{ "id": 8524049, "name": "ROBERT L. EVANS, Plaintiff v. PEGGY SHOAF EVANS, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Evans v. Evans", "decision_date": "1993-09-07", "docket_number": "No. 9221DC810", "first_page": "792", "last_page": "800", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "111 N.C. App. 792" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-16.9", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "59 ALR3d 152", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "183 S.E.2d 278", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "12 N.C. App. 353", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8549479 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/12/0353-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 S.E.2d 72", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "320 N.C. 791", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4726496, 4728836, 4728269, 4727919, 4726801 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/320/0791-05", "/nc/320/0791-02", "/nc/320/0791-04", "/nc/320/0791-01", "/nc/320/0791-03" ] }, { "cite": "356 S.E.2d 821", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "86 N.C. App. 225", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12127229 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/86/0225-01" ] }, { "cite": "242 S.E.2d 634", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 N.C. 363", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573057, 8573158, 8573097, 8573138, 8573117 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/294/0363-01", "/nc/294/0363-05", "/nc/294/0363-02", "/nc/294/0363-04", "/nc/294/0363-03" ] }, { "cite": "239 S.E.2d 701", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "34 N.C. App. 658", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551281 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/34/0658-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-16.4", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 S.E.2d 789", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 N.C. App. 484", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525066 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/74/0484-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 U.S.C. \u00a7 662", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(c)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "374 S.E.2d 882", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 N.C. App. 586", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527413 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/92/0586-01" ] }, { "cite": "288 N.E.2d 852", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "32 Ohio App. 2d 139", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ohio App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 6705394 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ohio-app-2d/32/0139-01" ] }, { "cite": "619 P.2d 598", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10443219 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/619/0598-01" ] }, { "cite": "110 A.D.2d 299", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "A.D.2d", "case_ids": [ 3421283 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ad2d/110/0299-01" ] }, { "cite": "494 N.Y.S.2d 238", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "577 A.2d 976", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 7383498 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/577/0976-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 U.S.C. \u00a7 659", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 407", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a) and (b)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "42 U.S.C. \u00a7 402", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)(1)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "29 U.S.C. \u00a7 1001", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "396 A.2d 365", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "164 N.J. Super. 354", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.J. Super.", "case_ids": [ 927387 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nj-super/164/0354-01" ] }, { "cite": "522 F. Supp. 718", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3335778 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/522/0718-01" ] }, { "cite": "592 F.2d 118", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 52979 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "garnishment order may be used to satisfy court ordered family support payments out of pension benefits because such an order is impliedly excepted from the anti-alienation and preemption clauses of ERISA" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/592/0118-01" ] }, { "cite": "594 F.2d 314", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 512689 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "garnishment of pension fund benefits under plan subject to ERISA due to arrearages in wife and child support obligations was not in conflict with anti-alienation clause of ERISA" }, { "page": "316" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/594/0314-01" ] }, { "cite": "698 F.2d 688", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1506182 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "employee's