{ "id": 8522071, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM MICHAEL HODGE, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Hodge", "decision_date": "1993-11-02", "docket_number": "No. 9210SC1286", "first_page": "462", "last_page": "470", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "112 N.C. App. 462" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "397 S.E.2d 337", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "470" }, { "page": "341" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 N.C. App. 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527002 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/100/0465-01" ] }, { "cite": "334 S.E.2d 107", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Imposition of a thirty year sentence for an habitual felon who could have received a maximum sentence of life imprisonment does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment." } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "76 N.C. App. 638", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527755 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Imposition of a thirty year sentence for an habitual felon who could have received a maximum sentence of life imprisonment does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment." } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/76/0638-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-7.6", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 S.E.2d 689", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "697" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 584", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565300 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "598" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0584-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 S.E.2d 294", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "296" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "282 N.C. 240", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564162 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "243-44" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/282/0240-01" ] }, { "cite": "233 S.E.2d 585", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "587" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 N.C. 431", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569971 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "433" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/292/0431-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 S.E.2d 249", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "253" }, { "page": "254" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 N.C. 110", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4721300 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "118" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/313/0110-01" ] }, { "cite": "357 S.E.2d 636", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "320 N.C. 143", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4725415 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/320/0143-01" ] }, { "cite": "313 S.E.2d 507", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2401681 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0482-01" ] }, { "cite": "381 S.E.2d 869", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "871" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 N.C. App. 72", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8519499 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "76" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/95/0072-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 S.E.2d 706", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "714" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "281 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573594 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/281/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "277 S.E.2d 376", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "384" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 N.C. 75", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571418 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "87" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/303/0075-01" ] }, { "cite": "379 S.E.2d 255", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "260" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "93 N.C. App. 596", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8528377 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "602" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/93/0596-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 S.E.2d 470", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 712", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2491524, 2490757, 2487690, 2488241, 2492148 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0712-05", "/nc/325/0712-04", "/nc/325/0712-03", "/nc/325/0712-02", "/nc/325/0712-01" ] }, { "cite": "383 S.E.2d 409", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "415" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 N.C. App. 