{ "id": 8522714, "name": "JONATHAN DUNBAR WESTON v. CAROLINA MEDICORP, INC., and FORSYTH MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, INC., d/b/a FORSYTH MEMORIAL HOSPITAL", "name_abbreviation": "Weston v. Carolina Medicorp, Inc.", "decision_date": "1994-01-18", "docket_number": "No. 9321SC229", "first_page": "415", "last_page": "418", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "113 N.C. App. 415" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "409 S.E.2d 611", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 123", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2510071, 2509388, 2513238, 2511407 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0123-02", "/nc/330/0123-03", "/nc/330/0123-01", "/nc/330/0123-04" ] }, { "cite": "402 S.E.2d 653", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "102 N.C. App. 370", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524196 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/102/0370-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "37 ALR3d 645", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "103 N.C.App. 312", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520626 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/103/0312-01" ] }, { "cite": "87 ALR2d 271", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 2d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "408 S.E.2d 520", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 N.C. 788", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2553443, 2555141, 2552921, 2556123, 2555932 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/329/0788-04", "/nc/329/0788-05", "/nc/329/0788-01", "/nc/329/0788-02", "/nc/329/0788-03" ] }, { "cite": "407 S.E.2d 556", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 S.E.2d 682", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1958, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "247 N.C. 606", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8628064 ], "year": 1958, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/247/0606-01" ] }, { "cite": "299 S.E.2d 629", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 563", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564174 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0563-01" ] }, { "cite": "210 S.E.2d 181", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 N.C. 235", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565054 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/286/0235-01" ] }, { "cite": "491 U.S. 164", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6211653 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/491/0164-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 Stat. 1071", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Stat.", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 N.C.App. 312", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520626 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/103/0312-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 481, "char_count": 8629, "ocr_confidence": 0.754, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.8559689502940833e-07, "percentile": 0.7241914489995362 }, "sha256": "2c0a3c39262a82c38f130dc8c026e737ebfd279910da223f1a534a24882cf286", "simhash": "1:9de06a8e738f04d1", "word_count": 1396 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:21:41.323369+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge ARNOLD and Judge EAGLES concur." ], "parties": [ "JONATHAN DUNBAR WESTON v. CAROLINA MEDICORP, INC., and FORSYTH MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, INC., d/b/a FORSYTH MEMORIAL HOSPITAL" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WELLS, Judge.\nPlaintiff argues in his first assignment of error that the trial court erred in denying his motion to set aside the judgment and award him a new trial pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff contends that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (the Act) applies retroactively to his claim so as to entitle him to relief from judgment. We disagree.\nThe Act was signed into law on 21 November 1991. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). In section 3 of the Act, Congress stated that one of the purposes of the Act was \u201cto respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide adequate protection to victims of discrimination.\u201d Section 101 of the Act prohibits all racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts, and, in response to Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 105 L. Ed. 2d 132 (1989), section 101 of the Act provides that \u201cmake and enforce contracts\u201d includes \u201cthe making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.\u201d 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981(b) (1991).\nEven if the Act did apply retroactively to plaintiffs claim, plaintiff is prevented from relitigating the issue of race discrimination based on the doctrine of the law of the case. According to the doctrine of the law of the case, once an appellate court has ruled on a question, that decision becomes the law of the case and governs the question both in subsequent proceedings in a trial court and on subsequent appeal. Transportation, Inc. v. Strick Corp., 286 N.C. 235, 210 S.E.2d 181 (1974). See also NCNB v. Virginia Carolina Builders, 307 N.C. 563, 299 S.E.2d 629 (1983).\nWhen the trial court entered judgment against plaintiff, the trial court made the following finding of fact: \u201cThe actions taken by the Hospital in summarily suspending and revoking plaintiff\u2019s staff privileges were not taken on account of his race. Dr. Weston\u2019s race played no role in the proceedings.\u201d On his first appeal to this Court, we held that \u201cplaintiff\u2019s assignments of error with regard to the findings of fact [were] . . . ineffective to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings under the \u2018any competent evidence standard\u2019 of appellate review\u201d and that \u201cthe trial court\u2019s findings of fact [were] conclusive on this appeal.\u201d Weston, supra.\nThe prior decision of this Court is the law of the case and as such is binding upon this panel. Plaintiff therefore is foreclosed from relitigating the question of race discrimination in this or any other subsequent proceeding. Furthermore, under general rules of estoppel by judgment, plaintiff is similarly precluded from relitigating an issue adversely determined against him. Poindexter v. First Nat\u2019l Bank, 247 N.C. 606, 101 S.E.2d 682 (1958).