interest in benefit plan is subject to garnishment where debt is support obligation" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/698/0688-01" ] }, { "cite": "29 U.S.C. \u00a7 1144", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "29 U.S.C. \u00a7 1056", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(d)(1)" }, { "page": "(d)(3)(A)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 Md. 28", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Md.", "case_ids": [ 2038819 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "30" }, { "page": "768" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/md/318/0028-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 824, "char_count": 18536, "ocr_confidence": 0.766, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.42875015256781e-07, "percentile": 0.8018152795780757 }, "sha256": "d4620c9a8c0c59e6afbe318df270174f3328ad131796fab41b805ca488dfd626", "simhash": "1:44cf2a1bd2c70c52", "word_count": 2986 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:07:55.768244+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges COZORT and MARTIN concur." ], "parties": [ "ROBERT L. EVANS, Plaintiff v. PEGGY SHOAF EVANS, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ARNOLD, Chief Judge.\nThe basis for plaintiff\u2019s appeal concerns Paragraph A.2. of the Agreement, which fixed the rights of the parties upon plaintiff\u2019s retirement from Piedmont. Paragraph A.2. of the Agreement states:\nIf the Husband retires from his employment with Piedmont at normal retirement age, the Wife will receive as alimony thirty percent (30%) of all income from his pension or retirement plan less income taxes attributable to said retirement income plus thirty percent (30%) of any Social Security payments he receives, payable monthly. The Husband will furnish the Wife satisfactory evidence of his income from these sources. Based on the triggering of Paragraph A.2. by plaintiff\u2019s retirement from Piedmont at normal retirement age, the district court ordered that under the terms of the Agreement, defendant was entitled to $138,259.18 (thirty percent of plaintiff\u2019s retirement income less taxes) plus interest accruing at the rate of eight percent per annum from 19 September 1990 until paid. Plaintiff was also ordered to pay to defendant, when received, thirty percent of such Social Security benefits as he receives monthly. The court also ordered that plaintiff pay defendant $11,000 on account of attorneys\u2019 fees. Plaintiff assigns as error the court\u2019s order regarding these three payments.\nRetirement Benefits\nThe district court ordered that plaintiff \u201cwithin ten days, pay to defendant the sum of $138,259.18, plus interest accruing at the rate of eight percent per annum from September 19, 1990, until paid.\u201d The court found plaintiff\u2019s retirement effective 4 August 1989, thereby triggering Paragraph A.2. and entitling defendant to thirty percent of plaintiff\u2019s retirement benefits. Plaintiff contends that the purported assignment of pension benefits was void on the date it was made, 30 July 1981, under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974. We disagree.\nIn 1974, Congress passed ERISA \u201cin order to provide better protection for beneficiaries of employee pension and welfare benefit plans\u201d in the private workplace. Rohrbeck v. Rohrbeck, 318 Md. 28, 30, 566 A.2d 767, 768 (1989). ERISA contained a series of amendments relating to requirements including reporting and disclosure, vesting, discontinuance, and payment of benefits. Id. One of the provisions added to ERISA was an anti-alienation requirement or \u201cspendthrift\u201d provision which required that \u201c[e]ach pension plan shall provide that benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated.\u201d 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 1056(d)(1) (1985).\nAnother amendment which became part of the labor code was a preemption provision that stated \u201c[ERISA] shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan [subject to ERISA requirements].\u201d 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 1144(a) (1985). Therefore, under the 1974 ERISA, a beneficiary could not assign or alienate his retirement benefits to anyone under any State law relating to employment benefit plans. It is under this strict construction of ERISA plaintiff would have the Court conclude that pursuant to \u00a7\u00a7 1056(d)(1) and 1144(a) of the Code, the assignment of thirty percent of his retirement benefits was void from the date of the Consent Judgment. We are not persuaded by plaintiffs narrow reading of these two ERISA provisions.