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521620 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "504" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/95/0494-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 718, "char_count": 18205, "ocr_confidence": 0.76, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1649908910660603e-07, "percentile": 0.5849258006933995 }, "sha256": "6aea073f18ff878274fd0f7b77f52f76dbec9d7a07ae2cc3bb38091ba580b25b", "simhash": "1:01507522c62e505e", "word_count": 2958 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:48:17.524906+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges WELLS and LEWIS concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM MICHAEL HODGE, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MARTIN, Judge.\nDefendant assigns as error the trial court\u2019s denial of his motion to dismiss the charge of felonious possession of cocaine in case No. 91 CRS 85692. In addition, defendant makes numerous assignments of error relating to the verdict finding defendant to be an habitual felon. For the reasons set forth herein, we conclude that defendant received a fair trial, free from prejudicial error.\nDefendant first assigns error to the trial court\u2019s denial of his motion to dismiss the charge of felonious possession of cocaine in case No. 91 CRS 85692. In ruling upon a motion to dismiss, the trial court must examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of all reasonable inferences which may be drawn from the evidence. State v. Sanders, 95 N.C. App. 494, 504, 383 S.E.2d 409, 415, disc. review denied, 325 N.C. 712, 388 S.E.2d 470 (1989). The court must determine whether there is substantial evidence of each essential element of the crime charged, and if so, the motion must be denied and the case submitted to the jury. State v. Styles, 93 N.C. App. 596, 602, 379 S.E.2d 255, 260 (1989). \u201c \u2018Substantial evidence\u2019 is that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.\u201d State v. Cox, 303 N.C. 75, 87, 277 S.E.2d 376, 384 (1981).\nConstructive possession of a controlled substance applies where the defendant \u201chas both the power and intent to control its disposition or use.\u201d State v. Harvey, 281 N.C. 1, 12, 187 S.E.2d 706, 714 (1972). When the substance is found on the premises under the exclusive control of the defendant, this fact alone may support an inference of constructive possession. State v. Givens, 95 N.C. App. 72, 76, 381 S.E.2d 869, 871 (1989). If the defendant\u2019s possession over the premises is nonexclusive, constructive possession may not be inferred without other incriminating circumstances. Id.\nThe State\u2019s evidence showed that defendant was observed entering a pickup truck occupied by two other individuals after leaving the residence of a known drug dealer. When Detective Stone stopped the vehicle he observed drug paraphernalia protruding from defendant\u2019s shirt pocket. When asked what the paraphernalia was used for, defendant responded that he was going home to get \u201chigh.\u201d Defendant was then asked to exit the vehicle, whereupon Detective Stone observed a small amount of cocaine on the pickup truck seat where defendant had been seated. Defendant later stated to Detective Stone that he used, but did not sell cocaine and that he bought the cocaine so that he could go home and get \u201chigh.\u201d Although defendant later stated that the cocaine did not belong to him and that it had been placed underneath him by the vehicle\u2019s driver, this contradiction is to be resolved in favor of the State for purposes of the motion. State v. Moose, 310 N.C. 482, 313 S.E.2d 507 (1984).\nThis evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the State, tends to show that the cocaine was found in a place not within defendant\u2019s exclusive possession. However, defendant\u2019s possession of cocaine paraphernalia, the location of the substance beneath defendant\u2019s body, and his statements that he bought the cocaine so that he could get high are substantial incriminating circumstances from which defendant\u2019s constructive possession of the cocaine could be inferred. State v. McLaurin, 320 N.C. 143, 357 S.E.2d 636 (1987). This assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant assigns error to the denial of his motion to dismiss the habitual felon indictment on the ground that the indictment failed to comply with G.S. \u00a7 14-7.3. Defendant first contends that the statute requires that the indictment charging defendant with the underlying felony must also charge that defendant is an habitual felon; in this case he was charged in one bill of indictment with felonious possession of cocaine, and in a separate bill of indictment with being an habitual felon. Defendant argues that this alleged noncompliance with G.S. \u00a7 14-7.3 renders the indictments invalid. We disagree.