{ "id": 8521557, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. NORMAN RAY PARKER", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Parker", "decision_date": "1994-01-04", "docket_number": "No. 9222SC1143", "first_page": "216", "last_page": "226", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "113 N.C. App. 216" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "406 S.E.2d 876", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "893" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 N.C. 278", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2554614 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "307" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/329/0278-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 S.E.2d 852", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 N.C. 275", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2555392, 2556973, 2555825, 2554514, 2553433 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/329/0275-01", "/nc/329/0275-02", "/nc/329/0275-03", "/nc/329/0275-04", "/nc/329/0275-05" ] }, { "cite": "401 S.E.2d 106", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "111" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 N.C. App. 593", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8528003 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "602" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/101/0593-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 S.E.2d 48", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 268", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5306215 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0268-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 S.E.2d 516", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 574", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2539656, 2543372, 2541266, 2545174, 2539422 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0574-05", "/nc/328/0574-03", "/nc/328/0574-01", "/nc/328/0574-04", "/nc/328/0574-02" ] }, { "cite": "398 S.E.2d 645", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 N.C. App. 12", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527206 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/101/0012-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 S.E.2d 458", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 369", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2393800 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0369-01" ] }, { "cite": "55 S.E.2d 792", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1949, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "231 N.C. 39", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8628021 ], "year": 1949, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/231/0039-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 S.E.2d 805", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "806" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 457", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5308068 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "458" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0457-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 84", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "91" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 626", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4714364 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "637" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0626-01" ] }, { "cite": "65 S.E.2d 304", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1951, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "307" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "233 N.C. 741", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8616635 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1951, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "746" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/233/0741-01" ] }, { "cite": "393 S.E.2d 811", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "814" }, { "page": "814" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "327 N.C. 210", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2498848 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/327/0210-01" ] }, { "cite": "380 S.E.2d 94", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 489", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2486845 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0489-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1007, "char_count": 21021, "ocr_confidence": 0.779, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2008923744952877e-07, "percentile": 0.593620709161036 }, "sha256": "996d0d85b832fe78cc492d62d96497dfa8be08fff6aefed29d7dfb67b97a14d3", "simhash": "1:912540b2011d14db", "word_count": 3528 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:21:41.323369+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges COZORT and McCRODDEN concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. NORMAN RAY PARKER" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JOHNSON, Judge.\nOn 4 November 1991, the Iredell County Grand Jury indicted defendant Norman Ray Parker for the second degree murder of Ms. Wanda Kay Welborn. State\u2019s evidence showed the following: The victim, Ms. Welborn, was twenty-eight years old and lived with her two children. Ms. Welborn\u2019s regular job was at Hunt Manufacturing and Distributing Company but on weekends she also worked as a waitress at Shirin\u2019s Restaurant.