\nPlaintiff ignores significant case law regarding the 1974 ERISA provisions at issue. The combination of the anti-alienation provision and the preemption provision eventually raised questions, evidently not anticipated by Congress, as to the validity of orders entered in State domestic relations proceedings whereby pension benefits were required to be paid to a person other than the plan beneficiary, i.e., spouse or child. Rohrbeck, 318 Md. 28, 566 A.2d 767. The majority of jurisdictions confronting this issue concluded that an implied exemption to the anti-assignment provision existed for domestic relation decrees authorizing the transfer of retirement benefits in satisfaction of support obligations. See Tenneco Inc. v. First Virginia Bank of Tidewater, 698 F.2d 688 (4th Cir. 1983) (employee\u2019s interest in benefit plan is subject to garnishment where debt is support obligation); Cody v. Riecker, 594 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979) (garnishment of pension fund benefits under plan subject to ERISA due to arrearages in wife and child support obligations was not in conflict with anti-alienation clause of ERISA); American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1979) (garnishment order may be used to satisfy court ordered family support payments out of pension benefits because such an order is impliedly excepted from the anti-alienation and preemption clauses of ERISA); see also Ball v. Revised Retirement Plan, Etc., 522 F. Supp. 718 (1981); Ward v. Ward, 164 N.J. Super. 354, 396 A.2d 365 (1978). For example, in Cody, 594 F.2d 314, the Second Circuit court relied on Merry, 592 F.2d 118, which upheld a garnishment of an ERISA regulated pension plan to enforce a post-divorce judgment for alimony and child support payments. The Cody court stated that \u201cit may not be necessary to distinguish, in the ERISA context, between garnishments to enforce family support orders and spousal property settlements.\u201d Cody, 594 F.2d at 316.\nSince the 1981 judgment in the case at bar and the implied exception followed by the majority of jurisdictions, Congress has amended the anti-alienation clause of ERISA. Known as the Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, Congress amended \u00a7 1056(d) by creating an exception for certain domestic relations orders. In short, \u00a7 1056(d)(3)(A) excepted from anti-alienation domestic relations orders which were determined to be qualified domestic relations orders (QDRO). 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 1056(d)(3)(A) (1985). The House Education and Labor Committee\u2019s intent was to remove the confusion then existing in this area and to remove ERISA as a barrier to recovery of alimony, child support and property settlements under certain conditions. Rohrbeck, 318 Md. 28, 566 A.2d 767. The 1984 amendment, however, has no retroactive effect on the 1981 judgment at issue. See 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 1001, Pub. L. No. 98-397, \u00a7 303(d) (1985) (plan administrator must have been actually paying out the benefits in 1985 to qualify for retroactivity). Thus, we are guided by the law that existed at the time of the 1981 judgment and recognize Congressional intent to create an exception for domestic orders relating to the assignment or alienation of retirement benefits pursuant to spouse or child support obligations. We hold that the trial court\u2019s order pursuant to the 1981 Consent Judgment for plaintiff to pay defendant $138,259.18 plus interest was not error.\nSocial Security Benefits\nPlaintiff\u2019s next assignment of error is that the court erred by ordering that \u201c[p]laintiff shall pay to defendant, when received, thirty percent of such social security benefits as he receives. Such payments shall be paid monthly.\u201d Plaintiff contends that insofar as the order attempts to enforce the assignment of Social Security benefits, it is void. He bases his argument on provisions of the Social Security Act which prohibit assignments of Social Security benefits. We disagree with plaintiff\u2019s contention.\nLike ERISA, the Social Security Act provides an exhaustive benefit plan. Although the Social Security Act provides a scheme by which divorced spouses may be entitled to portions of their former spouse\u2019s benefits, see 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 402(b)(1) (1991), the Act also has an anti-alienation clause and preemption clause similar in nature to the ones in ERISA:\n(a) The right of any person to any future payment under this subchapter shall not be transferable or assignable, at law or in equity, and none of the moneys paid or payable or rights existing under this subchapter shall be subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process . . . .\n(b) No other provision of law, enacted before, on, or after [the date of the enactment of this section] April 20, 1983, may be construed to limit, supersede, or otherwise modify the provisions of this section except to the extent that it does so by express reference to this section.\n42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 407(a) and (b) (1991). In 1975, Congress created an exception to the anti-alienation clause by enacting 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 659(a), which provides:\nNotwithstanding any other provision of law (including section 407 [anti-assignment and preemption clauses] of this title) . . ., [Social Security benefits] payable ... to any individual . . . shall be subject ... to legal process brought for the enforcement, against such individual of his legal obligations to provide child support or make alimony payments.\n42 U.S.C. \u00a7 659(a) (1991).