{ "id": 8521625, "name": "JOHNNY BRANTLEY, Petitioner v. DARRELL CROCKET WATSON, Co-Executor of the Estate of RACHEL A. BRANTLEY and WILLIAM WOODWARD WEBB, Respondents and IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF RACHEL A. BRANTLEY, Deceased", "name_abbreviation": "Brantley v. Watson", "decision_date": "1994-01-04", "docket_number": "No. 9210SC1008", "first_page": "234", "last_page": "240", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "113 N.C. App. 234" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "431 S.E.2d 178", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "179" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 115", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2529622 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "116" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0115-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 S.E.2d 849", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "277 N.C. 364", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565447 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/277/0364-01" ] }, { "cite": "173 S.E.2d 301", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 N.C. 445", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561699 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/276/0445-01" ] }, { "cite": "385 S.E.2d 185", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 N.C. App. 124", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520634 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/96/0124-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 S.E.2d 866", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 477", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2560744, 2566031, 2560698, 2563643, 2563999 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0477-01", "/nc/323/0477-04", "/nc/323/0477-02", "/nc/323/0477-05", "/nc/323/0477-03" ] }, { "cite": "370 S.E.2d 262", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "90 N.C. App. 692", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525990 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/90/0692-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 619, "char_count": 14404, "ocr_confidence": 0.774, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.20549846728515833 }, "sha256": "b59f832ed6363f6555b0ade8a9dc4c3138bb3c27889d20d6d7180d31fc1da69b", "simhash": "1:bd6cd666a7d79e8b", "word_count": 2384 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:21:41.323369+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges COZORT and McCRODDEN concur." ], "parties": [ "JOHNNY BRANTLEY, Petitioner v. DARRELL CROCKET WATSON, Co-Executor of the Estate of RACHEL A. BRANTLEY and WILLIAM WOODWARD WEBB, Respondents and IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF RACHEL A. BRANTLEY, Deceased" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JOHNSON, Judge.\nThis action centers around the validity of a postnuptial agreement between Rachel A. Brantley (decedent) and Johnny Brantley (husband-petitioner). The postnuptial agreement was signed 1 February 1977, and Rachel A. Brantley died testate on 21 November 1991. On 3 February 1992, petitioner filed his dissent from the will of Rachel A. Brantley and his petition for a year\u2019s allowance.\nOn 25 February 1992, respondents filed responses which contained Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Both responses contained the defense of the postnuptial agreement as a bar to petitioner\u2019s dissent and application for a year\u2019s allowance. Respondents also filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings.\nThe clerk of superior court consolidated these cases and entered an order on 18 May 1992 denying each of respondents\u2019 motions. The clerk ruled that the postnuptial agreement was void as a matter of law because it did not meet the provisions of North Carolina General Statutes \u00a7 52-10 (1976) and North Carolina General Statutes \u00a7 52-6 (1976) (repealed 1977) in effect at the time of the signing of the agreement. Respondents appealed to superior court.\nThe trial court\u2019s findings of fact were as follows:\n(1) On September 6, 1973 Rachel A. Brantley and Johnny Brantley were married.\n(2) On February 1,1977 Rachel A. Brantley and Johnny Brantley entered into a postnuptial agreement whereby each released, renounced and quitclaimed any and all rights accorded to each of them under Article 1 of Chapter 30 of the N.C. General Statutes, to dissent from the will of the other if surviving. Both signed the agreement before a Notary Public and no privy examination was given to the wife.\n(3) On November 21, 1991 Rachel A. Brantley died testate survived by her husband, Johnny Brantley.\n(4) On February 3, 1992 Johnny Brantley filed a dissent from the will of Rachel A. Brantley . . . and his application for a year\u2019s allowance[.] . . .\n(5) On May 18, 1992 the Clerk of Superior Court entered an order denying motions to dismiss the dissent and application for a year\u2019s allowance on the grounds that the agreement dated February 1, 1977 was void because of its failure to comply with the provisions of G.S. 52-6 and G.S. 52-10 as they existed at the time of the execution of the agreement.\n(6) Neither Rachel A. Brantley or Johnny Brantley questioned the validity of the agreement nor attempted to revoke it prior to the death of Rachel A. Brantley.