\nDefendant had been married three times prior to a relationship with Ms. Welborn. At the time of the murder, defendant lived with his parents next to Davis Oil Company on Buffalo Shoals Road in Statesville. Defendant was sometimes an employee of Davis Oil Company but at the time of the murder, he was not working because he was recovering from a hernia operation.\nThe couple first started dating in February 1991 after Ms. Welborn broke off a relationship with Mr. Jack Kitchens. Prior to the weekend of 30 March, defendant and Ms. Welborn seemed to have a good relationship evidenced by the giving of gifts. On Easter weekend, the couple traveled to Tennessee. Defendant asked Ms. Welborn to marry him, but she refused. When she refused, defendant refused to drive her home unless she married him. Ms. Welborn was eventually able to convince him to return home. Shortly after that incident, defendant moved into Ms. Welborn\u2019s mobile home with Ms. Welborn and her two children.\nAfter defendant moved in the home, he became very jealous. He accompanied Ms. Welborn everywhere she went. Defendant watched Ms. Welborn during her entire shift at Shirin\u2019s Restaurant. When the owner asked him not to remain in the restaurant, he watched Ms. Welborn through the window. When Ms. Welborn became ill and went into the hospital, defendant monitored Ms. Welborn\u2019s telephone calls and her visitors.\nPrior to the week she was murdered, Ms. Welborn asked defendant to move out of the mobile home several times but on 22 May 1991, she insisted that he move out. Defendant pulled out a gun and threatened Ms. Welborn telling her \u201cthat if he couldn\u2019t have her no one would.\u201d He refused to relinquish the house keys. After defendant moved out, he continued to call and follow Ms. Welborn in his pickup truck on her way to work.\nThe week before she was murdered, Ms. Welborn asked her ex-boyfriend to borrow his gun, but Mr. Kitchens never gave her an answer. On Thursday, 23 May 1991, defendant attempted to talk to Ms. Welborn while she ate her lunch but Ms. Welborn would not talk to him.\nOn the same Thursday, the Iredell Sheriff\u2019s Department responded to a call that someone was going to commit suicide and wanted to talk to an officer. Lieutenant R. M. Lambert and Chief Deputy Cook responded to the call and drove out to Homer\u2019s Truckstop. Defendant drove up and told the officers that he was depressed and was going to kill himself because he and his girlfriend had broken up and life was not worth living. Defendant had a weapon but would not turn it over. After talking to Deputy Cook, defendant calmed down and left.\nDefendant talked about committing suicide to several people. In particular, he talked to Mr. Charles Gregg about committing suicide because he had broken up with Ms. Welborn. Mr. Gregg told him to go home and think about it, and defendant said, \u201cWho says I\u2019m the one that\u2019s going to get it anyway?\u201d\nAt various times prior to the murder, defendant had been seen with two pistols: a silver-barreled, dark-handled .380 automatic which he admitted owning, and a silver-barreled, brown-handled larger weapon, said to resemble a black-barreled .357 Taurus magnum revolver. On the Monday before Ms. Welborn\u2019s death, defendant had been seen practicing with the .380 automatic and a revolver.\nOn Friday night, 24 May 1991, defendant left his parents\u2019 home, leaving his .380 automatic in his father\u2019s possession. He then went to visit a friend, Ms. Jackie Sexton. Ms. Sexton resided at the home of an elderly man as his care giver. She and defendant talked until approximately 10:30 p.m. that night. Ms. Sexton told defendant that he could sleep on the couch in the living room. When Ms. Sexton\u2019s daughter, Ms. Sharon Striker, came in at 2:00 a.m., 25 May 1991, defendant was asleep on the couch.\nMr. Keith Wishtichin saw defendant at Shirin\u2019s Restaurant around 1:30 a.m. or 2:00 a.m., 25 May 1991. Mr. Wishtichin told defendant he looked like \u201chell\u201d and that he needed to go home and get some sleep. Mr. Wishtichin later saw defendant around 4:30 a.m. at the truckstop fuel desk.\nBetween 7:45 a.m. and 8:00 a.m., defendant talked to Ms. Robin Prevette at the fuel desk at Homer\u2019s Truckstop. Defendant stated at that time that he had been out all night and had a lot on his mind. The truckstop is 4.9 miles from the scene of the crime.\nAt 8:00 a.m., Ms. Striker left Ms. Sexton\u2019s house for the farmer\u2019s market and noticed defendant sitting in the driveway in his pickup truck looking straight ahead. It takes approximately five minutes to travel from Ms. Sexton\u2019s house to the truckstop and it is 11 miles from the scene of the crime.\nBetween 8:30 a.m. and 9:00 a.m., defendant went into Shirin\u2019s Restaurant to inquire about Ms. Welborn\u2019s whereabouts asking Ms. Donna Shoaf to call him if she came in. Defendant\u2019s inquiry seemed to be rehearsed. At 10:00 a.m., defendant told Mr. Archie Cox at the Lake Norman Fuel Stop that Ms. Welborn was dead.\nThe same morning at approximately 6:28 a.m., Ms. Welborn had stopped at Lake Norman Fuel Stop intersection on Arey Road for coffee. She said she was in a hurry because she was late for work. That was the last time witnesses saw her alive.