{ "id": 8522306, "name": "TONI GILES, Guardian Ad Litem for CODA LAMAR GILES, Plaintiff v. BERTHA SMITH, Administratrix of the Estate of HAROLD SMITH, Defendant; TONI GILES, Plaintiff v. BERTHA SMITH, Administratrix of the Estate of HAROLD SMITH, Defendant; SHIRLEY SMITH, Plaintiff v. BERTHA SMITH, Administratrix of the Estate of HAROLD SMITH, Defendant; SHIRLEY SMITH, Guardian Ad Litem for KUENETE SMITH, Plaintiff v. BERTHA SMITH, Administratrix of the Estate of HAROLD SMITH, Defendant; TONI GILES, Guardian Ad Litem for COURTNEY SHAMAR GILES, Plaintiff v. BERTHA SMITH, Administratrix of the Estate of HAROLD SMITH, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Giles v. Smith", "decision_date": "1993-11-02", "docket_number": "No. 9213DC1064", "first_page": "508", "last_page": "512", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "112 N.C. App. 508" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "314 S.E.2d 544", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 735", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2394545 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0735-01" ] }, { "cite": "432 S.E.2d 425", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "conflicts in evidence raised question of whether incapacitating stroke occurred before or as a result of automobile collision" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 N.C. App. 422", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522348 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "conflicts in evidence raised question of whether incapacitating stroke occurred before or as a result of automobile collision" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/111/0422-01" ] }, { "cite": "230 S.E.2d 775", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "affirmative defense raised by evidence that defendant suffered a sudden seizure" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "32 N.C. App. 108", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8548791 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "affirmative defense raised by evidence that defendant suffered a sudden seizure" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/32/0108-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 S.E.2d 247", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "279 N.C. 397", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569058, 8568932, 8568969, 8569105, 8569144, 8569019 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/279/0397-04", "/nc/279/0397-01", "/nc/279/0397-02", "/nc/279/0397-05", "/nc/279/0397-06", "/nc/279/0397-03" ] }, { "cite": "182 S.E.2d 193", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "11 N.C. App. 703", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8556574 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/11/0703-01" ] }, { "cite": "343 S.E.2d 15", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "80 N.C. App. 370", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523925 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/80/0370-01" ] }, { "cite": "125 S.E.2d 426", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "257 N.C. 228", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566840 ], "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/257/0228-01" ] }, { "cite": "379 S.E.2d 710", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 N.C. App. 210", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526882 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/94/0210-01" ] }, { "cite": "273 S.E.2d 445", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 400", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566689, 8566575, 8566543, 8566611, 8566643 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0400-05", "/nc/301/0400-02", "/nc/301/0400-01", "/nc/301/0400-03", "/nc/301/0400-04" ] }, { "cite": "268 S.E.2d 229", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "48 N.C. App. 202", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8549766 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/48/0202-01" ] }, { "cite": "10 A.L.R. 5th 680", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 5th", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "124 S.E.2d 877", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "256 N.C. 677", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574496 ], "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/256/0677-01" ] }, { "cite": "209 S.E.2d 439", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 N.C. 108", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563609 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/286/0108-01" ] }, { "cite": "129 S.E.2d 585", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "259 N.C. 55", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559171 ], "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/259/0055-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 S.E.2d 562", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1935, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "208 N.C. 497", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8611693 ], "year": 1935, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/208/0497-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 S.E.2d 62", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "17 N.C. App. 554", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8556253 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/17/0554-01" ] }, { "cite": "348 S.E.2d 138", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that sudden emergency is an affirmative defense which must be specifically plead" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 282", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4738949, 4735006, 4731415 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that sudden emergency is an affirmative defense which must be specifically plead" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0282-01", "/nc/318/0282-02", "/nc/318/0282-03" ] }, { "cite": "343 S.E.2d 284", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that sudden emergency is an affirmative defense which must be specifically plead" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "80 N.C. App. 661", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525406 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that sudden emergency is an affirmative defense which must be specifically plead" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/80/0661-01" ] }, { "cite": "396 S.E.2d 323", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "327 N.C. 464", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2496706 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/327/0464-01" ] }, { "cite": "386 S.E.2d 76", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 N.C. App. 443", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522843 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/96/0443-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 588, "char_count": 9938, "ocr_confidence": 0.751, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.586872753682635e-08, "percentile": 0.44955786997620323 }, "sha256": "e2abb5f35d8e614a7749d8f2b4431f71eb5d567d08f36745ffc50e7444130d6a", "simhash": "1:87e9102e54bf1c72", "word_count": 1664 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:48:17.524906+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges LEWIS and MARTIN concur." ], "parties": [ "TONI GILES, Guardian Ad Litem for CODA LAMAR GILES, Plaintiff v. BERTHA SMITH, Administratrix of the Estate of HAROLD SMITH, Defendant TONI GILES, Plaintiff v. BERTHA SMITH, Administratrix of the Estate of HAROLD SMITH, Defendant SHIRLEY SMITH, Plaintiff v. BERTHA SMITH, Administratrix of the Estate of HAROLD SMITH, Defendant SHIRLEY SMITH, Guardian Ad Litem for KUENETE SMITH, Plaintiff v. BERTHA SMITH, Administratrix of the Estate of HAROLD SMITH, Defendant TONI GILES, Guardian Ad Litem for COURTNEY SHAMAR GILES, Plaintiff v. BERTHA SMITH, Administratrix of the Estate of HAROLD SMITH, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WELLS, Judge.\nPursuant to one of her assignments of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred in setting aside the judgment and ordering a new trial. Rule 59 provides in pertinent part:\n(a) Grounds. \u2014 A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues for any of the following grounds:\n(8) Error in law occurring at the trial and objected to by the party making the motion.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 59 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.\nThe question presented by this assignment of error arose out of these somewhat unusual circumstances. At trial, two of the plaintiffs, Toni Giles and Shirley Smith, testified that they were passengers in a car being driven by defendant\u2019s intestate, Harold Smith. They were traveling on a rural road in Brunswick County when Smith ran off the road to the right, hit a parked car, returned to the road, and ran off the road again into a canal and sandpile. Plaintiffs and the other passengers were injured in the collision. On cross-examination by defendant,- without objection by plaintiffs, both of these witnesses gave testimony tending to show that just prior to running off the road, Harold Smith, the driver, appeared to suffer a seizure which caused him to \u201cslump over\u201d the steering wheel, become rigid, and lose control of the car.\nAt the charge conference, defendant requested an instruction on \u201csudden emergency,\u201d and, over plaintiffs\u2019 objection, the trial court gave such a charge. After the jury retired, defendant moved pursuant to Rule 15(b) to amend her pleadings to conform to the evidence to plead sudden emergency as an affirmative defense. The trial court denied that motion. After the jury returned verdicts for the defendant on the negligence issues and judgment was entered, plaintiffs moved for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 on the grounds that the trial court had erred in charging on sudden emergency. The trial court subsequently entered the following order:\nTHIS CAUSE coming to be heard, and being heard, upon the Plaintiffs\u2019 Motion timely made to the Court pursuant to Rule 7(b)(1) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure immediately following the return of the jury\u2019s verdict in the above causes during the June 8th, 1992, Session of Civil District Non-Jury Court for Columbus County, North Carolina, wherein said Plaintiffs, by and through counsel, moved the Court to set aside Judgment and for a new trial pursuant to Rules 59(a)(3)(8)(9) and 60(a)(b)(l) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure;\nAnd IT appearing TO the Court that Plaintiffs\u2019 Motion made pursuant to Rule 59(a)(8) is meritorious in that an error of law had occurred during the trial of these matters whereby the jury was, over timely objections duly made the Plaintiffs, instructed as to the sudden emergency doctrine, when the same had not been plead as an affirmative defense in the Defendant\u2019s pleadings as required by Rule 8 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure;\nIt IS, THEREFORE, in the discretion of the Court, ORDERED that the verdict previously rendered be set aside, and a new trial granted in all cases as hereinabove entitled.\nIt IS SO ORDERED, this the 8th day of June, 1992.\nThe consideration of sudden emergency has been described as a convenient name for the effect which certain external forces can have on the determination of whether an individual has breached a duty of reasonable care. Bolick v. Sunbird Airlines, Inc., 96 N.C. App. 443, 386 S.E.2d 76 (1989), aff'd, 327 N.C. 464, 396 S.E.2d 323 (1990). Sudden emergency does not change or reduce the standard of reasonable care. It is simply one of the factors to be considered in determining whether a person acted reasonably under the circumstances. Id. The sudden emergency doctrine permits the court to call to the attention of the jury that an emergency faced by the actor may influence its determination of whether specific conduct was reasonable under the circumstances. The doctrine of sudden emergency is not a legal defense which operates to bar an action. Id. But cf. Hinson v. Brown, 80 N.C. App. 661, 343 S.E.2d 284, rev. denied, 318 N.C. 282, 348 S.E.2d 138 (1986) (holding that sudden emergency is an affirmative defense which must be specifically plead). External forces that have been found to create sudden emergencies include: automobile crossing the center line, Roberts v. Whitley, 17 N.C. App. 554, 195 S.E.2d 62 (1973); a tire blowing out, Ingle v. Cassady, 208 N.C. 497, 181 S.E.2d 562 (1935), Crowe v. Crowe, 259 N.C. 55, 129 S.E.2d 585 (1963); a disabled vehicle partially blocking the road at night, Foy v. Bremson, 286 N.C. 108, 209 S.E.2d 439 (1974); and severe weather, such as dense fog, Lawing v. Landis, 256 N.C. 677, 124 S.E.2d 877 (1962), and severe rain, Bolick, supra. See generally, Charles E. Daye and Mark W. Morris, North Carolina Law of Torts \u00a7 16.40.4 (1991). But see Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Modern Status of Sudden Emergency Doctrine, 10 A.L.R. 5th 680 (1993), for a criticism of the rule.