\nThe trial court found the following conclusions of law:\nSince neither Rachel A. Brantley or Johnny Brantley revoked the agreement during the wife\u2019s life, the agreement should be binding on the husband, Johnny Brantley, after her death. An agreement between a husband and wife dealing with the testamentary disposition of their properties is not binding upon the wife during her lifetime unless the procedure prescribed by G.S. 52-6 was followed. During the wife\u2019s life, such agreement, not properly acknowledged pursuant [sic] G.S. 52-6, is not binding on the husband either since, as to him, there is a failure of consideration. However, when the wife dies leaving unchanged the agreement dealing with the testamentary disposition of the properties, the agreement should be binding upon the husband. Their minds met on a particular testamentary disposition of their properties to accomplish a particular purpose and they both intended the agreement and their wills, made pursuant thereto, to remain unrevoked at their deaths. The agreement may be revocable during their joint lives so far as it relates to the testamentary disposition of their property but it should be irrevocable after the death of one of them. The wife complied with and never revoked or breached the terms of the agreement during her lifetime and thus the husband should also be bound by the terms of the agreement dealing with the testamentary disposition of property. Equity should enforce the agreement.\nFrom the trial court\u2019s order, petitioner gave notice of appeal to our Court.\nPetitioner first argues the trial court committed reversible error in reversing the ruling of the clerk of superior court and allowing respondents\u2019 motions to dismiss because no evidence was introduced to support the trial court\u2019s findings of fact and conclusions of law.\nA Rule 12(b)(6) motion is based on a party\u2019s failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. North Carolina General Statutes \u00a7 1A-1, 12(b)(6) (1990). A complaint must be dismissed when it is clear from the face of the complaint that the plaintiff cannot recover, that some essential fact is missing in regard to plaintiff\u2019s case, or a fact is revealed in the plaintiff\u2019s case which defeats the action. Piedmont Ford Truck Sale v. City of Greensboro, 90 N.C. App. 692, 370 S.E.2d 262, disc. review allowed, 323 N.C. 477, 373 S.E.2d 866 (1988).\nWe note that in the case sub judice, the clerk of superior court denied respondents\u2019 motions to dismiss upon finding that the postnuptial agreement was void as a matter of law. Respondents then appealed to the judge of the superior court, who reviewed the appeal, with findings of fact and conclusions of law. Because the trial judge heard evidence in the form of oral arguments and undisputed facts from counsel, this Rule 12(b)(6) motion was converted into a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment. Privette v. University of North Carolina, 96 N.C. App. 124, 385 S.E.2d 185 (1989). North Carolina General Statutes \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 12(b) (1990) provides in pertinent part:\nIf, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6), to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.\nThis assignment of error is overruled.\nPetitioner next argues the trial court committed reversible error in reversing the ruling of the clerk of superior court and allowing respondents\u2019 motions to dismiss because the trial court treated the 1 February 1977 agreement between decedent and petitioner as a contract to make a joint will. We find the reference to Olive v. Biggs, 276 N.C. 445, 173 S.E.2d 301 (1970) and Mansour v. Rabil, 277 N.C. 364, 177 S.E.2d 849 (1970) in the trial court\u2019s order was not an indication that the trial court treated the contract as a joint will.\nPetitioner further argues the trial court committed reversible error in reversing the ruling of the clerk of superior court and allowing respondents\u2019 motions to dismiss because the agreement dated 1 February 1977 between decedent and petitioner was absolutely void as a matter of law.\nThe law as it existed on 1 February 1977 relative to \u201ccontracts between husband and wife generally\u201d was found in North Carolina General Statutes \u00a7 52-10:\nContracts between husband and wife not forbidden by G.S. 52-6 and not inconsistent with public policy are valid, and any persons of full age about to be married, and, subject to G.S. 52-6, any married persons, may, with or without a valuable consideration, release and quitclaim such rights which they might respectively acquire or may have acquired by marriage in the property of each other; and such releases may be pleaded in bar of any action or proceeding for the recovery of the rights and estate so released.\nNorth Carolina General Statutes \u00a7 52-6 reads:\n(a) No contract between husband and wife made during their coverture shall be valid to affect or change any part of the real estate of the wife, or the accruing income thereof for a longer time than three years next ensuing the making of such contract, nor shall any separation agreement between husband and wife be valid for any purpose, unless such contract or separation agreement is in writing, and is acknowledged before a certifying officer who shall make a private examination of the wife according to the requirements formerly prevailing for conveyance of land.\n(b) The certifying officer examining the wife shall incorporate in his [/her] certificate a statement of his [/her] conclusions and findings of fact as to whether or not said contract is unreasonable or injurious to the wife. The certificate of the officer shall be conclusive of the facts therein stated but may be impeached for fraud as other judgments may be.\n(c)Such certifying officer must be a justice, judge, magistrate, clerk, assistant clerk or deputy clerk of the General Court of Justice or the equivalent or corresponding officers of the state, territory or foreign country where the acknowledgment and examination are made and such officer must not be a party to the contract.\nThis form of acknowledgement which was required in North Carolina General Statutes \u00a7 52-6 was set out in North Carolina General Statutes \u00a7 47-39 (1976) (repealed 1977).