\nAt about 6:40 a.m., witnesses in the vicinity of Arey Road heard three shots ring out. One of the witnesses heard squalling tires near the gunfire.\nAround 8:30 a.m., Ms. Welborn\u2019s car was discovered by Mr. Christopher Beam some 1000 feet off of Arey Road; the gear was in neutral and the car still running. Ms. Welborn was slumped over the wheel of the car and there was blood on the floorboard. There was a cigarette on Ms. Welborn\u2019s chest which appeared to have been put out by the blood. Ms. Welborn appeared to have been dead for two hours. There was a wad of money on top of a pocketbook on top of an apron in the passenger\u2019s seat.\nFurther investigation of the scene revealed tire impressions on the pull-off area of the road four hundred feet away from where Ms. Welborn\u2019s car came to rest. On the opposite side of the road from the pull-off area, there was a cigarette package and cellophane wrapper. The wrapper came from a pack of Winston Lights. Defendant smoked Winston Lights.\nThe body was removed from the car for an autopsy and the car was stored. The coroner determined that the cause of death was multiple gunshot wounds.\nDefendant was interviewed about 7:40 p.m. on 25 May 1991 by Lieutenant R. M. Lambert. During the interview, defendant stated that it had been months since he had fired a weapon; that he had not killed Ms. Welborn; that he did not know who killed Ms. Welborn; that he had last seen Ms. Welborn on 22 May 1991; and that he had not changed clothes that day.\nContrary evidence introduced showed that defendant had target practice days before the murder, and that he had changed clothing before attending the interview. Witnesses Ms. Robin Prevette and Ms. Donna Shoaf testified that he had on blue jeans and a red flannel plaid button shirt when they saw him between the hours of 7:30 a.m. and 9:00 a.m. At the time of the interview, defendant had on a pair of blue jeans, a pullover knit shirt and white tennis shoes.\nOther evidence for the State showed that Special Agent Joyce Petska, an expert tire track examiner, examined the photographs of tire impressions taken from the scene and compared them to defendant\u2019s truck tires. She determined that the pull-off area could not be used for comparison because there appeared to be overlapping impressions, and that the other tire impressions definitely did not match the tread design of defendant\u2019s tires. Expert forensic examination of paint samples from areas of minor damage on the right and left front fenders of defendant\u2019s truck and left rear of Ms. Welborn\u2019s car showed no transfer of paint between the vehicles.\nA residue sample was taken from defendant\u2019s hands but it was taken too late to be of any value. Special Agent Ronald Marrs, a firearms and tool mark examiner, examined the two guns obtained from defendant\u2019s father and compared them to the four bullets recovered from the victim and the victim\u2019s car. The bullets had entirely different class characteristics from the State\u2019s exhibit 11, the .380, and could not have been fired from that weapon. The bullets exhibited similar characteristics of State\u2019s exhibit 10, .357, but the bullets were too deformed for a determination of whether they were fired from that weapon.\nOn 17 June 1991, defendant talked with Deputy Cook who signed an additional statement basically repeating his innocence and stated that he would submit to a polygraph test. Defendant received a polygraph test.\nAfter a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of second degree murder as charged. From judgment entered 7 July 1992 imposing a sentence of life imprisonment, defendant appealed to this Court.\nBy defendant\u2019s first assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss at the close of all of the evidence because the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to support defendant\u2019s conviction for second degree murder. We disagree.\nSecond degree murder is defined as the unlawful killing of a human being with malice. State v. Young, 324 N.C. 489, 380 S.E.2d 94 (1989). The question before us is whether there was sufficient evidence of the unlawful killing of Ms. Welborn by defendant to support a conviction. In State v. Lynch, 327 N.C. 210, 393 S.E.2d 811 (1990), our Supreme Court summarized the law applicable to the question before this Court as follows:\nThe question is whether there is substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged and (2) that defendant is the perpetrator of the offense. (Citation omitted.)\nSubstantial evidence is \u201csuch relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,\u201d (citation omitted). . . .\nIf the evidence is sufficient only to raise a suspicion or conjecture as to either the commission of the offense or the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of it, the motion to dismiss should be allowed. This is true even though the suspicion so aroused by the evidence is strong.\nId. at 215, 393 S.E.2d at 814. In determining the sufficiency of the evidence on a motion to dismiss, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the State.