{ "id": 8521659, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM ABDULLAH MUSTAFA", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Mustafa", "decision_date": "1994-01-04", "docket_number": "No. 9215SC980", "first_page": "240", "last_page": "247", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "113 N.C. App. 240" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "292 S.E.2d 741", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "58 N.C. App. 150", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523706 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/58/0150-01" ] }, { "cite": "376 S.E.2d 745", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "751" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 190", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2486024 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "201" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0190-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 S.E.2d 354", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "358" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 541", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2568804 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "548" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0541-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 S.E.2d 245", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "251" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 232", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4696763 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "241" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0232-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 S.E.2d 298", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 N.C. 447", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569083 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/304/0447-01" ] }, { "cite": "380 U.S. 343", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1525098 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "350" }, { "page": "888" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/380/0343-01" ] }, { "cite": "283 S.E.2d 502", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "503" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 N.C. 349", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567671 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "351" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/304/0349-01" ] }, { "cite": "296 S.E.2d 261", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 79", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560661 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0079-01" ] }, { "cite": "295 S.E.2d 391", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 724", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573657 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0724-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 S.E.2d 834", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 760", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4752702 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0760-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 710, "char_count": 14518, "ocr_confidence": 0.769, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.3851000743679754e-07, "percentile": 0.7972171350530475 }, "sha256": "0634be894b512b77caab84afb9e2c52863e42a2870d35396ee3f97cba51d571e", "simhash": "1:4d2e912a2e6b88fd", "word_count": 2408 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:21:41.323369+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges WYNN and JOHN concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM ABDULLAH MUSTAFA" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JOHNSON, Judge.\nDefendant, William Abdullah Mustafa, was indicted on 16 September 1991 for the criminal offenses of first degree sexual offense, first degree rape, kidnapping, and robbery with a dangerous weapon. Defendant was convicted of first degree rape, first degree sexual offense and misdemeanor larceny. The trial court dismissed the charge of kidnapping at the close of the evidence. Defendant received a sentence of life in prison. Defendant gave timely notice of appeal to this Court.\nThe evidence presented by the State showed the following: During the night of 30 August 1991 and the early morning hours of 1 September 1991, the victim, Ms. Sheena Gladden Cheek, was at the Rock Creek Lounge. As Ms. Cheek proceeded to leave the club, she was approached by a friend, Mr. Danny Ray Timmins, and began conversation with him. While conversing, Ms. Cheek was approached by defendant. Ms. Cheek has known defendant for fourteen years by the name of Butch Garner.\nAfter this conversation, Mr. Timmins asked Ms. Cheek for a ride home. While Ms. Cheek drove to Mr. Timmins\u2019 home, defendant followed and parked across the street. Defendant asked Mr. Timmins if he could park in Mr. Timmins\u2019 driveway; Mr. Timmins denied this request. Ms. Cheek then left Mr. Timmins\u2019 home, and defendant followed, blowing the horn and flashing his headlights. After overtaking Ms. Cheek twice, defendant persuaded Ms. Cheek to pull over to the side of the road. Defendant indicated that he was having car trouble and asked for a ride back to the lounge. Defendant said that he wanted to return to the lounge because somebody had taken something from his car. Before returning to the lounge, Mr. Joe Patterson drove up on his motorcycle and asked defendant and Ms. Cheek if they needed help. Defendant responded no and Mr. Patterson drove off.\nOnce defendant and Ms. Cheek arrived at the lounge, Ms. Cheek stayed in the van while defendant went to look for a friend. After defendant failed to find this friend, defendant told Ms. Cheek to take him back to his car located at the Shady Oak Service Station.\nAfter returning to the service station, defendant shoved his knee in Ms. Cheek\u2019s chest and drew a knife placing the point of the knife under Ms. Cheek\u2019s throat. While holding the knife to Ms. Cheek\u2019s throat, defendant patted Ms. Cheek down and retrieved a gun. Holding the gun on Ms. Cheek, defendant told Ms. Cheek to take her clothes off. When Ms. Cheek did not take her top off, defendant told her that \u201cYou could do it this way or you can die.