C. App. at 167, 327 S.E.2d at 926.\nN.C.R. Evid. 412 is \u201ca codification of the \u2018rule of relevance\u2019 as it pertains to issues in a rape case.\u201d State v. Younger, 306 N.C. 692, 697, 295 S.E.2d 453, 456 (1982). Rule 412 provides that evidence of sexual behavior of the complainant is irrelevant unless it falls within one of four categories listed in the rule. N.C.R. Evid. 412(b)(l)-(4). Our Supreme Court, however, has held that Rule 412 is not the sole gauge in determining if evidence is admissible in rape cases. Younger, 306 N.C. at 698, 295 S.E.2d at 456. The victim\u2019s statements about prior specific sexual activity is sometimes admissible to impeach the victim even though the statements do not fall within Rule 412(b)(1)-(4). Id. at 698, 295 S.E.2d at 456-57.\nThe State objected to the testimony about the letter on the basis of Rule 412. The trial judge sustained the objection, apparently believing that Rule 412 rendered the testimony irrelevant and inadmissible. However, testimony about the letter is not the type of evidence which Rule 412 seeks to exclude. Rule 412 is concerned with sexual activity of the complainant. N.C.R. Evid. 412(a). We do not have evidence of sexual activity here. Instead, we have evidence of language.\nWe previously held that language or conversation is not sexual activity. See Durham, 74 N.C. App. at 167, 327 S.E.2d at 926 (child\u2019s accusation of her father to the extent it was evidence of conversation was not excluded by Rape Shield Statute), State v. Baron, 58 N.C. App. 150, 153-54, 292 S.E.2d 741, 743-44 (1982) (prior false accusations of improper sexual advances not prohibited by Rule 412). In State v. Smith, 45 N.C. App. 501, 263 S.E.2d 371, disc. review denied, 301 N.C. 104 (1980), we held that conversation between complainant and defendant concerning complainant\u2019s sexual problems with another man did not rise to the level of sexual behavior. Smith, 45 N.C. App. at 503, 263 S.E.2d at 372 (\u201cWhile the topic of conversation may have been sexual in nature, there is no evidence presented in this case to indicate that the speech rose to the level of sexual behavior or activity . . . .\u201d Id.).\nLikewise, in this case, defendant\u2019s evidence is evidence of conversation, not of a sexual act. Therefore, testimony concerning the letter is not deemed irrelevant by Rule 412 and was improperly excluded on that basis.\nThe remaining question is was testimony about the letter relevant to impeach the credibility of the victim. As in most sex offense cases, the victim\u2019s testimony is crucial to the State\u2019s case and her credibility can easily determine the outcome of the trial. Showing that the victim voluntarily wrote at least one letter to another person which is similar to the ones written to defendant bears directly on the victim\u2019s credibility. It infers that the victim wrote the letters to defendant voluntarily, contradicting her earlier testimony. Defendant had a right to develop this contradictory testimony on cross-examination, and denial of that right was reversible error.\nBecause we find reversible error in the limitation of defendant\u2019s cross-examination and because the evidentiary issues raised in defendant\u2019s remaining arguments may not arise at the second trial, we do not address defendant\u2019s remaining arguments.\nNew trial.\nJudges COZORT and LEWIS concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "ARNOLD, Chief Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Lacy H. Thornburg, by Senior Deputy Attorney General Isham B. Hudson, Jr., for the State.", "John T. Hall for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MANLEY JARVIS GUTHRIE, Defendant\nNo. 9210SC214\n(Filed 4 May 1993)\n1. Rape and Allied Offenses \u00a7 4.3 (NCI3d) \u2014 Rape Shield Statute\u2014 letter not excluded\nCross-examination of an alleged sexual offense and indecent liberties victim about a letter she wrote asking a school friend to have sex with her was not prohibited by the Rape Shield Statute, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 412, because evidence of language does not constitute evidence of sexual behavior excluded by this statute.\nAm Jur 2d, Rape \u00a7\u00a7 40, 82, 83, 86.\nModern status of admissibility, in forcible rape prosecution, of complainant\u2019s general reputation for unchastity. 95 ALR3d 1181.\n2. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 3088 (NCI4th)\u2014 letter soliciting sex \u2014admissibility for impeachment\nWhere an alleged sexual offense and indecent liberties victim testified that defendant dictated letters she wrote to defendant implying that she would do things of a sexual nature for defendant if he would take her to school and lend her money, cross-examination of the victim about a letter she voluntarily wrote to a school friend asking the friend to have sex with her was relevant to impeach the credibility of the victim because this evidence supports an inference that the victim voluntarily wrote the letters to defendant and thus contradicts her earlier testimony.\nAm Jur 2d, Witnesses \u00a7 862.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 15 November 1991 by Judge William H. Freeman in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals on 29 March 1993.\nDefendant, the victim\u2019s step-grandfather, was convicted on two charges of second degree sexual offense and three charges of taking indecent liberties with a child. The State introduced several letters which the victim wrote to defendant. The letters contained promises from the victim inferring that she would do things of a sexual nature for defendant if he would take her to school or lend her money. The victim testified that defendant dictated the letters to her.\nDuring cross-examination, defendant sought to question the victim about a letter (the letter) which she voluntarily wrote to a school friend in which she asked her friend to have sex with her. On voir dire, the victim admitted voluntarily writing the letter to her friend. The prosecutor objected to the testimony on the ground that it was prohibited by the Rape Shield Statute. The trial judge sustained the objection.\nThe jury returned a verdict of guilty on all charges, and defendant was sentenced. From this judgment defendant appeals.\nAttorney General Lacy H. Thornburg, by Senior Deputy Attorney General Isham B. Hudson, Jr., for the State.\nJohn T. Hall for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0091-01", "first_page_order": 121, "last_page_order": 124 }