\nOur Supreme Court has previously resolved this issue against defendant in State v. Todd, 313 N.C. 110, 326 S.E.2d 249 (1985) and State v. Allen, 292 N.C. 431, 233 S.E.2d 585 (1977). In Allen, the Court stated:\nProperly construed this act clearly contemplates that when one who has already attained the status of an habitual felon is indicted for the commission of another felony, that person may then be also indicted in a separate bill as being an habitual felon. (Emphasis added.)\nState v. Allen, 292 N.C. at 433, 233 S.E.2d at 587. Based on Todd and Allen, we reject defendant\u2019s argument.\nDefendant also contends that the habitual felon indictment was fatally flawed because it did not contain the requisite allegations under G.S. \u00a7 14-7.3, which provides that indictments charging a person with being an habitual felon must set forth the name of the state or other sovereign against whom the previous felonies were committed. Defendant argues that the indictment is invalid because in two instances, it refers only to \u201cWake County\u201d without naming any state. We disagree.\n\u201cThe purpose of an indictment is: (1) to give the defendant notice of the charge against him to the end that he may prepare his defense . . . ; and (2) to enable the court to know what judgment to pronounce in case of conviction.\u201d State v. Russell, 282 N.C. 240, 243-44, 192 S.E.2d 294, 296 (1972). The habitual felon indictment in the present case alleges that the felony of common law robbery was committed in \u201cWake County, North Carolina,\u201d and that the two subsequent felonies were committed in \u201cWake County.\u201d The description of defendant\u2019s three prior felony convictions is contained in the same sentence, separated only by semi-colons. The use of \u201cWake County\u201d to describe the sovereignty against which the felonies were committed, is clearly a reference to Wake County, North Carolina. We cannot discern, and defendant does not suggest, how he was prevented from preparing an adequate defense because the indictment utilized the words \u201cWake County\u201d rather than \u201cWake County, North Carolina.\u201d Defendant\u2019s assignments of error related to the denial of his motion to dismiss the habitual felon indictment on statutory grounds are overruled.\nDefendant next assigns as error the trial court\u2019s denial of his motion to dismiss the habitual felon indictment on constitutional grounds. Defendant argues that the Habitual Felon Act, G.S. \u00a7 14-7.1 et seq., is unconstitutional as written and as applied to him. Specifically, defendant argues that prosecution under the statute denies him due process and equal protection of the law and subjects him to double jeopardy and cruel and unusual punishment. We disagree.\nIn State v. Todd, 313 N.C. 110, 326 S.E.2d 249 (1985), the Court held that the procedures set forth in G.S. \u00a7 14-7.1 et seq., comport with a criminal defendant\u2019s federal and state constitutional guarantees. Todd, 313 N.C. at 118, 326 S.E.2d at 253. However, a sentence may be vacated on the ground of excessiveness if the defendant shows \u201can abuse of discretion, procedural conduct prejudicial to defendant, circumstances which manifest inherent unfairness or injustice, or conduct which offends the public sense of fair play.\u201d Id. at 119, 326 S.E.2d at 254, quoting, State v. Ahearn, 307 N.C. 584, 598, 300 S.E.2d 689, 697 (1983).\nBased on Todd, we hold that defendant\u2019s prosecution as an habitual felon neither denied him due process or equal protection of the law nor subjected him to double jeopardy. Likewise, we are not persuaded that defendant\u2019s sentences are excessive. As an habitual offender, a defendant must be sentenced as a class C felon and shall not receive a sentence of less than 14 years imprisonment. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-7.6. Class C felons are punishable by imprisonment up to 50 years, or by life imprisonment. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-l.l(a)(3). Defendant was found to be an habitual offender and was sentenced to fourteen years of imprisonment, the minimum sentence allowed under the habitual felon statute. In light of the maximum sentence allowed under the statute, as well as defendant\u2019s history of felony convictions, we hold that defendant has failed to show an abuse of discretion, procedural misconduct, unfairness, injustice, or conduct offensive to the public sense of fair play. See State v. Aldridge, 76 N.C. App. 638, 334 S.E.2d 107 (1985) (Imposition of a thirty year sentence for an habitual felon who could have received a maximum sentence of life imprisonment does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.) This assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant also argues that the habitual felon statute is unconstitutional as applied to him on the ground that it authorizes enhanced sentencing where the principal felony differs from the felonies which establish defendant as an habitual felon. According to defendant, he could only be sentenced as an habitual offender for felonious possession of cocaine if his prior convictions were also for felonious possession of cocaine. We reject this novel proposition. G.S. \u00a7 14-7.1 declares that an habitual felon is a person \u201cwho has been convicted of or plead guilty to three felony offenses . ...