\u201d\nDefendant forced Ms. Cheek to perform oral sex on him. Defendant then penetrated Ms. Cheek\u2019s rectum with his penis. After the anal sex, defendant had forced vaginal intercourse with Ms. Cheek. During all acts, defendant held the gun to Ms. Cheek\u2019s head.\nDefendant had Ms. Cheek get into the passenger\u2019s side of the van while continuing to hold the gun to Ms. Cheek\u2019s head. He told Ms. Cheek that she was going to get him some drugs. Ms. Cheek then directed defendant to the location of her son in Ramseur. After arriving at the Ramseur location, Ms. Cheek attempted to get out of the van with her purse, but defendant grabbed the purse back from Ms. Cheek. At this point, Ms. Cheek ran from the van screaming. Defendant sped off, and Ms. Cheek and other relatives attempted to follow him.\nMs. Cheek then reported the incident to a Liberty police officer, Lieutenant Smith. Because the incident took place out of his jurisdiction, Lieutenant Smith requested that the Alamance County Sheriff\u2019s Department take over the case.\nDeputy Roger Lloyd of the Alamance County Sheriff\u2019s Department went to the Shady Oak Service Station later that day with Ms. Cheek and found defendant\u2019s car stripped of license plates and the window broken out with a bullet hole in it. At about 6:00 a.m. that morning, Deputy Lloyd took Ms. Cheek to the hospital and turned the case over to Detective Phil Ayers.\nThe next night Deputy Lloyd planned to serve arrest warrants on defendant charging him with kidnapping, a sexual offense, rape and robbery. Defendant, however, turned himself in and gave a statement to Deputy Lloyd. Defendant said that on the night in question, Ms. Cheek asked him to follow her to Mr. Timmins\u2019 house. After leaving Mr. Timmins\u2019 house, defendant said that he and Ms. Cheek stopped at Shady Oak Service Station to smoke. The two then got into an argument over drugs and Ms. Cheek pulled a gun on him. Defendant then pulled out one of the four knives he possessed and proceeded to disarm Ms. Cheek. After he took her gun, he put away his knife and defendant and Ms. Cheek had consensual sex. Defendant then stated that they left the service station and went to Ms. Cheek\u2019s son\u2019s house to get drugs. However, when defendant saw Ms. Cheek\u2019s relatives come out of the house, he left with Ms. Cheek\u2019s purse and papers in the van. He returned to the service station and switched the license plates on the van with those on the car.\nOthers that testified at trial included: Ms. Diana Roark, an emergency room nurse, and Dr. James Strickland, an emergency room physician. Both testified that Ms. Cheek was visibly upset and crying when she came to the emergency room. Dr. Strickland testified that his examination revealed ten linear tears in the bottom of Ms. Cheek\u2019s rectum consistent with forced penetration.\nBy defendant\u2019s first assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred in instructing the jury about defendant\u2019s reputation for truthfulness in evaluating his statement to the police. We disagree.\nThe trial court has wide discretion in presenting the issues of a case to the jury so long as the law is adequately explained. State v. Higginbottom, 312 N.C. 760, 324 S.E.2d 834 (1985). The purpose of a charge is to give a clear instruction which applies the law to the evidence in such a manner as to assist the jury in understanding the case and in reaching a correct verdict. State v. Harris, 306 N.C. 724, 295 S.E.2d 391 (1982). Where a requested instruction is a correct statement of the law and supported by the evidence, the trial court is required to give the instruction; however, the instruction is not required to be given verbatim. It is sufficient if the instruction is given in substance. State v. Corn, 307 N.C. 79, 296 S.E.2d 261 (1982).\nIn the case sub judice, counsel for defendant requested the trial judge give North Carolina Pattern Jury Instruction 105.30, which provides that a jury may consider evidence of a witness\u2019 character for truthfulness in deciding whether to believe or disbelieve his testimony at trial. The trial judge pointed out to defense counsel that there had been no testimony at trial by defendant which would give rise to such an instruction. Defense counsel then modified his request that the same instruction be given to relate to defendant\u2019s exculpatory pre-trial statement. The judge denied the request.\nThe trial judge correctly denied defendant\u2019s request because the patterned instruction applies to testimony at trial and not exculpatory statements. A trial judge is only required to give instructions that are an accurate statement of the law and evidence.\nBy defendant\u2019s second assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on second degree rape and second degree sexual offense. More specifically, defendant alleges that there was an element of first degree rape that was in factual dispute, thereby requiring a charge of a lesser-included offense. We disagree.\nAs a general rule, the trial judge must charge upon a lesser-included offense whenever there is some evidence \u201cwhich might convince a rational trier of fact to convict the defendant of a less grievous offense.\u201d State v. Wright, 304 N.C. 349, 351, 283 S.E.2d 502, 503 (1981). \u201cA lesser-included offense instruction is only proper where the charged greater offense requires the jury to find a disputed factual element which is not required for conviction of the lesser-included offense.\u201d Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 350, 13 L.Ed.2d 882, 888 (1965).\nThe crime of first degree rape and second degree rape contain essentially the same elements. The sole distinction between first degree rape and second degree rape is the element of the use or display of a dangerous weapon. State v. Barnette, 304 N.C. 447, 284 S.E.2d 298 (1981). To sustain a conviction for first degree rape, the evidence need only show that a weapon was \u201cdisplayed or employed in the course of the rape.\u201d State v. Blackstock, 314 N.C. 232, 241, 333 S.E.2d 245, 251 (1985).\nIn the instant case, both defendant and the victim agree that weapons were displayed during the altercation in the van. Ms. Cheek alleges that defendant took her gun and displayed a knife to coerce her into sexual intercourse. Defendant alleges an argument broke out over drugs and Ms. Cheek displayed a gun. Defendant alleges he then displayed his knife and disarmed Ms. Cheek and that thereafter, they had consensual sex.