\nThe State is entitled to every reasonable intendment and every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom; contradictions and discrepancies are for the jury to resolve and do not warrant dismissal; and all the evidence'actually admitted, whether competent or incompetent, which is favorable to the State is to be considered by the court in ruling on the motion.\nId. at 216, 393 S.E.2d at 814.\nWe note:\nWhile circumstantial evidence is a \u201crecognized and accepted instrument in the ascertainment of truth,\u201d (citation omitted) when the State relies upon such evidence for a conviction of a felony, as in the present case, \u201cthe rule is, that the facts established or advanced on the hearing must be of such a nature and so connected or related as to point unerringly to the defendant\u2019s guilt, and to exclude any other reasonable hypothesis\u201d (citation omitted)[.]\nState v. Jarrell, 233 N.C. 741, 746, 65 S.E.2d 304, 307 (1951).\nWe find the circumstantial evidence presented by the State was sufficient to support a conviction of second degree murder. The State produced the following evidence which tended to connect defendant with the crime scene and the offense charged to commit the crime: defendant\u2019s constant surveillance of Ms. Welborn; defendant\u2019s possession of two firearms; defendant\u2019s target practice with his guns; defendant\u2019s threatened suicide because Ms. Welborn had ended the relationship; defendant\u2019s threats to kill Ms. Welborn; defendant\u2019s appearance around the area on the morning of Ms. Welborn\u2019s death; and defendant\u2019s brand of cigarette package found on the opposite side of the road where Ms. Welborn\u2019s vehicle came to rest.\nThe State\u2019s evidence, when taken in the light most favorable to the State, tends to show defendant had a motive, connects defendant to the execution of his threats, and shows sufficient facts to connect defendant to the crime charged. Based on these findings, the evidence was sufficient to take the case to the jury. Jarrell, 233 N.C. 741, 65 S.E.2d 304. The trial court correctly denied defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss.\nBy defendant\u2019s second assignment of error, defendant contends that he was denied a fair trial by the trial court\u2019s admission of irrelevant and inflammatory evidence of defendant\u2019s character and unrelated conduct for which he was not on trial and which was not a proper matter for the jury\u2019s consideration. We disagree.\nAfter a voir dire examination, the trial court ruled, over defendant\u2019s objections, that the testimony of Ms. Tonya Thomas was relevant to show motive, intent, purpose and design, and did not violate Rule 404(b) or Rule 403 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence. The trial court\u2019s ruling was correct.\nRule 404(b) provides:\n(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. \u2014 Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake, entrapment or accident.\nNorth Carolina General Statutes \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(b) (1992).\nThe preliminary issue to be addressed by the trial court when determining the admissibility of evidence under Rule 404(b) is whether the evidence is in fact being offered pursuant to that rule. State v. Morgan, 315 N.C. 626, 340 S.E.2d 84 (1986). In the instant case, the State clearly informed the court that it was offering the testimony of Ms. Thomas pursuant to Rule 404(b). The State offered, during the direct examination of Ms. Thomas, extrinsic evidence of prior conduct to prove modus operandi and identity of Ms. Welborn\u2019s assailant. Therefore, the trial court properly concluded the admissibility of the evidence was to be analyzed initially under Rule 404(b).\nUpon a finding the evidence is offered pursuant to Rule 404(b), the court must then determine whether the evidence is relevant. Morgan, 315 N.C. at 637, 340 S.E.2d at 91. Extrinsic evidence of conduct is admissible under Rule 404(b) as long as it is relevant for a purpose other than to show defendant has the propensity to engage in the type of conduct charged. Id. \u201cRelevant evidence means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.\u201d North Carolina General Statutes \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 401 (1992).\nMs. Thomas\u2019 testimony was admitted into evidence as proof of motive and identity. When evidence reasonably tends to prove a material fact at issue in the crime charged, it will not be rejected merely because it also proves defendant guilty of another crime. State v. Jeter, 326 N.C. 457, 389 S.E.2d 805 (1990). The existence of motive is a circumstance tending to make it more probable that the person in question did the act, hence evidence of motive is always admissible where the doing of the act is in dispute. State v. Church, 231 N.C. 39, 55 S.E.2d 792 (1949). Ms. Thomas\u2019 testimony helped to establish defendant\u2019s motive in killing the victim as it tended to show how defendant acted after he had been rejected and what he was motivated to do in attempting to effect a satisfactory resolution.\n\u201cIn a criminal case, the identity of the perpetrator of the crime charged is always a material fact.