\nPlaintiff next argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to set aside the judgment because there occurred a change in the law as announced by this Court in the case of Harris v. Miller, 103 N.C. App. 312, 407 S.E.2d 556, rev. granted, 329 N.C. 788, 408 S.E.2d 520 (1991). We disagree.\nIn Harris, we rejected the \u201ccaptain of the ship doctrine\u201d which plaintiff contends was relied upon by the trial court in ruling against him. Plaintiff argues that our rejection of the \u201ccaptain of the ship doctrine\u201d in Harris entitles him to relief from judgment.\nIn support of this argument, plaintiff makes the following statement in his brief: \u201cIn the present case, Dr. Weston had his staff privileges revoked mainly because of the actions of the anesthesiologist in overloading [a] myomectomy patient with fluid.\u201d (Emphasis added). This statement is a gross distortion of the findings made by the trial court in the original judgment. Those findings reflect a history of repeated conduct on the part of Dr. Weston which, as we have noted earlier, required the Executive Committee to recommend that, because his medical judgment was impaired, his staff privileges be revoked so as to protect his patients from a risk of harm. Under these circumstances, the Harris rule has no application which would require the trial court to grant plaintiff\u2019s motion.\nOur determination is that the trial court\u2019s denial was not a discretionary ruling but one which was required by the doctrine of the law of the case and issue preclusion. The order of the trial court is\nAffirmed.\nChief Judge ARNOLD and Judge EAGLES concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "WELLS, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Kennedy, Kennedy, Kennedy & Kennedy, by Harvey L. Kennedy and Harold L. Kennedy, III, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, by Anthony H. Brett, Dale E. Nimmo, and Joel M. Leander, for defendants-appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JONATHAN DUNBAR WESTON v. CAROLINA MEDICORP, INC., and FORSYTH MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, INC., d/b/a FORSYTH MEMORIAL HOSPITAL\nNo. 9321SC229\n(Filed 18 January 1994)\n1. Constitutional Law \u00a7 88 (NCI4th); Appeal and Error \u00a7 555 (NCI4th)\u2014 race discrimination alleged \u2014relitigation precluded based on doctrine of the law of the case\nEven if the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did apply to plaintiff, he was prevented from relitigating the issue of race discrimination in his dismissal from the staff of defendant hospital based on the doctrine of the law of the case.\nAm Jur 2d, Appeal and Error \u00a7\u00a7 744 et seq.; Civil Rights \u00a7\u00a7 3, 4.\nErroneous decision as law of the case on subsequent appellate review. 87 ALR2d 271.\n2. Hospitals and Medical Facilities or Institutions \u00a7 39 (NCI4th) \u2014 rejection of \u201ccaptain of the ship doctrine\u201d \u2014no applicability to defendant\u2019s case \u2014no relief from judgment\nThere was no merit to plaintiff\u2019s contention that the Court\u2019s rejection of the \u201ccaptain of the ship doctrine\u201d in Harris v. Miller, 103 N.C.App. 312, entitled him to relief from judgment in his action alleging that defendants violated his right to due process and racially discriminated against him in revoking his staff privileges at defendant hospital, since defendant repeatedly engaged in conduct which led to a recommendation that, because plaintiff\u2019s medical judgment was impaired, his staff privileges should be revoked so as to protect his patients from risk of harm.\nAm Jur 2d, Hospitals and Asylums \u00a7\u00a7 8 et seq.\nExclusion of or discrimination against physician or surgeon by hospital. 37 ALR3d 645.\nAppeal by plaintiff from order signed 28 August 1992 in For-syth County Superior Court by Judge W. Douglas Albright denying plaintiff\u2019s motion to set aside the judgment. Heard in the Court of Appeals 8 December 1993.\nIn April 1988, plaintiff was suspended from the medical staff of Forsyth Memorial Hospital for violating the hospital policy which requires a physician admitting a patient with HIV infection to identify the patient to other health care providers as being potentially infectious. In 1989, plaintiff was summarily suspended from the medical staff because of various incidents which raised questions concerning whether plaintiff should continue to be allowed staff privileges. Plaintiff appealed the summary suspension to the Executive Committee and to the hospital\u2019s Board of Trustees. Both bodies affirmed the suspension pending a full investigation. After an investigation, the Executive Committee recommended that plaintiff\u2019s staff privileges be revoked because the Executive Committee found that plaintiff\u2019s medical judgment was impaired and that revocation of his staff privileges was necessary to protect patients from the risk of harm. The hospital\u2019s Board of Trustees subsequently revoked plaintiff\u2019s staff privileges.\nOn 21 October 1988, plaintiff filed this action alleging that defendants violated his right to due process under the North Carolina Constitution and the Constitution of the United States by suspending and revoking his staff privileges and racially discriminated against him in violation of 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, and the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The trial court entered judgment in favor of defendants, and, on appeal to this Court, we affirmed. Weston v. Carolina Medicorp, Inc., 102 N.C. App. 370, 402 S.E.2d 653 (1991). Our Supreme Court dismissed plaintiff\u2019s appeal and denied his petition for discretionary review. Weston v. Carolina Medicorp, Inc., 330 N.C. 123, 409 S.E.2d 611 (1991).\nOn 25 February 1992, plaintiff filed a motion to set aside the judgment and for a new trial pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. On 28 August 1992, the trial court entered an order denying plaintiff\u2019s motion. Plaintiff appeals from that order to this Court.\nKennedy, Kennedy, Kennedy & Kennedy, by Harvey L. Kennedy and Harold L. Kennedy, III, for plaintiff-appellant.\nWomble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, by Anthony H. Brett, Dale E. Nimmo, and Joel M. Leander, for defendants-appellees." }, "file_name": "0415-01", "first_page_order": 445, "last_page_order": 448 }