\nThe doctrine of sudden emergency should not be confused with the defense of \u201cunavoidable accident.\u201d Prosser and Keeton define unavoidable accident as \u201can occurrence which was not intended and which, under all the circumstances, could not have been foreseen or prevented by the exercise of reasonable precautions.\u201d W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts \u00a7 29, at 162 (5th ed. 1984). An unavoidable accident \u201ccan only occur in the absence of causal negligence.\u201d Brewer v. Majors, 48 N.C. App. 202, 268 S.E.2d 229, rev. denied, 301 N.C. 400, 273 S.E.2d 445 (1980). Our courts have recognized and applied the term \u201cunavoidable accident\u201d to the following circumstances: a woman injured by a dog on a leash, Hunnicutt v. Lundberg, 94 N.C. App. 210, 379 S.E.2d 710 (1989); children darting into the street, Dixon v. Lilly, 257 N.C. 228, 125 S.E.2d 426 (1962); and defective brakes, Indiana Lumbermen\u2019s Mutual v. Champion, 80 N.C. App. 370, 343 S.E.2d 15 (1986). There is no liability in these cases because defendant is simply not negligent. This Court has also recognized that sudden incapacitation caused by seizure can result in an unavoidable accident. In Wallace v. Johnson, 11 N.C. App. 703, 182 S.E.2d 193, cert. denied, 279 N.C. 397, 183 S.E.2d 247 (1971), this Court held that \u201cthe operator of a motor vehicle who becomes suddenly stricken by a fainting spell or other sudden and unforeseeable incapacitation, and is, by reason of such unfQreseen disability, unable to control the vehicle, is not chargeable with negligence.\u201d See also Smith v. Garrett, 32 N.C. App. 108, 230 S.E.2d 775 (1977) (affirmative defense raised by evidence that defendant suffered a sudden seizure) and Mobley v. Estate of Johnson, 111 N.C. App. 422, 432 S.E.2d 425 (1993) (conflicts in evidence raised question of whether incapacitating stroke occurred before or as a result of automobile collision).\nWhen the trial court instructs the jury on an issue not raised by the evidence, a new trial is required. See Jacobs v. Locklear, 310 N.C. 735, 314 S.E.2d 544 (1984). That is what occurred in this case, and, for that reason, we must affirm the trial court\u2019s order.\nThe order of the trial court granting a new trial is\nAffirmed.\nJudges LEWIS and MARTIN concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "WELLS, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Marvin J. Tedder for plaintiffs-appellees.", "Johnson & Lambeth, by Maynard M. Brown, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "TONI GILES, Guardian Ad Litem for CODA LAMAR GILES, Plaintiff v. BERTHA SMITH, Administratrix of the Estate of HAROLD SMITH, Defendant TONI GILES, Plaintiff v. BERTHA SMITH, Administratrix of the Estate of HAROLD SMITH, Defendant SHIRLEY SMITH, Plaintiff v. BERTHA SMITH, Administratrix of the Estate of HAROLD SMITH, Defendant SHIRLEY SMITH, Guardian Ad Litem for KUENETE SMITH, Plaintiff v. BERTHA SMITH, Administratrix of the Estate of HAROLD SMITH, Defendant TONI GILES, Guardian Ad Litem for COURTNEY SHAMAR GILES, Plaintiff v. BERTHA SMITH, Administratrix of the Estate of HAROLD SMITH, Defendant\nNo. 9213DC1064\n(Filed 2 November 1993)\nAutomobiles and Other Vehicles \u00a7 536 (NCI4th)\u2014 driver incapacitated by seizure \u2014instruction on sudden emergency error \u2014 unavoidable accident\nIn an action to recover for personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident where the evidence tended to show that the driver of the vehicle suffered a seizure, \u201cslumped over\u201d the wheel of the car, and then lost control of the vehicle, the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the doctrine of sudden emergency rather than the defense of unavoidable accident.\nAm Jur 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic \u00a7 773.\nAppeal by defendant from order entered 26 June 1992 in Columbus County District Court by Judge Jerry A. Jolly. Heard in the Court of Appeals 30 September 1993.\nThis action involves five separate lawsuits, commenced by plaintiffs on 6 August 1991 and consolidated for trial. Plaintiffs, passengers in a car driven by Harold Smith, alleged that the personal injuries they sustained when the car left the road and ran into a ditch were caused by the negligence of Harold Smith. The only evidence at trial was presented by plaintiff. The evidence tended to show that Smith was driving a car occupied by plaintiffs and that Smith slumped over and lost control of the car. At defendant\u2019s request, the trial court instructed the jury on the doctrine of sudden emergency. After the jury retired for deliberations, defendant moved, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 15(b), to amend her pleading to conform to the evidence to plead the doctrine of sudden emergency. The trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion. The jury returned verdicts in favor of defendant, and judgment for defendant was entered on thos\u00e9 verdicts. Plaintiff moved to set aside the verdict and for a new trial pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rules 59 and 60. The trial court granted plaintiffs\u2019 Rule 59 motion and ordered a new trial. Defendant appealed from that order.\nMarvin J. Tedder for plaintiffs-appellees.\nJohnson & Lambeth, by Maynard M. Brown, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0508-01", "first_page_order": 538, "last_page_order": 542 }