\nNorth Carolina General Statutes \u00a7 52-8 (1991) is a curative statute which has been amended through the years. This statute seeks to validate contracts which fail to comply with the provisions of North Carolina General Statutes \u00a7 52-6. North Carolina General Statutes \u00a7 52-8 reads:\nAny contract between husband and wife coming within the provisions of G.S. 52-6 executed between January 1, 1930 and January 1, 1978, which does not comply with the requirement of a private examination of the wife or with the requirements that there be findings that such a contract between a husband and wife is not unreasonable or injurious to the wife and which is in all other respects regular is hereby validated and confirmed to the same extent as if the examination of the wife had been separate and apart from the husband. This section shall not affect pending litigation.\nThe particular question herein is whether the contract signed 1 February 1977 by the decedent and the petitioner is void, considering that this contract does not comply with the requirements of a private examination of the wife, that it does not contain findings that the contract is not unreasonable or injurious to the wife, and that it may not have been acknowledged by a proper party.\nWe need not address this question because of our Supreme Court\u2019s recent decision in Dunn v. Pate, 334 N.C. 115, 431 S.E.2d 178 (1993). The Court held in Dunn that noncompliance with North Carolina General Statutes \u00a7 52-6 may not set aside a deed executed in 1962 because \u201cthe principle of equal protection under the law . . . makes gender-based discrimination presumptively unconstitutional.\u201d Dunn, 334 N.C. at 116, 431 S.E.2d at 179. Therefore, we find that this agreement, executed 1 February 1977 between Rachel A. Brantley and Johnny Brantley, may not be set aside due to any alleged noncompliance with North Carolina General Statutes \u00a7\u00a7 52-6 or 52-10.\nWe find the agreement dated 1 February 1977 between decedent and petitioner is not void as a matter of law and that the trial court was correct in reversing this ruling of the clerk of superior court. The trial court properly allowed respondents\u2019 motions to dismiss as to petitioner\u2019s dissent from the will of Rachel A. Brantley.\nPetitioner\u2019s final argument is that the trial court committed reversible error in reversing the ruling of the clerk of superior court and allowing respondents\u2019 motion to dismiss as to petitioner\u2019s application for a year\u2019s allowance because the 1 February 1977 agreement between decedent and petitioner had no application whatsoever to petitioner\u2019s right to a year\u2019s allowance. We agree with petitioner.\nThe wording in the contract at issue in this case reads \u201c[the] party of the second part hereby releases, renounces and quitclaims any and all rights accorded to him under Article 1 of Chapter 30 of the North Carolina General Statutes, to dissent from the will of party of the first part should he survive her, both as to property now owned by party of the first part and property hereafter acquired.\u201d North Carolina General Statutes \u00a7 30-1 (1984) deals specifically with the statutory right to dissent.\nNorth Carolina General Statutes \u00a7 30-15 (1984) reads \u201c[e]very surviving spouse of an intestate or of a testator, whether or not he has dissented from the will, shall, unless he has forfeited his right thereto as provided by law, be entitled ... to an allowance of the value of five thousand dollars[.]\u201d We find that the express language in the agreement, referring only to North Carolina General Statutes \u00a7 30-1, should not be interpreted to include forfeiture also of the spousal right to a year\u2019s allowance found in North Carolina General Statutes \u00a7 30-15. Therefore, the trial court erred in reversing the ruling of the clerk of superior court allowing respondents\u2019 motion to dismiss as to petitioner\u2019s application for a year\u2019s allowance.\nThe decision of the trial judge is affirmed in part and reversed in part.\nJudges COZORT and McCRODDEN concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JOHNSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Sink, Powers, Sink & Potter, by Charles F. Powers III and Henry H. Sink, Jr., for petitioner-appellant.", "Broughton, Wilkins, Webb & Jernigan, by Charles P. Wilkins and Roy J. Baroff for respondents-appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JOHNNY BRANTLEY, Petitioner v. DARRELL CROCKET WATSON, Co-Executor of the Estate of RACHEL A. BRANTLEY and WILLIAM WOODWARD WEBB, Respondents and IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF RACHEL A. BRANTLEY, Deceased\nNo. 9210SC1008\n(Filed 4 January 1994)\n1. Husband and Wife \u00a7 28 (NCI4th)\u2014 postnuptial agreement \u2014no privy examination of wife \u2014agreement not set aside\nA postnuptial agreement executed between a husband and wife could not be set aside due to any alleged noncompliance with N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 52-6 or 52-10 because the principle of equal protection under the law makes gender based discrimination presumptively unconstitutional.\nAm Jur 2d, Husband and Wife \u00a7\u00a7 264, 265.\n2. Executors and Administrators \u00a7 108 (NCI4th)\u2014 year\u2019s allowance \u2014inapplicability of postnuptial agreement\nA postnuptial agreement in which the husband renounced his N.C.G.S. \u00a7 30-1 right to dissent from the wife\u2019s will did not include forfeiture of the spousal right to a year\u2019s allowance pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 30-15.\nAm Jur 2d, Descent and Distribution \u00a7\u00a7 115 et seq.\nAppeal by petitioner from order entered 17 August 1992 by Judge Robert L. Farmer in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 16 September 1993.\nSink, Powers, Sink & Potter, by Charles F. Powers III and Henry H. Sink, Jr., for petitioner-appellant.\nBroughton, Wilkins, Webb & Jernigan, by Charles P. Wilkins and Roy J. Baroff for respondents-appellees." }, "file_name": "0234-01", "first_page_order": 264, "last_page_order": 270 }