{ "id": 8526246, "name": "SOUTHEASTERN HOSPITAL SUPPLY CORPORATION, Plaintiff/Appellant v. CLIFTON & SINGER, Partnership, and BENJAMIN CLIFTON, JR., Defendant/ Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Southeastern Hospital Supply Corp. v. Clifton & Singer", "decision_date": "1993-06-15", "docket_number": "No. 9212SC258", "first_page": "652", "last_page": "654", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "110 N.C. App. 652" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-15", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(c)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "382 S.E.2d 872", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "873" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 N.C. App. 413", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521167 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "415" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/95/0413-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 145", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(c)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "338 S.E.2d 781", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "782" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 N.C. App. 763", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524124 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "765" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/78/0763-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 S.E.2d 394", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "313 N.C. 509", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4724263, 4721773, 4721207, 4721948, 4722847 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/313/0509-02", "/nc/313/0509-05", "/nc/313/0509-01", "/nc/313/0509-04", "/nc/313/0509-03" ] }, { "cite": "323 S.E.2d 410", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "416" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "72 N.C. App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526082 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "9" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/72/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 S.E.2d 878", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "879" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "10 N.C. App. 706", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8555517 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "708" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/10/0706-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 343, "char_count": 5972, "ocr_confidence": 0.767, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.3209698723697949e-07, "percentile": 0.7899939340092801 }, "sha256": "b1c723254de6f1a11dab81210847e5bc8d84acab9d301293d96e78a3e171365c", "simhash": "1:be7d1e2c6619de42", "word_count": 942 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:46:54.224272+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge McCRODDEN concurs.", "Judge GREENE dissents." ], "parties": [ "SOUTHEASTERN HOSPITAL SUPPLY CORPORATION, Plaintiff/Appellant v. CLIFTON & SINGER, Partnership, and BENJAMIN CLIFTON, JR., Defendant/ Appellee" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ARNOLD, Chief Judge.\nThe test on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is whether the complaint is legally sufficient. Tennessee v. Environmental Management Comm\u2019n, 78 N.C. App. 763, 765, 338 S.E.2d 781, 782 (1986). In ruling upon such motion, the trial court must view the allegations of the complaint as admitted and on that basis must determine as a matter of law whether the allegations state a claim for which relief may be granted. Id.\nPlaintiff Southeastern alleged the following in its complaint: Benjamin Clifton, Jr., a partner in the law firm Clifton and Singer, represented Southeastern in an action brought against it by Roane-Barker, Inc. During discovery, Roane-Barker requested production of certain documents. Clifton signed a consent order agreeing to produce the documents. However, Clifton did not produce the documents and ultimately Roane-Barker moved the trial court to compel discovery and for sanctions. On 21 August 1987, the trial court entered an order striking Southeastern\u2019s answer for failure to appropriately respond to discovery. Clifton filed notice of appeal from the order but he did not perfect the appeal.\nSoutheastern further alleged that, on 1 March 1988, Roane-Barker obtained an entry of default. The case was tried on the issue of damages and a verdict was returned for Roane-Barker. Clifton and the law firm of Clifton and Singer negligently represented Southeastern through 9 March 1988, the date Clifton ceased his representation of Southeastern. As a result of this negligence, Southeastern was precluded from presenting its meritorious defense to Roane-Barker\u2019s claim, and therefore, Southeastern did not prevail in the action and was required to pay damages.