\u201d Jeter, 326 N.C. at 458, 389 S.E.2d at 806. However, identity is not always at issue. Therefore, before identity is admissible pursuant to Rule 404(b), there must be a determination of whether the identity of the perpetrator is at issue. State v. Thomas, 310 N.C. 369, 312 S.E.2d 458 (1984). Here, the root of defendant\u2019s case is his contention that the State\u2019s circumstantial evidence is insufficient to connect him to the scene of the crime charged and therefore, insufficient to identify defendant as the assailant that killed Ms. Welborn. As the identity of the perpetrator is at the heart of this case, Ms. Thomas\u2019 testimony as to the motive and identity of the perpetrator is relevant and qualifies under Rule 404(b).\nAfter establishing identity is at issue, and therefore, relevant under Rule 404(b), we must next determine whether the evidence meets the mandate of Rule 403. State v. Davis, 101 N.C. App. 12, 398 S.E.2d 645 (1990), dimissal allowed and disc. review denied, 328 N.C. 574, 403 S.E.2d 516 (1991). Rule 403 states in pertinent part: \u201cAlthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudiced\u201d North Carolina General Statutes \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 403 (1992). Defendant argues that the prejudicial value of the evidence outweighed its probative value.\nWhether evidence is to be excluded under Rule 403 is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Coffey, 326 N.C. 268, 389 S.E.2d 48 (1990). \u201cWhen the incidents are offered for a proper purpose, the ultimate test of admissibility is whether the incidents are sufficiently similar and not so remote in time as to be more probative than prejudicial under the balancing test of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 403.\u201d State v. White, 101 N.C. App. 593, 602, 401 S.E.2d 106, 111, disc. review denied and appeal dismissed, 329 N.C. 275, 407 S.E.2d 852 (1991).\nHere, after Ms. Thomas and Ms. Welborn had rejected defendant in a relationship, defendant kept both women under constant surveillance; threatened to kill both women; threatened to commit suicide over both women; ran both women off of the road with his vehicle; pulled weapons on both women; and in Ms. Thomas\u2019 case, stabbed Ms. Thomas with grass shears requiring hospitalization.\nFinally, although Ms. Thomas\u2019 incident occurred in 1986 and the incident involving Ms. Welborn occurred in 1991, we do not find the incident involving Ms. Thomas to be too remote in time to be more prejudicial than probative. \u201cRemoteness in time is less significant when the prior conduct is used to show intent, motive, knowledge, or lack of accident; remoteness in time generally affects only the weight to be given such evidence, not its admissibility.\u201d State v. Stager, 329 N.C. 278, 307, 406 S.E.2d 876, 893 (1991). Under the applicable rules of law, the trial judge correctly admitted the testimony of Ms. Thomas. We find that defendant received a trial free from error.\nWe find no error.\nJudges COZORT and McCRODDEN concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JOHNSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Senior Deputy Attorney General Isham B. Hudson, Jr., for the State.", "Appellate Defender Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., by Assistant. Appellate Defender Constance H. Everhart, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. NORMAN RAY PARKER\nNo. 9222SC1143\n(Filed 4 January 1994)\n1. Homicide \u00a7 284 (NCI4th)\u2014 second-degree murder \u2014sufficiency of evidence\nEvidence was sufficient to support defendant\u2019s conviction of second-degree murder where it tended to show that defendant constantly maintained surveillance of the victim; defendant possessed two firearms; he engaged in target practice with the guns shortly before the murder; defendant threatened suicide because the victim had ended her relationship with him; defendant had threatened to kill the victim; defendant was seen by several witnesses in the area of the crime on the morning it was committed; and defendant\u2019s brand of cigarette package was found on the opposite side of the road from where the victim\u2019s vehicle came to rest.\nAm Jur 2d, Homicide \u00a7\u00a7 425 et seq.\n2. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 351 (NCI4th)\u2014 prior incident involving defendant \u2014 admissibility to prove motive and identity\nIn a second-degree murder prosecution where defendant contended that the State\u2019s circumstantial evidence was insufficient to connect him to the scene of the crime charged and therefore insufficient to identify him as the assailant who killed the victim, the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of an incident involving defendant five years earlier which was substantially similar to the events occurring in this case, since such evidence was admissible as proof of motive and identity. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(b).\nAm Jur 2d, Evidence \u00a7\u00a7 305 et seq.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 7 July 1992 by Judge L. P. Martin, Jr. in Iredell County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 14 September 1993.\nAttorney General Michael F. Easley, by Senior Deputy Attorney General Isham B. Hudson, Jr., for the State.\nAppellate Defender Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., by Assistant. Appellate Defender Constance H. Everhart, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0216-01", "first_page_order": 246, "last_page_order": 256 }