\nAll of the elements for first degree rape were present in the evidence; the only fact in dispute was whether the sex was consensual. The jury was properly instructed on this issue, and as such, we find that the trial court correctly denied the instruction to charge on a lesser-included offense.\nBy defendant\u2019s third assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred in not allowing defendant to present evidence that he was honorably discharged from the marines. We disagree.\nNorth Carolina General Statutes \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(a)(1) (1992) provides, in pertinent part, that evidence of a pertinent trait of the accused\u2019s character may be admissible. Pursuant to this rule, an accused may only introduce character evidence of \u201cpertinent\u201d traits of his character and not evidence of overall \u201cgood character.\u201d State v. Squire, 321 N.C. 541, 364 S.E.2d 354 (1988). In criminal cases, in order to be admissible, a pertinent character trait must bear a special relationship to or be involved in the crime charged. State v. Bogle, 324 N.C. 190, 201, 376 S.E.2d 745, 751 (1989). In determining whether a general \u201claw-abidingness\u201d character trait was admissible in a criminal case, the trait must be pertinent or relevant to the crime charged. Squire, 321 N.C. at 548, 364 S.E.2d at 358.\nDefendant asserts that the omitted military information is relevant to show whether defendant was the type of person to break civilian laws and commit forcible unlawful sex acts. We disagree. We believe that a good military record or military service is not relevant to defendant\u2019s guilt or innocence in this rape case. The trial court properly excluded this evidence.\nBy defendant\u2019s last assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred in overruling defendant\u2019s motion to introduce evidence of prior sexual conduct of the prosecuting witness. Defendant\u2019s argument is meritless.\nExcept when found to fall within one of the stated exceptions to our Rape Shield Act, the sexual history of rape victims is irrelevant. State v. Baron, 58 N.C. App. 150, 292 S.E.2d 741 (1982). The North Carolina Rape Shield Act provides in pertinent part:\n(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the sexual behavior of the complainant is irrelevant to any issue in the prosecution unless such behavior:\n(3) Is evidence of a pattern of sexual behavior so distinctive and so closely resembling the defendant\u2019s version of the alleged encounter with the complainant as to tend to prove that such complainant consented to the act or acts charged or behaved in such a manner as to lead the defendant reasonably to believe that the complainant consented[.]\nNorth Carolina General Statutes \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 412(b)(3) (1992).\nContrary to the assertions by defendant, Ms. Cheek\u2019s previous sexual encounter with a boyfriend does not amount to a pattern of sexual behavior closely resembling defendant\u2019s version of the incident. During an in-camera examination of Ms. Cheek and her previous boyfriend, Mr. David Patterson, the evidence revealed an on-going relationship since the 1970\u2019s. We find that Ms. Cheek\u2019s prior consensual relationship with Mr. Patterson does not amount to a pattern of sexual behavior closely resembling the events that took place in the case sub judice. The trial court properly excluded this evidence.\nThe decision of the trial court is affirmed.\nJudges WYNN and JOHN concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JOHNSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Lacy H. Thornburg, by Associate Attorney General John J. Aldridge, III, for the State.", "Appellate Defender Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., by Assistant Appellate Defender Mark D. Montgomery, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM ABDULLAH MUSTAFA\nNo. 9215SC980\n(Filed 4 January 1994)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 813 (NCI4th)\u2014 character for truthfulness-request for pattern instruction \u2014no supporting evidence\nThe trial court did not err by denying defendant\u2019s request to give the pattern instruction on consideration of a witness\u2019s character for truthfulness as it related to defendant\u2019s pretrial exculpatory statement to the police since the pattern instruction applied only to testimony at trial and not to pretrial exculpatory statements.\nAm Jur 2d, Trial \u00a7\u00a7 1338-1352.\n2. Rape and Allied Offenses \u00a7 190 (NCI4th)\u2014 first-degree rape \u2014 use of weapon \u2014submission of lesser offense not required\nThe trial court properly instructed on first-degree rape and did not err in failing to instruct on second-degree rape where both defendant and the victim agreed that a knife and a gun were displayed during the commission of the crime.\nAm Jur 2d, Rape \u00a7 110.\n3. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 84 (NCI4th) \u2014 defendant\u2019s military service record \u2014inadmissibility in rape case\nEvidence of defendant\u2019s good military record or military service was not relevant to his guilt or innocence in this rape case, and the trial court therefore properly excluded it.\nAm Jur 2d, Evidence \u00a7\u00a7 251 et seq.\n4. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 120 (NCI4th) \u2014 victim\u2019s prior sexual conduct \u2014 inadmissibility\nA rape victim\u2019s prior consensual relationship with her boyfriend which was ongoing since the 1970\u2019s did not amount to a pattern of sexual behavior closely resembling the events that took place in this case, and the trial court therefore did not err in excluding evidence of the victim\u2019s prior sexual conduct. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 412(b)(3).\nAm Jur 2d, Rape \u00a7\u00a7 55 et seq.\nAppeal by defendant from judgments entered 13 February 1992 by Judge Henry V. Barnette, Jr. in Alamance County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 31 August 1993.\nAttorney General Lacy H. Thornburg, by Associate Attorney General John J. Aldridge, III, for the State.\nAppellate Defender Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., by Assistant Appellate Defender Mark D. Montgomery, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0240-01", "first_page_order": 270, "last_page_order": 277 }