\nThe purpose of the anti-assignment clause, as recognized by the majority of jurisdictions, is to protect the Social Security benefit recipient and those dependent upon him from claims of creditors. Kirk v. Kirk, 577 A.2d 976 (1990); Sharlot v. Sharlot, 494 N.Y.S.2d 238, 110 A.D.2d 299 (1985); Meadows v. Meadows, 619 P.2d 598 (1980); Brown v. Brown, 32 Ohio App. 2d 139, 288 N.E.2d 852 (1972). But where a wife seeks her husband\u2019s Social Security benefits in the form of alimony, she is not a creditor as such; and the statute should not apply, therefore, to defeat her claim for alimony. Brown, 32 Ohio App. 2d 139, 288 N.E.2d 852.\nIt would be inconsistent to hold that a wife could not reach Social Security benefits under \u00a7 407(a) because the statute allowing benefits to be subject to legal process for a claim of alimony, \u00a7 659(a), was enacted partially to protect her as a dependent. Id. It is true that this Court in Cruise v. Cruise, 92 N.C. App. 586, 374 S.E.2d 882 (1989) reversed a trial court\u2019s order awarding the wife a percentage of defendant\u2019s Social Security benefits, but that case involved a distribution of benefits under North Carolina\u2019s Equitable Distribution statute. Federal law precludes Social Security benefits from being treated by state courts as property. Id.; 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 662(c) (1984). This case involves alimony payments pursuant to a Separation Agreement and Property Settlement Agreement. Unlike Cruise, the payments at issue in the case at bar are subject to the anti-alienation exception, \u00a7 659(a).\nClearly Congress has expressly recognized an exception to the general bar against assignments in the case of Social Security benefits paid to individuals obligated to pay alimony. See Brevard v. Brevard, 74 N.C. App. 484, 328 S.E.2d 789 (1985). Future Social Security benefits payable to plaintiff are subject to Judge Sharpe\u2019s order enforcing plaintiff\u2019s obligation under the Consent Judgment to make alimony payments in the form of a percentage of Social Security benefits. Plaintiff\u2019s requests for this Court to void the order based on the anti-alienation and preemption clauses of \u00a7\u00a7 407(a) and (b) is rejected.\nAttorneys\u2019 Fees\nFinally, plaintiff contends that the court was without authority to make an award of attorneys\u2019 fees pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-16.4 (1987) because at the time the order was entered, defendant was not the \u201cspouse\u201d of plaintiff as defined by statute and Webster\u2019s Dictionary. We disagree.\nThis Court has held that attorneys\u2019 fees are only allowed in alimony cases that come within the ambit of G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 50-16.4 and 50-16.3. Upchurch v. Upchurch, 34 N.C. App. 658, 239 S.E.2d 701 (1977), cert. denied, 294 N.C. 363, 242 S.E.2d 634 (1978). G.S. \u00a7 50-16.4 provides:\nAt any time that a dependent spouse would be entitled to alimony pendente lite pursuant to G.S. 50-16.3, the court may, upon application of such spouse, enter an order for reasonable counsel fees for the benefit of such spouse, to be paid and secured by the supporting spouse in the same manner as alimony.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-16.4 (1987). The effect of this section is not to limit attorneys\u2019 fees only to alimony pendente lite proceedings. Upchurch, 34 N.C. App. 658, 239 S.E.2d 701. Rather, anytime a dependent spouse can show grounds for alimony pendente lite under G.S. \u00a7 50-16.3, the court can award attorneys\u2019 fees. \u201cAnytime\u201d includes time subsequent to the determination of the issues in the dependent spouse\u2019s favor at the trial of his or her cause on the merits. Id. To recover attorneys\u2019 fees pursuant to G.S. \u00a7 50-16.3, the spouse must show he or she (1) is entitled to the relief demanded, (2) is a dependent spouse, and (3) has insufficient means to subsist during prosecution or defense of the suit and to defray the expenses thereof. Caldwell v. Caldwell, 86 N.C. App. 225, 356 S.E.2d 821, cert. denied, 320 N.C. 791, 361 S.E.2d 72 (1987). Plaintiff does not argue that defendant fails to meet the three requirements set forth above; he merely contends that defendant does not meet the definition of a \u201cspouse\u201d by virtue of the divorce decree rendered in 1981. He contends that a spouse means a husband or wife, and that defendant was no longer a wife at the time of the 13 April 1992 order awarding attorneys\u2019 fees.\nPlaintiffs argument is without merit. We do not believe that a spouse loses her status for purposes of the relevant provisions of \u00a7 50-16 by obtaining a divorce decree. If we were to hold that defendant cannot be awarded attorneys\u2019 fees only because she is no longer the per se wife of plaintiff, the purpose of allowance for attorneys\u2019 fees would be defeated. An award of attorneys\u2019 fees is meant to enable the dependent spouse to employ counsel to meet her supporting spouse on an equal level at trial, or subsequent to trial, while still maintaining herself according to her station in life. See Little v. Little, 12 N.C. App. 353, 183 S.E.2d 278 (1971). In order to award attorneys\u2019 fees in an alimony case, the trial court must make findings of facts showing that the fees are allowable and that the amount awarded is reasonable. Upchurch, 34 N.C. App. 658, 239 S.E.2d 701. The trial court made findings of fact as to these factors, and thus, we conclude that attorneys\u2019 fees were properly awarded.