\nThe issue here is whether plaintiff\u2019s action for legal negligence is barred under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 145(c) (1983). A cause of action for legal malpractice accrues at the time of the occurrence of the last wrongful act of the defendant and an action must be commenced within three years of that accrual. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Winslow, 95 N.C. App. 413, 415, 382 S.E.2d 872, 873 (1989); see N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-15(c) (1983). Plaintiff alleged that defendants\u2019 negligent representation continued through 9 March 1988. Taking plaintiff\u2019s allegations as true, defendants\u2019 last wrongful act may have occurred as late as 9 March 1988. As a result, the cause of action may not have accrued until that time. Therefore, the action, which commenced on 25 February 1991, might not be barred by the three year statute of limitations under G.S. \u00a7 l-15(c), and was improperly dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).\nWe have examined plaintiff\u2019s remaining argument and determine it to be without merit. The order of the trial court dismissing plaintiff\u2019s action is\nReversed.\nJudge McCRODDEN concurs.\nJudge GREENE dissents.", "type": "majority", "author": "ARNOLD, Chief Judge." }, { "text": "Judge Greene\ndissenting.\nI do not read the complaint, as does the majority, to allege that defendants negligently represented plaintiff through 9 March 1988. The complaint alleges that the \u201cdefendants\u2019 representation of Southeastern continued up to and including March 9, 1988.\u201d However, the allegations of negligence relate to the conduct of defendants in failing to respond to discovery requests up to and including 21 August 1987, the date on which the trial court struck Southeastern\u2019s answer for failure to respond to discovery.\nBecause a claim for legal malpractice does not accrue upon the termination of the attorney-client relationship, but instead accrues, in this case, upon the occurrence of the \u201clast act of the defendant giving rise to the cause of action,\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 l-15(c) (1983); see also Brantley v. Dunstan, 10 N.C. App. 706, 708, 179 S.E.2d 878, 879 (1971); Shelton v. Fairley, 72 N.C. App. 1, 9, 323 S.E.2d 410, 416 (1984), disc. rev. denied, 313 N.C. 509, 329 S.E.2d 394 (1985), plaintiff\u2019s claim for relief accrued on 21 August 1987. Therefore, the claim is barred because it was filed on 14 March 1991, more than three years after its accrual. Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court\u2019s dismissal of the complaint.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Judge Greene" } ], "attorneys": [ "Senter, Hockman & Koenig, P.A., by William L. Senter, for plaintiff appellant.", "Bailey & Dixon, by Gary S. Parsons and Renee C. Riggsbee, for defendant appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "SOUTHEASTERN HOSPITAL SUPPLY CORPORATION, Plaintiff/Appellant v. CLIFTON & SINGER, Partnership, and BENJAMIN CLIFTON, JR., Defendant/ Appellee\nNo. 9212SC258\n(Filed 15 June 1993)\nLimitations, Repose, and Laches \u00a7 26 (NCI4th)\u2014 attorney malpractice \u2014accrual of cause of action \u2014 last act giving rise to cause of action \u2014termination of attorney-client relationship\nThe trial court improperly dismissed a malpractice action against a law firm under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6) based upon the three-year statute of limitations of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 l-15(c) where defendant represented plaintiff in a lawsuit against plaintiff, defendant failed to produce documents as ordered, plaintiff\u2019s answer was stricken and a default judgment entered against it, a verdict on damages was returned against plaintiff, and plaintiff brought this action alleging that defendant\u2019s negligent representation continued through 9 March 1988, the date defendant ceased its representation of plaintiff. Taking plaintiff\u2019s allegations as true, defendant\u2019s last wrongful act may have occurred as late as 9 March 1988; therefore, this action may not have accrued until that time and, having commenced on 25 February 1991, might not be barred by the three-year statute of limitations.\nAm Jur 2d, Attorneys at Law \u00a7\u00a7 219-221.\nJudge GREENE dissenting.\nAppeal by plaintiff from judgment entered 12 December 1991 by Judge E. Lynn Johnson in Cumberland County Superior Court. Heard in ,the Court of Appeals 26 February 1993.\nPlaintiff filed a complaint alleging legal negligence, and defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s complaint for failure to state a claim. See N.C.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The trial court granted defendants\u2019 motion and dismissed plaintiff\u2019s action. From this order plaintiff appeals.\nSenter, Hockman & Koenig, P.A., by William L. Senter, for plaintiff appellant.\nBailey & Dixon, by Gary S. Parsons and Renee C. Riggsbee, for defendant appellees." }, "file_name": "0652-01", "first_page_order": 682, "last_page_order": 684 }