\u201d We believe that the manifest intent of the General Assembly in enacting the Habitual Felon Act was to insure lengthier sentences for those persons who repeatedly violate our criminal laws. Nowhere in the Act do we find any indication that the Act was intended to apply only to those persons who repeatedly violate the same criminal law, and we decline to write any such requirement into the law. This assignment of error is overruled.\nBy his next assignments of error, defendant contends the trial court erred by admitting into evidence certain documents contained in State\u2019s Exhibit 12. Exhibit 12 was the original file in case number 90 CRS 72404 in the name of \u201cMichael Hodge.\u201d The State\u2019s purpose for introducing these documents was to show that the \u201cMichael Hodge\u201d convicted of breaking and entering in case number 90 CRS 72404, was the defendant in the present case, William Michael Hodge. Defendant argues that the trial court erred by admitting these documents because the State failed to present a prima facie basis for their admission. We disagree.\nG.S. \u00a7 14-7.4 provides in pertinent part:\nA prior conviction may be proved by stipulation of the parties or by the original or a certified copy of the court record of the prior conviction. The original or certified copy of the court record, bearing the same name as that by which the defendant is charged, shall be prima facie evidence that the defendant named therein is the same as the defendant before the court, and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts set out therein.\nIn State v. Petty, 100 N.C. App. 465, 397 S.E.2d 337 (1990), this Court held that \u201cMartin Bernard Petty\u201d and \u201cMartin Petty\u201d were the \u201csame name\u201d for purposes of G.S. \u00a7 14-7.4. Id. at 470, 397 S.E.2d at 341.\nIn the present case, the documents introduced to prove defendant\u2019s prior conviction for breaking and entering in case 90 CRS 72404 were all identified as accurate copies of the originals. Each of the documents indicated that defendant\u2019s name in 90 CRS 72404 was \u201cMichael Hodge.\u201d Based on the decision in Petty, we hold that for purposes of G.S. \u00a7 14-7.4 \u201cMichael Hodge\u201d and \u201cWilliam Michael Hodge\u201d are the same name, and that the documents at issue therefore constituted prima facie evidence that the defendant named in 90 CRS 72404 was the same as the defendant before the court. This assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant also argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the habitual felon indictment on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence. Defendant bases this contention on the premise that the judgment in case 90 CRS 72404 was inadmissible. Having already determined that the judgment in case 90 CRS 72404 was properly admitted, we overrule this assignment of error.\nNo error.\nJudges WELLS and LEWIS concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "MARTIN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Assistant Attorney General Jeffrey P. Gray, for the State.", "John T. Hall for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM MICHAEL HODGE, Defendant\nNo. 9210SC1286\n(Filed 2 November 1993)\n1. Narcotics, Controlled Substances, and Paraphernalia \u00a7 155 (NCI4th) \u2014 felonious possession of cocaine \u2014 sufficiency of evidence of constructive possession\nEvidence was sufficient to support an inference of defendant\u2019s constructive possession of cocaine and therefore to support his conviction for felonious possession of cocaine where it tended to show that defendant was observed entering a pickup truck occupied by two other individuals after leaving the residence of a known drug dealer; an officer stopped the vehicle and observed drug paraphernalia protruding from defendant\u2019s shirt pocket; defendant stated that he intended to get high; and when defendant exited the vehicle an officer observed cocaine where defendant had been seated.\nAm Jur 2d, Drugs, Narcotics and Poisons \u00a7 47.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 1284 (NCI4th)\u2014 prosecution for cocaine possession and habitual felon \u2014separate indictments \u2014no error\nThere was no merit to defendant\u2019s contention that the habitual felon statute, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-7.3, required that the indictment charging him with the underlying felony must also charge that he was an habitual felon and that he could not be charged in a separate indictment with being an habitual felon.\nAm Jur 2d, Habitual Criminals and Subsequent Offenders \u00a7\u00a7 20, 21.