\nAffirmed.\nJudges COZORT and MARTIN concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "ARNOLD, Chief Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "White & Crumpler, hy Fred G. Crumpler, Jr. and Clyde C. Randolph, Jr., for plaintiff-appellant.", "Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, by Jimmy H. Barnhill, for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ROBERT L. EVANS, Plaintiff v. PEGGY SHOAF EVANS, Defendant\nNo. 9221DC810\n(Filed 7 September 1993)\n1. Divorce and Separation \u00a7 20 (NCI4th)\u2014 separation agreement \u2014pension benefits as alimony \u2014no prohibition by ERISA\nA provision in a 1981 separation agreement incorporated into a consent judgment requiring the husband to pay to the wife as alimony thirty percent of his pension benefits upon his retirement was not void on the date the agreement was entered under the anti-alienation and preemption clauses of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) since ERISA had been construed to contain an implied exception to the anti-assignment clause for domestic orders relating to the assignment of retirement benefits pursuant to spouse or child support obligations before a specific exception was enacted in 1984.\nAm Jur 2d, Divorce and Separation \u00a7 838 et seq.\n2. Divorce and Separation \u00a7 20 (NCL\u00e1th)\u2014 separation agreement \u2014 social security benefits as alimony \u2014no prohibition by Social Security Act\nA provision in a 1981 separation agreement incorporated into a consent judgment requiring the husband to pay to the wife as alimony thirty percent of his social security benefits was not void under the anti-alienation and preemption clauses of the Social Security Act because this provision comes within the exception to the anti-alienation clause enacted in 1975 subjecting social security benefits to legal process to enforce a beneficiary\u2019s alimony obligations.\nAm Jur 2d, Divorce and Separation \u00a7 838 et seq.\n3. Divorce and Separation \u00a7 526 (NCI4th)\u2014 alimony case \u2014 attorney\u2019s fees \u2014wife as \u201cspouse\u201d after divorce\nThe trial court was not without authority to award attorney\u2019s fees to defendant as the dependent spouse in an alimony action after a divorce had been entered and defendant was no longer plaintiff\u2019s wife since defendant did not lose her status as a \u201cspouse\u201d for purposes of N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 50-16.3 and 50-16.4 at the time of the divorce.\nAm Jur 2d, Divorce and Separation \u00a7 596.\nAmount of attorneys\u2019 fees in matters involving domestic relations. 59 ALR3d 152.\nAppeal by plaintiff from order entered 13 April 1992 in Forsyth County District Court by Judge Margaret L. Sharpe. Heard in the Court of Appeals 16 June 1993.\nPlaintiff and defendant were married on 24 March 1951. Plaintiff-husband filed for absolute divorce on 1 June 1979, and defendant-wife filed an answer and counterclaim for temporary and permanent alimony. The marriage was dissolved by divorce judgment entered 30 July 1981. On the same day, the parties entered into a Separation Agreement and Property Settlement Agreement (hereinafter \u201cAgreement\u201d) wherein plaintiff agreed to pay alimony to defendant, as well as pay her attorney\u2019s fees. The only child of the marriage was emancipated. The Agreement was incorporated into a Consent Judgment which ordered plaintiff to comply with the Agreement.\nAt the time the Consent Judgment was entered, plaintiff was employed by Piedmont Airlines as a commercial airline pilot earning approximately $80,000 per year. He continued his employment with Piedmont until he retired in August 1989, whereupon he received a lump sum retirement benefit distribution of $688,267.52 before taxes. Defendant was unemployed.\nPrior to August 1989, plaintiff paid to defendant alimony in compliance with the terms of the Agreement. On 19 September 1990, however, after a year of not receiving alimony payments in accordance with the Consent Judgment, defendant filed a Motion in the Cause seeking to hold plaintiff in contempt. Plaintiff subsequently filed a Motion pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-16.9 (1987) seeking an order modifying the prior order regarding payment of alimony based on substantial and material changes in circumstances. On 5 December 1990, a Temporary Order was entered requiring plaintiff to pay defendant $3,517.20, thereby bringing plaintiff current with his obligations under the Agreement without prejudice to the determination of what amounts were owed by plaintiff to defendant pursuant to the 1981 Agreement.\nThese matters came on for hearing before Judge Margaret L. Sharpe presiding at the 3 February 1992 Session of Forsyth County Civil District Court. On 13 April 1992, Judge Sharpe entered judgment and order in favor of defendant which plaintiff now appeals.\nWhite & Crumpler, hy Fred G. Crumpler, Jr. and Clyde C. Randolph, Jr., for plaintiff-appellant.\nWomble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, by Jimmy H. Barnhill, for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0792-01", "first_page_order": 822, "last_page_order": 830 }