\n3. Criminal Law \u00a7 1283 (NCI4th)\u2014 habitual felon indictment\u2014 name of state omitted \u2014 indictment not fatally flawed\nAn habitual felon indictment was not fatally flawed because it did not state specifically the name of the state or other sovereign against whom two of the previous felonies were committed, since the indictment alleged that one felony was committed in \u201cWake County, North Carolina\u201d and two other felonies were committed in \u201cWake County\u201d; the description of defendant\u2019s three prior felony convictions was contained in the same sentence, separated only by semi-colons; the use of \u201cWake County\u201d to describe the sovereignty against which the felonies were committed was clearly a reference to Wake County, North Carolina; and defendant was not prevented from preparing an adequate defense because the indictment did not include the words \u201cNorth Carolina.\u201d\nAm Jur 2d, Habitual Criminals and Subsequent Offenders \u00a7\u00a7 20, 21.\n4. Criminal Law \u00a7 1281 (NCI4th)\u2014 habitual felon \u2014 no denial of . equal protection or due process\nDefendant\u2019s prosecution as an habitual felon neither denied him due process or equal protection of the law nor subjected him to double jeopardy, nor was his fourteen-year minimum sentence excessive.\nAm Jur 2d, Habitual and Subsequent Offenders \u00a7\u00a7 2, 5.\n5. Criminal Law \u00a7 1281 (NCI4th) \u2014 habitual felon statute \u2014principal felony different from underlying felonies \u2014 statute constitutionally applied\nThe habitual felon statute is not unconstitutional as applied to defendant because it authorized enhanced sentencing where the principal felony differed from the felonies which established him as an habitual felon.\nAm Jur 2d, Habitual Criminals and Subsequent Offenders \u00a7\u00a7 2, 3, 5.\n6. Criminal Law \u00a7 1283 (NCI4th|\u2014 habitual felon \u2014 file in another case with similar name \u2014 same defendant \u2014 evidence admissible\nWhere defendant was charged with being an habitual felon, the trial court did not err in admitting the original file in another case in the name of \u201cMichael Hodge,\u201d since, for the purposes of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-7.4, \u201cMichael Hodge\u201d and defendant \u201cWilliam Michael Hodge\u201d were the same name, and the documents at issue constituted prima facie evidence that defendant named in the file was the same as defendant before the court.\nAm Jur 2d, Habitual Criminals and Subsequent Offenders \u00a7\u00a7 2, 5, 26.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 2 September 1992 by Judge F. Gordon Battle in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 28 September 1993.\nDefendant was charged in a proper bill of indictment in case No. 91 CRS 85692 with felonious possession of cocaine and, in a separate bill of indictment in case No. 92 CRS 6647, with being an habitual felon under G.S. \u00a7 14-7.1. His motion to dismiss the habitual felon indictment was denied. The State\u2019s evidence in case No. 91 CRS 85692 tended to show that on 22 November 1991 the Wake County Sheriff\u2019s Department was conducting a surveillance of the home of a known drug dealer in Zebulon, North Carolina. Detective Stone observed defendant leave the residence and enter the passenger side of a pickup truck. The vehicle was driven by another male and a female passenger occupied the center of the passenger seat. After following the vehicle away from the residence, Detective Stone stopped the vehicle and asked the driver for his license and registration. At that time, Detective Stone observed a piece of drug paraphernalia protruding from defendant\u2019s shirt pocket. Defendant told the detective that he intended to get \u201chigh.\u201d\nAfter defendant exited the truck, Detective Stone observed a small quantity of crack cocaine on the truck seat where defendant had been seated. Detective Stone thereafter arrested defendant. While en route to the magistrate\u2019s office, defendant told Stone that he was a drug user, not a drug seller, and that he had purchased the crack cocaine so that he could go home and get high. Defendant later said that the cocaine was not his, but that the driver of the vehicle had put the cocaine beneath defendant when the officer stopped the vehicle. Defendant did not present any evidence and the jury returned a verdict of guilty.\nThe trial court then conducted a proceeding pursuant to G.S. \u00a7 14-7.5 to determine defendant\u2019s status as an habitual felon. The State\u2019s evidence tended to show that defendant had previously been convicted of felony \u25a0 common law robbery and two counts of felonious breaking and entering. Defendant presented no evidence and the jury returned a verdict finding defendant to be an habitual felon. Judgment was entered sentencing defendant to imprisonment for a term of 14 years. Defendant appealed.\nAttorney General Michael F. Easley, by Assistant Attorney General Jeffrey P. Gray, for the State.\nJohn T. Hall for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0462-01", "first_page_order": 492, "last_page_order": 500 }